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SUMMARY  
 
The practice of spamming (sending unsolicited electronic communications) has been 
dubbed “the scourge of the 21st century” affecting different stakeholders. This practice is 
also credited for not only disrupting electronic communications but also, it overloads 
electronic systems and creates unnecessary costs for those affected than the ones 
responsible for sending such communications. In trying to address this issue nations 
have implemented anti-spam laws to combat the scourge. South Africa not lagging 
behind, has put in place anti-spam provisions to deal with the scourge. The anti-spam 
provisions are scattered in pieces of legislation dealing with diverse issues including: 
consumer protection; direct marketing; credit laws; and electronic transactions and 
communications. In addition to these provisions, an Amendment Bill to one of these 
laws and two Bills covering cybercrimes and cyber-security issues have been published. 
 
In this thesis, a question is asked on whether the current fragmented anti-spam 
provisions are adequate in protecting consumers. Whether the overlaps between these 
pieces of legislation are competent to deal with the ever increasing threats on electronic 
communications at large. Finally, the question as to whether a multi-faceted approach, 
which includes a Model Law on spam would be a suitable starting point setting out 
requirements for the sending of unsolicited electronic communications can be sufficient 
in protecting consumers. And as spam is not only a national but also a global problem, 
South Africa needs to look at the option of entering into mutual agreements with other 
countries and organisations in order to combat spam at a global level.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Our era has been variously described in attempts to show how we have evolved from 
bricks and mortar to technology. Terms including the “information age”,1 “information 
superhighway”;2 and “global village” have been used to capture the instantaneous ways 
in which people communicate and transact from remote areas around the world. The 
Internet,3 which is able to disseminate information to thousands of recipients in seconds 
via electronic mail,4 has also led to an upsurge in electronic commerce.5 Freed from 
geographical boundaries, merchants are able to market their goods and services to 
consumers without limits, while consumers too can access global markets at a click of a 
                                                          
1  The “information age” is defined as “a period beginning around 1970 and characterised for its 
nature of publication, consumption and manipulation of information especially by computers and 
computer networks”. The Free Dictionary ‘Information age’ 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/information+age (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
2  “Information superhighway” refers to “the global information and communication network that 
includes the Internet and other networks and switching systems such as telephone networks, cable 
television networks, and satellite communications networks”. It is also described as “the Internet 
bulletin board services, online services, and any other services that enable people to obtain 
information from telecommunications networks”. Margolis Computer & Internet Dictionary 273; and 
Free Dictionary ‘Information superhighway’ http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ 
information+superhighway (date of use: 7 September 2015).  
3  The “Internet” is a “global network connecting millions of computers. It is also defined as a 
cooperative message-forwarding system linking computer networks all over the world. Users of the 
Internet can exchange electronic mail, participate in electronic discussion forums (newsgroups), 
send files from any computer to the other via file transfer protocol (FTP), retrieve information via 
Gopher or Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and even use each other’s computer directly via 
Telnet”. See Downing, Covington & Covington Dictionary 243; also Margolis Computer & Internet 
Dictionary 283; and Oxford Dictionary of Computer Science 279.  
4  “Electronic mail”, or otherwise referred to in its short form as “e-mail”, is “the transmission of 
messages over communications networks” (Margolis Computer & Internet Dictionary 190); or 
“messages sent between computer systems, the computer systems being used to hold and 
transport messages” (Oxford Dictionary of Computer Science 184). The terms electronic mail, e-
mail, and e-mail messages are used interchangeably save where specific anti-spam legislation 
assigns a different meaning to them. 
5  “Electronic commerce” or “e-commerce” is defined broadly as “the use of electronic networks to 
exchange information, products, services and payments for commercial and communication 
purposes between individuals (consumers) and businesses, between businesses themselves, 
between individuals themselves, within governments, or between the public and government, and 
between business and government”. Department of Communications (Republic of South Africa) 
Green Paper on Electronic Commerce: Making it your own business (2000) 9.  
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mouse, 24/7, 365 days a year enabling them to transact and communicate freely and  in 
a relaxed environment. However, the Internet has also made it possible for dubious 
characters and unsavoury activities to thrive, thereby exposing consumers to a variety 
of dangers. Among these dangers are deceptive practices used by marketers, which 
include the dissemination of unsolicited electronic communications and also access to 
consumers’ private information, for use in marketing their goods and services. This has, 
in turn, made it difficult for consumers to safeguard their private information while 
transacting or communicating online.  
 
The practice of sending unsolicited electronic communications – otherwise known as 
spamming – has been termed the “scourge of the 21st century”.6 Spamming takes place 
when marketers or senders of spam (“spammers”) bombard consumers with products or 
services without the consent of those consumers. Because the spam e-mails are 
unannounced, uninvited, and from different sources, spamming has been said to 
compromise the convenience of e-mail.7  
 
Statistics reveal that spam was a problem in South Africa as far back as 2003 when 74 
per cent of South African consumers stated that they were unsettled by unsolicited 
advertising.8 Of the marketing community polled in that year, “72 per cent indicated that 
they found spam more problematic than viruses and hacking threats”.9 In 2004, a further 
                                                          
6  Cerf V ISOC Chairman (acknowledged as the father of the Internet), as quoted in Everett-Church R 
‘Why spam is a problem’ http://www.isoc.org/oti/articles/0599/everett.html (date of use: 7 
September 2015).  
7  Rao JM & Reiley D ‘The Economics of spam’ 1-25 http://www.davidreiley.com/papers/ 
SpamEconomics.pdf (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
8  Tin Can Communications ‘Unsolicited advertising material bothers 74% of South African 
consumers’ http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c=19&1=196&ai=1877 (date of use: 7 
September 2015). In this survey the following concerns were outlined “77% of respondents said 
companies send too much unsolicited advertising; 57% said they are not happy to receive 
information from companies with which business has not been done before; 62% said they do not 
bother to receive telephone calls selling products or services; 65% said many companies call 
consumers at their homes to sell them products and services”. 
9  Systems Publishers ‘South African spam summit announced’ http://www.bizcommunity. 
com/Article.aspx?c=16&1=196&ai=2347 (date of use: 7 September 2015). The Spam Summit 
revealed that spam had caused South African businesses between R7 and R13 billion per annum 
in terms of lost productivity; also Burger & Rensleigh (2007) 9/3 South African Journal of 
Information Management http://www.sajim.co.za/default.asp?to=peer1vol9nr3 (date of use: 7 
September 2015). 
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report revealed that a growing number of South African companies were using e-mail as 
an important component of their online marketing strategies, and that between 45 and 
60 per cent of all e-mail messages sent were spam e-mails.10 In 2007 spam had risen to 
95 per cent of online communications.11 By 2012 the e-mail spam percentage in South 
Africa revealed that “one in every 436,6 e-mails was considered malicious and carried a 
virus;12 and that 1 in every 1,48 e-mail was considered spam”.13 This made up 67,8 per 
cent of all South African e-mail traffic during July of 2012.14 In 2014 it was reported that 
spam accounted for 80 per cent of global e-mail traffic.15  
 
The question, then, is if spam accounts for the amount of traffic noted above, how do 
spammers or marketers obtain consumers’ e-mail addresses which enable them to 
solicit consumer support for their products and services? This, they do in various ways, 
notably by profiling consumers when they browse the web. Spammers also use 
dictionary attacks to extract e-mail addresses from web sites and also harvest such. 
Once the spammer has such lists, he or she can send spam e-mails to an undisclosed 
number of recipients, and (in most cases) remain undetected by using third parties’ 
domain names or false headers when sending those e-mails.16 The inability of 
consumers to locate spammers also creates problems which impact on a variety of 
                                                          
10  Idea Engineer ‘Ask before you send marketing e-mail’ http://www.biz-community.com/ 
Article.aspx?c=16&1=196&ai=2969 (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
11  Mann J ‘Spam is 95% e-mail traffic says Barracuda’ http://www.techspot.com/news/28226-spam-is-
95-of -e-mail-traffic-says-barracuda.html (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
12  Proome J ‘SA e-mail spam percentage revealed’ http://mybraodband.co.za/news/security/58901-
sa-e-mail-spam-percentage-revealed.html (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
13   Ibid. 
14        Ibid. 
15  ITU ‘ITU and Internet Society collaborate to combat spam’ 
http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2014.aspx#.VIvi-E1DGpo (date of use: 7 
September 2015); also Spamhaus ‘The world’s worst spammers’ http://www.spamhause.org 
/statistics/spammers (date of use: 7 September 2015). According to Spamhaus the spammers list 
is based on the following: “the view that spammers or spam gangs cause the highest threat; are the 
least repentant; are most persistent; and cause the most damage on the Internet currently”; and 
AVTest ‘Spam’ https://www.av-test.org/en/statistics/spam for the origins of spam per country (date 
of use: 7 September 2015). 
16  In January 2014 when the new generic top level domain (gTLD) program for the registration of new 
generic top-level domains was launched, it was noted that spammers were quick to utilise domain 
names for the distribution of largescale advertising spam (see Shcherbakova T, Vergelis M & 
Demidova N ‘Spam and phishing in the first quarter of 2015’ 
https://securelist.com/analysis/quarterly-spam-reports/69932/spam-and-phishing-in-the-first-
quarter-of-2015 (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
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stakeholders, including: Internet service providers (ISPs); businesses; and consumers 
themselves. For consumers, these problems include the inconvenience of having to 
wade through spam e-mails before reading their legitimate mail, and the need to pay 
elevated subscription fees to accommodate the increased storage capacity required for 
those unwanted e-mails.17 The ISPs, on the other hand, can incur revenue loss and loss 
of business opportunities, as well as damage to computer equipment where bandwidth 
is insufficient to handle the congestion created by spam.18 Other costs include the 
installation of filtering software,19 or any other software that can assist in limiting spam.20 
 
While these initiatives have proven effective in dealing with some of the problems 
caused by spam, they have been unable entirely to eliminate this scourge. In fact, the 
technical measures have merely revealed loopholes on which spammers have been 
quick to capitalise. In an effort to combat spam, international organisations such as the 
International Telecommunications Union and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development have from the early 2000s to the present day, made 
valuable contributions in this regard.21 
 
Regional communities, with specific focus on the African region: the African Union (AU), 
and its regional economic communities (RECs) such as the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) have added their voice to the discussions by drafting Model Laws 
and Conventions and finding ways in which to work towards harmonising their existing 
laws aimed at combating spam. 
 
While the international arena was conducting its research into the issue, some countries 
had anti-spam laws in place, and/or anti-spam provisions in existing legislation. 
Although the first specific anti-spam legislation was adopted in 1997, this was a “state” 
                                                          
17  Schryen Anti-spam Measures 22-8 for a discussion on the economic loss caused by spam. 
18  Ibid.  
19  Technical measures to eliminating spam will be covered in Chapter 3.  
20  These problems will be discussed at length in Chapter 3.  
21  Commonly abbreviated and hereafter cited as the ITU and the OECD respectively.  
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initiative within the United States of America (USA) and did not apply nationally.22 Anti-
spam laws at national level started taking shape in the 2000s.23 Japan led the way, 
quickly followed by the USA, Australia, and other players.24 South Africa is among those 
countries that had provisions regulating spam in the early 2000s.  
 
1.2 Scope and purpose of this study 
 
1.2.1 Title 
 
The title of this thesis is: “THE REGULATION OF UNSOLICITED ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS (SPAM) IN SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY”.  
 
 1.2.2 Study objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse whether the legal mechanisms established to protect 
consumers from the receipt of unsolicited electronic communications in South Africa are 
adequate. The feasibility of harmonising the current anti-spam provisions to provide 
better protection for consumers will be considered. Further, an assessment of whether 
the introduction of requirements for the dissemination of unsolicited electronic 
communications into existing legislation is feasible.  
 
1.2.3 Research question 
 
                                                          
22   The anti-spam legislation in the USA both at state and federal level is discussed in Chapter 6 
below. 
23  See, in particular, Lynch K ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ 
http://keithlynch.net/spamline.html (date of use: 5 November 2015). There are currently over sixty 
countries which regulate spam by legislation in their respective jurisdictions. This regulation is done 
through fully-fledged legislation or alternative legislation (pre-existing legislation). Spamlaws ‘How 
to stop scams and fraud’ http://www.spamlaws.com (date of use: 7 September 2015); also Schryen 
Anti-spam measures 17.  
24  See Law on Regulation of Transmission of Specified Electronic Mail Act passed April 2002, 
amended in 2005 and 2008 http://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/2008/07/japanese-new-
anti_spam.law (date of use: 7 September 2015). Canada has recently passed its anti-spam law 
namely: Canada Anti-Spam Legislation (CASL) of 2014 (see Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission ‘Canada’s Anti-spam Legislation’ 
http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/internet/anti.htm (date of use: 7 September 2015). This thesis will however, 
focus on the USA and Australia which will be discussed in detail below.  
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The question is asked whether the current overlapping and minimalist anti-spam and 
direct marketing provisions protect consumers adequately. Likewise, will the 
introduction of restrictive legislation adequately protect online consumers from receiving 
spam? Finally, the question as to whether a multi-faceted approach in combating spam 
with the introduction of a Model Law would be a suitable starting point in aligning with 
international best practices to combat the act of spamming is addressed.  
 
1.2.4 Hypothesis 
 
This thesis works on the assumption that spam is harmful and should be curbed. It is 
also accepted that the current, inadequate consumer protection measures can be 
improved. All measures adopted need to reflect a multi-faceted approach to curbing 
spam which will include all affected stakeholders in an effort to realise a holistic 
approach. This approach will start with an anti-spam law setting out basic requirements 
that can sufficiently protect consumers from receiving unsolicited electronic 
communications. And as spam is a global problem, South Africa needs to look at the 
option of entering into mutual agreements with other countries and organisations in 
order to combat spam at a global level. 
 
1.2.5 Rationale of the thesis 
 
The study is undertaken, in the main, by means of a literature review reflecting an 
analysis of the various legal instruments regulating the issue of spam such as: 
consumer protection laws; credit laws; data protection laws; cybersecurity and cyber-
crimes legislation, in particular. This is undertaken to establish whether those laws can 
be harmonised in order to regulate spam. Given the comparative nature of the study, 
domestic, international, and foreign materials are used. In addition, both hard and soft 
law instruments will be consulted.   
   
1.2.6 Parameters 
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It should be noted at the onset that the term spam has been variously described – for 
example, as unsolicited bulk communications; unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail; 
unsolicited commercial communications; unsolicited commercial electronic mail; 
unsolicited electronic communications; and unsolicited electronic communications. 
Focus will be on spam as generally described in anti-spam laws. The above terms will 
also be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
 
As spam is a multi-faceted problem affecting different stakeholders, it follows that focus 
will be on specific issues to keep the thesis manageable. Focus will solely be on 
consumers as recipients of spam from either spammers or businesses engaging in 
direct marketing practices. The terms consumers; individuals; recipients; and end users  
will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. Focus will also be on ISPs and their 
role in protecting consumers from receiving spam.  
 
The above will be followed by a discussion on the international and regional arenas to 
establish the initiatives so far taken to combat spam. While there are a number of 
international organisations dealing with this issue globally, the ITU and the OECD’s 
contribution is the main focus of this study. That will be followed by regional initiatives 
and the contribution made by the AU, COMESA, and SADC.  
 
A comparative study is also undertaken to establish how the jurisdiction below have 
been regulating spam. The comparative analysis will therefore be limited to three 
jurisdictions, namely the USA, Australia, and South Africa. The comparative study will 
focus on the differences and similarities in the chosen legal systems. It will analyse the 
content of the rules in each of the selected jurisdiction, and the manner in which they 
address the issue of spam.25 The similarities and differences will then be used to draw 
lessons for South Africa which follows a minimalistic approach with regards to spam. 
 
Spam overlaps with a number of constitutional provisions such as the right to conduct 
business freely (which relates mainly to markerters and or spammers). However, the 
                                                          
25  See generally Kothari Research Methodology: Methods and techniques 1 ff.  
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constitutional provision on the right to privacy which is also given effect to by the 
Protection of Personal Information Act of 2013 will be examined in this thesis. Of equal 
importance is the consumers’ fundamental right to privacy under the Consumer 
Protection Act of 2008. 
 
Finally, while traditionally spam has been sent via newspapers (junk mail), printed 
catalogues, et cetera, the evolving modes of communication such as e-mail; mobile 
phones, are now perpetuating the scourge. This study focuses, in the main, on spam 
distributed via e-mail including e-mails accessed by phones. Reference is made to 
mobile spam, only when necessary.  
 
1.3 Synopsis: Chapter trajectory 
 
Chapter one, this introductory chapter, establishes the scope and purpose of the study.  
 
In Chapter two,  focus will be on a discussion of direct marketing and the development 
of spam in the context of the Internet. The  concept of direct marketing will be outlined 
and a comparison of traditional marketing and online marketing will be made; the 
development of spam via electronic communications with special focus on commercial 
and non-commercial spam; and lastly, the benefits spamming holds for spammers.  
 
Chapter three focuses on the effect of spam on e-mail messages under the headings: 
the methods used to extract e-mail addresses in order to send spam; problems resulting 
from spam; technical measures used to combat spam; and spam fighters.  
 
In Chapter four an evaluation of international initiatives to combat spam through an 
examination of international guidelines and model laws adopted by the international 
community will be outlined.  The chapter focuses on initiatives of the ITU and the OECD 
aimed at the regulation of spam, and the background history of each organisation; 
initiatives taken to combat spam; and the documents, surveys, guidelines, and toolkits 
of those respective organisations are reviewed. 
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Regional initiatives are addressed in Chapter five with emphasis falling on African 
initiatives, most notably those of the AU as an organisation, and its regional 
communities (RECs). Because South Africa is located within this region, the SADC and 
COMESA as the RECs will be at the centre of this discussion.  
 
A study of this nature calls for a comparative element if issues are to be viewed in 
perspective. The trends in selected jurisdictions are discussed to establish how they 
have been combating spam. An essential part of this study involves an evaluation of the 
potential efficacy of the opt-out mechanism in contrast to opt-in mechanism for 
combating spam. Focus falls mainly on how these two mechanisms compare, and 
whether one is more effective than the other. As noted above the following anti-spam 
laws will be considered: the USA; Australia; and anti-spam provisions in South Africa 
will be considered which apply the above mechanisms respectively. All three 
jurisdictions have outlined basic requirements for sending unsolicited electronic 
communications in their legislation or anti-spam provisions. These include definition(s) 
describing what constitutes spam. These jurisdictions also enforce the provisions 
differently. Spam is not only legislated at a national level, but the jurisdictions have also 
entered into mutual agreements with other countries and organisations in an effort to 
combat spam at a global level, with the exception of South Africa. 
 
Chapter six opens the comparative study with an analysis of the USA’s anti-spam laws. 
The discussion of spam in the USA starts with the regulation of spam at state level. The 
requirements adopted on how to send electronic communications are addressed as 
outlined in state laws. How states define spam is highlighted and the mechanisms each 
state employ in regulating spam will be considered. A discussion on the prohibitions in 
those anti-spam laws will be highlighted. Case law is used to illustrate how state anti-
spam laws have been interpreted by the courts.  
 
The USA enacted its national anti-spam law namely: The Controlling the Assault of non-
solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM Act) in 2003. This law has a pre-
emptive clause on most state laws, some of which were considered to be very 
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restrictive in combating spam. In addressing the Federal law the following is considered: 
the background to the Act and its purpose; an outline of and commentary on the Act 
which includes the benefits of the Act; some criticisms levelled against the Act by 
commentators; and suggestions for improvement. Consideration is also made of the 
mutual agreements between the USA and other countries and/or organisations aimed at 
combating spam at a global level. This is done taking case law into consideration. It 
must be noted that the CAN-SPAM Act utilises the opt-out mechanism. 
 
The comparative study continues in Chapter seven which focuses on  Australia’s anti-
spam law. The Australian Spam Act was passed into law in 2003. Australia follows a 
five point approach to spam. The discussion will therefore focus on the following: the 
provisions of the Spam Act; a commentary on the Act covering the benefits of the Act, 
criticism of the Act by commentators, and suggestions for improvement. Other 
approaches are also addressed including: consumer education; technical measures; 
industry body; and mutual agreements. It should be noted that Australia follows a 
restrictive approach in dealing with spam – for example, an opt-in mechanism.  
 
In Chapter eight focus will be on anti-spam initiatives in South Africa. South Africa does 
not have a specific anti-spam law, but anti-spam provisions scattered thoughout a 
number of legislations. In the main, these provisions overlap, leave gaps, and offer 
consumers only meagre protection. The first anti-spam provisions in South Africa was 
adopted in the Electronic Transactions and Communications Act.26 This was followed by 
other provisions relating to consumer credit;27 consumer protection;28 and most recently, 
legislation on the protection of personal information.29 In 2012, 2015 and 2016 
respectively, a number of Bills were published: one proposing amendments to, inter alia, 
the anti-spam provisions in the ECT Act of 2002;30 and the other two Bills are on 
                                                          
26  Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
27   National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
28  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
29  Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
30  See Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill (GG No. 888 of 2012). 
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Cybercrimes and Cyber security.31 In addition to the above an industry body regulating 
ISPs was established in 2006 to deal with matters affecting ISPs.32 The regulation of 
spam falls within its mandate. In this chapter the South African legislation which 
includes the above anti-spam provisions will be discussed. A background study on each 
piece of legislation; the purpose of that particular legislation; and other provisions 
relating to the study are highlighted. This is followed by an outline of the anti-spam and 
direct marketing provisions in those laws; commentary on that particular provision; 
criticism levelled against the provision (if any); and solutions to those criticisms (if any) 
are also highlighted. Case law is called into service to show how some provision(s) 
have been interpreted by our courts of law. 
 
This discussion includes published Bills which contain spam related provisions. The 
issue of industry regulation is also highlighted in this chapter. The chapter concludes 
with a commentary on the contextualisation of these laws to compare and contrast 
them, and to see whether a harmonisation of these laws can offer a point of departure 
for the regulation of the issue of spam in South Africa.   
 
In Chapter nine the discussions above will be drawn together and recommendations 
will be offered as to the most feasible and effective approaches to the regulation of 
spam in South Africa. It is hoped that through this study South Africa will be able to work 
towards a multi-faceted approach to combating spam which will start with the 
harmonisation of its fragmented system. Most importantly an introduction of a proposed 
Model Law aimed at regulating spam within borders and also offers solutions at a global 
level will be outlined.  
                                                          
31  See Cybercrimes and Cyber security Bill: Draft for public comment (GG of 2015); and Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity Bill (GG No. 40487 of December 2016). 
32  Guidelines for Recognition of Industry Representative Bodies of Information System Providers’ 
“(IRB Code)” GN 1283 GG 29474 of 14 December 2006). 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
DIRECT MARKETING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPAM VIA ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Consumers are vital to the success of any economy. In an effort to understand 
consumers, businesses have resorted to studying them and, most importantly, to 
manipulat their behaviour.1 Marketing companies also use spam e-mails offering 
various options to persuade consumers to engage with them. These options include the 
sale of goods, services, dissemination of information, and ideas, et cetera.2  
 
Because of South Africa’s history, the majority of consumers are largely uneducated as 
regards their rights. Hence recent laws are aimed at remedying those shortcomings.3 
However, the age of technology plays its own part in perpertuating, indeed 
exacerbating, an unequal society in which the marketer is the “guru” and the consumer 
the “apprentice”, forever learning but always lacking sufficient wisdom and foresight. 
The new mediums are used to manipulate consumers and to influence them to act 
emotionally rather than rationally when faced with the advances in marketing.4 
 
In this chapter direct marketing as a concept and a comparison between traditional 
marketing and online marketing is addressed. This is followed by an analysis of the 
development of spam in an online environment with special focus on the different types 
                                                          
1   Cant & Van Heerden Marketing Management 12-13. 
2  Id 1-29. 
3  See, in particular, the following: section 3 (a) of the National Credit Act, 2007 which provides as its 
purpose: “to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans by promoting 
a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit 
market and industry. This is achieved by promoting the development of a credit market that is 
accessible to all South Africans, and in particular to those who have historically been unable to 
access credit under sustainable market conditions.” The preamble to the Consumer Protection Act 
68 of 2008 on the other hand notes: “that apartheid and discriminatory laws of the past have 
burdened the nation with unacceptably high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and other manifestations of 
social and economic inequality; and also it is necessary to develop and use innovative means to 
promote, among others: the interests of all consumers; to ensure accessible, transparent, and 
efficient redress for consumers who are subjected to abuse or exploitation in the marketplace”. 
4   Cant & Van Heerden supra n 1 411-13 on cyber marketing. 
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of spam e-mails disseminated in that environment. The chapter concludes by outlining 
the benefits that spammers derive from such practices. 
 
2.2  Direct marketing  
 
Marketing in general is a broad concept with different meanings for different people. It 
can, however, be defined as “a process where an organisation in its drive to meet its 
goals, focuses on meeting consumer needs and wants by offering the right product at 
the right price, at the right place, and through the right marketing communication 
channels”.5 In that process marketers strive to establish relationships with consumers 
and to develop and grow these relationships with relevant stakeholders in an ever-
changing environment.6 Ultimately, the aim of marketing is to know and understand the 
customer so well that the product and service offered fits that individual and sells itself.7 
Ideally this results in a customer who is ready to engage with those marketing tactics 
because all that a marketer is looking for is to have the product or services available for 
that consumer and to make a profit.8 
 
Direct marketing, on the other hand, is a management concept – a multi-level 
communication and distribution tool.9 It involves a variety of activities including: direct 
mail and direct response advertisements through that mail;10 telemarketing;11 database 
                                                          
5  Id 19. 
6  Id 2-3 and 19.  
7   Id 19-20 
8   Ibid. 
9  “Direct marketing” is also defined as “a form of advertising in which physical marketing materials 
are provided to consumers in order to communicate information about a product or service. Direct 
marketing removes the ‘middle man’ from the promotion process, as a company’s message is 
provided directly to potential consumers”. Investopedia ‘Definition of direct marketing’ 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/direct-marketing.asp (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
10  “Direct mail” is a “process of sending out sales letters or other materials through the mail to 
potential consumers or clients. Direct mail campaigns may be directed to either consumers or the 
business market”. Duermyer R ‘Direct mail defined’ http://homebusiness.about.com/od/ 
homebusinessglossar1/g/direct_mail_def.htm (date of use: 5 November 2015); and Hamman & 
Papadopoulos (2014) 47/1 De Jure 44-5 for examples of direct marketing. 
11  “Telemarketing” or “telesales” is “an act of marketing goods and services to potential consumers 
over the telephone, by either telemarketers or by automated telephone calls or “robocalls”. 
Telemarketing can be intrusive and also perpetrates scams and fraud”. Investopedia ‘Definition of 
telemarketing’ http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/telemarketing.asp (date of use: 5 November 
2015); and Bizcommunity ‘Telemarketing rings true in South Africa’ 
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management;12 the Internet;13 information, communication and technology;14 and mobile 
commerce.15 All these activities aim to stimulate the target audience to take immediate 
action and to create an individualised customer relationship.16 Although this definition is 
broad and encompasses a number of categories, focus is limited to Internet marketing 
as it relates to spam. The definition also covers both traditional and electronic marketing 
which is discussed below. 
 
2.2.1 Traditional marketing versus electronic marketing  
 
2.2.1.1 Background 
 
The direct marketing activities above outlines the traditional way of doing business 
(bricks and mortar) and that of an online environment. In a traditional market the 
consumer could feel, touch and examine the goods he or she intended to purchase 
before buying those products. This has changed in that while consumers in an online 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/14/118519.html (date of use: 5 November 2015), on the 
rising success of telemarketing.  
12  “Data management” is defined as “a computer program that catalogues, indexes, locates, retrieves, 
and stores data, maintains its integrity, and outputs it in the form desired by a user”. A “data 
management system (DBMS)” sometimes called “data manager”, is a program that “lets one or 
more computer user create and access data in a database. The DBMS manages user requests 
(even requests from other programs) so that users and other programs know where the data is 
physically located on storage media and in multi-user system. In handling user requests, the DBMS 
ensures the integrity of the data (making sure it continues to be accessible and is consistently 
organised as intended) and security (making sure that only those with access privileges can access 
the data)”. BusinessDictionary.com ‘Database management system (DBMS)’ 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/database-management-system-DBMS.html (date of 
use: 5 November 2015).  
13  “Internet marketing” refers to “the application of marketing principles and techniques via electronic 
media and more specifically the Internet”. Quirk ‘What is eMarketing and how is it better than 
traditional marketing?” https://www.quirk.biz/resources/88/What-is-eMarketing-and-how-is-it-better-
than-tradional-marketing (date of use: 5 November 2015); Cant & van Heerden supra n 1 411-14 
and 425-6; and Sterne & Priore Email Marketing 1 ff.  
14  Hereafter referred to as “ICT”. See Kokt & Koelane (2013) 7/3 African Journal of Business 
Management 3098-9. 
15  “Mobile commerce”, or “m-commerce” is “the use of wireless handheld devices such as cellular 
phones and laptops to conduct commercial transactions online”. Investopedia ‘Mobile commerce’ 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mobile-commerce.asp (date of use: 5 November 2015). For 
a discussion on mobile commerce see: Papadopoulos ‘Online Consumer Protection’ 63-4 on the 
rise of m-commerce; also Jobodwana (2009) 4/4 Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology 287 ff; and the following on mobile marketing: Rowles Mobile Marketing 9 ff; Petzer 
(2011) 8 Journal of Contemporary Management 384 ff; Krum Mobile Marketing 1 ff; Jansen van 
Ryssen (2004) 4 Acta Commercii 48 ff.  
16  Id Krum 5-12; and Rowles 24. 
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environment can still see the product they are interested in, they can no longer feel, and 
touch such a product. In the discussion below the comparison between traditional and 
electronic marketing is highlighted. 
 
2.2.1.2 Comparison between traditional marketing and electronic marketing 
 
The differences cover aspects such as modes of delivery, tools used to market products 
or services, and costs accompanying such marketing strategies. The terms “online 
marketing”, “Internet marketing”, and “electronic marketing” are used interchangeably in 
this section. In comparing traditional and electronic marketing the following important 
aspects emerge:17 
 
(a) Relationship. Traditionally a relationship was established once the consumer(s) 
had made contact or had responded to an offer of goods and or services from a 
particular merchant. In an online environment contact can be made without the 
establishment of a relationship.  
 
(b) Costs. In traditional marketing the high costs of advertising are incurred by the 
marketing companies who distribute the advertisements. These costs include: 
postage for “snail mail”; the cost of broadcasting time when TV adverts are 
involved; newspaper space for advertisements; or phone calls (in the case of 
telemarketing). Online marketing costs have shifted to the recipients and ISPs.18  
 
(c) Traceability. In traditional marketing the company includes a return address in its 
correspondence with the recipient in case that recipient would like to opt-out of 
receiving further mail from that particular business. In online marketing, the 
                                                          
17  See the following for a general comparison of traditional and electronic marketing: Li (2006) 3/1 
Webology 1-13 http://webology.ir/2006/v3n1/a23.html (date of use: 5 November 2015); and Quirk 
‘What is eMarketing and how is it better than traditional marketing?’ https://www.quirk.biz/ 
resources/88/What-is-eMarketing-and-how-is-it-better-than-traditional-marketing (date of use: 5 
November 2015). 
18  The issue of costs is discussed in Chapter 3 below. 
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unsolicited mail, in most cases, provides no return address which would allow 
the recipient to opt-out of receiving further unwanted mail.  
 
(d) Deterrence. In traditional marketing deterrence or punishment is an important 
cosideration as the sender is easily traceable. In online marketing deterrence is 
weak in that punishment depends on detecting the person responsible for 
sending the unsolicited mail. Prosecuting spammers is difficult as they often use 
third-party domains to send spam e-mails thus making it hard to trace. 
 
(e) Information. Traditionally, consumers provided personal information voluntarily 
as they wished to establish contact with a particular merchant. In an online 
environment, by contrast, when consumers browse the Internet their personal 
information is often captured without their knowledge – for example, through 
cookies in a web site.19 Once that personal information has been gathered it can 
either be sold to third parties dealing in such information, or the consumer can 
end up receiving even more spam.20  
 
(f) Reliability. In traditional marketing the snail mail might sometimes go missing or 
simply not be delivered. The consumer might even decide to discard the mail as 
it is clear from the mail itself who it is from. In online marketing the consumer 
might not be able to determine the origin of the e-mails in that spammers or 
marketers frequently disguise their headers. 
 
(g) Boundaries. Traditional marketing is sometimes territorial in nature – ie, it is 
limited by boundaries. Online marketing, on the other hand, is borderless and 
consumers are not only available 24/7, but are also accessible via the Internet 
from all over the world.  
 
(h) Delivery mode. Traditionally marketing information would be communicated to 
consumers either by snail mail, telephone, newspapers, TV, radio, catalogues, 
                                                          
19  This is discussed in Chapter 3 below.  
20  The issue of profiling is dealt with in Chapter 3. 
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et cetera. Marketing was limited as businesses could not reach each and every 
individual. In an online environment the middleman has been eliminated 
guaranteeing targeted and personalised delivery from the marketer to the 
consumer.21 
 
(i) Accessibility. Traditional marketing is not always accessible as there might be 
barriers. On the other hand, online marketing is accessible almost 
instantaneously.  
 
(j) Mediums of communication. With traditional marketing communication is mainly 
via post, TV, newspapers, catalogues, and telephone. Online marketing takes 
place mainly on the Internet using e-mail, and, also short messaging system. 22  
 
The above differences reveal how marketing has evolved by eliminating barriers such 
as, location and time. This environment allows the marketer to be in close contact with 
and monitors the consumer around the clock. This has, in turn, exposed  the consumer 
to dangers that were not there before, for example, receiving unsolicited 
communication, or spam. Hereafter follows a discussion on how spam developed in the 
electronic environment. 
 
2.3  Development of spam via electronic communications 
 
2.3.1  Background 
 
The Internet has indeed changed the way in which business is being conducted online. 
This has not only introduced new mediums of communications for ease of 
communicating but it has also brought about new challenges. The term “electronic 
communication” refers to the transfer of writing, signals, data, sounds, images 
                                                          
21  Krum supra n 15 6-7.  
22   “Short messaging system” or “SMS” is used to send text messages to mobile phones. The 
messages can be up to 160 characters in length. TechTerms ‘SMS’ 
https://techterms.com/definitions/sms (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
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conducted via an electronic device.23 The use of e-communications allows people to 
interact in different ways via mediums such as e-mails and SMSs et cetera.24 These 
mediums have been utilised by spammers and marketers alike to send unsolicited mail 
to unsuspecting recipients.  
 
Although the phenomenon of sending unsolicited e-mail has been around for some 
time, it is still unclear when spam became the nuisance it is today. Some are, of the 
opinion that electronic junk mail became known as spam because of the Monty Python 
skit on spam in the 1970s.25 In this skit a group of Vikings sang a chorus of “SPAM, 
SPAM, SPAM” at increasing volumes in an attempt to drown out other conversation.26 
This is today evident in mailboxes as spam drowns out legitimate e-mails. By the 1990s, 
concepts such as: “unsolicited commercial e-mail” (UCE), “mass dissemination of 
Netnews” and “unsolicited bulk mail” (UBE) were used to describe spam within an 
electronic environment.27 Later in the 2000s some of these concepts formed part of the 
definitions of spam in most anti-spam legislation. In the discussion below focus will be 
on the evolution of spam via electronic communication. 
 
2.3.2  The evolution of spam via electronic communication  
 
2.3.2.1  ARPAnet and the first signs of junk mail (spam) 
 
Before junk mail was referred to as spam, Jon Postel28 observed the following in a 
report on the problem of junk mail:29 
                                                          
23  Hereafter referred to ‘e-communications’. See Reference ‘What is e-communication?’ 
https://www.reference.com/technology/e-communication-9e8fce72a6a417a3# (date of use: 21 
March 2017). 
24  Ibid. 
25  Glasner J ‘A brief history of spam and spam’ http://www.wired.com/2001/05/a-brief-history-of-spam-
and-spam (date of use: 5 November 2015); also Fletcher D Time ‘A brief history of spam’ 
https://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933796,00.html (date of use: 10 November 
2015); Tladi (2008) 125/1 SALJ 179; and Geissler Bulk Unsolicited Electronic Messages 16.  
26   Ibid. 
27  Lynch K ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ http://keithlynch.net/spamline.html (date of 
use: 5 November 2015). 
28  John Postel was an American computer scientist who helped launch ARPAnet in the 1960s. He is 
regarded as one of the Internet pioneers. Internet Society ‘A ten year tribute to Jon Postel’ 
http://www.isoc.org/awards/postel/memory.shtml (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
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The ARPA Network30 Host/IMP31 interface protocol there is no mechanism for the “Host” to 
selectively refuse messages. This means that the Host which desires to receive some particular 
message must read all messages addressed to it. Such Host could sent many messages by a 
malfunctioning Host. This would constitute a denial of service to the normal users of this Host. Both 
the local users and the network communication could suffer. The services denied are the processor 
time consumed in examining the undesired messages and rejecting them and the loss of network 
thruput (throughput) or increased delay due to the unnecessary busyness of the network. It would 
be useful for a Host to be able to decline messages from sources it believes are misbehaving or 
are simply annoying. If the Host/IMP interface protocol allowed the Host to say to the IMP “refuse 
messages from Host X”, the IMPs could discard the unwanted messages at their earliest 
opportunity returning a ‘refused’ notice to the offending Host.  
 
This is a blueprint of the modern day spam, outlining the problems caused by spam 
such as burdening infrastructure and also denying service to normal users (recipients) 
of the host. The terms “host” and “malfunctioning host” is the modern day recipients of 
spam and those that send spam emails can either be spammers or marketers 
themselves who partake in spamming activities.  
 
Mention was, however, made of how a host could discard unwanted messages, and two 
possibilities were identified:32 
 
The destination IMP would keep a list (per local Host) of sources to refuse (this has the 
disadvantage of keeping the network busy). The destination IMP on receiving the “refuse 
messages from the Host X” message forwards the message to the source IMP (the IMP local to 
Host X). That IMP keeps a list (per local Host) of destinations that are refusing messages from 
this source Host. This restriction on messages might be removed by a destruction Host either by 
sending a “accept messages from Host X” message to the IMP, or by resetting its Host/IMP 
interface. A Host might make use of such facility by measuring per source the number of 
undesired messages per unit time if this measure exceeds a threshold then the Host could issue 
the ‘refuse messages from Host X’ message to the IMP. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29  Postel J ‘On the junk mail problem’ Network Working Group (SRI-ARC) Request for Comment 706 
(Nov 1975) NIC #33861 http://www.rfc-archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=706 (date of use: 5 November 
2015). 
30  ARPAnet or ARPA Network which stands for Advanced Research Projects Agency Networks was a 
precursor to the Internet. It was a large wide-area network created by the United States Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA). ARPAnet was established in 1969 and served as a 
testbed for networking technologies, linking many universities and research centers. Webopedia 
‘Arpanet’ http://webopedia.com/TERM/A/ARPANET.html; and Internet Society ‘Brief history of the 
Internet’ http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/ brief-history-internet 
(date of use: 5 November 2015). 
31  An IMP stands for “interface message processor” and it is noted as “having been the first packet 
router. It was part of the ARPAnet and is a precursor to the Internet”. Technopedia ‘Interface 
Message Processor (IMP) https://www.technopedia.com/definition/7692/interface-message-
processor-imp (date of use: 18 March 2017).  
32  Postel ‘On the junk mail problem’ supra n 29. 
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The above are the modern-day technical measures that have been put in place to 
combat spam, which include the use of filters. It is clear that before spam became the 
scourge it is today, it was viewed as a potential problem, and that while the concern was 
about a host malfunctioning, today this might easily refer to spammers or marketers 
sending unwanted e-mail.  
 
2.3.2.2 Types of spam messages in an electronic environment  
 
Spam comes in different forms, in the main masquerading as legitimate e-mail, enticing 
consumers to view something that might interest them. There are two broad types of 
spam e-mail: commercial and non-commercial.  
 
(a) Non-commercial spam 
 
Non-commercial spam, unlike its commercial counterpart, is characterised as a 
“nuisance” or “annoyance”. Although non-commecial spam does not attempt to sell 
anything, it does in most cases “prompt the receiver to do something about the e-mail – 
it elicites an emotional response from the recipient”.33 Non-commercial spam includes, 
but is not limited to: chain letters (urban legends, hoaxes and viruses),34 and petitions, 
each of which is discussed separately.  
 
Chain letters 
 
A chain letter is “a written text which advocates its reproduction by requiring the 
recipient to forward the e-mail to multiple recipients,35 usually with the promise of good 
luck”.36 Chain letters have been in existence for centuries, first as snail mail, then as 
                                                          
33   See Snopes.com ‘Chain linked’ http://www.snopes.com/luck/chain.asp (date of use: 5 November 
2015). 
34  Ibid. 
35  Emery D ‘What is a chain letter?’ http://urbanlegends.about.com/od/internet/f/chain_letter.htm (date 
of use: 5 November 2015). 
36  The promise of good luck depends on what the recipient is asked to do. There are different 
consequences for each request, some good some bad. Rutgers ‘Chain letters’ 
http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/~watrous/chain-letters.html (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
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faxes, and currently in the form of e-mail.37 Chain letters always attempt to play on the 
irrational wishes or fears of their recipients – and often they succeed.38 Most chain 
letters are forwarded to multiple recipients by friends or family members who appear to 
believe that they are avoiding some harmful situation or consequence by forwarding the 
e-mail.39  
 
There are differing opinions as to when the first chain letter e-mail was actually sent. 
Some say it was sent as far back as 1971, even though it was a non-network one.40 
Others are of the view that the first e-mail chain letter was recorded in February 1982 
which was a prayer of good luck by one Mark Bogg.41 This was soon followed by other 
chain letters.42 In 1994 the first “giant” spam incident reported was referred to as the 
“Jesus Spam”.43 This spam message drew attention because “it was apparently the first 
to be overtly abusive of mail and news systems using automated software to mail 
lists”.44 Below is an outline of different types of chain letters. 
                                                          
37  The first fully-fledged chain letter is recorded as having been sent in 1888 by Daniel W. 
VanArsdale. Emery ‘What is a chain letter?’ supra n 35; also Snopes.com ‘Chain linked’ supra n 
33; and Spamlaws.com ‘The purpose of chain letter scams’ http://www.spamlaws.com/chain-letter-
scam-purpose.html (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
38  Examples of playing on recipients’ irrational wishes or fears include, among others, sympathy chain 
letters which have proven in many instances to be hoaxes. Fear in this instance stems from the 
threats accompanying these letters that if the recipient fails to forward them, something bad will 
happen to them or their loved ones. See Emery ‘What is a chain letter?’ supra n 35. 
39  Other chain letters are sent to share content (which might be of an educational nature or at times 
inspiring). See Poteet Canning Spam 29-38. 
40  The 1971 spam was said to have been sent by a Tom Van Vleck, a co-author of the Compatible 
Time Sharing Systems (CTSS). He sent everybody on the CTSS mail a message on anti-war that 
stated: “THERE IS NO WAY TO PEACE, PEACE IS THE WAY”. Apparently the sender defended it 
by saying “but this is important”. See Templeton B ‘Origin of the term “spam” to mean net abuse’ 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/spamterm.html (date of use: 5 November 2015); also Zdziarski 
Ending Spam 7. 
41  Apparently the original copy was from the Netherlands, and it encouraged recipients to read and 
forward to others within 96 hours and that the chain should not be broken. Id Zdziarski 8. 
42  In 1988 a student struggling financially sent messages to several newsgroups with each post 
cross-posted to four or five newsgroups asking for financial assistance. This spam e-mail is 
referred to as the Jay Jay’s College Fund and is regarded as the first charitable spam. Id Zdziarski 
7; and Lynch ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ supra n 27. 
43  This spam message was the first major User’s Network (USENET) spam on 18 January 1994. It 
was titled: “Global Alert for All: Jesus is Coming Soon”. Id Zdziarski 9-10. USENET is a “collection 
of newsgroups where users can post messages and those posted messages are distributed via 
Usenet servers”. See Usenet.org ‘What is Usenet?’ http://www.usenet.org (date of use: 3 March 
2016). 
44  Ibid Zdziarski; also Templeton B ‘Origin of the term “spam” to mean net abuse’ 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/spamterm.html (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
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(i) Hoaxes  
 
A hoax is an act intended to deceive recipients into believing that the information 
provided is correct, and that one needs to forward that information to as many people as 
possible.45 There are different types of hoax e-mails circulating on the Internet today 
many of which warn users against viruses and/or “worms”.46 Other hoaxes include: 
sympathy hoaxes,47 charity hoaxes,48 bad-advice e-mails, and misleading 
recommendations,49 bogus warnings or false-alert hoaxes, celebrity e-mail hoaxes, 
among others.50 Perhaps the best-known hoax is the “Bill Gates hoax” which promised 
to give away hundreds of dollars to those who forwarded the e-mail message to a 
number of specified people.51  
 
                                                          
45  See Schryen Anti-spam Measures 19; also Fleming & O’Carroll ‘The art of the hoax’ (2010) 16/4 
Parallax 46; and Hitchcock Net Crimes 61. For reasons why these hoaxes get started see Hoax-
Slayer ‘Why do people create e-mail hoaxes’ http://www.hoax-slayer.com/why-hoaxes.html (date of 
use: 5 November 2015).  
46  A “worm” is “similar to a virus by design and is considered to be a sub-class of a virus. Worms 
spread from computer to computer, but unlike viruses, they have the capability of travelling without 
any human action. Worms take advantage of files or information transport features on ones’ 
system, which is what allows them to travel unaided. The biggest danger with worms is their 
capacity to replicate themselves on one’s system, rather than one’s computer sending out a single 
worm, it could send out hundreds or thousands of copies replicating itself, creating a huge 
devastating effect”. Webopedia ‘The difference between a computer virus, worm and Trojan horse’ 
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2004/virus.asp (date of use: 5 November 2015); 
and Poteet supra n 39 64 and 89. 
47  The following are the most popular sympathy hoaxes: the Craig Shergold hoax which started in the 
1980s concerning a 9 year old boy with a tumour. The boy apparently asked to receive enough get-
well cards to break the Guinness record; another hoax was that of Jessica Mydek, a young girl 
dying of a rare form of cancer. Donations were solicited for that cause. This hoax implicated the 
American Cancer Society, which debunked it as unsubstantiated on their web site. See Howe W 
‘Sympathy hoaxes and warm fuzzy stories’ 
http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/legends/sympathylegends.html (date of use: 5 November 2015); 
and American Cancer Society ‘Rumors, myths and truths’ 
http://www.cancer.org/AboutUs/HowweHelpYou/rumours-myths-and-truths (date of use: 5 
November 2015).  
48  These hoaxes include: the Amy Bruce hoax; Walmart fire charity; boy shot by step dad charity; et 
cetera. See Hoax-Slayer ‘Sick baby hoaxes-charity hoaxes’ http://www.hoax-slayer.com/charity-
hoaxes.html for the stories behind these hoaxes (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
49  Examples include: how to survive heart attack when alone; is lemon a cancer killer that is 10000 
times stronger than chemotherapy et cetera. Hoax-Slayer ‘Bad advice messages: Misleading 
recommendations’ http://www.hoax-slayer.com/bad-advice-emails.html (date of use: 5 November 
2015).  
50  Hoax Busters ‘The big list of Internet hoaxes’ http://www.hoaxbusters.org/#C (date of use: 5 
November 2015). 
51  This was apparently done by e-mail tracking. See Snopes.com ‘Thousand dollar bill’ 
http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/nothing/billgate.asp (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
 
 
23 
 
(ii) Urban legends 
 
An urban legend is an unverifiable story that has achieved wide circulation and deals 
with “outlandish, humorous, frightening, or supernatural events”.52 In some instances, 
the stories are based on actual occurrences that have been exaggerated or distorted in 
their retelling.53 Other urban legends have their origin in people misinterpreting or 
misunderstanding stories that they have heard or read in the media, or have heard from 
actual witnesses of an event.54  
 
Urban legends keep evolving by re-inventing and updating themselves, as was recently 
observed with the “Blood Gang legend”,55 which has evolved from anecdotal information 
to being shared via social media56 and now Whatsapp.57 Members of the public have 
been offered guidelines on how to detect urban legends and also to be cautious of 
messages that have particular characteristics.58  
                                                          
52  Urban legends are “a kind of folklore consisting of stories often thought to be factual by those 
circulating them. They appear mysteriously and spread spontaneously in various forms and are 
usually false”. Encyclopedia of the Unusual and Unexplained ‘Superstitions, strange customs, 
taboos, and urban legends’ http://www.unexplainedstuff.com/Superstitions-Strange-Customs-
Taboos-and-Urban-Legends/index.html (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
53  Ibid.  
54  Hitchcock supra n 45 61-76 for a discussion on urban legends. 
55  This legend started doing the rounds as far back as the 1980s in the USA. The legend warns 
motorists about the danger of flashing at any car with no lights on at night. It goes on to say a new 
gang member might be under initiation and anyone who flashes their lights at that car will be a 
target (to be shot at and killed, in order for that initiate to complete the initiation requirements). See 
Snopes.com ‘Lights out’ http://www.snopes.com/crimes/gangs/lightsout.asp (date of use: 5 
November 2015).  
56   In 2008 the same legend was being circulated warning South Africans to be on the lookout for the 
trend. The company that circulated this legend later stated that the message was sent in error and 
that it was to be ignored. At the time of writing the same legend is still doing the rounds. See IOL 
News ‘Crime: Separating the fact from fiction’ http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/crime-
seperating-the-fact-from-fiction-1.411773#.VlMSl3YrJhE (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
57  The term “WhatsApp” comes from the greeting “whats up”. WhatsApp messenger is “a cross 
platform instant messaging application available to only smart phones like iPhones, Blackberry, et 
cetera. In addition to normal texting, WhatsApp messenger users can send each other images, 
videos and audio media messages as well as engage in group conversations between multiple 
users”. Abbreviations ‘What does WhatsApp stand for?’ http://www.abbreviations.com/whatsapp 
(date of use: 6 November 2015).  
58   These guidelines include, but are not limited to the following characteristics: “a closing paragraph 
typed in capital letters and ending in multiple exclamation marks; the story begins with the 
affirmation that it is true and that it has happened to a friend, which is probably not an account of 
an actual event; the story received is similar to a story from several different sources, but with 
different names and details; there is no real evidence to support the story or its allegations; and the 
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(iii) Viruses 
 
A virus is “a malicious code that masquerades as a file sent through e-mail 
attachments”.59 Viruses can send themselves to a number of e-mail addresses in the 
user’s inbox inviting him or her to read an attachment.60 When the virus attaches itself to 
a host file, it can render the file unusable.61 Viruses ride on the back of files stored on a 
disk or in the boot-area of a floppy disk, and replicate when the disc is inserted into a 
computer.62 Viruses were first written in the 1980s and can be destroyed through the 
reformatting of the hard disk, because like any other programme, they too will be wiped 
out.63 However, if a virus has inadvertedly been copied to a disk and that disk is then 
inserted into another computer, it can re-infect the recipient computer although the 
original copy of the virus would have been destroyed on the host computer.64 
 
Some viruses are used to do the following: distribute malware;65 perform harmful 
functions which are sometimes referred to as payload, or a “bomb”;66 and also to turn 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
story describes some horrible crime perpetrated against an innocent victim”. See Encyclopedia of 
the Unusual and Unexplained ‘Superstitions, strange customs,  taboos, and urban legends’ 
http://www.unexplainedstuff.com/Superstitions-Strange-Customs-Taboos-and-Urban-
Legends/index.html (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
59  Viruses have also been seen to “attach themselves to programs or files which enable them to 
spread from one computer to another, leaving infections as they travel. Viruses range in severity; 
some may cause only mild annoying effects, while others have the potential to damage hardware, 
software or files”. Webopedia ‘The difference between a computer virus, worm and Trojan horse’ 
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2004/virus.asp (date of use: 6 November 2015); 
also Poteet supra n 39 64-6 and 88; Walker Absolute Beginners Guide 11; and Hitchcock supra n 
45 341.  
60  Id Poteet 81-2. 
61  Id 66 and 88; also Walker supra n 59 11-18; and Hitchcock supra n 45 340-1. 
62  Id Walker 10; id Hitchcock 339-41 for different kinds of viruses.  
63  Poteet supra n 39 66; and ibid Walker. Walker notes that “while these viruses were written in the 
1980s, they posed no great threat until the 1990s when those who owned personal computers 
started connecting to the Internet”. 
64  Ibid. 
65  “Malicious software” or “malware” is “software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system. 
This type of software is often sent as an unsuspicious e-mail attachment which installs itself when 
the user opens the file”. See TechTarget ‘Malware (malicious software)’ 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/malware (date of use: 6 November 2015); Schryen 
supra n 45 21. In 2013 it was reported that malware was targeting user information like logins, 
passwords, and financial information. Alfreds D ‘Spam declines, malware jumps: Kaspersky’ 
http://www.news24.com/Technology/News/Spam-declines-malware-jumps-Kaspersky-20131119 
(date of use: 6 November 2015). 
66  Walker supra n 59 13. Walker notes that “viruses share the following characteristics: they falsely 
claim to describe an extremely dangerous virus; they use pseudo-technical language to make 
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the systems they infect into “zombies”,67 controlled by the virus authors in order to 
distribute more viruses.68  
 
Petitions  
 
A petition is a formally drafted request addressed to authorities and often bearing the 
names of the people who are making the request.69 Electronic petitions (e-petitions) 
have been an Internet’s phenomenon since the 2000s.70 They offer “instant comfort to 
those outraged by the latest ills in the world through their implicit assurance that by 
affixing their names to a statement decrying a situation and demanding change, the 
respondents will make a difference”.71 These petitions do not as a rule contain 
information about the person they are intended to reach, and even if the intended 
recipient is clearly identified, the intended recipient(s) do not come with a guarantee that 
the person who is supposed to receive the document is in any position to influence 
matters.72 No matter how well thought out these petitions might be, problems often 
arise, notably the lack of a guarantee that anyone collecting and collating the signatures 
will deliver the completed documents to the correct parties.73  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
perceived but impossible claims; they falsely claim that the report was issued or confirmed by a 
well-known company; and the recipient is aksed to forward the message to all their friends and 
colleagues”. 
67  A “zombie” is “a computer that has been implanted with a daemon that puts it under the control of a 
malicious hacker without the knowledge of the computer owner”. Webopedia ‘Zombie’ 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/Z/zombie.html (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
68  Rimmer SW ‘Death of spam: A guide to dealing with unwanted e-mail’ http://www. 
mindworkshop.com/nospam.html (date of use: 6 November 2015). Poteet supra n 39 69, provides 
the following checklist to protect computers which are infected by viruses: “one is advised not to 
open the attachment sent; run anti-virus software; and also run the latest patches on ones 
operating system and applications”. 
69  Dictionary.com ‘Petition’ http://www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/petition (date of use: 6 
November 2015).  
70   Ibid. 
71  Lindner & Riehm (2009) 1/1 JeDEM 1 http://www.itas.kit.edu/pub/v/2009/liri09a.pdf (date of use: 6 
November 2015); also GoPetition ‘Petitions at GoPetition’ http://www.gopetition.com/petitions (date 
of use: 6 November 2015). 
72  In the absence of identifying details such as physical addresses and phone numbers, the names 
listed on petitions are unverifiable and easily falsified. See Lindner & Riehm supra n 71 3. 
73  GoPetition ‘Petitions at GoPetition’ http://www.gopetition.com/petitions (date of use: 6 November 
2015). 
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The mere existence of a petition also does not ensure that anyone will do anything with 
it once it has been completed.74 However, some e-petitions have made an impact that 
saw government officials and the public weighing in on the contents of the petition.75 A 
further problem with e-petitions is that there is no assurance that the signatures are 
indeed those of different people and have not been generated by a single individual.76 
Apparently it takes little by way of programming skills to create a sequence of code that 
will randomly generate fake names, e-mail addresses, and cities (or whatever 
combination these e-petition requires).77 E-petitions can also be characterised as 
formal78 or informal.79  
 
Other non-commercial spam e-mail includes political e-mails.80 The non-commercial 
spam e-mails above will however, not qualify as spam in anti-spam laws as they lack 
the commercial component in them.81 The discussion on commercial spam e-mails 
follows below. 
                                                          
74  Ibid. A case in point where a petition reached its destination but the matter could not be resolved, 
involved a campaign by white South Africans concerned about racism and crime. The group 
launched a Facebook petition to return to Holland (where their ancestors lived 300 years ago). This 
petition reached the intended recipients but the contents of the petition was declined, as one Dutch 
official stated that “chances of receiving Dutch citizenship are almost non-existent”. The Christian 
Science Monitor ‘White South Africans use Facebook in campaign to return to Holland’ 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0517/white-South-Africans-use-Facebook-in-
campaign-to-return-to-Holland (date of use: 5 November 2015).  
75   See in particular the e-petition titled ‘Stop racism at Pretoria Girls High’ calling out the school’s 
management to ensure that its code of conduct did not discriminate against Black and Muslim girls. 
This petition was said to have gathered more than 10 000 signatures within three days of its 
creation. See the Guardian ‘Racism row over South Africa school’s alleged hair policy’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/29/south-africa-pretoria-high-school-for-girls-afros 
(date of use: 1 September 2016). 
76  Snopes.com ‘Petitions’ http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/petition/internet.asp (date of use: 5 
November 2015). 
77  Ibid. 
78  See Lindner & Riehm supra n 71 3. Lindner and Riehm notes that a formal e-petition refers to 
“institutionalised and at least to some extent legally codified e-petition system operated by public 
institutions”. 
79  Ibid Lidner & Riehm. Informal e-petitions are “systems established and managed by non-
governmental, private organisations. Informal e-petitions usually seek to address public institutions 
after a certain number of signatures have been collected. The two types of informal e-petition are 
noted as: e-petitions initiated by NGOs as part of political campaigns; and e-petition platforms 
operated by private organisations (both commercial and not-for-profit) which provide the Internet-
based infrastructure to initiate e-petitions and collect signatures online”.  
80  For the problems caused by political spam and whether this kind of spam should be regulated or 
not see: Grossman (2004) 19/4 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1533 ff. 
81      See Buys ‘Online consumer protection and spam’ 160.   
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(b) Commercial spam e-mails 
 
Unlike the annoying spam e-mails above, commercial e-mails are the most enticing 
resulting in uninformed consumers assuming that the benefits offered by these e-mails 
are real. These are also the most dangerous e-mails which claim to offer free gift 
vouchers and also money from inheritances. The following are examples of commercial 
spam messages. 
 
The DEC spam  
 
The first form of electronic advertising is thought to have been distributed on a wide 
area network in 1978 as an advertisement from Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC).82 
DEC sent an invitation to all ARPAnet addresses on the USA west coast inviting 
recipients to come and view DEC’s newest decsystem-20 family of computers. The e-
mail addresses of all recipients of the advertisements had to be manually typed and 
sent by DEC through its marketing department.83 Apparently this created a significant 
overload on what was then considered low-bandwidth lines (the equivalent of today’s 
dial-up system).84 
 
The Green Card Lottery spam  
 
The most talked about spam in 1994 was the Canter and Siegel spam referred to as the 
“Green Card Lottery Spam”.85 This husband and wife lawyer team sold green card 
lottery tickets to immigrants by sending messages to newsgroups advertising their 
services. The reaction was negative and recipients started sending e-mails to the 
                                                          
82  Zdziarski supra 40 4; and also Templeton B ‘Reaction to the DEC spam of 1978’ 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/spamreact.html (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
83  Id Zdziarski 4-7. 
84  Id 5-6. 
85  Id 10-13; also Singel R ‘April 12, 1994: Immigration lawyers invent commercial spam’ 
https://www.wired.com/2010/04/0412canter-siegel-usenet-spam (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
Singer notes that Canter and Siegel profited from this spam, and that they also tried to cash in on 
their popularity by writing a book titled: “How to make a fortune on the information superhighway”, 
which was apparently a flop. Canter was subsequently disbarred in 1997 by the state of Tennessee 
in part for apparently spamming.  
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couples’ mailboxes in retaliation. This spam gave birth to the first known “bulk mailer 
software”.86  
 
Scams 
 
Perhaps the most dangerous spam e-mails that one can receive are scam e-mails. A 
scam is defined as a dishonest attempt to trap the recipient into parting with money.87 
Jayamala note that a scam is “generally sent personally (or electronically) by a 
scammer with persuasive techniques that can be difficult to resist”.88 In the 1990s a 
number of “make money fast” postings on the Internet emerged, but were usually once-
off postings each from different individuals.89 These scams come in a variety of forms 
including, but not limited to, Ponzi schemes, pyramid schemes, Nigerian 419 schemes, 
and most recently, phishing scams.90 These various scams are discussed individually in 
what follows. 
 
(i) Ponzi and pyramid schemes  
 
A Ponzi scheme is “an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns 
to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors”.91 A Ponzi scheme differs 
                                                          
86  See Fuqua J ‘Why lawyers have a bad name: A net legend’ 
http://www.jamesfuqua.com/lawyers/jokers/canter.shtml (date of use: 6 November 2015). Bulkmail 
is e-mail sent to a large number of people for marketing purposes. WiseGeek ‘What is bulk email?’ 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-bulk-email.htm (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
87  It is also defined as a fraudulent or deceptive act or operation. Merriam Webster ‘Scam’ 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scam  (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
88  See Jayamala (2014) 95/1131 Australian Journal of Pharmacy 18-19 http://search. 
informit.com.au/fullText;dn=759638788394502;res=IELHEA (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
89  Templeton ‘Origin of the term ‘spam’ to mean net abuse’ supra n 40; and Lynch ‘Timeline of spam 
related terms and concepts’ supra n 27.  
90  Other types of scam include: disaster relief schemes; credit card scams; food scams; work at home 
plans; lottery scams; and identity fraud scams. See Scambusters.org ‘Internet scams, identity theft, 
and urban legends: are you at risk?’ http://www.scambusters.org (date of use: 6 November 2015); 
also Nedbank ‘Scams’ http://www.nedbank.co.za/website/content/crimeawareness/scams.asp 
(date of use: 6 November 2015).  
91  Investopedia ‘Ponzi scheme’ http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ponzischeme.asp (date of use: 
6 November 2015). This scheme is named after Charles Ponzi who deceived thousands of New 
England residents into investing in a postage stamp speculation scheme back in the 1920s. The 
Museum of Hoaxes ‘Charles Ponzi and the Ponzi scheme’ http://hoaxes.org/archive/ 
permalink/charles_ponzi_and_the_ponzi_scheme (date of use: 6 November 2015).  
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from a pyramid scheme in that one person takes money from other individuals as an 
“investment” but does not necessarily tell them how their returns will be generated.92 
The organiser of the Ponzi scheme often solicits new investors by promising to invest 
funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk.93 In many 
Ponzi schemes the fraudsters focus on attracting additional money to make promised 
payments to earlier-stage investors, and also use that money for personal expenses 
instead of engaging in any legitimate investment activity.94 In South Africa thousands of 
individuals, are reported to have lost hundreds of millions of Rand to these Ponzi 
schemes.95 Characteristics of Ponzi schemes are brought to people’s attention so they 
can protect themselves from falling prey to these types of scam.96 
 
A pyramid scheme on the other hand is a scheme structured like a pyramid in which 
participants attempt to make money by recruiting new participants into the program.97 
This scheme starts with one person who recruits another person, who is then required 
to ‘invest’ a certain amount (for example, R 1 000) which is paid to the initial recruiter.98 
In order for the first person to make their money back, the new recruit must then 
                                                          
92  Investopedia ‘What is a pyramid scheme’ http://www.investopedia.com/articles/04/042104.asp 
(date of use: 6 November 2015). 
93  Modern-day Ponzi schemes include the infamous Benny Madoff (in the USA) who is currently 
serving 150 years in prison for orchestrating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme which swindled 
money from thousands of investors, some of them prominent figures in Hollywood such as Stephen 
Spielberg et cetera. See US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Ponzi schemes’ http://www. 
sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
94  Ibid. 
95  See in particular the Defencex Ponzi scheme. This scheme supposedly targeted South Africa’s 
wealthiest families. According to the report this scheme was perpetrated by Net Income Solutions 
known as Defencex. The company swindled R800m from 195 000 members before its bank 
account was frozen by the High Court (Cape Town) in February 2013. See: SouthAfrica.info ‘Ponzi 
scheme money frozen’ http://www.southafrica.info/news/business/ 690383.htm (date of use: 6 
November 2015); and Volker (2011-2012) Auditing SA 5-10 for a discussion and schematic 
illustration of a Ponzi scheme. 
96  US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Ponzi schemes’ http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm 
for the characteristics of Ponzi schemes which include, among others: overly consistent returns; 
and unregistered investments. See also Reese M ‘Warning signs of ponzi schemes: part 2’ 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/part-2-warnings-signs-of-ponzipyramid-schemes (date of use: 
6 November 2015). 
97  US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Pyramid schemes’ http://www.sec.gov/ answers/ 
pyramid.htm (date of use: 5 November 2015); also Reese M ‘Warning signs of ponzi schemes: part 
2’ http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/part-2-warnings-signs-of-ponzipyramid-schemes (date of 
use: 6 November 2015).  
98  Investopedia ‘What is a pyramid scheme’ http://www.investopedia.com/articles04/042104.asp (date 
of use: 6 November 2015); also Rothchild (1999) 74/3 Indiana Law Journal 907. 
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introduce more people who in turn will make the R 1 000 contribution.99 These schemes 
promise sky-high returns over a short period merely for handing over money and getting 
others to do the same.100 The scammers behind these schemes may also go so far as 
to making the program resemble a multi-level marketing program.101 But despite their 
claims to have legitimate products or services to sell, these scammers simply use 
money coming in from new recruits to pay off early-stage investors.102 The object is that 
as more people are added the earlier ones will move higher up the pyramid, one tier at 
a time, until ultimately they reach the top spot.103 The South African Reserve Bank 
launched an anti-pyramid scheme campaign in a bid to educate citizens on how to spot 
and avoid pyramid schemes.104 
 
(ii) Nigerian 419 scam 
 
The Nigerian scam, otherwise known as the 419 scam, apparently started circulating in 
the 2000s on the Internet.105 These scam messages are sent via e-mail generally to a 
number of persons, claiming that the recipients assistance is needed to access a large 
sum of money, which in most cases does not exist.106 The scams are historically said to 
be “a modern derivation of traditional centuries of West African scams and pranks, such 
                                                          
99  Ibid Investopedia. 
100   Ibid. 
101  US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Pyramid schemes’ supra n 97; and Rimmer ‘Death of 
spam: A guide to dealing with unwanted e-mail’ supra n 68. A multi-level marketing scheme is “a 
scheme where a person is recruited to sell products or services that actually have some inherent 
value. As a recruit, one can make profit from the sales of the product or services, so they won’t 
necessarily have to recruit more people to sell those products or services”.  
102  Ibid US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Pyramid schemes’ supra n 97. 
103  Corbett J ‘Reserve Bank launches anti-pyramid scheme campaign’ 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/reserve-bank-launches-antipyramid-scheme-campaign (date of use: 6 
November 2015).  
104  Ibid. 
105  See Ampratwum (2009) 16/1 Journal of Financial Crime 68 for historical perspective; and Lynch 
‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ supra n 27. Ampratwum notes that “the Nigerian 
scam is named after a formerly relevant section of the Criminal Code of Nigeria. These scams are 
believed to have been in circulation since the 1980s under the Successive Governments of Nigeria. 
In these scams a target receives unsolicited e-mail letter concerning Nigerian money laundering, or 
illegal proposal”. 
106  Ibid Ampratwum. 
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as the “Red Mercury” scam, sent by fax or letter”.107 Although these scams are set to 
have originated in Nigeria and are termed “Nigerian scams”, they are set to be sent from 
countries other than Nigeria.108 Scammers in the Nigerian 419 scam normally solicit 
help from others by promising to deposit exorbitant amounts of money into those 
recipients bank accounts.109 Initially these scams targeted those in business, but they 
have now expanded to include average citizens “due to the low cost of e-mail 
transmission in relation to potential gains”.110 The money can be from a number of 
sources,111 and the sums transferred are on average apparently in the hundreds of 
thousands, even millions, of dollars and the recipient is usually promised a commission 
for assisting in the transfer.112 Senders of these messages often claim to be government 
officials (from a Department in one of the Ministries, such as an auditing bureau, et 
cetera), Nigerian royalty, a spouse of the deceased, a relative, aide, or confidante of a 
deposed leader, or a religious figure such as Deacon, Brother, or Pastor.113 Atta-
Asamoah114 is of the opinion that these scams can be broken down into three stages, 
namely: 
  
(a) Stage 1: scouting and harvesting. This stage involves searching and extracting e-mail addresses 
and making contact with the targets; 
(b) Stage 2: relationship building and profiling. In this stage the scammers attempt to build a 
relationship with the target ranging from friendship and business social relationship. As the 
relationship deepens through frequent communication, the scammer profiles the target. This 
stage requires great tact and care to avoid the victim from becoming suspicious; and  
(c) Stage 3: operational stage. The scammer proposes an idea involving the transfer of money or 
goods. Experienced scammers proceed cautiously at this stage since any wrong or suspicious 
move could strain the relationship and allow the target to escape. 
                                                          
107  The Red Mercury scam is “a magical substance advance fee fraud scam very similar to Black 
Currency 419”. See Atta-Asamoah (2009) 18/4 African Security Review 107.  
108  Other countries include Ghana, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and any other foreign countries. Ibid; and 
Ampratwum supra n 105 68. 
109  Smith (2009) 23/1 Cultural Studies 27-47 for a discussion of these scams; also Kassner M ‘The 
truth behind those Nigerian 419 scammers’ http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/the-truth-
behind-those-Nigerian-419-scammers (date of use: 6 November 2015); and Glickman (2005) 39/3 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 463-8. 
110  Nigerian scams ‘West Africa scam/Nigeria advance fee fraud in Internet web mail frauds and email 
letter scam’ http://www.crimes-of-persuasion.com/Crimes/Business/nigerian.htm (date of use: 6 
November 2015). 
111  Ibid. These sources include: the transfer of funds from over invoiced contracts; sale of crude oil at 
below market prices; disbursement of money from wills; contract fraud (COD of goods or services); 
purchase of real estate; or conversion of hard currency or even an inheritance. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Ibid. Also Smith supra n 109 27-47.  
114  See Atta-Asamoah supra n 107 109-12.  
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The Nigerian 419 scam is considered “the most dangerous and in some cases has 
“apparently” resulted in the death of individuals who were lured into travelling to Nigeria 
to claim their fortune, only to be held to ransom on arrival so as to extract money from 
their loved ones”.115 Countries have issued alerts to their citizens who might be involved 
in or affected by such scams to file complaints with the Nigerian Embassy or High 
Commission in their respective countries.116 South Africa has additional specific 
instructions117 regarding the 419 scams which include providing assistance to 
individuals in avoiding these scams.118 In order to detect scam messages, members of 
the public are advised to be on the lookout for certain characteristics in these scam 
letters.119 The latest version of the 419 scam is the “419 heartbreaker scam”.120   
 
                                                          
115  Nigerian scams ‘West Africa scam/Nigeria advance fee fraud in Internet web mail frauds and email 
letter scam’ supra n 110; and Rimmer ‘Death of spam: A guide to dealing with unwanted e-mail’ 
supra n 68.  
116  Nigeria: The 419 Coalition Web site ‘The Nigerian scam (419 advance Fee fraud) Defined’ 
http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/ (date of use: 5 November 2015). 
117  These additional instructions include “faxing all scam documents referencing South Africa, 
especially those with phone numbers or banking information of a commercial branch, to the South 
African Police Service. Phone numbers and contact details where the documents need to be sent 
are provided – eg, fax and e-mail addresses”. The following rules are also provided for doing 
business with Nigeria regarding the 419 scam: “never pay anything up front for ANY reason; never 
extend credit for any reason; never do anything until their cheque clears; never accept any help 
from the Nigerian Government; and never rely on your Government to bail you out”. See Glickman 
(2005) Canadian Journal of African Studies 463-70; also Ampratwum supra n 105 68-70; Nigerian: 
The 419 Coalition Web site ‘The Nigerian scam (419 advance Fee fraud) Defined’ supra n 116. 
118  The following are pointers for users: “protect ones’ personal information. Share credit or personal 
information only when buying from a company you know and trust; know the people one is dealing 
with. One should not do business with any company that will not provide its name, street address, 
and telephone number; one should take time to resist any urge to ‘act immediately’ despite the 
offer and the terms. Once the money is turned over to the scammer one may never get it back; 
read the small print, get all promises in writing, and review them carefully before making a payment 
or signing a contract; and never pay for a “free” gift. Disregard any offer that asks one to pay for a 
gift or prize: if it’s free or a gift, one should not have to pay for it”. See OnGuardOnilne.gov ‘Spam’ 
http://www.onguardonline.gov/spam.html (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
119  The characteristics are as follows: “many scammed e-mail are addressed to “presidents” or “CEOs” 
rather than a specific name (nowadays Madam or Sir); e-mails may contain spelling mistakes and 
grammatical errors which give the reader a sense of intellectual superiority, sympathy, or 
assurance of origin; they are almost always written in capital letters reminiscent of older type 
writers even though currently e-mailed; the amounts to be transferred invariably in the tens of 
millions of dollars, is also written out in text form, that is, $40 000 000 (forty million United States 
Dollars); and the e-mail states that the recipients have been recommended or their honesty and 
business acumen has been verified”. See Nigerian scams ‘West Africa scam/Nigeria advance fee 
fraud in Internet web mail frauds and email letter scam’ supra n 110. 
120  This latest version targets online dating sites. See Kruger H ‘The Top 10 Scam types in South 
Africa’ http://www.junkmail.co.za/blog/the-top-10-scam-types-in-south-sfrica/6897 (date of use: 6 
November 2015).  
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(iii) Phishing 
 
Phishing is “the act of sending an e-mail or SMS121 to a user falsely claiming to be an 
established legitimate enterprise (in most cases a banking institution) in an attempt to 
scam users into surrendering private information which will be used for identity theft”.122 
These users are lured to bogus web sites, which appear legitimate, and would then 
require users to perform normal log in procedures.123 Once this has been done, the 
scammers obtain personal information such as bank account numbers and online 
banking passwords.124 The most infamous phishing scams in South Africa have been 
the South African Revenue Service (SARS) e-filing tax return scam, and those that 
involve banking institutions.125 These scams have been debunked by these respective 
enterprises.126 In addition to the above, the following scams were reported as plaguing 
South Africa: false payment confirmations; unethical app download charges; SIM 
swops; credit card skimming; and the Microsoft scam, to name but a few.127 While 
consumers are exposed to these deceptive practices, spammers and scammers have 
turned those activities into a lucrative business so exacerbating the problem. 
 
2.4 Lucrative business for spammers 
 
                                                          
121  Phishing send via SMS is called “smishing” and it is similar to phishing but refers to fraudulent 
messages sent by SMS or text message. TechTerms ‘Smishing’ 
http://www.techterms.com/definition/smishing (date of use: 6 November 2015); also Kennedy 
(2009) Aug/Sept Journal of Marketing 22; Molefi N ‘Consumers ripped off by spam SMSes’ 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/ce063b8041dfe949a29eaf1c2eddf908/Consumers-ripped-off-by-
spam-SMSes-20131811 (date of use: 6 November 2015); and Cloudmark ‘Spammers target mobile 
users with more than 350,000 unique SMS spam variants in 2012’ 
http://www.cloudmark.com/en/press/spammers-target-mobile-users-with-more-than-350-000-
unique-sms-spam-variants-in-2012 (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
122  Webopedia ‘Phishing’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/phishing.html (date of use: 6 November 
2015). For a discussion on phishing see generally Cassim (2014) 47 CILSA 401 ff.   
123      Ibid Cassim. 
124      Ibid.  
125  SARS ‘Scams and phishing attacks’ http://www.sars.gov.za/TargTaxCrime/Pages/Scams-and-
Phishing.aspx?k=SARSScamSource%3Aemail (date of use: 6 November 2015); also ABSA 
‘Phishing scams’ http://www.absa.co.za/Absacoza/Security-Centre/Scams/Phishing-Scams (date of 
use: 6 November 2015); and Cassim supra n 122 412-16 for a South African perspective on this 
problem.  
126   Ibid SARS ‘Scams and phishing attacks’ and ABSA ‘Phishing scams’. 
127  Kruger ‘The Top 10 Scam types in South Africa’ supra n 120. 
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Given the above, it is no surprise that spam has become the scourge it is today. It is 
noted how spammers and scammers swindle money out of unsuspecting individuals. 
This they do by extracting those individuals personal information for purposes of 
“spamming” them on a large scale. This shows how spammers have managed always 
to stay one step ahead of their victims, becoming more aggressive through the years 
and even profiting from their deceptive practices. It is noted that spammers started 
using different programmes – such as spamvertise128 and spamware129 – to distribute 
their spam e-mails during the 1990s.130  
 
In that decade the act of spamming became entrepreneurial, and spammers, built 
businesses through flooding recipients’ mailboxes. Examples of such spammers 
include: Jeff Slaton dubbed the “Spam King” who made spam appear lucrative, by 
claiming “to have made $42 per distribution of between fifteen and thirty e-mails 
weekly”.131 Krazy Kevin Lipsitz also began a notorious newsgroup-spamming campaign, 
specialising in various spam promotions.132 Around the same time Velveeta was also 
sending cross-posting articles to a number of newsgroups.133 Sanford Wallace 
otherwise known as “Spamford” also began “a one man spam campaign” and later 
founded Cyber Promotions (aka CyberPromo, a notorious spam outfit).134 Recently 
                                                          
128  Spamvertise is defined as: “to advertise products and services via unsolicited bulk e-mail, or to 
abuse a particular Internet resource such as a domain name by spamming frequently contributing 
to a blacklisting or loss of value of the resource”. Urban Dictionary ‘Spamvertise’ 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=spamvertise (date of use: 10 November 2015).  
129  Spamware is “software that is designed for sending spam in ways that hide the sender, attempting 
to circumvent spam filters, or which contains features only of use to spammers. Spamware is 
developed by criminals for criminals specifically for illegal use often containing features such as the 
ability to falsify e-mail headers to hide the true source of the spam”. Spamhaus ‘Spamware’ 
http://www.spamhaus.org/whitepapers/spamware (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
130  Lynch ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ supra n 27. 
131  See Zdziarski supra n 40 14-15; also Wired ‘Spam king’ https://archive.wired.com/wired/ 
archive/4.02/spam.king_pr.html (date of use: 10 November 2015); and Garfinkel S ‘Spam King’ 
https://www.wired.com/1996/02/spam-king (date of use: 6 November 2015). 
132  Id Zdiariski 15; also Lynch ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ supra n 27; and 
Rahul.net ‘Overview of spam from Lipsitz’ http://www.rahul.net/falk/Lip (date of use: 10 November 
2015) for a sample of the spam sent by Lipsitz. 
133  Ibid Lynch ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ supra n 27. 
134  See Zdziarski supra n 40 15-16; ibid Lynch; ibid Wired ‘Spam king’. Hormel Foods objected to 
Sanford Wallace’s use of the word spam and registration of the web site “spamford”, thus keeping 
spam (its brand name) from being used as synonymous for unwanted e-mail. The objection was 
later abandoned.  
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Wallace was indicted for spamming Facebook users.135 Nowadays organisations such 
as Spamhaus monitor spammers that are notorius for their spamming activities, and by 
so doing alert stakeholders to be on the lookout for such characters so as to avoid 
falling prey to such deceptive practices.136 
 
While some spammers were benefiting by selling books or using new programmes to 
send even more spam, others were collecting lists of e-mail addresses and selling 
them.137 The sale of lists of e-mail addresses was recorded as a lucrative business as 
far back as the 1990s,138 and has been escalating with each passing year.139 While it is 
not clear how many lists are now up for sale, it is common cause that government 
departments, organisations, businesses et cetera, own large numbers of databases 
which they have been accused of selling to third parties.140  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
  
In this chapter, the development of spam in an online environment was highlighted. It 
was shown how spam started with just one message sent manualy in the 1970s, and 
has evolved into millions of spam e-mails clogging up mailboxes throughout the world 
on a daily basis. It is clear from the above that the problem has escalated and that those 
behind these scam and spam e-mails are benefitting from their deceptive practices. 
Newer modes of communication are also contributing to the scourge by shrinking 
                                                          
135  The Register ‘Spanking Spam King: Sanford Wallace faces jail for Facebook flood’ 
http://theregister.co.uk/2015/08/25/spammer_wallace_faces_jail_facebook_scam (date of use: 10 
November 2015); also The FBI (San Francisco Division) ‘Sanford Wallace indicted for spamming 
Facebook users’ https://www.fbi.gov/sanfrancisco/press-releases/2011/sanford-wallace-indicted-for 
sending spam messages to Facebook users (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
136   See Spamhaus ‘The world’s worst spammers’ http://www.spamhause.org/statistics/spammers for a 
list of the world’s worst spammers (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
137   Lynch ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ supra n 27. 
138  Ibid. Apparently in 1995 2 million e-mail addresses were offered for sale.  
139  Ibid. In 1996 it was reported that the lists offered for sale increased from 7 million to 11 million; 
followed by 31 million; 57 million; and 80 million in 1997; in 1998 those lists amounted to 91 million, 
and in 2001 to 209 million.  
140  Recently, one of South Africa’s cell phone providers was accused of sharing its customers’ 
personal information. The explanation provided by the cell phone giant was that there was a breach 
in their systems when it was upgraded. See Mochiko T ‘Cyber security: oversharers anonymous’ 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/11/06/cyber-security-oversharers-anonymous (date of 
use: 10 November 2015). 
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boundaries and making recipients available around the clock. Direct marketers and 
spammers alike have wasted no time in making their presence felt in those mediums. 
While consumers are falling prey to these practices, spam is causing problems.  
 
In the next chapter focus will be on the problems caused by spam and how spammers 
use certain methods to extract personal information of consumers for spam purposes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EFFECT OF SPAM ON E-MAIL MESSAGES 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we observed how spam evolved from a nuisance to an all-out 
attack on e-mail boxes. We have also seen how spam is an effective marketing tool 
sometimes masked in deceptive activities such as scams. And while these spamming 
activities causes problems, spammers have in turn benefited from the whole exercise. 
The question then, is how do spammers and marketers alike get the personal 
information of individuals in order to send spam messages? This they do by extracting 
personal information of individuals from web sites. While the free exchange of personal 
information is set “to promote consumer welfare (by encouraging businesses to develop 
and market goods and services that most interest their existing and potential 
consumers), it also raises issues of fairness and confidentiality”.1  
 
In this chapter focus is on the effect of spam on e-mail messages. The following will be 
at the centre of the discussion: the methods that spammers use to obtain e-mail 
addresses; the problems caused by spam; and technical measures used to limit spam.  
 
3.2 Methods used to extract e-mail addresses for purposes of spam  
 
3.2.1 Background 
 
Personal information is a broad term that encompasses characteristics of individuals 
including, but not limited to: their names; address; phone numbers; codes or symbols; 
and fingerprints.2 An e-mail in this instance also falls within that definition because it 
identifies an individual in cyberspace. In order for a spammer to send unsolicited 
communications he or she must be in possession of lists of e-mail addresses of 
consumers to whom they wish to pitch their goods, products or communications. These 
                                                          
1  Irving (1996) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 9; and De Bruin Consumer Trust 11.  
2  BusinessDictionary.com ‘Personal information’ http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ 
personal-information.html (date of use: 10 November 2015).  
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e-mail addresses can be obtained in a variety of ways including by consumers 
themselves divulging the information voluntarily by filling out subscriptions to 
newsletters. It can also be collected while the individual is “surfing the Internet”.3 The 
following methods, each of which is discussed separately, are some of the most popular 
methods used to source consumers’ e-mail addresses in order to send spam 
messages: online profiling and the use of cookies; spyware; dictionary attacks; using 
software to harvest e-mails addresses; and also spoofing. 
 
3.2.2. Online profiling and the use of cookies  
 
3.2.2.1 Online profiling 
 
Most individuals do not realise that when they surf the Internet, they leave a trail of 
information on every web site they visit.4 The trail – otherwise referred to as “mouse 
droppings”5 – is valuable to online merchants who collect that information to be used for 
marketing purposes.6 This trail of information reveals extensive personal information 
pertaining to those individuals, and in the wrong hands can be used to inflict harm to 
those individuals.7 The information left behind during a web site visit is routinely 
collected without the individual’s knowledge and used for a variety of purposes without 
the individual’s consent.8 This raises questions as to how businesses market their 
goods and services to consumers, and how a consumer’s online shopping experience 
                                                          
3  The phrase “surfing the Internet” or “surfing the net” is described as “an undirected type of 
browsing on the Internet without a planned search strategy or definitive objective”. See Reference 
‘What does the phrase ‘surf the Internet mean’ https://www.reference.com/technology/phrase-surf-
internet-mean-8bf3144adff725c (date of use: 3 March 2017).  
4  Irving supra n 1 7.  
5  Ibid. Mouse droppings are pixel(s) (usually single) that are not properly restored when the mouse 
pointer moves away from a particular location on the screen, producing an appearance that the 
mouse pointer has left droppings behind. Dictionary.com ‘Mouse droppings’ 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mouse+droppings (date of use: 10 November 2015).  
6  Irving note that “while these droppings are beneficial to online merchants, to the user they are 
detrimental because their information might be sold to other online merchants who will in turn send 
spam in order to advertise their products or services. Several online companies already track and 
sell information derived from these mouse droppings”. See Irving supra n 1 7; and Budnitz (1998) 
49/4 South Carolina Law Review 851. 
7  Id Irving 7 and 9. 
8  Idler (1999) 138/7 Trusts and Estates 42; also Jordaan (2007) 3/1 International Retail and 
Marketing Review 42-53. 
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can be customised and personalised without leaving a trace.9 Profiling starts when 
consumers enter a merchant’s site irrespective of whether or not a purchase is made.10 
Consumers may visit a merchant’s site several times before acting on an offer or buying 
goods and services.11 There are a number of online profiling and personalisation 
systems available and each uses its own database, even though they all follow a basic 
outline.12 In order for one to build an online profile database, one need to know what 
important information to request based on the knowledge of one’s consumers.13 
 
The purpose of collecting and analysing this data is to allow marketers to draw a variety 
of inferences about each consumer’s interests and preferences.14 These merchants are 
most often invisible to consumers and all the consumer sees are the web sites they 
visit.15 This also enables computers to make split-second decisions about how to deliver 
ads directly targeted at the consumer’s specific interests.16 The result is a detailed 
profile that attempts to predict the individual consumer’s tastes, needs, and purchasing 
habits.17 Unless the web sites visited by consumers provide notice of the marketers’ 
presence and the collection of data consumers will remain unaware that their activities 
are being monitored online.18 Even when consumers are aware of this kind of profiling, 
they cannot effectively prevent it from happening, and there have, consequently, been 
calls for a need to regulate this form of harmful practice.19 
                                                          
9  Suchet P ‘Real time online profiling’ http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1718804/real-time-online-
profiling (date of use: 10 November 2015); and Steindel (2011) 17/2 Michigan Telecommunications 
and Technology Law Review 459-64 on how online profiling work. 
10  Bennett (2011) 44/4 John Marshall Law Review 899-904 on the origins of online behavioural 
advertising, and how that works; also Hoofnagle et al (2012) 6 Harvard Law and Policy Review 
279-280 on how web tracking works. 
11  Ibid Bennett. 
12  See Kania D ‘The art and science of online profiling’ 
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1702454/the-art-and-science-of-online-profiling (date of use: 
10 November 2015). 
13  Ibid Kania; also Suchet ‘Real time online profiling’ supra n 9. 
14  Federal Trade Commission ‘Online profiling: a report to Congress part 2 recommendations’ 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/934.pdf (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
15  Ibid. 
16  Suchet ‘Real time online profiling’ supra n 9. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid.  
19  Steindel supra n 9 466-75; also Whipple (2013) 21 LBJ Journal of Public Affairs 90-100 where the 
author lists a number of regulatory tools including: self-regulatory initiatives; do-not-call lists; 
specialty consumer reporting agencies; and Bennett supra n 10 907-13. 
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3.2.2.2 Cookies 
 
Online profiling is most effective when cookies are set on web sites to gather 
information about prospective buyers. A cookie is “a file that is downloaded to a user’s 
computer  to remember the user’s preferences each time he or she returns to the site”.20 
Cookies are widely used by the marketing industry and are regarded by that industry as 
essential to the efficient operation of commercial web sites.21 Cookies basically allow 
businesses to build a database of consumer habits and hobbies by recording where 
they created their shopping baskets and what items were in those baskets.22 They also 
track where those consumers go online after they leave the web site(s).23 This gathered 
information will be transfered to web servers.24 The collection of information varies from 
cookie to cookie depending on the lifespan of the specific cookie.25  
 
The cookie’s intended purpose is to eliminate the need for web users to re-enter 
username and password each time they want to read news articles or enter a web site 
requiring membership.26 As part of a self-help solution consumer’s are advised to do the 
following to prevent cookies from being set on their computers: maintain a cookie file on 
their computers; set their browser to reject all or some cookies; receive an alert when 
cookies attempt to download themselves onto the consumer’s hard drive; install 
software that manages cookies on their behalf; and select an opt-out (if any) provided 
                                                          
20  King (2003) 12 Information and Communications Technology Law 228; also Rogers (2004) 25 
Business Law Review 293; Albrecht (2002-2003) 36 Suffolk University Law Review 422; and 
Lanois (2010) 9/2 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 32-43 where the 
author discusses privacy in the digital world and the use of cookies. 
21  Ebersӧhn (2004) 16/4 SA Merc LJ 741 ff; id King 229; ibid Rogers where the author notes that 
“cookies are potentially a silent, hidden, and unseen Trojan horse, although they may appear 
harmless and potentially necessary for the correct functioning of the web sites, they contain 
monitoring devices which track a person’s usage of the Internet, and this may be a threat to the 
privacy of the individual”; and Traung (2010) 31/10 Business Law Review 216-17. 
22  Youngblood (2001) 11/1 DePaul-LCA Journal of Art and Entertainment Law 48; and Buys ‘Privacy 
and the right to information’ 384-387. 
23  Ibid 
24  King supra n 20 228; and Lanois supra n 20 32-43. 
25  Ibid King; and Brandon (2012) 29 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information 641-2. 
26  When one submits data online the following happens: the data is e-mailed to a designated e-mail 
box; the data is stored in a database; or some combinations of these options occur. See Leiserson 
(2002) 94 Law Library Journal 541 and 546. 
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by web site operators.27 Most cookies are set to be entirely benign and, indeed, play an 
important role in web browsing and e-commerce.28 In an effort to move away from 
standard cookies, newer tracking devices have also been identified.29 Big data30 is also 
used by marketers who are trying better to understand their customers and so hopefully 
improve relationships.31 The phrase big data is used to describe “a massive volume of 
both structured and unstructured data that is difficult to process using traditional 
database and software because of its volume”.32 While big data assists businesses to 
thrive, it also puts consumers in the precarious situation of always having to try to 
protect their personal information.33  
 
3.2.3 Harvesting e-mail addresses  
 
Harvesting is defined as “the use of a program to scan through documents, e-mails, 
bulletin boards, and other material to identify and store e-mail addresses”.34 Most often 
harvested e-mail address lists are either created by marketers, compiled into a contact 
list and then sold.35 These can also be purchased from those who are trading in such 
lists, spammers included.36 Bankrupt businesses also sell their client databases to settle 
                                                          
27  Ebersӧhn supra n 21 764; Shostak CyberUnion Handbook 83-4, where the author lists the 
following ideas on how to support ones effective and safe exploration of the Internet: establishing 
multiple e-mail accounts; learning to use e-mail filters; learning how to recognise fake e-mail 
addresses; and verifying attachments by checking with the sender. 
28  Mercado-Kierkegaard (2005) 21/4 Computer Law & Security Report 314, where the author lists two 
types of cookie namely: persistent; and session cookies. “Session cookies are temporary and are 
erased when the browser exits. As these cookies are discarded after one leaves a site they do not 
present the same tracking problems as “persistent cookies” which remain on the individual’s hard 
drive until the user erases them or until they expire”. See too Idler supra note 8 41- 2.  
29  Hoofnagle et al supra note 10 281-5; and Bowman (2012) 7/3 Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 725-30 for a discussion on flash cookies or zombie cookies; history sniffing; 
and device fingerprinting. 
30  Big data when used by vendors may refer to “the technology, which includes tools and processes 
that an organization requires to handle the amount of data and storage facilities”. See Webopedia 
‘Big data’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/B/big_data.html (date of use: 4 March 2016).  
31   Motloung (2015) IMM Journal of Strategic Marketing 18; and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 367-8. 
32   See Webopedia ‘Big data’ supra n 30. 
33  Motloung supra n 31 18. 
34  Raz U ‘How spammers harvest e-mail addresses’ http://www.private.org.il/harvest.html (date of 
use: 10 November 2015).  
35  AtomPark Software ‘How to gather email addresses and create mailing lists’ 
http://www.massmailsoftware.com/ezine/past/2003-03-05.htm (date of use: 10 November 2015).   
36  Asscher & Hoogcarspel Regulating Spam 69. 
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debts.37 Some lists are collected from public web sites which display employees’ 
personal information.38 This practice is also encouraged by those in the marketing 
business,39 hence products or services are offered free of charge provided that users 
furnish valid e-mail addresses which are then used as spam targets.40 Various methods 
are also used to harvest such lists including: “web crawlers”;41 the use of software such  
as “harvesting bots” or “harvesters”. Fingerman notes that harvesting causes two main 
types of harm:42 
 
first, automated scanning can overburden a server with queries, and secondly, as many Internet 
users are aware of harvesting techniques and try to avoid them, this has a chilling effect on the use 
of the web and discussion fora. This leads to users refusing to post their addresses on media 
platforms for fear that they will be inundated with spam. This reluctance to display contact 
information has been noted as stifling communication and also harming free speech interests. 
 
Some are of the opinion that harvesting of e-mail addresses is very bad business 
etiquette and that an honest etiquette is indicative of an honest business.43 With this in 
mind, consumers are cautioned about such practices and suggestions on how to reduce 
the process of their e-mail adressess from being harvested on the Internet are also 
provided.44 
                                                          
37  Ibid. Also Smith (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 600-01; and Raz ‘How spammers harvest e-mail addresses’ 
supra n 34. 
38  Most organisations display their employee’s personal information on their web sites. Other lists can 
be acquired from government departments which require certain information to be made public. 
See South African Government ‘Get Deeds Registry information’ (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
39  Bonar A ‘Buying e-mail lists cheaper than e-mail list rental?’ http://emailexpert.org/buying-email-
lists-cheaper-than-email-list-rental/ (date of use: 10 November 2015); also Solomon D ‘Harvesting 
e-mail addresses’ http://www.businesstoolchest.com/articles/data/ 20010305130908.shtml (date of 
use: 10 November 2015). 
40  See Poteet Canning Spam 6-8; also Rimmer SW ‘Death of spam’ 
http://www.mindworkshop.com/nospam.html (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
41  Id Poteet 14-5. Web crawler is referred to as “a computer program that automatically retrieves web 
pages for use by search engines”. Dictionary.com ‘Web crawler’ 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/webcrawler (date of use: 10 November 2015). Web 
crawlers, robots, and spiders are various names given to “the tools used for traversing the web and 
cataloging the information found”. Spiders are used to feed pages to search engines and are so 
called because they crawl. Webopedia ‘Spider’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/spider.html 
(date of use: 10 November 2015). Market researches are set to use web crawlers to determine and 
assess trends in a given market.  
42  See Fingerman (2004) 7/8 Journal of Internet Law 1-14.  
43  Solomon ‘Harvesting e-mail addresses’ supra n 39; and Patel A ‘How spammers get your number’ 
http://www.citypress.co.za/business/how-spammers-get-your-number/ (date of use: 10 November 
2015).  
44  See Surf-in-the-Sprit ‘How spammers reap what you sow’ http://www.surfinthespirit.com/the-
web/harvesting.html (date of use: 10 November 2015); and Raz ‘How spammers harvest e-mail 
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3.2.4 Dictionary attacks 
 
Dictionary attacks – also known as “brute force” or “direct harvesting” attacks – involve 
spammers sending unsolicited messages to hundreds or thousands of addresses, 
usually with the same domain name.45 In this case e-mails are sent to thousands of 
addresses on a particular domain, the non-existent ones are discarded, while the ones 
determined to be genuine are compiled into lists and then sold.46 With this method 
computers generate every possible combination of letters and numbers on a particular 
domain, for example, “….@yahoo.com”.47 These e-mail addresses are generated based 
on words from a “dictionary” of possible likely words, combined with the domain being 
attacked.48 This is done to compile a list of deliverable e-mail addresses for future spam 
communications.49 Dictionary attacks are also used as a means of obtaining passwords 
to gain unauthorised access to computer systems.50 It has been noted that “dictionary 
attacks are a major burden to corporate e-mail systems, because these systems usually 
process nearly all the messages sent to them, even those sent to invalid addresses are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
addresses’ supra n 34 where the following methods of harvesting are outlined: “(a) from posts to 
USENET: spammers regularly scan USENET for e-mail addresses, using programs designed to do 
that. Some programs just look at article headers containing e-mail address (from, reply-to); (b) 
mailing lists: spammers regularly attempt to get lists of subscribers from mailing lists (some mailing 
lists will give these upon request) knowing that the mail addresses are a mixture of valid and a few 
invalid ones; (c) web pages: this is done using a program which combs through web pages looking 
for addresses, like e-mail addresses contained in mailto: hypertext markup language (HTML) tags. 
Some spammer’s even target mail-based pages; (d) web and paper forms: some web sites request 
various details via forms, for example, guest registers and registration forms. Spammers get these 
e-mail addresses from those either because the form becomes available on the worldwide web, or 
because the site sells or gives e-mails to others; (e) web browser: some sites use various tricks to 
extract a surfer’s e-mail address from the web browser, sometimes without the surfer noticing. 
Those techniques include, making the browser access one of the pages’ image through 
anonymous file transfer protocol (FTP) connection to the site, or using JavaScript to make the 
browser send an e-mail to a chosen e-mail address with that e-mail address configured into the 
browser; and (f) chat rooms and Internet relay chat (IRC)”. 
45  Washington Times ‘Spammers turn to dictionary attacks’ 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/business/20040505-092614-5432r.htm (date of use: 10 
November 2015) and Poteet supra n 40 22.  
46  Ibid Poteet. 
47  Sullivan ‘Preventing a brute force or dictionary attack: how to keep brutes away from your loot’ 
http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/17111/Preventing-a-Brute-Force-or-Dictionary-Attack-How 
(date of use: 10 November 2015); also Quo (2004) 11/1 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law 1-31; and Walker Absolute Beginners Guide 139-40. 
48  Ibid Sullivan. 
49  Quo supra n 47 1-31. 
50   Ibid. 
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often held before being returned to the sender”.51 While the number of dictionary attacks 
have in some cases outnumbered legitimate e-mails, some companies have used filters 
or block all e-mails they think are part of dictionary attacks by recognising the high 
volume of messages coming from a single source.52 However, spammers have become 
sophisticated in that they reduce the number of e-mails sent in each attack, but  
increase the number of attacks overall.53  
 
While dictionary attacks have become more effective in disseminating spam, consumers 
have gradually learned not to make their addresses public.54 Users are also less likely 
than before to sign up for mailing lists unless they know that their addresses will not end 
up in the hands of spammers.55 Individuals are also urged to choose e-mail addresses 
that do not follow established patterns: a mix of letters and numbers, with possible 
character(s) thrown in, which complicate the processs of ‘guessing’ an e-mail address.56 
 
3.2.5 Spyware  
 
Spyware is software that collects user information through an Internet connection 
without the user’s knowledge, usually for advertising purposes.57 Spyware is regarded 
as malware because it installs itself on a computer without the user’s knowledge and 
then monitors the user’s computer habits so compromising his or her privacy.58 Spyware 
is akin to a ‘Trojan horse’ in that users unwittingly install the product when they install 
                                                          
51  Ibid. 
52  Washington Times ‘Spammers turn to ‘dictionary attacks’ supra n 45. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Sullivan ‘Preventing a brute force or dictionary attack: how to keep brutes away from your loot’ 
supra n 47; also Quo supra n 47 1-31; and Poteet supra n 40 23. 
57  Webopedia ‘Spyware’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/spyware.html (date of use: 10 
November 2015); Feinstein How to do everything 124-5; Engle (2007-2008) 3/3 Journal of Law and 
Policy for the Information Society 582-3; and Walker supra n 47 123 where the author lists the 
following as other sneaky spyware techniques: “clicking on a link that downloads spyware from web 
sites. Spyware can also be embedded in the installation process of a free or pirated piece of 
software one might have downloaded. Spyware can also get onto one’s computer by arriving as an 
automatic download from web sites one might have visited”. 
58  Ibid Walker; also Kapersky Lab ‘Malware classifications’ http://www.kaspersky.co.za/threats/what-
is-malware (date of use: 10 November 2015); Schryen Anti-spam Measures 19. 
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something else.59 Spyware can take over a user’s Internet connection for its own 
unlawful use such as disseminating spam.60 It can also take the form of the Internet 
browser resetting the user’s homepage or inserting toolbars into the user’s browser that 
link the user to products or services.61 Spyware manifests itself on user’s computer 
through sluggish personal computer (PC) performance, weird pop-up-ads, and toolbars 
that cannot be deleted, and also makes unexpected changes to the users home page 
settings, and unusual search results.62 The following have been identified as types of 
spyware: adware; snoopware; browser hijackers; key loggers; and dialers.63 Users can 
protect themselves by using spyware detection and removal utilities,64 or they can also 
use anti-spyware software.65 Once spammers have utilised the above methods in 
extracting the consumers’ e-mail addresses, they are in a position to spoof their spam 
messages so as to remain undetected. 
 
                                                          
59  According to Greek Mythology a “Trojan horse” was “a huge, hollow wooden figure of a horse 
which was left outside the city of Troy by Greek soldiers pretending to have abandoned their siege 
of Troy. The Trojans took it into Troy. At night the Greek soldiers who were concealed in the horse 
opened the gates of Troy to the other Greek soldiers and thus Troy was defeated. In computing 
terms, Trojan horse means a bug inserted into a program or system designed to be activated after 
a certain time or certain number of operations”. Dictionary.com ‘Trojan horse’ 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/trojan+horse (date of use: 10 November 2015).  
60   Ibid. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Walker supra n 47 51-2. 
63  Id Walker 48-52. “Adware” is a common name used to describe “software given to the user with 
advertisements embedded in the application. It is considered a legitimate alternative offered to 
consumers who do not wish to pay for software”. Webopedia “Adware” 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/ A/adware.html (date of use: 10 November 2015). “Snoopware” 
is “malware that is capable of monitoring one’s computer habits on behalf of someone else. This 
can include parental monitoring software programs designed to track children’s computer habits”. 
Techtarget ‘Snoopware’ http://www.whatis.techtarget.com/definition/snoopware (date of use: 10 
November 2015). “Browser hijacking” is “a type of online fraud where scammers use malicious 
software to take control of a computer’s Internet browser and change how and what it displays 
when the user is surfing the net”. See Microsoft ‘Fix your hijacked web browser’ 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc-security/browser-hijacking.aspx (date of use: 10 November 
2015). “Key logger” is “a type of data surveillance software (considered to be either software or 
spyware) that can record every key stroke one make to log files that are usually encrypted”. 
Webopedia ‘Keylogger’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/K/keylogger.html (date of use: 10 
November 2015). ‘Dialers’ are “programs that initialise a computer’s modem and call out silently to 
a toll line and connect to a web page” (ibid Walker).  
64  Slutsky & Baran (2005) 10 Georgia Bar Journal 26. 
65  “Antispyware” is “a type of program designed to prevent and detect unwanted spyware program 
installations and to remove those programs if installed. Detection may either be rules-based or 
based on downloaded definition files that identify currently active spyware programs”. See 
WhatIs.com ‘Anti-syware software’ http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/anti-spyware-software 
(date of use: 10 November 2015).  
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3.2.6 Spoofing (disguising headers)  
 
Spoofing is a technique used by spammers to disguise or to mask their identities.66 
Spoofing is also described as a deliberate attempt to cause a user or resource to 
perform an incorrect action.67 Most e-mails are disguised in the header68 to make it 
appear as if the e-mail came from somewhere or someone other than the actual 
source.69 This is generally done by “exploiting poor authentication measures” in order 
for spammers to masquerade as someone else.70 
 
The following has been characterised as aggravating: addressing schemes that are 
virtual; domain names that are handed out without verification of the identity of the 
domain owner;71 and technical aspects of the Internet which make it easy to forge 
identifying information that appears in e-mails.72 The above practices cause problems 
which affects different stakeholders. Those problems are outlined below. 
 
3.3 Problems caused by spam 
  
3.3.1 No costs to the sender but to the recipients and ISPs  
 
                                                          
66  See Poteet supra n 40 104. Spoofing is also “the act of impersonating a machine” (see Downing, 
Covington & Covington Dictionary 453). On the other hand, to spoof is to fool, and in networking 
the term is used to describe a variety of ways in which hardware and software can be misled. See 
Margolis Computer & Internet Dictionary 523.   
67   See Oxford Dictionary of Computer Science 520. 
68  An “e-mail header” is “that part of a message that describes the following: the originator of the 
message, the addressee or other recipients, and message priority level”. See TechTarget ‘Header’ 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/header (date of use: 4 March 2017) 
69  See Ebersӧhn (2003) De Rebus 25-6. 
70    Ibid.  
71  In January 2014 when the new gTLD program of registration for new generic top-level domains 
was launched, it was noted that spammers were quick to utilise domain names for the distribution 
of large-scale advertising spam. Shcherbakova T, Vergelis M & Demidova N ‘Spam and phishing in 
the first quarter of 2015’ https://securelist.com/analysis/quarterly-spam-reports/69932/spam-and-
phishing-in-the-first-quarter-of-2015 (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
72  Rothchild (1999) 74/3 Indiana Law Journal 908. Poteet offers the following checklist that individuals 
should apply before opening a spoofed e-mail: “if an e-mail seems to be out of character for a 
particular person, first verify its authenticity before over-reacting; if an e-mail’s authenticity is in 
doubt, check the headers to see whether anything appears odd; evaluate how you trust what you 
read on e-mail, and see whether you need to add a verification step to some of the messages”. 
See Poteet supra n 40 114. 
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The biggest problem with spam is that the recipients are the ones who have to pay for 
the spam received.73 This payment is for Internet access provided by the ISPs as a 
service cost for using e-mail. The low cost of sending such material is, in turn, the single 
biggest factor leading to the growth in spam.74 These costs go beyond the recipients in 
that each ISPs also has to pay for each and every e-mail message received – the 
messages which take up a certain amount of the ISPs connectivity and computer 
bandwidth.75 This has the effect of slowing down traffic in e-mail transmissions.76 ISPs 
end up paying for repairs to servers that crash under the load of the messages being 
transmitted.77  
 
Furthermore, because most spammers spoof (disguise) e-mails, if any e-mail(s) is 
undelivered it cannot be returned to the sender’s e-mail account but is left in the server 
overloading the system.78 ISPs are also advised to enlarge their capacity to deal with 
the volume of spam by paying for sophisticated filters and creating safe lists to block 
senders.79 Other costs include the increase in subscription fees for installing filters (in 
order to block unwanted e-mails), which reduce the intake of spam but does not 
                                                          
73  Warner (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 144-5. Warner notes 
the two costs that pass from ISPs to their subscribers as follows: “access costs, which are incurred 
by the recipients in order to gain access to the Internet. This fee depends on the amount of the 
data exchanges of both e-mail and non-e-mail. Since e-mail contributes significantly to the extent of 
data traffic, it also contributes significantly to network access fees. The other one is processing 
costs which are costs an ISP incurs when it processes e-mail through its computers and into the 
recipient’s inbox, and when it processes e-mail from the sender’s inbox through its computers on 
the way to a regional network. The more e-mail the ISP processes, the greater the costs it incurs”. 
74  Simmons & Simmons E-Commerce Law 131. 
75  Haase, Grimm & Versfeld International Commercial Law 140 where the authors note: “many large 
ISPs have also suffered major system outages as a result of massive junk e-mail campaigns. If 
huge ISP can clearly not cope with the flood one should not wonder that small ISPs are unable to 
cope under the crash of junk e-mail”; and Magee (2003) 19/2 Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal 339. 
76  Ibid Haase, Grimm & Versfeld. 
77  Mayer (2004) 31/1 Journal of Legislation 179; also Schryen supra n 58 24-6 where the author 
discusses the following different types of cost that an ISP incurs: staff costs; infrastructure costs; 
download costs; legal fees costs; communications and marketing costs; harm through fraud and 
loss of reputation and opportunity costs et cetera; and York & Chia E-Commerce 24. 
78  Simmons & Simmons supra n 74 131. 
79  They also need to use other technologies to reduce the influx of spam, and bear the costs of 
additional consumer service personnel to handle spam-related subscriber complaints. See 
Grossman (2004) 19/4 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1542; and Mayer supra n 77 179. 
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eliminate it.80 Other costs are felt by legitimate businesses which say e-mail marketing 
has received a “bad rap” because of spam.81 These businesses are set to have been 
“unfairly lumped with spammers in that their discreet and legitimate e-mail marketing 
and communications are not reaching their audience because of spam-filtering 
technology”.82 
  
3.3.2 Flooding of recipients’ mailboxes 
 
Flooding leads to system crashes and the consumption of massive amounts of memory, 
storage space, and other resources.83 The data from undelivered e-mails also requires 
massive data storage space,84 and sufficient equipment and personnel to handle the 
traffic, because the ISP cannot distinguish between legitimate mail and spam e-mails.85 
 
3.3.3 Wasting time reading and discarding unwanted messages 
 
Spam has the potential to exceed the volume of legitimate e-mail and overwhelm 
recipients of such e-mail boxes.86 A clogged mailbox wastes recipients time in that they 
must wade through the spam e-mail (reading, deleting, replying, filtering) before they 
can get to their legitimate e-mails.87 Spam, therefore, both increases the time spent 
downloading e-mails resulting in subscription fees being increased as noted in par 3.3.1 
above.88 
 
                                                          
80  Hoffman P ‘Unsolicited bulk e-mail: definitions and problems’ http://www.imc.org/ube-def.html (date 
of use: 10 November 2015); Haase, Grimm & Versfeld supra n 75 140; also Goldman (2003) 22 
John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 20-1; and Kamal Law of Cyber-space 45. 
81  Chang R ‘Could spam kill off e-mail?’ http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/113061/could_spam_kill_off_e-mail.html (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
82  Ibid. 
83  Kamal supra n 80 45. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Coalition against Unsolicited Bulk E-mail, Australia (CAUBE.AU) ‘The problem’ 
http://www.caube.org.au/problem.htm (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
86  See Haase, Grimm & Versfeld supra n 75 141; Hoffman ‘Unsolicited bulk e-mail: definitions and 
problems’ supra n 80; also Mayer supra n 77 179; and Alongi (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review 264. 
87  Systems Publishers ‘South African spam summit announced’ 
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c=16&1=196&ai=2347 (date of use: 7 September 
2015).  
88  See Coalition against Unsolicited Bulk E-mail, Australia (CAUBE.AU) ‘The Problem’ supra n 85.  
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3.3.4 Fraudulent practices and objectionable content 
 
Many of the objections to spam relate to its content. For example, some object to 
receiving commercial messages, particularly those that promote questionable ventures 
like pyramid schemes and multi-level marketing scams, or contains viruses, et cetera.89 
Others are offended by messages that contain or advertise sexually explicit material, 
especially those sent to minors (because senders of unsolicited e-mail rarely know the 
age of persons to whom the messages are sent).90  
 
As noted above spammers forge headers and subject lines to create the impression that 
the messages originate from a source other than the spammer.91 This is done by 
offloading return e-mail addresses and complaint handling onto an unsuspecting origin 
or relay operator by specifying one or more incorrect return addresses in the message 
itself.92 By the time the recipient has read through the e-mail message and realised that 
it is unwanted or objectionable, he or she has been exposed to the content of the 
message.93  
 
3.3.5 Stifling of communication 
 
Spam stifles the efficiency of communication and the free flow of information.94 It is also 
set to pose threats to consumer confidence in e-commerce.95 This, in turn, threatens the 
mode of communicating as users hesitate to provide their e-mail addresses and thus 
share ideas with other Internet users.96 With USENET individuals will either make posts 
with fake addresses, making replies difficult, or they will avoid posting to USENET at all, 
                                                          
89  See Magee (2003) 19/2 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal 339. 
90  Li (2006) 3/11 Webology http://www.webology.ir/2006/v3n1/a23.html (date of use: 7 September 
2015). 
91  See Grossman supra n 79 1544; also Hoffman ‘Unsolicited bulk e-mail: definitions and problems’ 
supra n 80; and Blainpain & Van Gestel Use and Monitoring of e-mail 228. 
92  Ibid Hoffman. 
93  Grossman supra n 79 1544. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Haase, Grimm & Versfeld supra n 75 144. 
96  IT Security ‘The 25 most mistakes in email security’ http://www.itsecurity.com/features/25-common-
email-security-mistakes-022807 (date of use: 10 November 2015).  
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thus depriving the fora of their input.97 Individuals now avoid putting their e-mail 
addresses on web pages, because web crawling robots search for e-mail addresses on 
behalf of spammers as noted above.98 Once spam exceeds legitimate e-mail, it is said 
to have the power to reduce or destroy the usefulness and efficacy of e-mail as a 
modern, fast, and secure communication tool, especially for businesses.99  
 
Throughout the years measures have been put in place to eliminate spam, and while 
these technologies are useful, they have proven to be only part of the solution to this 
escalating problem. Below follows the discussion on technical measures that have been 
implemented in order to protect those affected by spam.  
 
3.4 Technical measures for combating spam 
 
3.4.1 Background  
 
Technical measures have been used to limit spam throughout the years. While not all 
technical measures can be addressed here, a few which are well known and widely 
used will be covered including: filters; blocking techniques and spam fighters.100 These 
are largely used by ISPs in order to protect their clients/users from this scourge.  
 
3.4.2 Types of technical measures in place to combat spam 
 
3.4.2.1 Filters 
 
(a) Background 
 
Filters are the most common anti-spam mechanism used to sort through e-mails before 
they reach recipients’ inboxes. Both recipients and ISPs derive some benefit from the 
use of filters. Using filters has been noted as being able to reduce time lost from having 
                                                          
97  Hoffman ‘Unsolicited bulk e-mail: definitions and problems’ supra n 80.  
98  Ibid.  
99  Haase, Grimm & Versfeld supra n 75 141-2. 
100  See Schreyn supra n 58 59-117 for a discussion of other technical measures in combating spam 
and a model-driven analysis of the effectiveness of technological anti-spam measures. 
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to sort through unwanted e-mails before attending to legitimate mail.101 ISPs, too, can 
reduce the negative impact of these unwanted e-mails by not relaying them.102 Poteet 
puts forward the following options when using filters: “filtering at the client level, running 
e-mails through an external service, and filtering at server-level if the recipient has 
control over this level”.103  
 
The main reason why filters are not used more often (or not used at all) has been 
attributed to the fact that the rate of false positives – ie, legitimate e-mail messages that 
are incorrectly marked as spam – leading to most people being at risk of losing 
important legitimate e-mails, is more critical than the inconvenience caused by spam 
messages.104 Another reason is the fear of losing important e-mails which might have 
been deleted or relegated to the junk folder by filters.105 Below is an outline on the 
different kinds of filters.  
 
(b) Types of filters 
 
Structured text filter 
 
This is the most basic filter which can be built into a number of e-mails, and can enable 
a recipient to set up rules when matches are made based on the e-mail being 
scanned.106 For example, the source code of the message (including header and body) 
is compared against a list of words, phrases, and text patterns that have been 
                                                          
101  See Khong (2004) 1 Erasmus Law and Economic Review 37. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Poteet further notes the following regarding these filters: “the first type offers the most control and 
allows users to set up varying rules for what they consider spam, but does nothing to prevent spam 
from destroying bandwidth; the second deals with spam problem and also places the responsibility 
for confirguring filters on another party (the external service), however, it has the same level of 
control as the first. The last one gives more control than the external service, although it does not 
cut down on bandwidth from the spammer to the server it does, however, it prevents e-mails from 
being downloaded to the clients” (see Poteet supra n 40 140-2). 
104  Poteet supra n 40 150; and Bindman (2013) 39/4 William Mitchell Law Review 1306-09 on the 
advent of spam filters. 
105  Ibid. 
106  An example of this would be “setting up a name on a subject line like “Viagra” with regular 
expressions such as [Vv][Ii] and so forth, which would catch the capitalisation of that word, or any 
other word that one wishes to filter out” (Poteet supra n 40 141). 
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previously identified as belonging to spam messages.107 The advantage of this filter is 
that it can be easily understood and is effective for particular classes of spam, because 
the reason or command is clear regarding the filter and the message will be picked up 
as spam.108 The disadvantage is that this type of filter does not adapt as easily as 
advanced filters to new forms of spam.109 Should it happen that the word or phrase has 
been misspelt it will escape the structured filter.110 
 
Heuristic filter 
 
This filter applies a series of rules that add or subtract points from a set spam score.111 
If the spam score exceeds a predetermined number, the e-mail is then classified as 
spam and appropriate action is taken.112 This filter has an advantage over structured 
filters in that “it looks at a variety of indicators such as: the text in the e-mail; colour 
choices; use of web bugs; e-mail headers; and other characteristics of spam e-mail to 
determine whether that particular e-mail is spam”.113 The feature can assist in reducing 
false positives by not flagging e-mails as spam because they contain “bad” or 
“unsavoury words”.114 The disadvantage is that legitimate e-mail messages can contain 
many of the indicators that this filter is set to flag, and therefore some effort needs to be 
made to strike a balance between what indicators to pay attention to and what the 
threshold should be.115 
 
Bayesian filter 
 
                                                          
107  See Goodman Spam Wars 206-07.  
108  Ibid; Wanli Ma et al Hoodwinking spam email filters (Proceedings of the 2007 WSEAS International 
Conference on Computer engineering and Applications Australia January 17-19 2007) 533-537 
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dat_Tran11/publication/255665198.Hoodwinking_Spam_Email
Filters/links/54087f860cf2c48563bdc37f.pdf (date of use: 26 November 2015). 
109  Ibid. 
110  Ibid. 
111   Zdziarski Ending Spam 29-32. 
112  Ibid.  
113  Ibid; Subramaniam, Jalab & Taqa (2010) 5/12 International Journal of the Physical Sciences 1873.  
114  Ibid. 
115  Poteet supra n 40 142. 
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This type of filter is based on the mathematical probabilities of a given message being 
spam.116 Instead of looking for particular phrases or applying rules to determine a spam 
score, Bayesian filtering compares the style of the e-mail being scanned against a 
number of lists of e-mails: one that has been previously provided; one containing good 
e-mails; and one containing spam.117 This filter makes a statistical analysis of the e-mail 
and determines the probability of the e-mail being spam.118 This filter is good at flagging 
spam and reducing false positives, however, it is difficult to detect whether the filter will 
flag a particular e-mail as spam or legitimate e-mail.119  
 
3.4.2.2 Blocking spam by using blacklists and whitelists 
 
Blocking spam e-mails can be used at domain level where the Internet protocol (IP) 
address of incoming mail that is offensive is determined and added by an administrator 
of the network to what is termed a “blacklist”.120 The downside of blacklists is that they 
require human intervention to block spammers who appear on those lists.121  
 
Whitelists on the other hand, are “approved sender lists” which allow users to identify e-
mail(s) from approved and legitimate senders.122 The difficulties associated with 
whitelists is that while they can assist in reducing spam, they are, however, prone to 
spoofing or falsification of e-mail source data.123 In order for these technical measures 
to be effective, new addresses must constantly be added in order to stop spam from 
entering mail boxes.124 Other blocking methods include greylisting which have been 
credited with being successful in protecting e-mail servers against spam, however, it too 
                                                          
116  Ibid; Schryen supra n 58 69-71. 
117  Ibid.  
118  Ibid. 
119  Ibid. Subramaniam, Jalab & Taqa supra n 113 1873. 
120  Chigona W; Bheejun A; Spath M; Derakhashani S and Van Belle JP ‘Perceptions on 
spam in a South African context’ Internet and Information Technology in Modern Organisations: 
Challenges and Answers 283-291  
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.515.745&rep=rep1&type=pdf (date of 
use: 20 January 2016); and Zdziarski supra n 111 27-8. 
121   Asscher & Hoogcarspel supra n 36 125; and Subramaniam, Jalab & Taqa supra n 112 1873. 
122  Id Asscher & Hoogcarspel 123; and Schryen supra n 58 64. 
123  Ibid. See also Chigona et al supra n 120 283-291. 
124  Ibid. 
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has inherent drawbacks.125 The last part in this chapter focuses on spam fighters and 
their role in combating spam. 
 
3.4.2.3 Spam fighters 
 
There have been proactive measures put in place to curb spam through organisations 
whose sole purpose it is to eradicate spam. These spam fighter groups include, but are 
not limited to, the Coalition against Unsolicited Commercial E-mail and Spamhaus.  
 
(a) The Coalition against Unsolicited Commercial E-mail 
 
The Coalition for against Unsolicited Commercial E-mail126 was founded in May 1997 by 
concerned Internet users to advocate for anti-spam laws in the United States of 
America. It has been instrumental in the discussions around amendments of other anti-
spam laws to include e-mail.127 CAUCE does not assist with spam reports, but directs 
whomever has complaints to relevant stakeholders.128 CAUCE also updates individuals 
on what is taking place regarding spam around the world.129  
 
(b) Spamhaus 
 
                                                          
125  See Schryen supra n 58 65. Schryen note that “the main problem with greylisting has been the 
assumption that spammers do not implement the resume feature in order to increase their 
throughput, thus making it easier for them to circumvent the greylisting”.  
126  Hereafter referred to as “CAUCE”. CAUCE is a non-profit advocacy group with branches 
worldwide, that works to reduce the amount of spam via legislation. The Canadian chapter was 
launched in 1998; followed by Australia in 1998; India later merged into APCAUCE (Asia-Pacific). 
CAUCE also created an international parent group named CAUCE International (iCAUCE). CAUCE 
North America Inc. was formed in March 2007 from a merger between CAUCE and CAUCE 
Canada. CAUCE ‘About CAUCE’ http://www.cauce.org/about.html (date of use: 30 November 
2015). 
127  Ibid.  
128  CAUCE ‘Spam reporting centers’ http://www.cauce.org/spam-reporting-centres.html (date of use: 
30 November 2015). CAUCE also collaborates with the following groups: the Messaging Anti-
abuse Working Group (MAAWG); the anti-phishing Working Group (APWG); London Action Plan 
(LAP); and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN). CAUCE ‘About 
CAUCE’ http://www.cauce.org/about.html (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
129  CAUCE ‘Home’ http://www.cauce.org (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
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Spamhaus was founded in 1998 and it is based in Geneva.130 It is run by 38 
investigators, forensic specialists, and network engineers located in ten countries.131 
The Spamhaus project is an international non-profit organisation whose mission is, 
among others: to track the Internet’s spam operation and sources; to provide 
dependable real time anti-spam protection for Internet networks; to work with law 
enforcement agencies; to identify and pursue spam and malware gangs worldwide; and 
to lobby governments for effective anti-spam legislation.132  
 
Spamhaus also maintains a number of security intelligence databases and real-time 
spam-blocking databases responsible for withholding the vast majority of spam and 
malware sent out on the Internet.133 In addition to generating real-time reputation data, 
Spamhaus publishes the Register of Known Spam Operations (ROKSO), a database 
collating information and evidence on the “100 known professional spammers and spam 
gangs” worldwide.134 ROSKO is used by ISPs to avoid signing up known spammers 
who would abuse their networks, and by law enforcement agencies to help target and 
mount prosecutions against spam and malware.135 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the use of different methods to extract personal information from the 
Internet by spammers and marketers alike in order to distribute spam was highlighted. It 
has also emerged clearly that consumers surf the net without considering their privacy 
and are largely oblivious to the deceptive practices used by spammers and markerts on 
the Internet. This reveals a lack of education on the consumer’s part on how to conduct 
                                                          
130  Spamhaus ‘About Spamhaus’ https://www.spamhaus/organization (date of use: 30 November 
2015). 
131   Ibid. 
132  Ibid. 
133  These are used by the majority of Internet e-mail service providers, corporations, universities, 
governments, and military networks. These security intelligence databases include: the Spamhaus 
Block List (SBL); the Exploits Block List (XBL); the Policy Block List (PBL); and the Domain Block 
List (DBL). Spamhaus currently protects over 1,9 billion internet user mailboxes (ibid). 
134  Ibid. 
135  Ibid. 
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themselves, especially in an online environment.136 Consumers should note some 
important pointers when surfing the net which include: being on the look-out for and 
reading the posted privacy statements of individual web sites before divulging their 
personal information to find out what personal information that web site gathers, and 
with whom it will be shared; and when filing forms online, they should keep their 
information private by making sure of its transit across the Internet.137 
 
It is also noted in this chapter that while there are technical measures in place to 
eliminate spam, these have only proven effective to a limited extent, and that while they 
do not reduce the overall cost associated with spamming, they can substantially avoid 
the cost of forwarding and storing spam e-mails for their subscribes.138 The problem, 
however, persits so proving that the spammer is invariably one step ahead of any 
measures currently available. 
 
In order to combat spam, research has been undertaken by different stakeholders. In 
Chapter 4 an examination of the initiatives taken by the international arena in combating 
spam is undertaken. 
                                                          
136  Smith (2005) 12/2 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 186. 
137  See Idler supra n 8 42. Consumers should also “protect themselves from less reputable sellers 
online, by looking for sites that clearly disclose the following: the type of business (for example, 
retailers, online auction); where this business is physically located; how one can contact the 
business (for example, 800 number); the cost of the products and services; safeguards for 
protecting payment information; and the availability of warranties or guaranties; sites that can make 
a significant difference in one’s e-mail experience”. See O’Neill B (2001) 47 Consumer Interests 1; 
and Poteet supra n 40 10-11. 
138  See Khong (2004) Erasmus Law and Economic Review 38. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TO COMBAT SPAM 
ITU AND OECD 
 
4.1 Introduction  
  
In the first three chapters the basis for the study was laid by noting how spam evolved 
into the scourge it is today. Also the technological measures put in place in order to 
combat spam were considered. The international arena entered the discourse as far 
back as the early 2000s lending its voice in this ongoing process. A number of 
international organisations (some of which were highlighted in the previous chapter), 
were formed with the sole purpose of creating awareness of this problem, and coming 
up with solutions. In this chapter focus is on the two organisations which conducts 
research among others in combating spam, namely: the ITU; and the OECD.  
 
The research undertaken by these organisations has been and remains instrumental in 
encouraging the transposition of Model Laws to the national level, encouraging mutual 
agreements in combating spam at a global level, advising regional communities on their 
initiatives to address the issue of spam, and the question of enforcement.  
 
Here a discussion on initiatives by these two organisations to estabish how this battle 
has been waged through the years and whether there are solutions in sight for this ever-
escalating problem is undertaken. Focus will be on the backgrounds of each 
organisation, research and initiatives the organisations has undertaken, and the 
recommendations each has come up with. Surveys, discussion documents, and reports 
are highlighted to establish whether they offer solutions to the problem. 
 
4.2 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
 
4.2.1 Background  
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The ITU was established in 1865 to facilitate and regulate the interconnection and inter-
operability of national telegraph networks.1 Over the years, its mandate has extended to 
cover the development of radio-communication and telecommunication, among others.2 
The ITU has also been a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN) since 1947.3 It 
has over 190 member states and 700 private-sector members.4  
 
The overall objectives of the ITU are to promote the development of telecommunication 
networks and access to telecommunication services by fostering cooperation between 
governments and a range of non-governmental actors, which include a variety of role 
players.5 The three main sectors6 of the ITU are: Radio-communications (ITU-R); 
Telecommunication development (ITU-D); and Telecommunication standards (ITU-T).7 
Focus will be on the ITU-T sector whose mandate it is to research and put forth 
initiatives in combating spam. 
 
                                                          
1  ITU ‘Discover ITU’s History’ http://www.itu.int/en/History/Pages/DiscoveerITUsHistory.aspx (date of 
use: 30 November 2015). 
2  Ibid. 
3  ITU ‘About ITU’ http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages?default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
4  ITU ‘700+ ITU Sector Members & Academia’ http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/membership.aspx 
(date of use: 30 November 2015). The ITU is located in Geneva Switzerland and has 11 regional 
and area offices around the world. It coordinates global networks and services of both governments 
and the private sector. 
5  These role players include: network operators; service providers; equipment manufacturers; 
scientific and technical organisations; financial organisations; and development organisations. For 
the objectives of the ITU see: Article 1 of the Constitution of the ITU ‘Collection of the Basic Texts 
of the International Telecommunication Union Adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conference’ (2011 
edition, hereafter the ‘ITU Constitution’) http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF (date use: 6 November 2015). 
6  These three sectors are mandated by the Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU, see art 1 of the 
Convention of the ITU (2002). For the functions of the Plenipotentiary Conference see art 8 of the 
ITU Constitution; and ITU ‘Sector Members, Associates and Academia’ 
http://www.itu.int/en/membership/Pages/sector-members.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015).  
7  The Radio-communications (ITU-R) coordinates the vast growing range of radio-communication 
services, as well as international management of the radio frequency spectrum and satellite orbits. 
See ITU ‘What does ITU do?’ http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/whatwedo.aspx (date of use: 30 
November 2015). The ITU-D has as its core mission to forge international solidarity in the delivery 
of technical assistance and in the creation and development and improvement of 
telecommunication/ICT equipment and networks in developing countries. See ITU ‘About the ITU-D 
and the BDT’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Pages/About.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
Each of these sectors activities is directed by international and regional conferences, supported by 
a bureau under the administration of a director. The bureau directors are in turn advised by 
advisory groups open to representatives of national telecommunication administrators, authorised 
organisations, and study groups.   
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4.2.2 The Telecommunication Standards Sector (ITU-T) 
 
4.2.2.1 Introduction  
 
The ITU-T assembles experts from around the world to develop international standards 
known as ITU-T recommendations.8 These recommendations act as defining elements 
in the global infrastructure of ICT.9 The framework of the ITU-T sector includes the 
following groups and/or activities: the World Telecommunication Standardisation 
Assemblies10 – an assembly that sets out the overall direction and structure for the ITU-
T;11 the Telecommunication Standardisation Advisory Group12 which provides ITU-T 
with flexibility between WTSA by reviewing priorities, programmes, operations, and 
strategies, among other things;13 and study groups which represent the standardised 
work of the ITU-T by technical study groups. Representatives of the ITU-T membership 
develop recommendations (standards) for various fields of international 
telecommunication;14 hold workshops and seminars to promote existing work areas and 
explore new ones;15 and Technology Watch, which identifies and surveys emerging 
technologies and their likely impact on future standardisation for both developed and 
developing countries.16  
 
                                                          
8   See ITU ‘The framework of ITU-T’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/Pages/framework.aspx (date of 
use: 30 November 2015). 
9  Ibid.  
10  Hereafter referred to as ‘WTSA’. The WTSA meets every four years and defines the general policy 
for the sector, establishes study groups, approves their expected work programmes, and also 
appoints their chairmen and vice chairmen. 
11  See art 18(2) of the ITU Constitution; and art 13 of the ITU Convention.  
12  Hereafter referred to as ‘TSAG’.  
13   The TSAG follows up on the achievements of a particular work program, restructures and 
establishes ITU-T study groups, and also provides guidelines to the study groups. See art 19 of the 
ITU Constitution and art 14A of the ITU Convention. 
14  There are a number of study groups conducted in the ITU-T sector, and they work in periods of four 
years during which they must formulate recommendations. The study groups’ work is done 
primarily in the form of study questions, each addressing technical studies in a particular area of 
telecommunication standardisation. ITU ‘ITU-T study groups (study period 2013-2016)’ 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/2013-2016/Pages/default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 
2015); also art 23 of the ITU Constitution; art 14 of the ITU Convention; and ITU ‘ITU-T in brief’ 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/Pages/default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
15  ITU ‘What does ITU do?’ supra n 7.  
16  Ibid. 
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4.2.2.2 Study Group 17 
 
Study Group 1717 was formed by the merging of study groups 7 and 10 in 2001.18 SG17 
coordinates security-related work across all ITU-T study groups which includes cyber-
security, security management, identity management, and countering spam.19 SG17 
has been designated the “Lead Study Group” (LSG) for the telecommunication security 
sector.20 The objective of the ITU’s study of spam is to help member states and relevant 
operating agencies to investigate the significance and characteristics of their spam 
issues.21 
 
4.3 Countering and combating spam  
 
4.3.1 Background 
 
                                                          
17  Hereafter referred to as ‘SG17’. 
18  See ITU ‘Short history of study group 17’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/2013-
2016/17/Pages/history.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015). Study group 7 was responsible for, 
among others, data communication, data network and open system communications. See ITU-T 
‘Study Group 7 area of responsibility (study period 1997-2000)’ http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/1997-
2000/com07/area-resp-old.html (date of use: 30 November 2015). Study group 10, on the other 
hand, dealt with languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems. See ITU 
‘ITU-T study group 10 (study period 2001-2004)’ http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/studygroups/com10/index.html (date of use: 30 November 2015). For a short history of the 
merger between the two groups see ITU ‘Merger of study groups 7 and 10 into new study group 17’ 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygoups/com07/merger.html (date of use: 30 November 2015).  
19   Other activities in this group include protection of identifiable information, and security of 
applications and services for the Internet of things (IoT). ITU ‘Study group 17 at a glance’ 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/groups/Pages/sg17.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015); and 
ITU ‘ITU-T work programme’ http://www.itu.int/itu-t/workprog/wp_block.aspx?isn=1759 (date of use: 
30 November 2015).  
20  Activities of the LSG include: “developing and maintaining security outreach; coordination of 
security-related work; and identification of needs and assignment and prioritization of work to 
encourage timely development of telecommunication security recommendations. All study groups 
are requested to keep SG17 informed of their work plans regarding security so that they can 
integrate into an overall security work programme”. ITU ‘ITU-T study group 17 (study period 2005-
2008)’ http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/2005-2008/com17/tel-security.html (date of use: 30 November 
2015).  
21  See ITU-T ‘Study groups (study period 2013-2017)’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/2013-
2016/17/Pages/countering -spam.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
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The ITU’s initial activities relating to countering spam consisted of a discussion 
framework for international cooperation.22 Following the recommendations of the Global 
Symposium Regulator (GSR) a virtual conference on regulatory cooperation on spam 
was held on 30 March 2004.23 In May of the same year, the spam laws and authorities 
web site was created containing data from more than 40 countries which had adopted 
anti-spam measures.24 This web site is updated continuously with information received 
directly from member states.25 The web site maintains a webpage dedicated to 
international cooperation initiatives, providing information on the content and scope of 
new projects, referring to and linking with the organising or responsible entities, and 
maintaining an updated list of interesting meetings and conferences on the topic.26 
 
The ITU World Summit on the Information Society27 Thematic Meeting on countering 
spam followed,28 where it was noted that: “spam was becoming a major concern taking 
into account fraudulent activities such as phishing which threatened the confidence in e-
mail and the Internet as a whole”.29 The following sessions covering the topics below 
were held at this meeting: the scope of the problem; technical solutions; consumer 
education and awareness; spam legislation and enforcement (a cross-border issue); 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation; and frameworks for international action.30  
  
                                                          
22  See ITU ‘Council 2005: Note by the Secretary-General Report on spam’ Document C05/EP/10-E 
(Geneva 12-22 July 2005) 2 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/itu-spam-council-report.pdf (date of 
use: 30 November 2015).  
23  This conference gathered representatives from regulators responsible for countering spam from a 
number of countries. ITU ‘Virtual Conference on Regulatory Cooperation on Spam’ 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/semonars/Virtual-events/Spam/index.html (date of use: 30 
November 2015).  
24  ITU ‘Council 2005: Note by the Secretary-General Report on spam’ supra n 22 2. 
25   Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Hereafter ‘WSIS’. See ITU Legislation and enforcement: a cross-border issue 
https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/law.html (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
28  ITU WSIS Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam (Geneva, 7-9 July 2004) 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/presentations/HORTON-OpeningRemarks.pdf (date of use: 30 
November 2015). 
29  The chairperson noted in his remarks that “there was a need for improved cooperation in the field, 
and improving the exchange of best practices between developed and developing countries, 
creating harmonized legal frameworks and cooperating with other international organizations 
working in the area”. ITU ‘WSIS Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam: Chairman’s Report’ 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/chairman-report.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
30  Ibid. 
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In 2005 it was noted that spam had developed into a real threat to the security of e-
mails and of the Internet as a whole.31 Also noted was that spam is a significant and 
growing business for users, networks, and the Internet as a whole, and that to build 
confidence and security in the use of ICTs, there is a need to take appropriate action at 
both national and international levels.32  
 
4.3.2 Survey conducted 
 
In realising its objective of countering spam, the ITU conducted a survey among its 
member states to establish their anti-spam measures or lack thereof.33 The survey was 
conducted in 2004 and involved 189 ITU member states.34 Of the 189 member states 
who participated, only 58 responses were received.35 The survey revealed that while  a 
number of countries had implemented anti-spam laws,36 several countries used 
alternative laws – such as data protection laws, consumer protection laws, or electronic 
commerce laws – to address the spam issue.37 In other countries laws used to enforce 
spam fell under the jurisdiction of communication regulators and other related bodies.38 
Some countries were in the process of discussing the adoption of specific anti-spam 
legislation,39 while several countries had developed no anti-spam legislation at that 
time.40  
                                                          
31  The meeting was held from 28 June to 1 July 2005. See ITU ‘Council 2005: Note by the Secretary-
General Report on spam’ supra n 22 5. 
32  See para C5 (d) Plan of Action. ITU World Summit on the Information Society ‘Plan of Action’ 
Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (12 December 2003) 
http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
33  See generally Bueti MC ITU Survey on Anti-spam Legislation Worldwide ITU WSIS Thematic 
Meeting on Cybersecurity (Geneva 28 June-01 July 2005) Document: CYB/06 1-62 http://www.itu-
int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf (date of use: 30 November 
2015). 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Id 57-8 for survey results. At the time of the survey 26 countries had anti-spam legislation in place. 
These included: Australia; Austria; Belgium; China; Czech Republic; Cyprus; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luthuania; Malta; The Netherlands; 
Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom; and the USA.  
37  Ibid. The 18 countries include: Argentina; Armenia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; Columbia; 
Costa Rica; South Korea; Hong Kong; Luxemburg; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; Russia; 
and Switzerland. 
38  Id 58. 
39  Ibid. Nine countries were at the time of the survey working on implementing anti-spam laws 
namely: Argentina; Brazil; Canada; Columbia; Hong Kong; New Zealand; Russia; Singapore; and 
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4.3.3 Approaches to combating spam by the ITU 
 
The ITU noted that since spam is a serious problem for the Internet it concluded that a 
single approach to resolving the problem was inadequate and that a coordinated global 
approach was required.41 The ITU further observed that spam was a problem impacting 
on privacy issues, the protection of minors and human dignity, additional costs for 
businesses, and a loss of productivity. Furthermore, spam was increasingly used in 
combination with or as a vehicle for viruses.42 It was further noted that spam generally 
undermines consumer confidence which is essential for the success of electronic 
commerce, electronic services, and the development of the information society.43 The 
acknowledgment of this problem as one with global implications gave rise to a number 
of initiatives in the fight against spam. 
 
A coordinated global approach was outlined in Resolutions 5144 and 52 and included a 
multi-pronged or comprehensive approach to combating spam. This was reiterated in 
2006 when it was noted that this approach should include international cooperation to 
counter the problems associated with cyber security, including spam.45 These two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Turkey. Note should be taken here that some of these countries now have anti-spam legislation in 
place (for example, Canada (2014); Singapore (2008); and New Zealand (2007)). 
40  Ibid. These countries included: Bangladesh; Burkina Fuso; El Salvador; Haiti; Ecuador; Kuwait; 
Lebanon; Madagascar; Moldova; Morocco; Qatar; Singapore; Syria; and Turkey.  
41  ITU WSIS Thematic meeting on countering spam supra n 28 1. 
42  ITU WSIS Thematic meeting on countering spam ‘Multilateral and Bilateral cooperation to 
combating spam’ (2004) 1-12 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper 
Multilateral%20Bilateral%20Coop.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015); Sarrocco C Spam the 
Information Society: Building Frameworks for International Cooperation (2004) 11 for an outline on 
the impact of spam 1-28 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20 
Paper_Building%20Frameworks%20for%20Int/%20Cooperation.pdf (date of use: 30 November 
2015); Bambauer DE et al A comparative analysis of spam laws: the quest for a Model Law (June 
2005) 9-10 https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_ 
Comparative_Analysis_of_Spam_Laws.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
43  Ibid. 
44  ITU-T Telecommunication Standardization Sector of ITU World Telecommunication Standardization 
Assembly (WTSA) (Resolution passed in Florianopolis, 5-14 October 2004) ‘Resolution 51: 
Combating Spam’ http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/wtsa/resolutions04/Res51E.pdf (date of use: 30 
November 2015); ITU-T World Telecommunication Standardization Sector of ITU World 
Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA) (resolution was passed in Dubai, 20-29 
November 2012) ‘Resolution 52: Countering Spam’ (which has been renamed ‘Countering and 
combating spam’ 1-5 http://www.itu.int./dms_pub/ITU-T/opb/res/T-RES-T.52-2012-PDF-E.pdf (date 
of use: 30 November 2015). 
45  ITU-T World Telecommunication Development Conference WTDC-06 ‘Mechanisms for enhancing 
cooperation on cybersecurity, including combatting spam’ (Document 116 (Rev.5)-E (12 April 
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resolutions were later combined to form a consolidated ‘Resolution 52’ on countering 
and combating spam. 
 
4.3.4 A comprehensive or multi-pronged approach to combating spam 
(Resolution 52) 
 
4.3.4.1 Background 
 
The ITU considered that exchanging e-mails and other forms of telecommunication over 
the Internet had become one of the main means of communication between people 
around the world.46 The ITU also noted that with a variety of definitions for spam, it was 
clear that spam has become a widespread problem resulting in potential loss of revenue 
for ISPs, telecommunication operators, mobile telecommunication operators, and 
business users alike.47 Countering spam by technical means burdens affected entities, 
including network operators, ISPs, and users who receive spam against their wishes.48  
 
Further, spam is often used for criminal, fraudulent, or deceptive activities and is a 
global problem that requires international cooperation if solutions are to be found.49 
Addressing the issue of spam has become a matter of urgency and that a “multi-
pronged” or “comprehensive approach” to combating spam was important. Resolution 
52, which outlined the following multi-pronged approach: strong legislation; the 
development of technical measures; the establishment of industry partnerships to 
accelerate the studies; education; and international cooperation.50 All five elements will 
be discussed in order to review the recommendations and or guidelines mooted.  
 
4.3.4.2 Strong legislation 
 
(a) Introduction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2006)) https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/ITU-060315-CoopInCSpam.pdf (date of use: 
30 November 2015). 
46  See Resolution 52 pars (a)-(k) supra n 44. 
47   Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
49   Ibid. 
50  Resolution 52 (c) (i-v) supra n 44. 
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First on the list of a multi-pronged approach to combating spam is strong legislation. 
According to the ITU, “legislation is a fundamental tool in the anti-spam battle and care 
must be taken in enacting appropriate and efficient legislation in conjunction with 
appropriate enforcement”.51 And that spam is a “horizontal issue” touching different 
aspects of telecommunications, trade, privacy and consumer protection.52 Therefore, 
the legal framework that must be put in place to combat spam is complex owing, in 
particular, to the multitude of laws that have been enacted and differing national 
authorities which deal with the topic.53  
 
The first step to strong legislation is to identify and use or create laws to prohibit spam 
in one’s country.54 For the ITU, there is a need not only to embrace national approaches 
to spam, but also to be clear on the international component of those anti-spam 
responses as, realistically, no one is able to stop spam on his or her own.55 Each set of 
laws should be seen as part of a web of anti-spam legislation stretching around the 
globe.56 The ITU noted that the first anti-spam law was enacted when an average e-mail 
user received approximately one unsolicited commercial e-mail message per week, and 
since then the volume of spam has increased.57 The ITU further noted that while 
countries have enacted anti-spam laws, those laws have largely been “sentimental 
laws” and were passed for purposes of having legislation in place.58 Little effort or 
design was put into how these laws were to be enforced.59 Those who had anti-spam 
legislation in place were seen to have failed to harmonise their legislation so as to 
provide greater protection for their consumers by ensuring that the laws not only protect 
                                                          
51  See ITU WSIS Thematic workshop on countering spam ‘Discussion Paper Countering Spam: How 
to Craft an Effective Anti-Spam Law’ 1-15 at 4 and 8 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_How%20to%20craft%20-
effective%20anti-spam%20law.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
52   Ibid. 
53  Sarrocco supra n 42 14.  
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Bueti supra n 33 8-9. 
58   See ITU WSIS ‘Discussion Paper Countering Spam: How to Craft an Effective Anti-Spam Law’ 
supra n 51 4. 
59  Ibid. 
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users nationally, but that they also do so internationally.60 Adopting effective legislation 
was seen as the first and essential step in combating spam. And while legislation may 
not on its own be sufficient, it was seen as a minimum necessity to cope with spam to 
define the rights and obligations, and thereby ensure as much legal certainty as 
possible.61 In dealing with this issue the ITU noted that while there were anti-spam 
legislation in place, there were also challenges facing its implementation. 
 
(b) Challenges in implementing legislation to combat spam at national level 
 
The ITU observed that in countries with anti-spam laws, there was a trend towards 
adopting spam-specific regulation rather than simply applying general-purpose laws to 
electronic communications.62 It also noted that spam posed unusual challenges to 
regulation given its cross-border context and unique financial structures.63 Legislators 
were advised to adopt rules aimed specifically at spam and emphasise the need to align 
existing laws64 for example, data protection and anti-fraud provisions – with these new 
rules to ensure that the theories underlying the regulations are coherent.65 These laws 
vary considerably in their approach to tackling the issue of spam. This includes the way 
in which countries define the term spam and the mechanisms they use to regulate it.66 
These countries also set requirements subject to which unsolicited communications can 
be sent. These requirements are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
(c) Requirements  for strong anti-spam legislation 
 
Definition of spam   
 
                                                          
60  Ibid. 
61  ITU WSIS ‘Multilateral and bilateral cooperation to combat spam’ supra n 42 3.  
62  Bueti supra n 33 9. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Bambauer et al supra n 42 10-11. 
65  Ibid.  
66  Sarrocco supra n 42 14. For e-mail to be legitimate, many anti-spam instruments required as a 
general rule that the unsolicited mail must be commercial in nature.  
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The ITU noted that there is no agreed definition of spam generally accepted by 
stakeholders embodied in anti-spam laws.67 Therefore, the initial decision for legislators 
when assessing spam, is whether to differentiate between messages on the basis of 
their content or of their purpose.68 A further characteristic is that spam is sent in bulk – 
whereby the sender distributes a large number of essentially identical messages and 
recipients are chosen indiscriminately.69 Many spam laws focus on messages with a 
commercial content which presupposes the advertising of products and services 
addressed to recipients.70  
 
While there is disagreement and confusion as to the precise definition, it was noted that 
there is fairly widespread agreement that spam exhibits certain general characteristics. 
First, spam generally takes the form of an electronic message – in most cases restricted 
to e-mail but there are other methods of delivering spam including: SMS; Voiceover 
Internet Protocol (VoIP); and mobile phone multimedia messaging services.71 Secondly, 
spam is unsolicited in that no consent is given for the receipt of the messages.72 
 
Mechanisms for regulating spam 
 
The ITU advised that in order to regulate spam, legislators should, in the initial phase, 
determine whether unsolicited messages are permitted or forbidden.73 To that end, anti-
spam legislation should either adopt the “opt-out mechanism”, or the “opt-in 
mechanism”.74 These mechanisms, while common, vary from country to country. Opt-in 
regimes focus on the means of obtaining, recording, and revoking consent, while the 
                                                          
67  Ibid.  
68  Bambauer et al supra n 42 16. 
69   Ibid. 
70  Ibid. The ITU noted for instance, that Japan’s spam laws only apply to organizations that make 
profit or individuals engaged in business, while Australian spam laws expressly do not apply if they 
affect the constitutional right of political parties. 
71  Bueti supra n 33 7. Bueti noted that “in some countries applications relates specifically only to e-
mail and that communications by other applications are covered by other regulators. In such cases 
regulators also need to decide whether the laws will cover other applications such as dealing with 
spam only in the context of e-mail or SMS texts et cetera”. 
72  Ibid 
73  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
3. 
74  Ibid. 
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opt-out regime concentrates on how recipients can indicate that they do not wish to 
receive messages.75  
 
(i) Opt-in mechanism 
 
This mechanism requires prior consent from the recipient before any marketing 
correspondence can be sent.76 The opt-in mechanism discourages marketers from 
sending spam to consumers unless they have clearly asked to receive those 
messages.77 The ITU noted that “those who adopt this approach are making a 
statement that marketers should not send messages to recipients unless those 
recipients have expressly asked to receive such communications”.78 Under the opt-in 
approach affirmative requests for messages may be delivered directly by a recipient in 
the form of an actual request, or consent can be constructively construed if the sender 
has an existing business relationship with the recipient.79 The ITU noted in some 
jurisdictions that have adopted this approach, also create an exception for business 
entities with which recipients have a pre-existing business relationship.80 In that case, 
member countries could choose between the opt-in and opt-out approaches, provided 
that they respect the legitimate interests of subscribers with regard to unsolicited 
communications.81  
 
The ITU pointed out that the critics of the opt-in mechanism contend that it 
unreasonably burdens legitimate business.82 Direct marketers have in this case cited 
statistics to show that some e-mail users wish to receive unsolicited offers via e-mail, 
                                                          
75  Bambauer et al supra n 42 17. 
76  Sarrocco supra n 42 15.  
77  Ibid. 
78  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
5. 
79  Ibid. For example if one buys a product under this approach, the merchant may send an offer(s) in 
the future until one asks that merchant to stop.  
80  This exception is applicable only to advertisements of similar products and services and the 
address must be used by the same person who legally collected the original data. Sarrocco supra n 
42 15.  
81  Ibid. 
82  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
5-6  
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and that closing that channel entirely would be overly restrictive and burdensome.83 The 
ITU also noted that approximately one-third of anti-spam laws are considered to have 
adopted the opt-in mechanism.84 It also observed that although these laws have 
proliferated over the years, prosecutions under them remain virtually non-existent.85 The 
ITU further noted that any anti-spam regime with an opt-in system at its core, is almost 
certain to offer a more aggressive anti-spam regime than the opt-out system.86 
 
(ii) Opt-out mechanism 
 
As regards the opt-out mehanism, the ITU noted that this regime considers direct 
marketing, and therefore unsolicited commercial communication, a legitimate activity 
unless certain conditions are not respected.87 The opt-out approach advocates that a 
sender may send a message to a recipient even if there is no existing business 
relationship. It is important to note that the recipients must have not specifically elected 
to receive such messages.88 Laws that advocate for this mechanism, typically require 
the sender to honour the requests of recipients to be removed from its mailing list.89  
 
Critics of the opt-out mechanism note that this mechanism legalises spam because it 
does not expressly provide that the sending of unsolicited e-mail messages is illegal.90 
Instead, this mechanism provides a framework under which such messages may be 
sent as a result exacerbating the problem.91 It is noted that most users already have 
strong preconceptions regarding spam, and they have been widely advised not to open 
or reply to any spam messages to avoid confirming that their e-mail addresses are 
                                                          
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. Countries that have adopted the opt-in mechanism include: Australia; Singapore; and New 
Zealand. The Australian position in combating spam is discussed in Chapter 7 below. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Bambauer et al supra n 42 17. 
87  Sarocco supra n 42 15. 
88  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
5; and Sarrocco supra n 42 15.  
89  Ibid. In this instance, unsolicited messages may be sent but senders should refrain from sending 
such upon a request from recipients.  
90   ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 5  
91  Ibid.  
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active.92 The ITU observed that approximately two-thirds of world’s anti-spam laws can 
be regarded as expressions of the opt-out mechanism.93 It noted further that two of the 
most effective anti-spam laws originated in two states in the USA which have adopted 
the opt-out mechanism as their default mechanism.94 The same was later adopted by 
the federal law in 2003. Even the OECD noted that while these laws  appeared to have 
been weak on paper, they managed to address the practical problems prosecutors face 
when enforcing laws against spammers.95 Regarding these two mechanisms (opt-in and 
opt-out) the ITU noted that the lesson to be learned is “that the strength of the sentiment 
in a specific law bears little correlation to the successful enforcement of that law”.96  
 
Note should be taken here that the first two requirements – the definition and the 
mechanisms – are found in most anti-spam laws currently in force. However, in most 
jurisdictions the requirements that follow do not necessarily apply either in whole or in 
part. In the discussion below I continue by outlining additional requirements for anti-
spam laws.  
 
Fraudulent or misleading header information 
 
(i) Background 
 
The ITU defines a subject line as part of the message body which is generally displayed 
by a user’s e-mail application system along with the sender’s name and address.97 It is 
common cause that spam messages often contain false subject lines designed to lure 
                                                          
92  Sarocco supra n 42 16.  
93  Id 17. The ITU noted that countries such as the USA; South Korea; and Columbia have adopted 
the opt-out mechanism.  
94  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
5-6. The two states are: Virginia and Washington. The provisions of those states and the USA’s 
Federal Law are discussed at length in Chapter 6 where the anti-spam laws of the USA are 
highlighted. 
95  Ibid.  
96  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
6. 
97  Id 20.  
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users into opening and viewing the messages.98 The ITU noted that a common concern 
regarding subject-line requirements is “the burden they place on legitimate law-
compliant advertisers while having no effect on non-compliant senders”.99 
 
(ii) Disguising sender identity 
 
According to the ITU, most anti-spam laws prohibit messages that contain fraudulent, 
deceptive or misleading information – for example, an incorrect representation of the 
sender’s identity, e-mail address, or affiliation.100 This further includes an incorrect opt-
out address for users to decline further communication,101 or where the purpose of the 
message and its routing path (including message headers)102 are incorrect.103 It is noted 
that these provisions are important to the aim and application of spam legislation, 
because if senders were to be allowed to defraud recipients, consumers would be less 
willing to engage in electronic commerce.104  
 
Messages with fraudulent sender addresses are set to harm innocent third parties who 
may suffer significant reputational damage, and who may incur significant costs when 
consumer complaints are erroneously sent to them.105 The ITU noted that the 
falsification of the sender’s identity in the header message makes law enforcement 
more difficult and further adds to user costs – especially senders whose addresses are 
frequently disguised.106  
 
(iii) Use of labels 
 
                                                          
98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid. Bambauer et al supra n 42 20. 
100  Bambauer et al supra n 42 16. 
101   Ibid. 
102   A “header” is part of the message that describes the originator; the addressee; other recipients; 
priority of a message; subject of the message et cetera. WhatIs.com ‘Definition header’ 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/def/header (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
103  Ibid. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid. 
106  Id 14.  
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The ITU noted that the label requirement is common but varies from one legal system to 
another. Spam messages are required to have a subject line containing the following 
characters “ADV” to enable recipients to set filters to delete or quarantine all messages 
with “ADV” in the subject line.107 This approach seeks to enable users to identify spam 
messages easily by requiring that the subject line contain a distinctive identifier such as 
a series of characters.108 This condition is often imposed for messages having sexually 
explicit content to warn the recipient of the content and, in particular, to avoid it reaching 
children who are often the unintended recipients of this form of spam.109  
 
Labels for commercial messages have also been imposed in that the use of tags in the 
subject line of an e-mail is visible, and so allows users to identify commercial messages 
more easily.110 This is set to be in order to allow users to make use of filters which 
redirect those e-mails to a specific folder, or to avoid children receiving e-mail 
messages with pornographic content.111 The ITU noted that labeling requirements may 
increase the volume of non-compliant messages as marginal senders may choose 
openly to disregard the law rather than increase the likelihood that their messages will 
be deleted by filters.112  
 
The ITU reckons that additional quantitative research would be useful in this area 
because the merits of such requirements depend on an empirical assessment of how 
frequently users filter messages based on subject lines.113 Furthermore, how often 
recipients respond to messages with misleading subjects, and what level of blocking of 
complaint messages is acceptable in achieving a given reduction in non-complaint 
messages, would also be helpful.114 Sarocco notes that the problem with this 
requirement is that the labeling rule is difficult to enforce in respect of anonymous 
                                                          
107   Ibid. 
108  Ibid. 
109  Sarocco supra n 42 15.  
110  Ibid. The Republic of Korea was noted as one of those countries that require such listing.  
111  Bambauer et al supra n 42 21. Countries such as Spain; South Korea and the USA were noted as 
requiring labelling messages with “Advertising” and “ADV” respectively. 
112  Ibid. 
113   Ibid. 
114  Ibid. 
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spammers, and that this might be ascribed to labels being decided at national level and 
so varying from country to country.115  
 
Aggravating violations 
 
In order for an e-mail to be legitimate, many anti-spam laws require that a procedure 
governing address gathering which respects the right to privacy in the processing of 
personal data in the electronic communication sector be followed.116 According to the 
ITU, aggravated violations include the use of address harvesting and dictionary attacks 
which are outlined below. 
 
(i) Address harvesting  
 
The ITU noted that harvesting inhibits the use of e-mail addresses on the Internet as a 
contact method, and subjects users who use their addresses in an unrelated context to 
a barrage of spam.117 It was also noted that the use of address harvesting tools is 
prohibited, and gathering addresses in this fashion, whether manually or using software 
tools, is unlawful in certain jurisdictions.118 
 
(ii) Dictionary attacks 
 
The ITU noted that software programs can automate address gathering and use 
algorithms to create more realistic addresses than random generation would produce.119 
In this case, spammers attempt to send messages to each of these addresses even 
though many, if not most, do not correspond to actual users.120 This has two detrimental 
effects: “first, the large number of inaccurate addresses place a considerable load on 
ISP servers with no corresponding benefit; and secondly, it results in messages that are 
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unsuccessfully transmitted to be poorly targeted since the recipient is selected at 
random”.121 The transmission of messages to addresses created in this way is often 
prohibited.122 
 
(iii) Software tools for address harvesting and dictionary attacks 
 
The ITU noted that spam laws prohibiting address harvesting and dictionary attacks 
also outlaw the creation and use of software that performs these functions.123 The aim 
of these prohibitions is to make the dissemination of spam more difficult by reducing the 
number of automated tools that produce addresses.124 Secondary liability was also 
noted as important because it is faster and easier for a spammer to purchase lists of e-
mail addresses than to collect them (either manually or using software tools).125 In this 
light, banning the use and sale of lists generated by the use of authomated tools helps 
prevent spammers from avoiding liability.126 
 
(iv) Publicly disclosed addresses 
 
Senders might seek to communicate with the general public (for example, a political 
candidate who posts an address on his or her campaign site, or any other public figure 
who posts an address that might be of importance to the public).127 Existing regimes 
treat publicly disclosed addresses differently when it comes to whether their collection 
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and use should be prohibited.128 The assumption here is that those recipients have 
implicitly consented to receive unsolicited messages.129 
 
(v) Requirements for the destruction or removal of addresses 
 
Once recipients have indicated that they no longer wish to receive communications from 
a particular sender, the sender may be legally obliged to remove  information such as e-
mail addresses from its records.130 Such a mandate finds greater application in an opt-in 
regime where only recipients who have consented to receiving messages may be 
lawfully contacted, than in an opt-out regime where senders might need to retain the e-
mail addresses of users who unsubscribe in order to track to whom messages should 
be sent.131 
 
Unsubscribe requirement 
 
The ITU noted that anti-spam legislation often contains a requirement that the sender of 
a message include a means by which recipients can indicate that they no longer wish to 
receive messages from that sender, or messages dealing with the specific topic, along 
with an instruction that the sender adhere to the recipient’s wishes.132 Although the 
unsubscribe requirements are important in an opt-out regime, they are also useful in an 
opt-in system as they allow a recipient to change his or her mind and revoking 
permission to communicate with the sender in future.133   
 
The ITU noted that legislation may, however, prescribe one or more ways in which 
recipients wishing to unsubscribe are able to communicate with the sender – for 
example, through a working e-mail address, or a phone number. Some anti-spam laws 
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also dictate characteristics for an unsubscribe process which include requiring the 
sender’s unsubscribe mechanism to remain functional for at least 30 days after a 
message has been sent, and prohibiting senders from imposing costs on recipients who 
opt-out.134 Laws may also specify which languages the unsubscribe mechanism must 
use – for example, the country’s official language(s).135  
 
The ITU notes that for the unsubscribe requirement to be effective senders must:136 
“honour the request (some senders may ignore these requests or may seek to evade 
them by closing the e-mail addresses used to gather such requests rapidly and shifting 
to a new one); and recipients must have sufficient confidence in the efficacy of the 
unsubscribe methods in order to use them”. Failing this, if the opt-out addresses are 
non-functional recipients cannot choose what advertising to receive and what to 
reject.137 
 
Users are also cautioned against using the unsubscribe mechanism as there is no 
guarantee that senders will comply with their requests, and that in attempting to 
unsubscribe they will in fact confirm their existence.138  
 
Penalties 
 
The ITU noted that many legal regimes adopted multiple types of penalties for violating 
spam laws.139 These penalties falls within the following three categories: administrative 
penalties imposed by an enforcement entity for less serious offences; civil damages 
(actual or statutory) imposed by an adjudicating court; or criminal penalties for more 
serious and harmful offences (imposed by a court in criminal prosecutions).140 Other 
penalties often encountered include provisions specifying increased penalties for repeat 
violators, and provisions allowing entities harmed by spam to seek injunctive relief to 
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mitigate or prevent future harm.141 The ITU noted that the level and type of penalty 
imposed in spam laws should reflect both subjective judgment and criteria as to the 
relative gravity of the harm in question,  and also how to enforce the relevant law 
effectively.142 It is also noted that how penalties are structured may also present 
challenges for enforcement in that spam laws may provide for statutory damages for 
violations because of the difficulty of quantifying the harm caused by spam 
message(s).143  
 
The problem of proof is also a form of deterrence enforcement by allowing violators to 
evade penalties when evidence of quantifiable harm is lacking.144 As a result, by 
increasing the costs and uncertainty of recovery for enforcers, statutory damages 
encourage enforcement and increase deterrence.145 The ITU noted that administrative 
penalties are viewed as useful in that administrative agencies often use less formal and 
more rapid adjudication measures than a court system.146 This reduces the cost of 
enforcement and can help improve compliance.147 In addition, an agency whose scope 
is limited to data or consumer protection may be more focused and better equipped to 
deal with a problem like spam than an entity with broad law-enforcement 
responsibilities.148 
 
Enforcement 
 
The ITU advised that enforcement of anti-spam provisions should be addressed at both 
national and international levels.149 Practical issues relating to enforcement – eg, 
jurisdictional questions – are the most significant barriers to developing effective legal 
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responses to spam.150 E-mail is generally unaffected by national boundaries because of 
the borderless nature of the Internet, and many e-mail addresses provide no indication 
of their physical location while e-mail addresses which include a geographic identifier 
can be used from anywhere in the world.151 In addition to the above, the ITU noted that 
enforcement of the provisions regarding unsolicited communications is not performed by 
the same authority in all countries.152 For example, it was noted that in most countries in 
which spam is treated as a breach of privacy, a Data Protection Authority (DPA) decides 
on the application of the law and on enforcement of the rules.153 In other instances, a 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA)154 for telecommunications may be involved; while 
in yet other cases, the Consumer Protection Authority fulfills this role.155  
 
The ITU observes that while most countries regulate spam, there continue to be only a 
limited number of spam cases that end up before the courts.156 This is perhaps due to 
the fact that spammers are using increasingly sophisticated techniques to hide their 
identities and the origin of their e-mails, making prosecution a “drawn-out process” 
which is both time consuming and expensive as the laws regulating spam are territorial 
while spam is international or borderless.157 The difficulty of identifying spammers and 
enforcing the law against those identified, adds to why spamming is so easy and is 
considered “a low-risk and profitable business”.158 Further, because spammers do not 
have to bear high operational costs, and given the barriers to law enforcement and 
anonymity, the threat of punishment is considered an ineffective way of ensuring 
compliance with anti-spam laws.159  
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As indicated by the ITU, prosecutors face a number of costs when bringing legal action 
against spammers.160 Understanding what those costs are and how to minimise them, is 
crucial when crafting effective anti-spam legislation.161 The costs faced by prosecutors 
in tracking down and identifying spammers are substantial as spammers use multiple 
techniques to hide their identities.162 Identification costs would be relatively minor if only 
a few cases had to be filed.163 However, cases against hundreds of spammers will 
probably be required before any real benefit or deterrence can be achieved.164 These 
costs can soon become prohibitive for an individual litigant.165 In addition to the cost 
involved in tracking down spammers, victims also face the costs of litigation once the 
target has been identified.166 Some suggestions have been made to assist drafters of 
anti-spam laws when they consider enforcement.167 
 
In conclusion, the ITU proposes that experts consider the importance of developing 
effective enforcement measures which empower enforcement agencies to act against 
the proliferation of spam.168 These measures should also promote cooperation between 
the different jurisdictions from which an e-mail user is likely to receive spam.169 At a 
national level, the ITU recommends the following initiatives: attention to spam 
prevention and the dissemination of information through working group hearings 
involving the principal actors; the creation of education modules; the maintenance of 
                                                          
160  ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 
6. 
161   Ibid. 
162  Ibid. 
163  Ibid. 
164  Ibid. 
165  Id 7. 
166  Ibid. 
167  These suggestions include: “allocating primary responsibility for enforcing spam law to a single 
entity within each state that is suitably funded and staff to pursue violations aggressively; 
establishing explicit coordination, including coordination mechanisms, among entities with 
responsibility for enforcement (including, private actors such as ISPs); creating a graduated system 
of penalties, from administrative fines for minor offenses to criminal penalties for major or repeated 
violations; creating secondary liability for entities that advertise products or services via spam to 
deter, to encourage advertisers to select reputable communications firms, and set up incentives for 
advertisers to monitor the communications on their behalf; and establish further Memorandum of 
Understanding between enforcement officials in multiple regions to facilitate enforcement 
cooperation.” See Bambauer et al supra n 42 35; also ITU WSIS ‘Discussion paper countering 
spam: how to craft an effective anti-spam law’ supra n 51 9. 
168   Ibid Bambauer. 
169  Sarocco supra n 42 16.  
 
 
80 
 
regular contact with law enforcement officials; and finally, the identification of the fight 
against spam as a government priority.170 
 
(d) Harmonisation of laws 
 
According to the ITU, spam laws, whether harmonised or not, are at best only part of 
the solution to the problem and must be developed in concert with technical, market, 
and norm-based tools if the scourge of spam is to be substantially reduced.171 Although 
it is crucial to the success of spam legislation that harmonisation of laws through a 
“Model Law” approach provide consistent responsibilities and penalties, the burden of 
enforcing these dictates falls to each legal system involved.172 
 
The ITU noted that existing regulatory provisions within the states’ legal systems and 
spam legislation must be aligned.which is to be achieved: first, by legislators who must 
decide whether to rely on broader, more general-purpose laws; and second, if the 
“general purpose laws” route is followed, the specific elements in the spam laws must 
be reconciled with the relevant provisions of the general purpose laws.173 Regarding the 
first aspect, the ITU noted that there is a clear trend among individual states to move 
towards regulations aimed specifically at addressing spam.174 A number of states do not 
have rules focused solely on spam and rely instead on data protection laws, common-
law suits, consumer- protection statutes, and self-regulation by service providers.175 It is 
further noted that creating regulations specifically targeting spam can help focus 
enforcement efforts, strengthen anti-spam norms, and close loopholes or uncertainties 
in existing laws that also apply to spam.176  
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The ITU also observed, that spam tends to fall under different rubrics including 
computer misuse and false advertising, to data protection and criminal fraud.177 
Individual states that introduce spam-specific legislation must consider, and ideally 
specify, how these different pieces of legislation must interact.178 The ITU, therefore, 
suggests that for an anti-spam law to serve as a successful deterrent to spammers, its 
level of effectivity must be increased.179 By this is meant that, “the next generation of 
spam laws must be “action laws” and should achieve the following goals:180 increase the 
benefit of successful prosecution; reduce the cost of identifying spammers; reduce the 
cost of prosecution; increase the probability of success at trial; and reduce any external 
costs to society arising from investigating and bringing a spammer to trial”. This is 
hoped will give prosecutors the tools and resources they need to effectively track down 
and prosecute spammers.181 Every legislature will, however, need to adapt its own 
regulations to emphasise its law enforcer’s strength and overcome specific weaknesses 
within its system.182  
 
In conclusion, for nations to succeed in regulating the scourge of spam, they will first 
have to put laws in place which meet the requirements set out above. Below, a 
discussion of the remaining four multi-pronged elements are considered, starting with 
the development of technical tools and best practies. 
 
4.3.4.3 Development of technical tools and best practices 
 
According to the ITU, industry research bodies – and the Internet community in 
particular – need to continue with the development of technical anti-spam solutions.183 
This work needs to be conducted on the international level.184 Technical solutions have 
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been noted as representing the user’s first line of defence against spam.185 These anti-
spam technologies are in a state of continuous flux due to continual adaptation by 
spammers attempting to circumvent them.186 It has been noted that in order to curb 
spam three different stages in the e-mail system need to be considered and that 
attention be paid to where technical solutions could be implemented: (a) at source187 
where the e-mail is sent out; (b) at destination188 where the e-mail is received; and (c) at 
the end-user point.189 Most, if not all, anti-spam legislation makes no provision for 
technical measures to combat spam.190 These technical solutions are left to other 
stakeholders – for example, ISPs – using filters to protect recipients from receiving 
unsolicited mail.191 The ITU noted that spam-filtering software remains the most popular 
tool in combating spam and that several different methods should be combined to 
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provide the best service to users.192 Filters used at ISP level or directly at the user level 
can block a high percentage of spam. A natural consequence of this, however, is the 
possibilty of blocking legitimate mail and so reducing the reliability of electronic 
communications.193 The ITU further noted that these filters are soon outpaced by 
spammers who become increasingly sophisticated in their attempts to evade filtering 
techniques.194 And that the constant need to update filters represents a significant 
additional cost for users and providers.195  
 
The ITU noted that collaboration on anti-spam technologies is required across sectors 
of industry, for example, the Internet and e-mail service providers, network operators 
(carriers), and software developers.196 Also included are governments, the technical 
community, industry organisations, which have a valuable function to fulfil in order to 
stop this persistent nuisance which has far reaching consequences.197 The ITU also 
noted that some technical measures if incorrectly applied may cause more harm than 
good, and may on their own create little incentive for spammers to curtail or stop their 
behaviour.198 Instead, they allow spammers to claim that their activities are harmless or 
that they are providing a valuable service to the community on the basis that consumers 
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are always themselves able to filter unwanted messages.199 Furthermore, while some 
techniques successfully keep spam out of end users’ inboxes, cost shifting continues 
once e-mail has entered an ISP or company network which would already have paid the 
price involved in handling the message.200  
 
In conclusion, the ITU suggested that end-users, corporations, and ISPs must each play 
its part in curbing the scourge of spam.201 Technical measures are a critical component 
in any multi-pronged strategy targeting spam, and if used in conjunction with other 
available measures, the tide in the war against spam can be turned.202 
 
4.3.4.4 The establishment of industry partnership  
 
The ITU noted that appropriate action on spam both nationally and internationally is 
necessary as part of a wider effort aimed at building confidence in the use of ICTs.203 
Role players such as industry ISPs, direct marketers, and software developers can 
contribute and also adapt their practices to combat spam.204 This would be seen as a 
move towards promoting industry partnership in that most countries operate on a multi-
national basis.205  
 
Self-regulatory tools such as codes of conduct should also be encouraged and 
systematically improved by drawing on experience.206 The sharing of expertise and best 
practices both across industry branches, and across countries and regions in the world, 
should be encouraged.207 Improved cooperation on enforcement between industry and 
enforcement authorities also needs to be promoted, in particular, tracing spammers and 
providing evidence that can be used in investigation and prosecution.208 
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4.3.4.5 Consumer education  
 
The ITU noted that user education is a necessary and ongoing component of an 
effective legal regime aimed at combating spam.209 As users move onto the Internet 
they need to be educated on how to recognise and defeat tactics considered to be 
harmful by technical experts.210 Users who are often the victims of spam are considered 
a part of the problem for two reasons: they read spam messages and also purchase 
items that are advertised through spam; they also enable spammers by failing to 
maintain adequate computer security.211  
 
The ITU has noted that consumers in particular should be aware of the following: “the 
rules of the game; how to limit their exposure to spam; what filtering or basic security 
measures can be taken to minimise spam; and where to complain when confronted with 
spam”.212 Consumers are also advised to take the following into account in order to 
reduce the amount of spam that they receive: reduce posting on publicly accessible web 
sites;213 create multiple e-mail addresses;214 limit disclosure of e-mail addresses;215 and 
use e-mail filters.216  
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The role of education is also seen as of particular importance to the success of anti-
spam legislation, with both national and international coalitions being formed to promote 
education.217 At national level the following have been identified as playing an important 
role in consumer awareness:218 action plans aimed at enhancing consumer education 
and awareness; and plans to promote international frameworks to fight spam. The ITU 
noted that there is however a lack of uniformity in anti-spam legislation in that spam is a 
major threat to consumer confidence, which in turn is a pre-requisite for the growth of e-
commerce.219 But that consumer education can help consumers identify privacy tools 
that may limit spam, but it remains an incomplete solution.220 While user identification 
such as a sender’s identity may reduce the risk of spoofing and phishing it is also said 
to increase privacy risks for consumers as personal information will be readily 
available.221  
 
In conclusion, the ITU points out that education always succeeds only in part for the 
following reasons:222 that users lack incentives to maintain perfect security as they do 
not gain the full benefit of measures they take to protect their computers; the reduction 
in the volume of spam they see bears little relation to these actions; and many users 
agree to host programs such as adware on their computers in exchange for free use of 
programs such as screensavers or peer-to-peer software.   
 
4.3.4.6 International cooperation 
 
The ITU noted that international cooperation on enforcement is essential for the 
following reasons: to ensure the effectiveness of anti-spam rules; to trace spamming 
activities; and to prosecute spammers regardless of where they are based.223 The ITU 
encouraged countries to form partnerships aimed at combating spam.224 The ITU noted 
                                                          
217  Id 5-6. 
218  Ibid. 
219  Ibid. 
220  Ibid. 
221  Id 7. 
222  Bambauer et al supra n 42 33. 
223  ITU WSIS ‘Multilateral and bilateral cooperation to combat spam’ supra n 42 5. 
224  Id 7.  
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that as a pre-requisite national legislation should facilitate information sharing and 
mutual assistance between competent authorities in the different countries.225 And that 
appropriate bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation would allow for information sharing 
and mutual assistance in specific cases of spam.226 As a result a number of countries 
have entered into bi- and multilateral cooperation agreements by signing Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU).227 MoUs are not legally binding but they carry a degree of 
gravitas and mutual respect, are stronger than the so-called “gentlemen’s agreements”, 
and often represent a first step towards a legal contract.228  
 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
 
The ITU’s work in combating spam is commendable. Not only has it called upon 
countries and organisations to work together to combat spam, it has also provided 
guidelines for those affected by this scourge. This research has revealed the challenges 
of having an anti-spam legislation in place. The ITU study on spam is a continuing one 
and member states are kept abreast of global developments in the field. In 2012 
member states were again encouraged to take necessary measures to prevent the 
propagation of unsolicited communications and to minimise its impact on international 
telecommunication services.229 In 2013 an ITU workshop on countering and combating 
                                                          
225  Ibid. 
226  Ibid. 
227  Hereafter referred to as ‘MoU’. An MoU is “a formal agreement between two or more parties which 
can be used by companies or organisations to establish official partnerships. These MoUs are 
popular in multinational international relations, because unlike a treaty they are quickly ratified and 
can be kept confidential”. WhatIs.com ‘Memorandum of understanding (MOU or MoU)’ 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/memorandum-of-understanding-MOU-or-MoU (date of use: 5 
December 2015). Countries that have signed these MoUs include USA, Australia, and South Korea 
to name but a few. Some of these MoUs will be highlighted when the anti-spam laws of a particular 
country are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 below. See ITU WSIS ‘Multilateral and bilateral 
cooperation to combat spam’ supra n 42 1-8. For a general discussion of some of these 
agreements see ITU-T Series X: Data Networks, Open System Communications and Security ITU-
T X. 1240 Series Supplement on Countering Spam and Associated Threats (Supplement 6) 
(09/2009) http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec/aspx?rec=10245 (date of use: 30 
November 2015). 
228  WhatIs.com ‘Memorandum of understanding (MOU or MoU)’ 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/memorandum-of-understanding-MOU-or-MoU (date of use: 5 
December 2015).  
229  See article 5B of the International Telecommunications Regulation dealing with unsolicited bulk 
electronic communications ‘Final Acts World Conference on International Telecommunications’ 
(Dubai 2012) http://ww.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/spam/201307/pages/ 
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spam was held in Durban, South Africa.230 The workshop noted that while there is no 
single solution to combating spam, in practice there are various complementary 
approaches to the problem which have proved practical.231 It was also noted that the 
problem of spam affects developed and developing countries alike, and that each of 
these parties need the other if spam is to be successfully combated.232 Partnerships 
and/or agreements between the African Union (AU) and the African 
Telecommunications Union (ATU) should be formed, together with the ITU and Internet 
Society (ISOC). The need for a follow-up report was mooted.233 In 2014 the ITU and 
ISOC held discussions on the tools available and the role of collaboration in combating 
the threats posed by spam.234 It was noted that legislation is not in place in certain 
developing countries even though they share the problem of spam with developed 
countries and are also active in spamming activities.235  
 
It remains to be seen how the ITU’s work will proceed beyond 2016. In the meantime 
countries with anti-spam laws in place and those without such laws must seriously 
consider the guidelines set out above as regards their national laws. At a global level 
these countries should also consider a set of international standards on acceptable 
ethics, the development of best practices, and technical assistance in this area. Below 
follows the discussion on how the OECD is combating spam. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015). At the time of writing there were 89 signatories to 
these Final Acts, South Africa being one. Since then the ITU Council Working Group on 
International Internet-related Public Policy Issues (CWG-Internet) has held open consultations with 
all stakeholders invited to provide input on the international public-policy issues related to 
effectively countering and combating spam.  
230  ITU ‘Workshop on countering and combating spam’ (Durban South Africa 8 July 2013) 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/spam/201307/Pages/default.aspx (date of 
use: 30 November 2015).  
231   Ibid. 
232  Ibid. 
233  ITU ‘Workshop on countering and combating spam’ supra n 230. These partnerships will be 
discussed in the next chapter when regional initiatives for combating spam are considered. 
234  ITU WSIS ‘WSIS+10 High Level Event’ (Geneva 10-13 June 2014) 
http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/implementation/2014/forum (date of use: 5 November 2015). This event 
was designed to review progress made in the implementation of the WSIS outcomes under the 
mandates of participating agencies, and to take stock of achievements in the last ten years based 
on reports of WSIS stakeholders. 
235  Ibid. 
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4.4 The OECD 
 
4.4.1 Background  
 
The OECD was formed in 1961 with the aim of promoting policies to improve the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world, and providing a forum in 
which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to 
common problems.236 Headquartered in Paris, France, the OECD currently has 34 
members.237 In 2011 the OECD turned 50 and adpoted as its mandate going forward: to 
restore confidence in markets and institutions and to re-establish healthy public finances 
as a basis for future sustainable economic growth.238 
 
4.4.2 The OECD’s initiatives in combating spam 
 
4.4.2.1 Task Force on spam 
 
The OECD appointed a Task Force which included participants from member states 
and other stakeholders, to take the lead in developing an anti-spam toolkit.239 The Task 
Force was given two years (from the time the mandate was granted) to study existing 
and emerging anti-spam strategies across all sectors and to develop and promote the 
toolkit focused on practical anti-spam strategies, arrangements, and solutions.240 It was 
                                                          
236  OECD ‘About the OECD’ http://www.oecd.org/about (date of use: 30 November 2015). The OECD 
was preceded by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which was 
established on 16 April 1948. See OECD ‘Organisation for European Economic Co-operation’ 
http://www.oecd.org/general/organisationforeuropean economicco-operation.htm (date of use: 9 
December 2015). 
237  In May 2007 the OECD Council at Ministerial level adopted a resolution to strengthen the co-
operation with South Africa as well as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia through a program of 
enhanced engagement. Thus making South Africa one of the many non-member economies with 
which the OECD has a working relationship. See OECD ‘OECD invites five countries to 
membership talks, offers enhanced engagement to other big players’ 
http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/southafricaandtheoecd.htm (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
238  See Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level ‘OECD 50th Anniversary Vision Statement’ 
(C/MIN(2011)6 1-4 http://www.oecd.org/mcm/48064973.pdf (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
239  Other stakeholders included the European Commission, the Business Advisory Committee to the 
OECD, and civil society. OECD ‘OECD launches anti-spam toolkit and invites public contributions’ 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdlaunchesanti-spamtoolkitandinvites 
publiccontributions.htm (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
240   Ibid. 
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also mandated to devise a public awareness strategy to support global efforts to combat 
spam.241 The Task Force’s initial mandate was to decide on appropriate action to be 
taken and the roles of the different stakeholders in fighting spam.242 The OECD agreed 
that governments should establish clear national anti-spam policies in concert with other 
players,243 collaborate with the private sector, and also promote cross-border 
cooperation.244 It also noted that in order to fight spam it was important to set-up 
domestic coordination groups and create appropriate regulatory frameworks based on 
well-defined policy objectives backed by effective enforcement mechanisms.245 In 
response, the Task Force developed the concept of the anti-spam toolkit to provide 
OECD member states with a comprehensive policy orientation and consistent 
framework in their fight against spam. This was also to be applicable to and useful for 
non-OECD countries.246  
 
4.4.2.2 The Anti-spam Toolkit 
 
Like the ITU, the OECD noted that there was no simple solution to eliminate spam but 
that measures should be taken to prevent it. Those measures should be designed to 
meet a number of policy goals and objectives.247 The toolkit contains recommendations 
to assist policy makers, regulators, and industry players orient their spam policies and 
restore trust in the Internet and e-mail.248 The toolkit includes a spam regulation 
handbook (a reference guide) to different existing approaches to spam regulation in 
order to help identify loopholes and ways of improving international enforcement and 
cooperation.249  
                                                          
241  OECD ‘Report of the OECD Task Force on spam: Anti-spam Toolkit of recommended policies and 
measures’ 2 (DSTI/CP/ICCP/SPAM(2005)3/FINAL) 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/consumer/36494147.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015). Hereafter 
‘Anti-spam ToolKit’. 
242  Id 6. 
243  Ibid. This is consistent with the ITU, see para 4.3.4.2 above. 
244  Ibid. 
245  Ibid. 
246  Id 7. 
247  These policies and objectives include: to preserve the benefits of electronic communication; to 
prohibit and apply sanctions against the act of spamming as defined by national laws; and to 
reduce the amount of spam. See the Anti-spam Toolkit supra n 241 6. 
248  Ibid. 
249  See OECD ‘OECD launches anti-spam toolkit and invites public contributions’ supra n 241. 
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It also provides for an examination of self-regulation arrangements which exist at 
industry, national, or international levels which can be applied to fight spam.250 An 
analysis of existing and emerging counter-spam technical measures, including 
authentication technology, is included in the toolkit.251 It further includes a central 
information resource to educate members and raise awareness of the threat of spam 
and how to fight it.252 An overview of existing partnerships against spam, examples of 
good practice, and lessons that can be learned for the development of cooperative anti-
spam partnerships are also included.253 The aim of the toolkit is to provide OECD 
members with a comprehensive policy orientation and consistent framework in their 
fight against spam.254 This toolkit contains eight elements to assist member states to 
implement spam laws in their regions. 
 
4.4.2.3 Eight elements contained in the Anti-spam Toolkit 
 
The toolkit comprises of the following eight elements which are discussed separately 
below: anti-spam regulation; anti-spam enforcement; industry-driven initiatives; anti-
spam technology; education and awareness; cooperative partnerships against spam; 
and spam quantification; and global cooperation or outreach. 
  
(a) Anti-spam regulation  
 
The OECD indicated that national anti-spam legislation which tackles spam and related 
problems is fundamental and should preserve the benefits of electronic 
communications.255 National legislation should also prohibit and take action against 
spamming as defined by a state’s national law, and act to reduce the amount of 
                                                          
250  Ibid. 
251  Ibid. 
252  Ibid. This includes tips for users on how to protect themselves from spam and how to avoid 
phishing when spammers fake e-mails to encourage Internet users to divulge confidential financial 
data. 
253  Ibid. 
254   Ibid. 
255   Anti-spam Toolkit supra n 241 8. 
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spam.256 In pursuing these goals law makers should consider four general principles: 
policy direction; regulatory simplicity; enforcement effectiveness; and international 
linkages.257 In reviewing best practices for legislation the following elements should as 
far as possible be included, account being had to a country’s institutional and legal 
framework. 
 
Services concerned 
 
This element concerns the definition of spam as focusing on a particular medium, or 
attempting to provide a technology-neutral approach.258 In developing an anti-spam 
regulatory approach policy makers should consider that with the convergence of 
messaging formats made possible by the emergence of new technologies and 
applications, new and unforeseen messaging media arise.259 New legislation should 
therefore be sufficiently flexible to ensure that future communication technologies are 
covered in the event of their being subject to new forms of spam.260 At the same time it 
should be recognised that any policy or regulatory regime imposed on a messaging 
technology will have an impact on both legitimate messaging and the spam messages 
being targeted.261 The nature of spam messages is aimed at making money through the 
sale of goods and/or services such as, for example, religious or political non-commercial 
messages.262 However, limiting the scope of spam legislation to commercial messages 
may result in legitimising equally harmful types of spam.263  
                                                          
256  Ibid.  
257  Id 8, 24-5. The OECD notes that “legislation should be in a position to provide a clear policy 
direction, and that the main lines and objectives of national and international anti-spam policy 
should be outlined at an earlier stage. ‘Regulatory simplicity’ means legislation should be simple 
and short; enforcement effectiveness has been noted a fundamental issue which if not dealt with 
appropriately can make a good piece of legislation useless. Therefore, it is important to put in place 
an effective sanction regime and appropriate standards of proof, and also that appropriate powers 
and resources need to be allocated for ‘enforcement authorities’; and “international linkages” 
involves the possibility of legislation for-seeing appropriate international linkages and providing 
national authorities with the possibility to co-operate in investigations and exchange information 
with foreign authorities”. 
258  Anti-spam Toolkit supra n 241 9 and 26. 
259  Id 26. These new technologies and applications include the 3G and 4G or VoIP.  
260  Ibid. 
261  Ibid. 
262  Id 9 and 26-7. Only messages with commercial content and not the volume.  
263  Ibid.  
 
 
93 
 
Consent  
 
A fundamental principle used in formulating most anti-spam policy frameworks is based 
on ensuring that suitable consent is obtained from potential message recipients before 
sending commercial messages.264 This type of consent focuses mainly on the 
mechanisms used in anti-spam legislation to protect consumers, namely the opt-in and 
opt-out mechanisims.265 The OECD noted that while the opt-in versus opt-out 
mechanism debate was appropriate in the past, recent approaches to spam regulation 
have incorporated more complex and subtle methods involving consent.266 
 
Information on message origins 
 
The OECD observed that while appropriate legislation and effective enforcement are 
essential, governments should also raise awareness among consumers of the possible 
risks they (consumers) can be exposed to in using e-mail and educate users on how to 
recognise spam e-mail.267 If the sender disguises its header information it makes it very 
difficult for an enforcement agency to identify the spammer, and it also makes an 
                                                          
264  Id 9 and 27-8. 
265  See the discussion on these two mechanisms in para 4.3.4.2 (c) (ii) above. 
266   See Anti-spam Toolkit supra n 241 9 and 27-8. The OECD defines the following types of consent: 
“express consent”, which is “a direct indication from the person one wishes to contact that it is in 
order to send the messages. Consent can be given in a variety of ways such as: filling in a paper 
form; ticking a box on a web site; and during a phone call or face to face conversation. The 
advantage of this type of consent is that a user’s privacy is protected so ensuring greater control of 
personal data. The burden of proving express consent lies with the sender of the message and not 
with the recipient. The disadvantage of express consent is the difficulty businesses have keeping 
records of such consent. This results in the restriction on a potential pool of recipients who can be 
targeted for legitimate mail should those records not be available”; “Inferred” and “implicit consent” 
is consent which generally “can be inferred from the recipient’s conduct and/or other business 
relationships. While the advantage of this consent is that it is more flexible, the disadvantage is that 
it may be difficult to define when a message can be related to an existing business relationship”; 
“Assumed consent” is “consent which presumes that consent is provided until the recipient 
withdraws, for example by un-subscribing from a mailing list or by placing the electronic address on 
a do-not-contact list. The advantage of this type of consent is that it is less constricting to the 
operation of online commerce, in that there is minimal risk of inadvertently proscribing legitimate 
messaging. It also does not restrict choice of e-mail recipients who might receive commercial 
messages. The disadvantage is that assumed consent transfers the burden of effort and cost to the 
consumer – to unsubscribe from a mailing list the e-mail must be opened and responded to. This is 
contrary to good e-security practice unless the e-mail is from a known and trusted source. 
Unsubscribe links are often non-functional which places the evidentiary burden on recipient of the 
message”.  
267  Id 30.  
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investigation complex, expensive, and time consuming.268 In addition, technical 
instruments should be developed to support legislative efforts and the development and 
implementation of e-mail authentication solutions.269 
 
Ancillary elements 
 
These ancillary elements include issues such as the prohibition of harvesting software 
and harvested address lists and the use of dictionary attacks.270 The OECD notes that 
an additional sanction should be imposed if such tools are used to aid the sending of 
spam in contravention of an anti-spam legislation.271 In this instance sanctions should 
apply not only to the person actually sending the spam, but also to the commissioning 
or authorisation of the spamming.272 This should further extend to other entities that 
benefit from the spamming and who normally share the resulting profits.273 
 
(b) Anti-enforcement  
 
The OECD pointed out that legislation needs to ensure that enforcement agencies have 
adequate powers to function effectively.274 In furthering their work to facilitate anti-spam 
legislation across borders, governments may need to intervene in the following areas: 
national coordination; procedures and sanctions; empowerment of enforcement 
authorities; and cross-border enforcement cooperation. 
 
National coordination  
 
                                                          
268  Ibid. 
269  Ibid. 
270  Ibid. Also see para 4.3.4.2 (c) (iv) above. 
271  See Anti-spam Toolkit supra n 241 30-1. 
272  Id 31-6. 
273  Ibid. Other elements include: “(a) cyber-crime and content-related questions which include illegal 
access to computers via zombie computers, or using third-party resources to send spam; 
misleading or fraudulent content (e-mail used as a form of scam or misleading trade practice, and 
also security threats such as the use of malware, viruses et cetera); and (b) labelling, cross-border 
issues, identification of involved parties (eg, users and ISPs)”. 
274  Id 11. 
 
 
95 
 
Spam impacts not only on consumer rights and data privacy, but also on network 
security and efficiency. The OECD noted that countries have different agencies with 
different powers and priorities mandated to deal with one or more aspect of spam.275 
Some countries may need to increase efforts to strengthen an agency as a contact point 
for foreign authorities to facilitate cross-border cooperation.276 To support these 
initiatives the OECD has set up a list of “contact points for authorities” to facilitate cross-
border cooperation.277  
 
Empowerment of enforcement authorities  
 
The OECD noted that since the evidence of illegal spam is generally electronic and may 
be stored on many individual computers, devices, or networks in multiple countries or 
jurisdictions, enforcement authorities dealing with spam need appropriate powers to 
preserve, access, intercept, search, and seize electronic evidence.278 Evidence 
gathering in this instance should be broader than just records of message transmission, 
as financial records and related correspondence can potentially assist in determining 
who commissioned or otherwise generated the spam.279  
 
Procedures and sanctions 
 
The OECD noted that legislation must make provision for severe sanctions and 
discourage spam by implementing criminal sanctions.280  
                                                          
275  Id 37.  
276  Ibid. 
277  Id 37-8. 
278  Ibid.  
279  Ibid.  
280  Id 38-9. The following remedies are available to OECD member countries. “Civil proceedings which 
include monetary sanctions like a civil fine which might be an amount to be determined depending 
on the nature and extent of violations; consumer redress; non-monetary sanctions; warning letters; 
and injunctions which can be brought by private citizens, public and private enforcement agencies, 
and ISPs; criminal proceedings which may result in a fine, non-monetary sanction, and 
imprisonment. While this is perceived as a strong remedy – especially when the content of spam is 
criminal or when the spammer has not complied with an administrative order – it is time consuming 
and carries a higher burden of proof; and administrative action, for example monetary sanctions, 
administrative fines, non-monetary sanctions, injunctions, and warning letters”. The OECD also 
noted that administrative fees and non-monetary sanctions are the primary instruments for 
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Cross-border enforcement cooperation 
 
Enforcement action across borders would benefit from a global strategy to overcome a 
number of challenges, most notably information gathering and sharing.281 The OECD 
adopted the following guidelines to improve cross-border cooperation:282 the 
establishment of a domestic framework to empower national enforcement authorities to 
investigate and take action against spammers or the dissemination of spam; and the 
improvement of the ability of authorities to cooperate with their foreign counterparts by 
authorising national bodies to share relevant information and provide investigative 
assistance.  
 
(c) Industry-driven initiatives 
 
The OECD recommends that in order to deal appropriately with spam, the anti-spam 
laws in countries must be linked to self-regulatory initiatives undertaken by private- 
sector players such as ISPs, telecommunication operators, direct marketers, online 
operators, software companies, and their associates.283 The OECD noted that ISPs play 
an important role in the field of Internet security and the idea that messaging providers 
should intervene actively to prevent spam from being sent from or across their 
networks, is gaining acceptance.284 But it also notes that there are generally no 
provisions in national legislative instruments which place any kind of obligation on ISPs 
to intervene actively to help eliminate spam.285 However, most ISPs are noted as having 
a commercial interest in blocking or limiting incoming spam to protect their customers 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enforcement authorities in many countries. The application for administrative remedies avoids the 
necessity of going through the civil or criminal courts”.  
281  Id 41. 
282  Ibid. Other guidelines includes: to improve procedures for cooperation, prioritise requests for 
assistance, to make use of common resources and networks, and to develop new cooperative 
models between enforcement authorities and relevant private sector entities. 
283  Id 11-12 and 42. 
284  Id 42-5. 
285   Ibid. 
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should any massive influx of spam disrupt their service and affect both their availability 
and reliability.286  
 
(d) Anti-spam technologies 
 
Regarding anti-spam technologies, the OECD pointed out that what is required is 
defensive technology that goes beyond text-based tools to tools that analyse 
behavioural and contextual factors to determine whether to accept or reject specific mail 
or even attempted connections.287 The types of anti-spam technology would include: 
authentication of electronic mail;288 a Sender Policy Framework (SPF); sender 
identification;289 and blacklists and whitelists.290 
 
(e) Education and awareness 
 
The OECD noted that a comprehensive anti-spam strategy must take the end-user who 
is the recipient of the spam into account.291 The recipient is also the potential victim of 
viruses and scams, yet is also the person who has control over his or her computer and 
personal information.292 Users still do not perceive security as a real issue as they are 
not aware of the risks connected with their activities when surfing the Internet.293 
Education and awareness strategies should target the role players identified below. 
                                                          
286  For a discussion of other stakeholders such as banks, operators, and industry associates see: id 
41-8. 
287  Id 13 and 49-61 for a discussion of these technologies. 
288  Id 50. “Mail authentication methods fall into the category of rules (which although they help in the 
fight against spam), do not constitute specific anti-spam technologies. While perpetrators use 
identification cards, these are not trust markers but help with the requirement of transparency 
which will be of greater benefit to legitimate senders than spammers”. 
289  Id 51. “The proliferation of spam may be ascribed to the ability of spammers to hide their true 
identity by masking headers et cetera. With the use of sender authentication the burden would then 
be placed on the sender of spam rather than on the receiver, and would render phishing attacks 
more difficult. SPF and sender ID can be best used to test whether an e-mail server is authorized 
to send on behalf of a given domain. This is done by publishing a record in the Domain Name 
System (DNS) which lists the authorized e-mail servers for a domain. The two techniques differ in 
the choice of the identity tested” (ibid). 
290  Id 52-3.  
291  Id 13-14 and 62. 
292  Ibid. 
293  Id 14 and 63. 
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Individual users and governments 
 
The OECD noted that governments are urged to develop public information and 
awareness campaigns to educate end-users on the products and services they are 
using and the associated risks they may face.294 This information will enable users to 
protect themselves from spam, viruses, and other malicious codes.295 Governments 
should also organise nation-wide campaigns to attract the attention of the media and 
the population at large.296 They also need to work with the private sector, civil society, 
and other interested parties on user education campaigns and other initiatives.297 
 
Government enforcement agencies should partner with industry and consumer groups 
to educate users and promote information sharing.298 Government, should also 
cooperate with  the private sector to promote the development of technological tools to 
fight spam, including tools to facilitate the location and identification of spammers.299  
 
ISPs, and other network operators 
 
The OECD noted that ISPs and other network operators, including mobile operators, 
need to use their company-customer communication channels (web site, portals, SMS, 
newsletters) to provide pertinent information to their customers.300 The information 
should include how recipients can avoid spam and risks connected with spam e-mails, 
SMS, MMS; what anti-spam and anti-virus filters and open source solutions are 
available to the platform concerned; an indication of how to report spam abuses to  ISPs 
or users, operators and competent authorities; and e-mail or phone contact to the 
provider’s abuse desk.301 
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User groups 
 
The OECD notes that user groups (including children, students, and senior citizens) can 
be targeted with information tailored to their needs/interests.302 The following is 
recommended to these groups: computer classes for senior citizens are seen as the 
best way in which to introduce the concept of computer and information security;303 for 
children and students, awareness of online threats and security issues should be part of 
their educational curriculum;304 and schools should include sessions on spam in their 
computer courses and also address issues such as online fraud, viruses, illegal content, 
and on-line/computer/Internet etiquette.305 
 
Users and phishing  
 
The OECD notes that a solution for users will include the implementation of technical 
measures to limit the phishing and reduce the consequent damages.306 Online 
operators should establish, implement, and enforce appropriate and clear policies on e-
mail practices with their customers, and also develop consumer education initiatives.307 
Awareness campaigns are essential in educating individuals on how to recognise and 
respond to deceptive and fraudulent messages.308  
 
Companies: Small, medium, and large enterprises 
 
                                                          
302   Ibid. 
303  Ibid. 
304  Id 63. 
305  Ibid. Parents are also urged to play an important role in teaching children how to be safe online by 
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306   Id 64. 
307  Ibid. 
308  Ibid. The OECD noted that “government authorities, online operators, and ISPs were at that time 
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protect their computers and avoid accepting unwanted files that could harm the computer or track a 
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Companies usually fall victim to spam and malware because their e-mail addresses are 
accessible from public sites or are widely circulated.309 The OECD noted that 
educational needs of large companies will be different from those of small or medium-
sized companies.310 Large companies are urged to make available to their staff 
pamphlets explaining the company’s e-mail security policy and existing filters and best 
practices for dealing with spam.311 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), on the other 
hand, need to provide their employees with specific information on simplified security 
management practices, training material, software, et cetera.312 Regulators and 
business associations can play an important role in educating companies by 
disseminating information on how businesses can communicate with its clients using e-
mail, for example – in a way that complies with national legislation.313 
 
Direct marketing associations 
 
Direct marketing associations should inform their members of relevant anti-spam 
legislation in force in the message’s country of origin and country of destination.314 In 
order to assist direct marketers in this endeavour, the Direct Marketing Association 
(DMA) provides lists of online marketing best practices, often in the form of checklists 
indicating the requirements a company must satisfy from the moment it decides to 
launch an online advertising campaign, to the actual sending of the message.315 
 
(f) Cooperative partnership against spam 
 
The OECD noted that issues such as spam and cyber security are affecting public and 
private players. Both therefore share a common interest in preserving the availability 
and reliability of communication tools to promote the development of the digital 
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economy.316 These partnerships include a government-led regulatory approach, where 
the regulator sets the rules which impose certain responsibilities on private companies – 
for example, the obligation to apply security practices to the more market-led approach 
in which private operators autonomously decide their level of involvement and 
participation.317  
 
Public and private sectors have also developed a number of innovative ways in which to 
cooperate because governments also seek the involvement of both private sector 
entities and non-governmental bodies in the discussion of comprehensive anti-spam 
strategies and activities.318 As a rule, the objectives of strategic partnership are to 
improve networking awareness, raise activity, and share information.319 More 
operational partnerships also contribute to education, development (and application) of 
best practices, and the exchange of information and data on cross-border cases of 
spam.320  
 
The OECD further noted that private-public partnerships in the field of spam are 
necessary to promote interaction and cooperation between the two players, especially 
considering the wide range of stakeholders involved and their different needs and 
backgrounds.321 Relying solely on legislation to impose obligations on private players 
would not be effective unless combined with other measures, an example being that 
laws cannot keep up with technical change.322 If widely applied, best practices can be 
effective when combined with legal and other measures. In this context strategic 
partnerships such as those between different task forces created at national and 
international levels, are a fundamental tool in the improvement of communication, 
understanding of reciprocal needs, expectations, and problems.323 They therefore 
                                                          
316  Id 66; also para 4.3.4.4 above. 
317  Ibid.  
318  Id 67-8.  
319  Id 67-9. 
320  Id 67. 
321  Id 68. 
322  Ibid. 
323  Ibid. 
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promote further cooperation and mutual involvement.324 For partnership to succeed and 
achieve concrete results, which can then be put into practice by the different 
stakeholders, the following elements as noted by the OECD appear necessary: a 
commitment and real contribution from all parties (ownership of the end product);325 and 
well-defined objectives and timeframes.326 National partnerships that feed into 
international initiatives and partnerships are needed to complement and harmonise 
solutions.327 Rather than duplicating efforts, partnerships should build on tried and 
trusted existing relationships and representative bodies.328  
 
(g) Spam statistics  
 
The OECD noted that most of the data on spam originates from industry, in particular 
from anti-spam solution providers and also from ISPs.329 Data gathered by these 
players is difficult to compare as they relate to different user bases and are founded on 
different parameters.330 Filtering companies and ISPs (using filters) collect data from 
their customers that provide information on the amount of spam detected by the 
filters.331 This data gives an indication of the growth of spam relative to the total volume 
of e-mail traffic (different possible content) and affected countries.332 Statistics can also 
provide relevant information for policy makers on the burden that spammers impose on 
network operators.333 
 
(h) Global cooperation (outreach) 
 
                                                          
324  Ibid. 
325  Ibid. 
326  Ibid. 
327  Ibid. 
328  Ibid. 
329  Id 14-15 and 70-2. 
330  Ibid. 
331  Ibid. 
332  Ibid. Data on spam is, to a limited extent, also collected by some government or public 
organisations which have the responsibility to develop anti-spam policies or regulations. 
333  Ibid.  
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The OECD noted that global cooperation has two main objectives namely: to promote 
appropriate domestic frameworks to counter spam; and to encourage cooperation 
among countries, the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders.334 
Cooperation ensures that the problem of spam is addressed comprehensively and 
promotes the harmonised and widespread application of technical measures and the 
effective enforcement of applicable rules.335 The OECD also encourages its member 
states to contribute to the development of laws and regulation and enforcement 
measures; to promote education on all levels; and to facilitate industry cooperation.336 
The OECD is also involved in outreach activities such as contributing to anti-spam 
initiatives at the global level in partnership with other organisations active in the field.337 
It also promotes cooperation and the exchange of information and facilitates the 
dissemination of its anti-spam toolkit by the task force to provide education, regulatory 
and technical measures, and a contact list of enforcement authorities and anti-spam 
legislation around the world.338  
 
4.4.3. Conclusion 
 
As noted by the OECD, all stakeholders have an important role to play in fighting spam. 
Governments can contribute by: (a) establishing clear national anti-spam policies in 
concert with other players; (b) collaborating with private operators and promoting cross-
                                                          
334   Id 15 and 73. 
335  Ibid. 
336  Id 74. Regarding law and regulation enforcement, the OECD noted that “international co-operation 
in the field of law and regulation is fundamental to support the establishment of an appropriate anti-
spam regulatory framework in all countries, possibly following a set of basic harmonised principles 
at the international level. National policy should include measures to facilitate international 
cooperation and the sharing of information and practices. Educational and awareness tools which 
have already been developed should be made available more generally to all users, operators, 
schools, and public authorities in all countries. Considering that in developing countries Internet 
access is often collective – for example, users connect from work, schools, and Internet cafés – this 
information should also be made available at those places. The OECD also noted that establishing 
a series of best common practices is a global objective and that all ISPs should be involved. The 
commitment of industry will be necessary for further steps – in particular international co-operation 
would be useful – to bring together ISPs from developed economies which have considerable 
experience in the field and their counterparts in developing economies in order to share knowledge, 
experience and best practices”. 
337  Ibid. This includes support for developing countries from those technically developed countries and 
the international community in facing the problem of spam and Internet security.  
338  Ibid. 
 
 
104 
 
border cooperation; (c) setting up domestic coordination groups; and (d) creating 
appropriate regulatory frameworks based on well-defined policy objectives and backed 
by effective enforcement mechanisms which can greatly contribute to the anti-spam 
battle.339  
 
On the basis of this framework it is hoped the private sector will take the lead in the 
development of relevant business practices and innovative technical solutions that can 
contribute to the education of users.340 Coordination beween private and public players 
is crucial to the achievement of results in the fight against spam.341 In considering the 
rapid pace of technical evolution and changing fraudulent and illegal online practices, 
the anti-spam toolkit is seen not as a tool for providing answers, but rather as a tool for 
policy orientation.342 As spam is not a problem that will “go away” once the task force 
has fulfilled its mandate, it is important to establish and maintain a clear strategy for 
fighting spam through continuing national coordination and public/private cooperation 
and dialogue.343 
 
4.5 Commentary and conclusion on ITU and OECD initiatives 
 
The contributions of the ITU and OECD illustrate that spam affects a number of 
stakeholders, it can be combated only through a multi-pronged approach. It is important 
to note that the work of these two organisations in combating spam compliment one 
another. In their documentation – surveys, reports, the toolkit – each has outlined what 
a multi-pronged approach should entail by providing guidelines on how to implement 
recommendations outlined above in the respective regions.   
 
Both the ITU and the OECD noted that whether spam is regulated in a single or in 
multiple pieces of legislation, the crucial consideration is that the provisions dealing with 
the basic elements identified be included in that legislation. Countries can benefit from 
                                                          
339  Ibid.  
340   Ibid. 
341  Ibid. 
342  Ibid. 
343  Ibid. 
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these guidelines to strengthen their enforcement regimes. Both the ITU and OECD 
notes that spam has survived all regulation, technical measures, or other obstacles 
thrown at it, and therefore an on-going study is necessary, and, it is hoped, will lead to a 
solution in the future. It was noted that spam is as much a problem in developing as in 
developed countries. However, given certain technical issues it has also been noted 
that much-needed assistance is long overdue to ensure that developing countries are 
also equipped to fight spam.  
 
Perhaps the most important element in the multi-pronged approach is that of involving 
the users themselves. Both organisations laid down guidelines as to who should be 
responsible for educating consumers and how this should be achieved. Education starts 
with consumers themselves monitoring their online activities and taking care as to 
whom they reveal their personal information. ISPs also have a prominent role to play as 
they are best equipped to protect users. By educating users ISPs will also be assisting 
in minimising the majority of the problems they run into in attempting to protect their 
users.  
 
As spam is also a global problem, a further challenge is to ensure that national laws are 
harmonised, especially as regards issues of enforcement and collaboration between 
countries is therefore necessary to ensure that this battle is won both locally and 
globally. However, all this is possible only if each and every stakeholder involved does 
its part in combating this scourge. Partnerships should therefore include agreements 
between countries themselves, or between organisations within a particular country and 
other organisations beyond borders in order to combat spam. 
 
While these are all guidelines and so not compulsory, it remains to be seen if those 
countries that do not have anti-spam laws in place will adopt legislation reflecting the 
guidelines laid down by both the ITU and OECD. Countries that already have anti-spam 
laws in place, also have an opportunity to improve their laws.  
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Having outlined the international arena’s contribution to this issue, regional initiatives 
aimed at combating spam will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
REGIONAL INITIATIVES TO COMBAT SPAM: AFRICAN REGION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter an outline of international initiatives to combat spam was 
presented. In this chapter focus is on regional initiatives. A number of regions in the 
world have contributed, and continue to contribute to initiatives aimed at combating 
spam.1 The African region and its initiatives will be the main focus. The study is 
undertaken because Africa is in the process of harmonising its ICT laws. South 
Africa as a part of this region is also involved as these initiatives affect it either 
directly or indirectly. 
 
When dealing with Africa it is important that the following initiatives are considered: 
The African Union’s (AU) contribution to the issue of spam and developments in part 
of its regional communities namely: The Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 
addition, account must be had of the role of the African Telecommunications Union 
(ATU). The discussion centers on the background to the specific groupings; their 
initiatives, with specific reference to the instruments developed to combat spam; and 
lastly, a commentary on those particular instruments. In conclusion, a 
contexualisation of the regional initiatives to combat spam is addressed in order to 
highlight both harmonised approaches and areas in which harmonisation is yet to be 
achieved. 
 
5.2 African Region 
 
5.2.1 Background  
 
                                                          
1  These include among others: the European Union (EU), see European Union ‘The history of 
the European Union’ http://www.europa.eu/about-eu/eu-historyy/index_en.htm (date of use: 09 
December 2015). For a discussion of the EU’s spam regulation see Geissler Bulk Unsolicited 
Electronic Messages 1-403; Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ‘History’ 
http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/History.aspx (date of use: 9 December 2015), and 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ‘History: the founding of ASEAN’ 
http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history (date of use: 9 December 2015).  
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Africa is one of the six continents in the world and consists of 54 countries made up 
of different ethnic groups, cultures, traditions, language et cetera. For the past five 
hundred years Africa has been plagued by misfortune and injustice resulting from 
colonial rule.2 Africa, as a whole, broke free of its Colonial shackles only during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. With independence came the major project of rebuilding 
the states, a process which continues to this day.3 This new dawn for Africa was 
heralded by the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity4 in 1963, which 
has since been renamed by the African Union.5 
 
5.2.2. African Union 
 
The establishment of the AU is a signal event in the institutional evolution of the 
continent.6 In July 1999, the OAU Heads of State and Governments issued a 
declaration calling for the establishment of an AU.7 The AU aimed to accelerate the 
process of integration on the continent8 and enable Africa to play its rightful role in 
                                                          
2  See South African History Online ‘The impact of colonialism’ 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/impact-colonialism (date of use: 27 December 2015); and 
Iweriebor EEG ‘The colonisation of Africa’ http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-
colonisation-of-africa.html (date of use: 27 December 2015).  
3  The year of Africa’s independence is noted as 1960, the year in which most of the sub-Saharan 
African nations, including fourteen former French colonies gained independence from their 
colonisers. See France24 ‘1960: The year of independence’ http://www.france24. 
com/en/20100214-1960-year-independence (date of use: 27 December 2015); also Japan 
African Network ‘African countries’ independence days’ 
http://www.japanafricanet.com/directory/ presidents/africanindependence.html (date of use: 27 
December 2015); and Talton B The challenge of decolonization in Africa 
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-challenge-of-decolonization-africa.html (date of 
use: 27 December 2015).   
4  Hereafter referred to as ‘the OAU’. The OAU was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. The OAU Charter was signed by representatives of 32 governments. Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (RSA) ‘Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African 
Union (AU)’ http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (date of use: 9 December 
2015). For a background on the OAU and its transformation see Bujra A ‘Africa: The transition 
from OAU to AU’ Lecture delivered at ACARTSOD Tripoli, Libya (23 September 2002) 
http://www.dpmf.org/meetings/From-OAU-AU.html (date of use: 9 December 2015), and Du 
Plessis M ‘The African Union’ in Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective 3 ed 
(Juta & co, Ltd Lansdowne SA 2006) 546-54.  
5   Hereafter referred to as ‘the AU’. The AU was established in 2002 by the nations of the former 
OAU. See Infoplease ‘African Union’ http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/african-
union.html (date of use: 3 March 2017); and African Union Summit ‘Transition from the OAU to 
the African Union’ http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm (date of use: 3 
March 2017). 
6  African Union ‘AU in a nutshell’ http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (date of use: 9 December 
2015) for a background history of the AU. 
7   Ibid. 
8   Ibid. 
 
 
109 
 
the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic, and political 
problems compounded by negative aspects of globalisation.9  
 
The AU’s objectives10 are, among others, “to achieve greater unity and solidarity 
between African countries and the peoples of Africa; to harmonise the policies 
between the existing and future regional economic communities for gradual 
attainment of the objectives of the Union; and to advance the development of the 
continent by promoting research in all fields but particularly in science and 
technology”. There are 54 countries which form part of the AU, and until recently only 
one was not a member namely: Morocco.11  
 
5.2.3 Regional integration in the African region  
 
The African region currently has eight regional communities, otherwise known as 
RECs.12 These RECs include: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU);13 the COMESA;14 
the Community of Sahel-Saharan states (CEN-SAD);15 the East African Community 
                                                          
9  Ibid. 
10  See art 3 of the Constitution of the African Union (9. 9. 1999). The Constitution was adopted at 
the thirty sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments on 11 
July 2000 at Lome, Togo. See Constitutive Act of the African Union (1999) 
http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/ngm/Documents/Conventions%20and%20Resolutions/constituti
on.pdf (date of use: 15 December 2015). 
11  See African Union ‘History’ http://www.au.int/en/about/history (date of use: 9 December 2015); 
and McNamee T; Mills G; and Pham J.P ‘Morocco and the African Union: prospects for re-
engagement and progress on the Western Sahara’ (Discussion paper 1/2013) 1-27 
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_Reports/Brenthurst-
paper-201301-Morocco-and-the-AU.pdf (date of use 27 December 2015). 
12  For a general discussion of these RECs see: The Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (RSA) ‘Regional Economic Communities (RECs)’ 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/recs.htm (date of use: 9 December 2015); United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) ‘History and background of Africa’s regional 
integration efforts’ https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/history-africa’s-regional-integration-efforts 
(date of use: 9 December 2015); also Vere A ‘Legal and Regulatory frameworks for the 
knowledge economy: concept paper’ E/ECA/CODIST/1/15 (29 March 2009) 
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/3452/Bib-27924.pdf?sequence=1 (date of 
use: 9 December 2015) for an overview on the current status of cyber laws in Africa; and 
Ndomo A ‘Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A progress overview’ (May 2009) 
http://www2.gtz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECS_Final_report.pdf 25-35 (date of use: 9 December 
2015. 
13  AMU was established in 1989. It entered into a treaty to coordinate and harmonise and 
rationalise its policies and strategies for sustainable development in all sectors of human 
activity. See UNECA ‘UMA Arab Maghreb Union: Treaty/Protocols’ 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/uma-arab-maghreb-union-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
14  This REC is discussed in paras 5.2.3.1 and 5.3.3 below. 
15  CEN-SAD was established in 1998 as a framework for integration and complementarity which 
intends to work with the other regional economic communities and the AU to strengthen peace, 
security, and stability, and to achieve economic and social development. See UNECA CEN-
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(EAC);16 the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS);17 the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);18 the Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD);19 and SADC.20  
 
The four pillars regarded as constituting the basic tenets of regional integration are:21  
harmonisation of sectoral policies in infrastructure, natural resources, climate, food, 
and agriculture; macroeconomic policy convergence and financial and monetary 
integration; peace and security, stability and governance; and trade and market 
integration.  
 
Not every treaty or protocol covers all sectors in the REC, but alignment with the four 
pillars is evident in the eight REC protocols and treaties.22 While the integration is in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
SAD ‘Community of Sahel-Saharan states’ http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-
community-sahel-saharan-states-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
16  EAC was established in 1999 and came into operation in July 2000 when a treaty was entered 
into between three partner states – Kenya; Uganda and Tanzania – with the aim of widening 
and deepening cooperation among partner states in, among others, political, economic and 
social fields for their mutual benefit. See UNECA ‘EAC Eastern African Communities’ 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eac-east-african-community-0 (date of use: 9 December 
2015).  
17  ECCAS was established on 18 October 1983 to form a wider economic community of Central 
African states. See UNECA ‘ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States’ 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states-0 (date of 
use: 9 December 2015).  
18  ECOWAS was formed in 1975 mainly to promote cooperation and integration in the context of 
an economic union of West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people and also 
maintain and increase economic stability. See UNECA ‘History and background of Africa’s 
regional integration efforts’ http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-economic-community-
west-african-states-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
19  IGAD was established in 1996 in East Africa. IGAD superseded the Inter-governmental 
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was established in 1986. See UNECA 
‘History and background of Africa’s regional integration efforts’ 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/history-bacground-africas-regional-integration-efforts (date of 
use: 9 December 2015); and African Union ‘Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD)’ http://www.au.int/en/recs/igad (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
20  This REC is discussed in paras 5.2.3.2 and 5.3.4.2 below.  
21  See UNECA ‘Regional integration tenets and pillars’ http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/regional-
integration-tenets-and-pillars (date of use: 9 December 2015); Questia ‘Four strategic pillars to 
guide the African Union: Commission’s activities 2009-2012’ https://www.questia.com/ 
magazine/1G1-203770101/four-strategic-pillars-to-guide-the-african-union (date of use: 9 
December 2015). 
22  Ibid. The main objectives of the RECs are: “to strengthen peace, security and stability and 
achieve economic and social development; to achieve sustainable growth and development of 
member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of their production 
and marketing strategies; to promote, develop, transfer, and master technology; and to 
coordinate and harmonise international relations of member states and secure international 
understanding”. See Ndomo A ‘Regional Economic Communities in Africa: a progress 
overview’ (May 2009) http://www2.gtz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECS_Final_report.pdf (date of 
use: 9 December 2015); and Dube M ‘Traditional and emerging partners’ role in African 
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place there remain certain challenges which include: multiple and overlapping 
membership which creates a complex web of competing commitments, and 
harmonisation and coordination among member states.23 Below the backgrounds to 
two of the RECs – SADC and COMESA – and also the background of the ATU are 
examined. This is followed by a discussion of initiatives undertaken to combat spam 
in the AU with particular reference to SADC and COMESA.  
 
5.2.3.1 COMESA  
 
The COMESA came into being in December 1994 to replace its predecessor the 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which had existed since early 1981.24 COMESA was 
established as an organisation of free independent sovereign states which agreed to 
cooperate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of all their 
people.25 The main focus of COMESA is on the formation of a large economic and 
trading unit capable of overcoming some of the barriers faced by individual states.26  
 
The treaty establishing COMESA was signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, 
Uganda, and was ratified a year later in Lilongwe, Malawi.27 COMESA’s objectives 
include: to achieve sustainable growth and development in member states by 
promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of their production and 
marketing strategies.28 Currently COMESA has nineteen member states.29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Regional Economic Integration: Issues and recommendations’ SAIIA Occasional Paper No 158 
Economic Diplomacy Project (Oct 2013) http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/ 
123456789/1/saia_sop_158%20_dube_20131204 (date of use: 9 December 2015) for a 
background study of the REC’s. 
23  Ibid. 
24  See COMESA ‘About COMESA’ 
http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=Article&id=75&Itemid=106 (date 
of use: 9 December 2015). For the history of COMESA, see COMESA ‘Looking back: Evolution 
of PTA/COMESA’ http://about.comesa.int/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95&Itemid=117 (date of use: 9 December 
2015); and UNECA ‘COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Protocols/Treaties’ http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/uma-arab-maghreb-union-0 (date of use: 9 
December 2015). 
25  Ibid COMESA ‘About COMESA’.   
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
28  See art 3 of the Common Market Treaty of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (1993) for a list of aims and objectives of COMESA. 
29  COMESA ‘COMESA member states’ http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option 
=comcontent&view =article&id=123&Itemid=121 (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
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5.2.3.2 SADC 
 
The SADC is an organisation of member states in the southern region of Africa and 
was established on 17 August 1992.30 SADC was preceded by the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)31 in 1980.32  The SADC Treaty 
effectively launched a scheme for economic integration.33 The SADC is a 
decentralised organisation with a small secretariat based in Gaborone, Botswana. 
South Africa became a member in 1994 after the abolition of apartheid. 
 
The objectives of the SADC are among others:34 (a) to promote self-sustaining 
development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the interdependence of 
member states; and (b) to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, 
social, and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region. In order to 
achieve these objectives the SADC is mandated to promote the development and 
transfer of technology.35 It is also tasked with coordinating and harmonising 
international relations of member states and securing international understanding, 
cooperation, and support.36 Importantly, the SADC must mobilise the inflow of public 
and private resources into the region.37 
 
5.2.3.3 ATU 
 
                                                          
30  Currently SADC comprises of fifteen member states. Ten member states – Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – 
signed a Declaration, Treaty and Protocol in 1993. See SADC ‘Member states’ 
http://www.sadc.int/member-states (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
31  SADCC was established on 1 April 1980 when the Lusaka Declaration was adopted by nine 
heads of states. South Africa was excluded because of its apartheid regime. For the 
background history of SADC see AU ‘Southern African Development Community (SADC)’ 
http://www.au.int/ en/recs/sadc (date of use: 9 December 2015); and Saurombe (2009) 21 SA 
Merc LJ 697-9.  
32   See UNECA ‘SADC Southern African Development Community’ http://www.uneca.org/oria/ 
pages/sadc-southern-african-development-community-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
33  Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (17 August 1992) 1-
30 http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/ Declaration_Treaty-of-SADC.pdf (date of use: 9 
December 2015). Hereafter referred to as ‘the Declaration and Treaty of SADC’. 
34  Id art 5(1) for a list of these objectives.  
35   Id art 5(2). 
36   Ibid. 
37  Ibid.  
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The ATU was established in 1977 as a specialised agency of the OAU in the field of 
telecommunications.38 The ATU adopted its current name in 1999 when it was 
transformed into a partnership between public and private stakeholders in the ICT 
sector.39 In addition to providing a forum for stakeholders involved in ICTs, it also 
formulates effective policies and strategies aimed at improving access to information, 
infrastructure and services.40 The ATU also represents the interests of its members 
at global decision-making conferences and promotes initiatives aimed at integrating 
regional markets, attracting investment into the ICT infrastructure, and building 
institutional and human capacity.41  
 
The ATU’s goals include enhancing Africa’s contribution to global decision-making 
conferences and ensuring an equitable share of global resources.42 The ATU 
currently has 44 member states and sixteen associate members (fixed and mobile 
telecom operators).43 
 
Now that the backgrounds to the AU, certain of its RECs, and the ATU have been 
highlighted, the initiatives taken by these stakeholders to combat spam are reviewed. 
 
5.3 Combating spam in the African region 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
In the past decade the African region has been in the process of harmonising its ICT 
laws and developing laws where there are none.44 These laws include: e-commerce 
                                                          
38  For the history of the ATU see: ATU ‘History’ http://www.atu-uat.org/index.php/about-us/history 
(date of use: 9 December 2015). 
39  Ibid.   
40   Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42  See ATU ‘Goals Strategies’ http://www.atu-uat.org/index.php/about-us/core-activity-
programmes/global-decision-making (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
43  ATU ‘ATU member states as at 25th April 2013’ http://www.atu-uat.org/ 
index.php/members/member-states (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
44  See the following projects dealing with harmonisation: United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Harmonization of Cyberlaws and Regulation: The Experience of 
the East African Community (Reforming Cyberlaws Part 1)’ 
UNCTAD/DTL/STICT/2012/4/Corr.1. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2012d4_ 
en.pdf (date of use: 9 December 2015).  
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laws;45 protection of privacy laws;46 and, of late, cybercrime and cybersecurity laws 
or a combination of all three categories.47 In this section, the documents and/or 
instruments developed in Africa to combat spam are examined. In Africa this issue 
is, in the main, addressed in multi-purpose legislation and/or general-purpose 
instruments, for example, Model Laws and/or Conventions.  
 
5.3.2 African Union 
 
5.3.2.1 Background 
 
In 2009 at an extraordinary AU Conference, the AU Commission was requested to 
develop, jointly with the UNECA, a convention on cyber legislation based on the 
Continent’s needs and adhering to the legal and regulatory requirements of 
electronic transactions, cybersecurity, and personal data protection.48 In 2011 the AU 
released its “Draft Legal Framework on Cybersecurity in Africa”.49 This Draft 
Convention embodied the existing commitments of AU member states at sub-
regional and international levels, to build the information society.50 It also sought to 
define the objectives and broad orientation of the information society in Africa and to 
strengthen existing information and communication legislation in member states and 
regional communities.51 The major challenge facing the Draft Convention was to 
achieve a level of technological security adequate to prevent and effectively control 
technological and informational risks.52 The Draft Convention was adopted at the AU 
                                                          
45  For a discussion on e-commerce in Africa see the following: Ndonga (2012) 5 African Journal of 
Legal Studies 243-68; Ewelukwa N ‘Is Africa ready for electronic commerce: A critical appraisal 
of the legal framework for ecommerce in Africa’ (2011) 13 European Journal of Law Reform 
550-76; Bwalya ‘E-commerce penetration’ 235-53; and Esselaar & Miller (2002) 2/1 South 
African Journal of information and Communication 1-12.  
46  See Greenleaf & Georges (2014) 132 Privacy Laws and Business International Report 19-21.  
47  See generally Uchenna JO ‘Multilateral legal responses to cyber security in Africa: Any hope for 
effective international cooperation?’ Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict (2015) https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2015/proceedings/08_orji.pdf (date of use: 27 
December 2015). 
48  See African Union ‘Oliver Tambo Declaration’ Extra-Ordinary Conference of African Union 
Ministers in Charge of Communication and Information Technologies Johannesburg, South 
Africa (2-5 November 2009); also African Union INFOSOC ‘Cyber Security’ 
http://pages.au/int/infosoc/cybersecurity (date of use: 9 December 2015).  
49  See African Union ‘Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal 
Framework for Cybersecurity in Africa’ http://au.int/en/cyberlegislation (date of use: 9 
December 2015). Hereafter referred to as ‘the Draft Convention’.  
50   Id 5. 
51  Ibid.  
52  Id 2-3. 
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Summit in June 2014 as the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and 
Personal Data Protection.53 
 
5.3.2.2. African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
 
(a) Preamble to the Convention 
 
The preamble to the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection54 seeks to: harmonise African cyber legislation on e-commerce and 
cybercrime control.55 It also aims to define the objectives and broad orientation of the 
information society in Africa and to strengthen existing legislation in member states 
and the RECs regarding ICTs.56 The AU also seeks to establish a regulatory 
framework on cyber-security and personal data protection which takes into account 
the requirements of respect for the rights of citizens guaranteed under the 
fundamental texts of domestic law and protected by international human rights 
Conventions and Treaties, particularly the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights.57 The Convention seeks “to modernise instruments for the repression of 
cybercrime by formulating a policy for the adoption of new offences specific to ICTs, 
and aligning certain offences, sanctions, and criminal liability systems in force in 
member states”.58 
 
The Convention is divided into three parts: electronic transactions;59 the personal 
data protection;60 and the promotion of cybersecurity and combating of cybercrime.61 
                                                          
53  See African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection adopted 
by the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union (27 June 2014, Malabo) 1-40 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/AU-270614-CSConvention.pdf (date of use: 9 
December 2015).  
54  Hereafter referred to as ‘the AU Convention’. 
55  See AU Convention supra n 53 1-3. 
56   Ibid. 
57   Ibid. It also seeks to pursue the principles of the African Information Society Initiative and the 
African Regional Action Plan for the Knowledge Economy (ARAPKE). 
58  Ibid. 
59  This part is divided into three sections dealing with a variety of issues namely: s 1 electronic 
commerce especially art 4. Other articles include contractual liability of the provider of goods 
and services by electronic means (art 3); s 2 deals with contractual obligations in electronic 
form (which includes: art 5: electronic contracts; and art 6: writing in electronic form); and s 3 
covers security of electronic transactions. 
60  This chapter includes issues such as: personal data protection (s 1); institutional framework for 
the protection of personal data (s 2); obligations relating to conditions governing personal data 
protection (s 3); and data subjects’ rights (s 4).   
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Spam is dealt with specifically in Chapter I of the Convention which covers electronic 
transactions, and in particular section 1 which deals with electronic commerce. Only 
the electronic commerce section of the Convention will be discussed here.  
 
(b) Combating spam under the AU Convention 
 
Electronic commerce 
 
The Convention defines electronic commerce as “the act of offering, buying, or 
providing goods and services via computer systems and telecommunication 
networks such as the Internet, or any other network using electronic, optical or 
similar media for distance information exchange”.62 It requires that certain 
information be provided by those persons involved in e-commerce activities to those 
who will be accessing goods and services.63 Article 4 of the Convention contains 
provisions on advertising by electronic means. 
 
Article 4: Advertising by electronic means 
 
Article 4 of the AU Convention provides: 
 
1. Without prejudice to Article 364 any advertising action irrespective of its form accessible 
through an online communication service, shall be clearly identified as such. It shall clearly 
identify the individual or corporate body on behalf of whom it is undertaken; 
2. The conditions governing the possibility of promotional offers as well as conditions for 
participating in promotional competitions or games where such offers, competitions or games 
are electronically disseminated, shall be clearly spelt out and easily accessible; 
3. State Parties of the African Union shall prohibit direct marketing through any kind of indirect 
communication using in any form the particulars of an individual who has not given prior 
consent to receiving the said direct marketing through such means; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
61  Chapter III covers promoting cyber security and combating cybercrime. The following sections 
are outlined: cybersecurity measures to be taken at national level (s 1); and criminal provisions 
(s II).  
62  See art 1 of the AU Convention. This definition is an improvement on the one in the Draft 
Convention which defined electronic commerce as “an activity by which a person offers or 
provides goods and services remotely or by electronic means”. Contrast with art 1 s 1 of the 
Draft Convention supra n 49. 
63  This information includes: the name of the vendor and, in the case of a legal person, its 
corporate name; registration number; full address of the place of establishment; and e-mail 
addresses. For the scope and application of electronic commerce, see art 2 of the AU 
Convention.  
64  See art 3 of the AU Convention which deals with the contractual liability of the provider of 
goods and services by electronic means. 
 
 
117 
 
4. The provisions of Article 4.2 above notwithstanding direct marketing by electronic mail shall 
be permissible where: 
(a) The particulars of the addressee have been obtained directly from him/her; 
(b) The recipient has given consent to be contacted by the marketing partners; 
(c) The direct marketing concerns similar products or services provided by the same 
individual or corporate body. 
5. State parties shall prohibit the transmission for the purposes of direct marketing of messages 
by means of any form of indirect electronic communication without indicating valid particulars 
to which the addressee may send a request to stop such communications without incurring 
charges other than those arising from the transmission of such a request. 
6. State parties undertake to prohibit concealment of the identity of the person on whose behalf 
the advertisement accessed by an online communication service is issued. 
 
 
(c) Commentary on the AU Convention  
 
It has been noted that most African states are lagging behind when it comes to 
strengthening cyber security and fighting cybercrime, but that by adopting this 
Convention, Africa will have taken the first step toward aligning itself with 
international best practices.65 Africa also understands that spam is a global 
phenomenon that can be combated only through the cooperation of all stakeholders. 
In what follows the Convention is discussed in general and the specific provisions 
governing advertising by electronic means. 
 
General comments on the Convention 
 
(i) Structure 
 
The AU Convention is a multi-purpose document which covers the following three 
issues: electronic commerce; personal data protection; and cybercrime and 
cybersecurity. As outlined above, these three topics are addressed in three chapters 
each of which concentrates on issues relevant to the topic covered. The final 
structure of the Convention is a major improvement on earlier drafts. For example, in 
the 2012 Draft Convention the three parts each listed definitions, as opposed to the 
                                                          
65  Tamarkin E ‘The AU’s cybercrime response: a positive start, but substantial challenges ahead’ 
Policy Brief 73 (January 2015) 1-8 https://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/the-aus-
cybercrime-response-a-positive-start-but-substantial-challenges-ahead (date of use: 27 
December 2015). 
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current Convention in which article 1 contains definitions applicable to the 
Convention as a whole.66  
 
(ii) Benefits of the Convention 
 
Some opine that the mere fact that the AU has adopted overarching policy on 
cybersecurity is already a significant step forward for the continent which has to date 
been viewed as a safe haven for cybercriminals.67 Africa is noted by some as being 
home to four of the ten countries with the highest cybercrime rates in the world.68 
The AU Convention highlights the importance of adhering to national constitutional 
human rights law with particular emphasis on the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights and this is to be welcomed,69 as is the fact that the Convention 
outlines safeguards for citizens with regard to the processing of personal data.70 
 
(iii) Criticism of the Convention 
 
As noted above the current AU Convention was ratified in June 2014 after a delay 
occasioned by protest and criticism from certain stakeholder of provisions in the 
Draft Convention. Kenya drafted a petition to block its adoption listing, among other 
things, that “the Convention allowed African states to process personal and sensitive 
data without the owner’s consent on the basis of state security and public interest”.71 
                                                          
66  See the Draft Convention supra n 49 in particular: Part 1 on electronic transactions, s 1 
contained a list of definitions relating to that issue; Part II dealt with personal data protection, 
and s 1 had a list of definitions; and Part III dealt with promoting cybersecurity and combating 
cyber-crime. 
67  Roigas H ‘Mixed feedback on the African Union Convention on Cyber security and Personal 
Data Protection’ https://ccdcoe.org/mixed-feedback-african-union-convention-cyber-security-
and-personal-data-protection.html (date of use: 9 December 2015); also Finnan D ‘Africa: Lack 
of laws governing cybercrime making Africa a safe haven for Cybercriminals’ 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201502161962.html (date of use: 27 December 2015); and Tamarkin 
supra n 65 1-8. 
68  Macharia J ‘Africa needs a cybersecurity law but AU’s proposal is flawed, advocates say’ 
http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/24712/africa-union-cybersecurity-law-flawed (date of use: 
27 December 2015); and Accessnow ‘Emerging threats in cybersecurity and data protection 
legislation in African Union countries’ https://www.accessnow.org/emerging-threats-in-
cybersecurity-data-protection-in-african-union (date of use: 27 December 2015). 
69  Ibid Macharia. 
70  Ibid. See in particular, arts 13 of the AU Convention for the basic principles governing personal 
information. 
71  Githaiga G ‘A Report of the online debate on African Union Convention on Cybersecurity 
(AUCC)’ (December 2013) 1-23 http://www.iitpsa.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/REPORT-ON-OF-THE-ONLINE-DEBATE-ON-AFRICA-UNION-
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This, it was felt, endangered the privacy of subjects and limited freedom of speech.72 
It also noted that rather than explicitly establishing a model legal framework which 
African countries could adopt, the Draft Convention merely created guidelines for 
African states when developing cybersecurity laws.73 Many clauses in the AU 
Convention (as opposed to the Draft Convention) are said to provide for stringent 
control over and restriction on how developers may implement apps, many of which 
touch on electronic commerce and personal data collection and processing.74 
Internet sites and content developed outside of Africa – including popular social 
media sites – may elect not to offer their solutions in Africa as it may not make 
economic sense to comply with the stringent requirements in a region that barely 
contributes to their revenue.75 The broad scope of the AU Convention has also been 
cited as a matter of concern.76 Others have also raised serious concerns about the 
human rights implications, particularly those provisions that might support 
discrimination and expand government power.77 The AU addressed these criticisms 
in May 2014 and finally adopted the Convention in June of that year.78  
 
Provisions governing advertising by electronic means 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CONVENTION-ON-CYBERSECURITY.pdf (date of use: 27 December 2015); Ugwu P ‘Analyst 
picks holes in proposed AU Cybersecurity Convention’ 
http://www.nigeriacommunicationsweek.com.ng/e-business/analyst-picks-holes-in-proposed-
au-cybersecurity-convention (date of use: 27 December 2015); and Roigas supra n 67.  
72  Accessnow ‘Africa moves towards a common cybersecurity legal framework’ 
http://www.acessnow.org/blog/2014/06/02/africa-moves-toward-a-common-cyber-security-legal-
framework (date of use: 9 December 2015) for other contentious provisions; and Van Zyl G 
‘Adoption of the “flawed” AU cybersecurity convention postponed’ 
http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/523-africa/232273-adoption-of-flawed-au-
cybersecurity-convention-postponed (date of use: 9 December 2015). 
73  See Uchenna supra n 47 128. Uchenna also notes that “the language of the Draft Convention 
does not intend these directives to create an explicit legal framework for the criminalisation of 
cybercrime or for cybersecurity, and that the adoption and ratification of the Draft Convention 
by African states will not suffice unless states individually enact cybersecurity laws that meet 
the guidelines in the Convention. It is also not guaranteed that the enactment of those laws will 
be uniform for the purpose of regional harmonisation as the draft does not explicitly establish a 
Model Law for countries to adopt”.  
74  Mbuvi D ‘African countries propose stringent rules governing ecommerce and data’ 
http://www.cio.co.ke/news/main-stories/african-countries-propose-stringent-rules-governing-
ecommerce-and-data (date of use: 27 December 2015). 
75  Ibid. 
76  Tamarkin supra n 65.  
77  Fidler M and Madzingira F ‘The African Union Cybersecurity Convention: a missed human 
rights opportunity’ http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/22/the-african-union-cybersecurity-
convention-a-missed-human-rights-opportunity/ (date of use: 27 December 2015); Jackson T 
‘Can Africa fight cybercrime and preserve human rights’ http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
32079748 (date of use: 27 December 2015).  
78  Roigas supra n 67.  
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(i) Definitions 
 
The Convention defines a number of terms, notably, direct marketing,79 electronic 
communications;80 indirect electronic communications,81 electronic mail,82 and 
consent of data subject.83 However, there is no definition of unsolicited commercial 
communications or advertising, although it is clear from article 4 of the AU 
Convention that spam involves the solicitation or advertising of promotional items.84 
Interestingly, the term direct marketing includes solicitation carried out through 
message dispatch, irrespective of the message base or nature of the message.85 
This applies, in particular, to commercial, political, or charitable messages designed 
indirectly to promote goods and services or the image of a person selling goods or 
providing a service.86 Political and charitable messages fall under the term “direct 
marketing” in so far as they too can promote goods and services.87 The AU would, 
therefore, regard such messages as spam. 
 
(ii) Mechanism for regulation 
 
                                                          
79  Article 1 of the AU Convention defines “direct marketing” as “the dispatch of any message that 
seeks to directly or indirectly promote goods and services or the image of a person selling such 
goods or providing such services. It also refers to any solicitation carried out through message 
dispatch, regardless of the message base or nature, especially messages of commercial, 
political or charitable nature, designed to promote indirectly goods and services or the image of 
a person selling goods or providing the service”. 
80   See art 1 of the AU Convention which defines the term “electronic communications” as “any 
transmission of signs, signals, written material, pictures, sounds or messages of whichever 
nature to the public or a sector of the public by electronic or magnetic means of 
communication”.  
81  See art 1 of the AU Convention where the term “indirect electronic communication” is defined 
as “any text, voice, sound, or image message sent over an electronic communications network 
which is stored in the network or in the recipient’s terminal equipment until it is collected by the 
recipient”.  
82  See art 1 of the AU Convention which defines “electronic mail” as “any message in the form of 
text, voice, sound, or image sent by a public communication network, and stored in a server of 
the network or in a terminal facility belonging to the addressee until it is retrieved”.  
83  Article 1 of the AU Convention defines the term “consent of data subject” as “any manifestation 
of express, unequivocal, free, specific and informed will by which the data subject or his/her 
legal, judicial or treaty representative accepts that his/her personal data be subjected to manual 
or electronic processing”.  
84  See the following articles where these phrases are used: “advertising action” (art 4(1)); 
“promotional offers and promotional competitions” art 4(2)).  
85   See direct marketing definition in art 1 of the AU Convention. 
86        Ibid. 
87  Ibid. 
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As is clear from article 4, the Convention takes a restrictive approach to dealing with 
direct marketing and solicitation issues and adopts the opt-in mechanism.88 Article 4 
requires that a relationship be established before any marketing can be solicited, and 
that consent be given before that solicitation.89 Even though consent is required, the 
AU Convention is silent on the form this consent should take.  
 
(iii) Other requirements for sending electronic messages 
 
What is encouraging about the AU Convention is that it gives rise to certain 
prohibitions that the ITU and the OECD have highlighted. These include the accurate 
labelling of advertisements before spam mail can be sent thus eliminating the 
problems surrounding the falsification of information or deliberately misleading the 
recipients of the messages.90 This allows recipients either to take part in those 
promotional activities, or not to take part as the e-mail will be properly labelled. The 
issue of spoofing and disguising headers is also covered in the AU Convention,91 as 
is the harvesting of addresses, albeit indirectly under the data protection 
provisions.92  
 
The AU Convention further gives data subjects a right to be informed before their 
personal data can be disclosed for the first time to third parties or used on their 
behalf for purposes of marketing.93 It further entitles the data subject to object, free of 
                                                          
88  Phrases such as “shall prohibit direct marketing” (art 4(2)); and “shall prohibit the transmission 
for purposes of direct marketing” (art 4(5)) allude to that fact.  
89  Article 4(4) lists instances where direct marketing is permissible which includes: “whether the 
particulars of the addressee have been obtained directly from them; the recipient has given 
consent to be contacted by the marketing service; and that the direct marketing concerns 
similar products or services provided by the same individual or corporate body”. 
90  See art 4(1) of the AU Convention which provides that “any advertising action irrespective of its 
form accessible through an online communication service shall be clearly identified as such”. 
Also art 4(2) of the AU Convention which provides that “promotional competitions disseminated 
electronically shall be clearly spelt out and easily accessible”. 
91  Article 4(6) (1) of the AU Convention provides that “the individual or corporate body on behalf of 
whom the advertising is undertaken shall be clearly identified”. Also art 4(6) of the AU 
Convention which “prohibits concealment of the identity of the person on whose behalf the 
advertisement accessed by an online communication service is issued”. 
92  See in particular, art 13 of the AU Convention which addresses the basic conditions for 
processing the personal information of data subjects. These principles include: the principle of 
consent; the principle of lawfulness and fairness of personal data processing; the principle of 
purpose, relevance and storage of processed personal data; the principle of accuracy of 
personal data; the principle of transparency of personal data processing; and the principle of 
confidentiality and security of personal data processing.  
93  See art 18 of the AU Convention. 
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charge, to such disclosures.94 All these provisions could go a long way to minimising 
the issue of harvesting and/or the sale of e-mail address lists for marketing 
purposes. The AU Convention is, however, silent when it comes to uses such as 
dictionary attacks and the issue of software used to generate e-mail addresses for 
purposes of spam. Be that as it may, the AU Convention has at least put some basic 
elements in place to regulate the sending of commercial or promotional 
communications. And, since the AU itself welcomes amendments to the provisions in 
the Convention, problematic aspects can receive the necessary attention at a later 
date as part of the effort to ensure that proper measures are put in place.95 In the 
previous chapter it was noted that spam is now commonly used for phishing and 
other malicious acts. The Convention’s cyber security provisions include a call for 
international cooperation to address this threat.96 Although those provisions do not 
deal specifically with the issue of spam, they can nonetheless be used to enforce 
cooperation in the fight against spam at the global level.  
 
(iv) Penalties 
 
State parties shall take necessary legislative measures to ensure that offences 
provided under the AU Convention are not only punishable by effective, 
proportionate, criminal penalties,97 but that they are also punishable by appropriate 
penalties under member states’ national legislation.98 State parties are required to 
take the necessary legislative measures to ensure that those held liable pursuant to 
the terms of the AU Convention, are punishable by effective and proportionate 
sanctions.99  
 
These criminal sanctions include state parties taking the measures necessary to 
ensure that in the case of a conviction for an offence committed through a digital 
                                                          
94  Ibid. 
95  See art 37(1) of the AU Convention. The amendments are to be submitted to the Chairperson 
of the Commission of the AU who shall transmit them to state parties within 30 days of receipt 
(art 37(2)). Upon recommendation from the Executive Council of the Union, the proposals will 
be considered at one of the sessions (art 37(3)), and the amendments shall be adopted in 
accordance with its rules of procedure (art 37(4)). 
96  See art 28 of the AU Convention. 
97  Id art 31(1)(a). 
98  Id art 31(1)(b). 
99  Id art 31(1)(c). 
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communication medium, a competent court may impose sanctions.100 For example, 
the judge may order the mandatory dissemination, at the expense of the convicted 
person, of an extract from his or her judgment using the same medium used for the 
original message and in accordance with the requirements prescribed by the law in 
the member state concerned.101 A breach of the confidentiality of data stored in a 
computer system is punishable by the same penalties as those applicable to 
breaches of professional secrecy.102   
 
Measures to be taken at AU level 
 
The Convention further includes measures to be taken at AU level by requiring the 
chairperson of the Commission to report to the Assembly on the establishment and 
monitoring of the operational mechanism.103 These include encouraging AU 
members to adopt and implement measures to strengthen cybersecurity in electronic 
services and to combat cybercrime and human rights violations in cyberspace.104 It is 
further required to advise African governments on how to promote cybersecurity and 
combat the scourge of cybercrime and human rights violations in cyberspace at 
national level, and to gather information and carry out analyses of the criminal 
behaviour of information network users and computer systems operating in Africa.105 
This information must be transmitted to competent national authorities. It must also 
formulate and promote the adoption of harmonised codes of conduct for use by 
public officials in the area of cyber security, and carry out any other tasks relating to 
cybercrime and breaches of the rights of individuals in cyberspace as may be 
assigned to it by the policy organs of the AU.106   
 
Signature and ratification 
 
                                                          
100  Id art 31(2)(a-c). 
101   Ibid. 
102  Ibid. 
103   Id art 32. 
104   Ibid. 
105  Ibid. 
106  Ibid. 
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The Convention is open to all AU state parties107 for signature, ratification, or 
accession in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures.108 It remains 
to be seen which state parties will ratify the Convention and whether it will act as a 
protective measure against cybercrime in Africa including combating spam.109 As of 
September 2016 no member state had yet ratified the Convention. Some member 
states are apparently considering Bills aimed at aligning their laws with the 
Convention.110 Be that as it may, state parties who do not have laws in place to 
address the issue, would be wise to become party to the Convention and also draw 
from those state parties who have laws in place which appear to be providing greater 
protection and safeguards for their nationals.  
 
In the discussion below, the stance taken to combat spam by the two RECs listed 
above, followed by the role of the ATU is highlighted. 
 
5.3.3 COMESA Model Law on Electronic Transactions and its Guide to 
Enactment  
 
5.3.3.1 Background 
 
The COMESA Model Law on Electronic Transactions111 has been following a 
programme on e-legislation aimed at assisting its member states to develop 
appropriate legislation to support e-commerce.112 A study to develop e-legislation 
guidelines for the COMESA region was undertaken followed by two workshops on e-
legislation in general and on e-commerce laws in particular.113 The Model Law is 
drafted on the basis of United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
                                                          
107  Article 1 of the AU Convention defines the term “state party” or state parties as “member 
state(s) which has or have ratified or acceded to the present Convention”. 
108  Id art 35. 
109   In terms of art 36 of the AU Convention, the Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the 
date of the receipt by the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU. 
110  Countries with proposed Bills on cybercrimes; cyber-security and data protection laws are: 
Botswana; Kenya; Madagascar; Mauritania; Morocco; Tanzania; Tunisia; and Uganda. See 
Finnan supra n 67. 
111  See COMESA Model Law on Electronic Transactions and Guide to Enactment (2010) 115, 
hereafter the ‘COMESA Model Law’. It is also recommended that the Model Law be called 
Electronic Transactions Act rather than the Electronic Commerce Act as the former is said to 
provide a wider description than the latter. This is more in keeping with the nature and scope of 
the Model Law.  
112  See Executive Summary of the COMESA Model Law 1. 
113  Ibid. 
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Communications in International Contracts,114 the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic Commerce,115 and the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures.116 The provisions of the COMESA Model Law apply to international 
transactions only – domestic transactions, therefore, do not fall within its ambit.117 
The COMESA Model Law is divided into five parts namely: general issues;118 
application of legal requirements to data messages;119 communication of data 
messages;120 consumer protection;121 and online dispute resolution.122 The issue of 
unsolicited commercial communications is dealt with under consumer protection 
provisions in Chapter IV of the Model Law. 
 
5.3.3.2 Consumer protection 
 
The COMESA Model Law makes provision for certain core information to be 
provided to consumers123 and ensures for consumers the right to withdraw from a 
transaction if these requirements have not been met.124 A “consumer” is defined as 
“any natural person who enters or intends entering into an electronic transaction with 
a supplier as the end user of the goods and services offered by that supplier”.125 The 
issue of unsolicited goods, services, or communications (spam) is dealt with under 
article 25 of the COMESA Model Law to be discussed below.  
                                                          
114  Hereafter ‘UNECIC’. See id 4.  
115  See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996). Hereafter ‘UNCITRAL’. 
116  See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment (2001). 
117  See Executive Summary of the COMESA Model Law 2. 
118  See Chapter 1 of the COMESA Model Law. This chapter covers the following issues: sphere of 
application (art 1); definitions (art 2); interpretation (art 3); variation of agreement (art 4); and 
location of parties (art 5).  
119  Id Chapter II which covers the following: legal recognition of data message (art 6); writing (art 
7); signatures (art 8); original form (art 9); admissibility and evidentiary weight of data 
messages (art 10); and retention of data messages (art 11). 
120  Id Chapter III which covers the following articles: formation and validity of contracts (art 12); 
and time and place of dispatch and receipt of data messages (art 19). For other provisions see 
arts 12-21.  
121  Id Chapter IV which covers among others: scope of application (art 22); information to be 
provided (art 23); and cooling off provisions (art 24) et cetera.  
122  Id Chapter V which covers issues such as conciliation before the court of justice of the 
Common Market (art 30). 
123  This information includes: the full name and legal status of the vendor; physical address and 
telephone number; e-mail and web site address; membership of any self-regulatory or 
accreditation bodies to which the supplier belongs (id art 23(1) for an exhaustive list of the 
information to be provided to consumers). 
124  See in particular art 23(2) - (4) of the Model Law. 
125  See art 2 of the COMESA Model Law. 
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5.3.3.3 Combating spam under the COMESA Model Law 
 
Spam provisions under the COMESA Model Law are dealt with under Article 25. The 
title of the article is: Unsolicited goods, services, or communications 
 
(a) Article 25: Unsolicited goods, services, or communications 
 
Article 25 provides as follows: 
 
(1) That any person sending unsolicited communications to a consumer must provide the 
consumer with  
(a) the option to cancel such subscription to the senders mailing list; and also  
(b) identifying particulars of the source from which the sender obtained consumers personal 
information.  
(2) No agreement is concluded where the consumer has failed to respond to an unsolicited 
communication(s).  
(3) Any person who fails to comply with or contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to a maximum fine of [currency and amount].  
(4) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to a person, who has advised 
the sender that such communications are unwelcome, is guilty of an offence and liable, on 
conviction, to a maximum fine of [currency and amount].  
 
 
(b) Commentary on the COMESA Model Law 
 
The COMESA Model Law is accompanied by a “Guide to Enactment”126 which 
comments on the provisions of the Model Law. The Guide provides a detailed 
explanation of how each article is intended to function in practice.127 The Guide also 
serves as an aid to the interpretation of the Model Law once it has been enacted by 
member states.128 Using the Guide for purposes of interpretation will also enhance 
the harmonising effect of the Model Law within the region.129  
 
The commentary on article 25 in the Guide notes the following:130 
 
This article places an obligation on the sender of spam to provide consumers with an opt-out 
mechanism. It also gives the consumer a right to obtain information on where the person 
obtained their personal particulars. Non-compliance with this provisions is liable the payment of 
a fine or conviction.131 Unlike other provisions where civil remedies were regarded as sufficient 
to protect the interests of consumers, in this instance, civil remedies were regarded as 
                                                          
126  Hereafter ‘the Guide’. 
127  See Executive Summary of COMESA Model Law 7. 
128   Ibid. 
129  Ibid.  
130  See the Guide 106. 
131  The COMESA Model Law has left it to state parties to indicate the amount of a fine for 
contravening the provisions of this article.  
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ineffective in themselves to counter the problem of spam. Article 25 paragraph (2) is aimed at 
providing legal certainty and protection to consumers against another unconscionable selling 
technique, namely sending communications132 purporting to be an offer which will be regarded 
as being accepted if a consumer should fail to respond to it. This is similar to the technique 
where unsolicited goods are sent followed by an invoice if the consumer does not return the 
goods within a specific time. This provision simply states that consumers will incur no 
obligations by failing to respond to unsolicited electronic communications from suppliers. Their 
silence is treated in law as a rejection in law rather than as an acceptance.  
 
Consumers may also lodge a complaint with the relevant government department or 
Consumer Protection Organisation in respect of any non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Chapter by a supplier.133  
 
(c) Shortcomings in the Model Law 
 
The COMESA’s Model Law deals with the issue of spam in a minimalist approach, 
offering only a basic description of provisions on how to regulate spam. It is 
important to note here that the provisions of the COMESA Model Law are identical to 
those in section 45 of the South African ECT Act of 2002.134  
 
Lack of definitions 
  
The COMESA Model Law describes spam as “unsolicited commercial 
communications”,135 “unsolicited communications”,136 and “unsolicited goods, 
services or communications”.137 However, it fails to define what these terms mean, 
although it is clear from the provisions that spam involves the content of the 
message – namely, its “commercial aspect” – rather than the “volume”. There must 
be a sale or offer of goods and services before a communication can be classified as 
                                                          
132  Article 2 of the COMESA Model Law defines the term “communications” as “any statement, 
declaration, demand, notice or request, including an offer and acceptance of an offer that the 
parties are required to make or choose to make in connection with the formation or 
performance of a contract. Electronic communication, on the other hand, means 
communication by means of data messages”.  
133  See art 29 of the COMESA Model Law. According to the commentary effectiveness of the 
remedy provided in this article will depend on the powers to which such complaints will be 
directed. It is not the only remedy but provides a further remedy to strengthen consumer rights. 
It also raises consumer awareness of other possible avenues through which to address their 
grievances. See the Guide 107. 
134   Section 45 of the ECT Act is dealt with in Chapter 8 par 8.2.5.1 below. 
135  See art 25(1) and (4) of the COMESA Model Law. 
136  Id art 25(2). 
137  See title of art 25 of the COMESA Model Law. 
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spam. In these terms, non-commercial e-mails – chain letters, urban legends, and 
the like – would not qualify as spam.  
 
The COMESA Model Law, however, defines certain terms including 
“communications”,138 “consumer”,139 and “electronic communications”.140 However, 
certain concepts that are important in clarifying the issue of spam are not defined – 
for example, terms such as “electronic transactions”,141 “electronic commerce”, and 
“personal information”.142  
 
Regulation rather than prohibition of spam 
 
The COMESA Model Law follows the opt-out mechanism which regulates spam but 
does not prohibit it. Although the COMESA Model Law places an obligation on the 
sender to provide the consumer with an opt-out facility, it does not provide for the 
ways in which this mechanism is to be administered, so defeating the whole purpose 
of allowing the consumer to opt-out. As noted in the previous chapter, certain 
requirements must be met if this facility is to be administered successfully, and the 
COMESA Model Law fails to provide this information.143 There is, therefore, no 
deterrent which would persuade the sender to stop sending further spam emails.  
 
Other basic requirements governing the sending of e-mail that could assist in this 
regard are not spelt out. Notable here are e-mail harvesting, labelling requirements, 
and disguised headers. Without these requirements, consumers are unable to 
request particulars of how and where the spammer came by their personal 
information. 
 
                                                          
138  Article 2 of the COMESA Model Law defines the term “communication” as “any statement, 
declaration, demand, notice or request, including an offer and the acceptance of an offer that 
the parties are required to make or choose to make in connection with the formation or 
performance of a contract”. 
139  See para 5.3.3.2 above for the definition of consumer. 
140  Article 2 of the COMESA Model Law defines the term “electronic communications” as “a 
communication by means of data message”. A “data message”, in turn, is defined as 
“information generated, sent, received, or stored by electronic, optical or similar means 
including but not limited to electronic data interchange (EDI), e-mail; voice, where the voice is 
used in automated transactions; and a stored record”. See art 2 of the COMESA Model Law. 
141  See the title of the COMESA Model Law. 
142  This term is used in art 25(1)(b) of the COMESA Model Law.  
143  See para 4.3.4.2 (c) (ii) in Chapter 4 above for the use of the opt-out facility. 
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According to the COMESA Model Law, the advantage of this instrument is that it is 
able to achieve a high level of harmonisation without the restrictions of a 
Convention.144 As a result, member states are able to tailor the Model Law to 
national requirements and to take account of the differences and needs of domestic 
law.145 The Model Law also allows for amendments to the national legislation of 
member states aimed at strengthening regulation.146 In 2011 a decision was taken 
that state parties should adopt the Model Law.147 Like the AU Convention above, it is 
not clear how many COMESA member states have signed or ratified the Model Law. 
Below is a discussion on the SADC Model Law. 
 
5.3.4 SADC  
 
5.3.4.1 Harmonisation of ICT Policies in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
The Harmonisation of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa148 is a project initiated as a 
result of a request from Economic Integration Organisations in Africa, as well as 
regional regulator associations, to the ITU and the European Commission for 
assistance in harmonising ICT policies and legislation in sub-Saharan Africa.149 The 
project for harmonisation of ICT laws started in 2008 and culminated in the Southern 
region with the Electronic Transactions and Electronic Commerce Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Model Law.150 Consultants worked on the draft 
document which was later reviewed, discussed, and validated by broad consensus 
                                                          
144   See Executive Summary of COMESA Model Law 4. 
145  Ibid. 
146  Ibid.  
147  The decision was made by the Council that the Electronic Transaction Model Bill be adopted. 
See art 38(a) Official Gazette of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 16 (15 
October 2011). 
148  Hereafter ‘HIPSSA’. HIPSSA is part of a global ITU-EC-ACP project being implemented 
through three sub-projects customised to the specific needs of each region: Sub-Saharan 
Africa (HIPSSA); the Caribbean (HIPCAR); and the Pacific Island Countries (ICB4PAC). See 
ITU ‘HIPSSA project: Support for harmonization of the ICT policies in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC-ACP/HIPSSA/Pages/default.aspx (date of use: 20 
March 2017).  
149  Ibid. The project was divided into four sub-regional programs taking into account sensitive 
issues such as geographical, political, and cultural diversity in the region, and also to avoid 
potential competition between regional organisations. These sub-regions are East Africa, 
Central Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa. The main aim of this project is to develop a 
strong, integrated and viable communications sector on the Continent. 
150  See the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law on Electronic 
Transactions and Electronic Commerce (2013) iii. Hereafter ‘the SADC Model Law’. 
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among participants at a workshop held in Gaborone, Botswana, in 2012.151 One of 
the broad objectives of the HIPSSA is: to establish harmonised policy and legal and 
regulatory frameworks at the regional and continental levels; to create an enabling 
environment that will attract investment and foster the sustainable development of 
competitive African Telecommunication/ICT regional markets and infrastructures; 
and increase access to the related services for its people.152  
 
This SADC Model Law was adopted by the SADC Ministers responsible for 
telecommunications, postal services, and ICT in their regions, at a meeting in 
Mauritius during 2012.153 In addition to this Model Law, the Computer Crime and 
Cybercrime Model Law154 was published in 2013. This Model Law also contains 
provisions relevant to spam. Although a discussion of the Model Law on Computer 
Crime and Cybercrime falls outside of the scope of this thesis, reference will be 
made to the relevant spam provisions in the discussion below. 
 
5.3.4.2 SADC Model Law  
 
(a) Background 
 
According to the SADC Model Law the advent of the use of electronic 
communications for commercial transactions has posed unexpected and complex 
legal problems not only for SADC countries, but also for countries worldwide.155 The 
SADC Model Law provides a tool that member states can use to create a more 
secure legal environment for electronic transactions and electronic commerce.156 It 
also seeks to “enhance regional integration and has adopted the best practices and 
collective efforts of member states to address the legal aspects of e-transactions and 
                                                          
151  Ibid. 
152  ITU HIPSSA Project ‘Support for harmonization of the ICT policies in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC-ACP/HIPSSA/Pages/default.aspx (date of use 30 
November 2015). 
153  See SADC Model Law par iii. 
154   The Southern African Development Community Model Law on Computer Crime and 
Cybercrime Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan African (2013). This Model Law is 
aimed at the criminalisation and investigation of computer and network-related crime (Part 1 art 
2 of the Model law).  
155  See Preamble to the SADC Model Law 1.   
156  Ibid. 
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e-commerce”.157 The SADC Model Law is divided into five parts: (a) general enabling 
provisions;158 (b) electronic transactions;159 (c) electronic commerce;160 (d) consumer 
protection;161 and (e) service providers.162 Of importance for present purposes are 
the consumer protection provisions, and especially the issue of online marketing. 
 
(b) Consumer protection 
 
The issue of consumer protection under the SADC Model Law is dealt with in Part IV 
where Chapter 8 dealing with the protection of online consumers is located.163 This 
chapter creates obligations for suppliers in that they are required to make specific 
information available to consumers.164 Chapter 9 deals expressly with the issue of 
online marketing, while section 30 covers the issue of unsolicited commercial 
communications. 
 
(c) Combating spam under the SADC Model Law  
 
Spam provisions under the SADC Model Law are contained in section 30. The title of 
that section is unsolicited commercial communications. Section 30 provides: 
 
(1) Marketing by means of electronic communication shall provide the addressee with: 
                                                          
157  Ibid. 
158  See Part I of the SADC Model Law dealing with: Chapter 1: definitions and interpretation (ss 1-
3); Chapter 2: the legal recognition of electronic communications (ss 4-5); and Chapter 3: the 
legal effect of electronic communications (ss 6-9).  
159  See Part II of the SADC Model Law which encompasses: Chapter 4: the legal recognition of 
electronic transactions (ss 10-11); and Chapter 5: time and place of dispatch and receipt of 
electronic communications (ss 12-16). 
160  See Part III of the SADC Model Law which covers the following: chapter 6 attribution (sections 
17-18); chapter 7 admissibility and evidentiary weight of electronic communications (sections 
19-24). 
161  Id Part IV. 
162  See Part V of the SADC Model Law which deals with the following: Chapter 10: online safe 
harbours (ss 31-34); and Chapter 11: requirements (ss 35-37). 
163   Section 1 of the SADC Model Law defines the term “consumer” as “a natural person and or a 
non-profit organisation that purchases goods and services for the direct satisfaction of 
individual needs or wants, or the collective needs of members of a community; or a natural 
person who enters or intends entering into an electronic transaction with a supplier as the end 
user of goods or services offered by the supplier”. 
164  This information includes the full contract details of senders; their place of business; and full 
price of the goods and services rendered. The supplier should also provide the consumer with 
the opportunity to review his or her transactions, correct mistakes, and withdraw from 
transactions, as well as a cooling off period. See ss 25(1) and (2) and 27 of the SADC Model 
Law.  
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(a) The originators identity and contact details including its place of business, e-mail 
addresses and telefax numbers; 
(b) A valid and operational opt-out facility from receiving similar communications in the 
future; and 
(c) The identifying particulars of the source from which the originator obtained the 
addressees personal information. 
(2) Unsolicited commercial communications may only be sent to addressees where the opt-in 
requirement is met. 
(3) The opt-in requirement will be deemed to have been met where: 
(a) The addressee’s e-mail address and other personal information was collected by the 
originator of the message in the course of a sale or negotiations for a sale; 
(b) The originator only sends promotional messages relating to its “similar products and 
services” to the addressee; 
(c) When personal information and address was collected by the originator, the originator 
offered the addressee the opportunity to opt-out (free of charge for the cost of 
transmission) and the addressee declined to opt-out; and 
(d) The opportunity to opt-out is provided by the originator to the addressee with every 
subsequent message. 
(4) No contract is formed where an addressee does not respond to an unsolicited 
commercial communication. 
(5) An originator who fails to provide the recipient with an operational opt-out faculty referred 
to in subsections 1b and 3d is guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to the 
penalties prescribed in subsection 8. 
(6) Any originator who persists in sending unsolicited commercial communications to an 
addressee who has opted out from receiving any further electronic communications from 
the originator through the originator’s opt-out facility, is guilty of an offence and liable, on 
conviction, to the penalties prescribed in subsection 8; 
(7) Any party whose goods or services are advertised in contravention of this section is guilty 
of an offence and liable, on conviction, to the penalties prescribed in subsection 8. 
(8) A person convicted of an offence referred to in this section is liable on conviction to a fine 
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. 
 
 
(d) Commentary on the SADC Model Law(s) 
 
The SADC Model Law is expressed in a technologically neutral manner so that it can 
be applied to existing technologies as well as those yet to be developed.165 It also 
contains comprehensive anti-spam provisions. These provisions include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
 
Definitions 
 
The SADC Model Law addresses the scope of application of key concepts and has 
proposed neutral definitions.166 Provision is made for the following definitions: 
                                                          
165  See Preamble to the SADC Model Law.  
166  See SADC Model Law 1. 
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“addressee”;167 “data message”;168 “electronic communications”;169 “electronic 
transactions”;170 “intermediary”;171 “originator”;172 and “place of business”.173 Some 
terms which could improve the reach of the SADC Model Law are, however, not 
defined. Notable among these are “marketing”;174 “e-mail”;175 “unsolicited commercial 
communications”;176 and “personal information”.177 However, it is clear from the term 
“unsolicited commercial communications” that the SADC Model Law regulates spam 
only in relation to its content and that any other malicious e-mails that do not have a 
commercial aspect, will not fall under this definition. This is consistent with the 
discussion above. 
 
Mechanism for regulating spam 
 
The SADC Model Law advocates for strict measures to regulate spam. It advocates 
the sending of unsolicited communications only once an opt-in requirement has been 
satisfied.178 It also sets out requirements to be met where an opt-in requirement is 
needed which covers the fact that the recipient’s e-mail address or personal 
information be collected by the originator.179   
                                                          
167  The term “addressee of an electronic communication” means “any party who is intended by the 
originator to receive the electronic communications, but does not include a party acting as an 
intermediary in respect of that electronic communication”. See s 1 of the SADC Model Law.  
168  Id s 1 which defines a “data message” as “information generated, sent, received, or stored by 
electronic, magnetic, optical or similar means, including but not limited to electronic data 
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, mobile communications (such as SMS messages) and audio 
or video recordings”. 
169  The term “electronic communications” is defined as: “communication made by means of a data 
message”. Ibid.  
170  An “electronic transaction” means “a transaction, action, or set of actions, of either a 
commercial or non-commercial nature, and includes the provision of information and or e-
government services”. Ibid. 
171  The term “intermediary with respect to a particular electronic communication”, means “a person 
who on behalf of another person sends, receives, or stores that electronic communication or 
provides other services with respect to it”. Ibid. 
172  The term “originator of an electronic communication” is defined as “a person or party by whom 
or on whose behalf the electronic communication purports to have been sent or generated prior 
to storage if any”. This term does not include a person or party acting as an intermediary with 
respect to that communication. Ibid. 
173  The term “place of business” is defined as “any place where the party maintains a non-
transitory establishment to pursue an economic activity other than the temporary provision of 
goods and services out of a specific location”. Ibid. 
174  As used in s 30(1) of the SADC Model Law. 
175  As used in s 30(3)(a) of the SADC Model Law. 
176  As referred to in s 30(2), (4) and (6) of the SADC Model Law. 
177  Id s 30(1) (c), and (3) (a)(c).  
178  Id s 30(2). 
179   Ibid. 
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In this case the originator must provide the addressee with an option to opt-out from 
receiving similar communications in the future.180 That opt-out facility must be valid 
and operational, and failure to provide this will render the originator guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding five 
years.181 
 
Requirements for the sending of e-mail 
 
Section 30(7) of the SADC Model Law also imposes liability on senders for 
advertising in contravention of these provisions. The SADC Model Law also requires 
that the originator provide the addressee with its identity and contact details which 
include: e-mail addresses and telefax to mention but a few.182 Also required is that 
the recipient be provided with the identifying particulars of where the originator 
obtained the addressee’s personal information.183 The SADC Model Law does not 
address the following aggravated issues: address harvesting; the sale of e-mail 
address lists for marketing purposes; dictionary attacks; and the use of software to 
extract e-mail addresses from public sites.  
 
The move towards a Model Law in the SADC region is a starting point in ensuring 
that member states in the region are prepared for the current electronic age. The 
SADC Model Law holds anyone liable (on conviction to either a fine or imprisonment 
not exceeding five years), who persists in sending communications after they have 
been instructed to stop.184 It remains to be seen how the SADC member states will 
fare in adopting this Model Law in their national laws.185 
 
SADC Model Law on Computer Crime and Cybercrime 
 
                                                          
180  Id s 30(1) (b) and 3(d). 
181  Id s 30(1) (b), (5) and (6). 
182  Id s 30(1) (a). This will be helpful in cases where the addressees would like some information 
furnished regarding the source from which the originator or sender obtained their personal 
information. 
183  Id s 30(1) (c). 
184  Id s 30(6) and (8). 
185  It is unclear how many members have ratified this Model.  
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Other spam related provisions are located in article 19 of the SADC Model Law on 
Computer Crime and Cybercrime. This article prohibits the following unlawful acts 
committed by a person intentionally and without lawful cause or justification:186 
initiating the transmission of multiple e-mail messages187 from or through such 
computer system;188 the use of a protected computer system189 to relay or re-
transmit multiple e-mail messages with the intent to deceive or mislead users; or any 
e-mail or ISP190 as the origin of such messages.191 This article includes provisions on 
materially falsified header information in multiple e-mail messages and the intention 
of initiating the transmission of such messages.192 The above activities are 
punishable on conviction, by imprisonment for a specified period or a fine not 
exceeding a specified amount, or both.193 Countries may restrict the criminalisation 
with regard to the transmission of multiple electronic messages within a customer or 
business relationship.194 Note should be taken here that these provisions has to do 
with the technological aspects of spam. 
 
Below an outline of the ATU’s position on spam is highlighted. 
 
5.3.5 ATU 
 
5.3.5.1 Cooperation between ATU and other stakeholders 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 4, a meeting on countering and combating spam was held 
in July 2013, at which a partnership between the AU, the ATU, the ITU, and the 
ISOC was mooted.195 The following action was identified as appropriate for 
                                                          
186  See art 19(1) of the SADC Model on Computer crime and Cybercrime. 
187  Part 1 art 3(17) of the of the SADC Model on Computer Crime and Cybercrime defines the term 
“initiating the transmission of multiple e-mail messages” as “a mail message including e-mail 
and instant messaging sent to more than thousand recipients”. 
188  Id art 19(1) (a). 
189  The term “computer system” or “information system” as “a device or a group of inter-connected 
or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic 
processing of data or any other function”. Id Part 1 art 3(5). 
190   The term “Internet service provider (ISP” is defined as “a natural or legal person that provides 
to users’ services mentioned in arts 28-32 of the Model law”. Id Part 1 art 3(21). 
191  Id art 19(1)(b). 
192  Id art 19(1)(c). 
193  Id art 19(1)(c). 
194   Iid art 19(2). 
195  ITU ‘Workshop on countering and combating spam’ (Durban South Africa 8 July 2013) 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/spam/201307/Pages/default.aspx (date of 
use: 30 November 2015). 
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partnerships and or agreements between the stakeholders, namely, to develop a 
Model Law governing spam (including SMS spam) based on existing laws that have 
proven effective.196 This would include cybercrime laws, the ITU’s work, the SADC 
Model Law on Computer and Cybercrime, and the AU Convention.197 These were to 
be developed jointly by the AU and the UNECA. Inherent is the development of a 
model program for cooperation between governments and industry in national 
actions to combat spam – for example, agency cooperation to detect and take down 
botnets should also be taken into account.198 This model program would be 
disseminated through workshops and other means with the aim of developing a 
program to assist African ISPs to implement effective anti-spam tools.199 The 
development of information for users on how to protect themselves against spam, 
and also to identify suspicious messages and deal with them safely, was also 
included.200  
 
In September of 2013 a seminar for policy makers on combating spam was also 
organised in Nairobi, Kenya.201 This seminar offered government representatives, 
policy makers, and developing-country participants an opportunity to engage with 
technical experts, industry associations, and government agencies working to reduce 
the impact of spam.202 The seminar provided an opportunity for open discussion on 
what tools to use, government requirements, and best practices for network 
management associated with combating the proliferation of spam, malware, botnets, 
and phishing based upon experiences and approaches currently in use.203  
 
The meeting aimed to adopt actionable outcomes to provide meaningful technical 
and policy information on best practices, and also to meet the ATU spam action 
items identified at the July seminar in Durban, South Africa.204 It further aimed to 
                                                          
196  Ibid. 
197  See the AU Convention para 5.3.2 above. 
198  Ibid. 
199  ITU ‘Workshop on countering and combating spam’ supra n 194.   
200  Ibid. 
201  See Internet Society ‘Program for joint ATU and the Internet Society seminar on combating 
spam’ (9 September 2013 Nairobi Kenya) 1-2 http://www.internetsociety.org/ 
sites/default/files/ATU%20Spam%20Agenda%20and%20Speakers.pdf (date of use: 9 
December 2015). 
202  Ibid. 
203  Ibid.  
204  Ibid. 
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establish a multi-stakeholders process by which to bring Internet technical expertise, 
industry associations, and policy makers together to create a sustainable model for 
engagement and problem solving in combating spam in all its forms both within 
Africa and as part of the global community.205 Now that the Model Laws and other 
initiatives in this region have been outlined, a contextualisation of the instruments 
follows below.  
 
5.4 Contexualisation of the African Region’s Model Laws and Conventions 
 
The recent instruments for combating spam in Africa are an indication of the 
continent taking part in the knowledge economy by aligning itself with international 
best practices. What has emerged from the first-step on the road to harmonisation is 
that while there are areas in which harmonisation has been achieved, differences 
remain. It is noted that the instruments are either multi-purpose (for example, the AU 
Convention), or specific (the COMESA and SADC Model Laws).  
 
5.4.1 Uniformity among instruments: definitions 
 
The issue of spam is dealt with under consumer protection provisions in the 
COMESA and SADC Model Laws, whereas in terms of the AU Convention, spam is 
covered under its electronic commerce provisions. Both the COMESA and SADC 
Model Laws refer to spam as unsolicited commercial communications, while under 
the AU Convention spam is approached in relation to direct marketing and 
solicitation. In all three instruments the term “unsolicited commercial 
communications” or “spam” is undefined. What is, however, clear from those terms is 
that the classification of spam is based on the content of the message rather than its’ 
“size”. Consequently, any unsolicited communication sent to a receiver which has as 
its content the sale of goods and or services will be regarded as spam. Even where 
the AU Convention includes political and charitable messages in its definition of 
direct marketing, the content of such messages must still meet the requirement of 
the advertising of goods and services. With this mind, any other malicious, 
unsolicited e-mails sent to a recipient – such as urban legends, and the like – would 
not qualify as spam in Africa.  
                                                          
205  Ibid. 
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While the SADC Model Law and the AU Convention appear to have provided an 
exhaustive list of definitions, the COMESA Model Law falls short in this regard. It is 
further worth noting that some of the terms that are important in clarifying the spam 
problem such as “marketing” or “online marketing” (used in the SADC Model Law 
and the AU Convention) are not defined.   
 
5.4.2 Contrasting the instruments: mechanisms  
 
As with any other spam legislation, the mechanism is always the most important 
element when it comes to regulating spam, and this is where the documents differ. 
Both the AU Convention and the SADC Model Law advocate a restrictive approach 
to spam in the form of the opt-in mechanism. These two instruments make the 
sending of spam illegal in their jurisdictions by providing that direct marketing is only 
permitted where the particulars of the addresses have been obtained directly from 
the consumers; and the recipients must have consented to be contacted through 
marketing instruments.206 The SADC Model Law on Computer Crimes and 
Cybercrime also criminalises the transmission of multiple electronic messages within 
customer and business relationships.207  
 
The COMESA Model Law advocates an opt-out mechanism which does not prohibit 
spam but merely regulates it as shown above. In addition, it makes no provision for 
the requirements regarding the functionality of the opt-out facility. The SADC Model 
Law requires a valid opt-out facility to be included where the recipient elects not to 
receive similar communications in the future.208 The originator who fails to provide 
the recipient with an operational opt-out facility is guilty of an offence.209   
 
5.4.3 Requirements for sending electronic communications  
 
The SADC Model Law is the most comprehensive of the three instruments 
considered. Both the AU Convention and the SADC Model Law addresses the 
                                                          
206  See art 4(4)(a) and (b) of the AU Convention contrasted with s 30(3) of the SADC Model Law.   
207   See s 19(2) of the SADC Model Law on Computer Crimes and Cybercrime. 
208  See s 30(1)(b) of the SADC Model Law. 
209  Id ss 30(3)(c) and (d) and 30(5). 
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requirement that spammers should not disguise (spoof) their headers.210 This is in 
line with the ITU’s recommendation as noted in Chapter 4 above. This will also 
minimise the aggravation experienced by receivers who are not able to locate the 
sender of spam e-mails. Clear penalties for contravention of these provisions are 
also provided.211 
 
As noted above, participation by different stakeholders in combating spam is vital as 
spam is not only a national issue but a global one which demands a multi-pronged 
approach. The issue of involving consumers or those affected by this scourge should 
be a priority in these instruments. Education for all regarding the inner workings of 
the Internet could reduce the amount of spam sent to consumers. Only the AU 
Convention contains an article that deals with education in its provisions on cyber 
security.212  
 
The ISPs also need to inform and educate their clients not only about their products, 
but also on the dangers which come with the use of these products. The AU 
Convention also addresses the issue of stakeholders partnering together to combat 
spam especially in relation to the prohibition on harvesting and the sale of lists. As 
has been noted, governments need to introduce the study of cybercrime or cyber 
security and or electronic communication skills at lower levels in grade school, so 
that by the time those learners are consumers they would have learned how to 
protect themselves and be savvy while surfing the net.213 The need for cooperation 
must also be prioritised and the ITU, in partnership with ISOC and the ATU, needs to 
follow up on and implement the measures identified at their workshops.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Africa is indeed rising by aligning itself with the world on ICT laws. While there is still 
a long way to go, the first steps have been taken. Most countries in the African 
region have yet to implement laws regulating electronic commerce, personal data 
                                                          
210  Id s 30(1)(a) and (b). Information such as: contact details; place of business; e-mail addresses; 
and telefax should be provided; art 4(1) of the AU Convention, and s 19(1)(c) of the SADC 
Model Law on Computer Crimes and Cybercrime. 
211  See s 30(8) of the SADC Model Law. 
212  See, in particular, art 26 of the AU Convention. 
213  See Chap 4 par 4.4.2.3 par (e) where the element of education is discussed.  
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protection, and cybersecurity. The instruments described above, with regards to the 
issue of spam, are of vital importance – more particularly in those jurisdictions which 
have yet to implement relevant legislation. For those that are in the process of doing 
so, the instruments will assist in the legislative drafting process. Those that already 
have laws in place can also benefit from these instruments by amending their 
legislation where necessary in order to tighten their control over spam. Where the 
national laws provide greater protection on the issue of spam, those nations should 
publicise their provisions so that the Convention or Model Laws can be amended 
accordingly.  
 
In all three instruments member states or state parties are encouraged to ratify these 
instruments but only time will tell whether this will in fact happen. Be that as it may, 
these instruments are not binding on member states but are there as a guide for 
parties who embark upon the process of implementing ICT laws in their region, or to 
draw from the instruments those provisions that might enhance and strengthen their 
existing laws aimed at combating spam.  
 
In the next three chapter’s focus will be on anti-spam laws in three jurisdictions to 
establish how those countries are dealing with the problem: Chapter 6 focuses on 
the USA; Chapter 7 on Australia; and Chapter 8 on the South African regulatory 
regime. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-SPAM LAWS: THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (USA) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding two chapters dealt with initiatives to combat spam at both the 
international and regional levels. In this and the following two chapters, focus will be 
on the national anti-spam laws in three countries: the USA, Australia, and South 
Africa. It should be noted that these countries’ anti-spam legislation and provisions 
considered here were in place when the international initiatives were being 
conducted. At the time of writing it is estimated that, worldwide, there are over fifty 
countries with anti-spam laws or provisions.1   
 
In this chapter focus will be on the anti-spam legislation in the USA. Before the USA 
passed its federal anti-spam law, most of the states had already implemented anti-
spam legislation. It is consequently appropriate to consider anti-spam legislation 
from both the state and the federal perspectives. At state level an outline of anti-
spam legislation focusing specifically on the requirements for the transmission of e-
mail messages is provided. At federal level a commentary on the federal anti-spam 
law will be outlined with specific focus on: the benefits it offers; commentators’ 
criticism levelled at certain of its provisions; and suggestions for improvement. This 
discussion includes an evaluation of relevant case law illustrating how the courts 
have interpreted specific provisions in both state and federal law.  
 
6.2 Anti-spam laws at state level in the USA 
 
6.2.1 Background 
 
There are 52 states in the USA and all but twelve had anti-spam legislation in place 
before the federal law came into operation.2 State laws were passed from 1997 until 
                                                          
1  See Spamlaws ‘Spam laws’ http://www.spamlaws.com (date of use: 30 December 2015) for a 
list and brief summary of these anti-spam laws. 
2  States that had not enacted legislation relating to unsolicited bulk or commercial e-mail 
included: Alabama; Hawaii; Kentucky; Massachusetts; Mississippi; Montana; Nebraska; New 
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the enactment of the federal law in 2003.3 These state laws differ as to what 
constitutes spam and how to regulate it.4 Below is a discussion on anti-spam laws at 
state level. 
 
6.2.2 Features of anti-spam laws at state level 
 
6.2.2.1 Definition of spam in state laws 
 
Anti-spam state laws use the following terms to describe spam: “unsolicited 
commercial electronic message or mail” (UCEM or UCE);5 “unsolicited commercial 
mail advertisement” (UCEA);6 “unsolicited bulk electronic e-mail” (UBEM or UBE);7 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hampshire; New Jersey; New York; South Carolina; and Vermont. See Kendrick (2003) 7/3 
Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 565.  
3  The first state to pass an anti-spam law was Nevada. See Nevada Revised Statutes (as 
amended in 2001 and 2003); also Prince & Shea (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer 
& Information Law 33-4 and 76.  
4  See, generally, Sorkin (2003) 22/1 The John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information 
Law 3 ff; also Nelson (2003) 58 The Business Lawyer 1209-10; and id Prince & Shea 33-40.  
5  “UCEM” means “a commercial e-mail message sent without the consent of the recipient, by a 
person with whom the recipient does not have an established business relationship”. See s 44-
1372 (6) of the Arizona Revised Statutes Title 44 Trade and Commerce Chapter 9 Trade 
Practices Generally art 16 Commercial e-mail (added by 2003 SB 1280 approved 16 May 2003 
hereafter ‘Arizona Revised Statutes’). UCEM also means “any commercial e-mail message that 
is not a transactional or relation message that is sent to a recipient without the recipient’s 
affirmative or implied consent”. See s 668.602(14) of the Florida Statutes Title 39 Commercial 
Relations Chapter 668 Electronic commerce Part III e-mail communications (added by 2004 Fla 
Laws ch 233 approved 25 May 2004 effective 1 July 2004), hereafter ‘Florida Statutes’. In 
addition to these two states, other states also define spam as UCEM including: Louisiana; 
Missouri; Oregon; South Dakota; and Texas to mention but a few. UCE, on the other hand, 
means “an e-mail other than e-mail sent at the request of the recipient, via an e-mail service 
provider to two or more recipients in the state with whom the sender does not have an existing 
business relationship for the purpose of offering real property, goods or services”. See s 
45.50.479 (b)(3) of Alaska Statutes Title 45 Trade and Commerce Chap 50 Competitive 
Practices and Regulation of Competition s 479 Limitation of electronic mail (added by 2003 
Alaska Laws ch 14 HB 82 2003 approved 5 May 2003 effective 30 July 2003), hereafter ‘Alaska 
Statutes’; see too, s 1497(1)(C) of the Maine Revised Statutes: Title 10 Commerce and Trade 
Part 3 Regulation of Trade Chapter 224 Electronic Mail Solicitation (added by Public Laws ch 
327 (2003) HB 210 approved May 2003), hereafter ‘Maine Revised Statutes’. UCE is discussed 
below.  
6  “UCEA” means “a commercial e-mail advertisement sent to a recipient who meets the following 
criteria: the recipient has not provided direct consent to receive advertisements from the 
advertiser and the recipient does not have a pre-existing or current business relationship”. See 
s 17529(o)(1-2) California Business and Professions Code Division 7 Part 3 Ch 1 art 1.8 
Restrictions on Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Advertisement (added by Stats 2003 ch 487 SB 
186 approved 23 September 2003 as amended), hereafter ‘California Business and 
Professions Code’; see too s 815 ILCS 511/5 Illinois Compiled Statutes ch 815 Business 
Transactions Deceptive Practices 815 ILCS 511/ Electronic Mail Act, hereafter ‘Illinois 
Compiled Statutes’.  
7  “UBE/UBEM” means “any electronic message which is developed and distributed in an effort to 
sell or lease consumer goods and services and is sent in the same or substantially similar form 
to more than one thousand recipients”. See ss 73.1 (13) and 73.6 of the Louisiana Revised 
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“unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail” (UBCE);8 “unsolicited commercial or sexually 
explicit e-mail”;9 or simply the “prohibition of e-mail with specific content”. The 
variations in state legislation above, define spam either as unsolicited commercial e-
mail or communications (UCE), or unsolicited bulk e-mail (UBE).10 These two 
variants are further discussed below. 
 
(a) Unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) 
 
An unsolicited commercial e-mail or message is classified as such “if it is sent to a 
person who does not have an existing personal or business relationship with the 
sender, and/or to a person who has not given permission for or requested the 
sending of the commercial e-mail”.11 Sorkin raises a number of arguments in support 
of defining spam as UCE including:12  
 
the fact that spam shifts costs from the sender to the recipients; its use for commercial 
purposes is objectionable; that defining spam as UCE rather than UBE avoids the need to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Statutes Title 14 Criminal Law (as amended by 1999 La Acts 1180 approved 9 July 1999), 
hereafter ‘Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 14’; also s 39-14-603 (a) of the Tennessee Code 
Title 39 Criminal Offences Ch 14 Offenses against Property Part 6 Tennessee Personal and 
Commercial Computer Act of 2003 (added in 2003), hereafter ‘Tennessee Code’. UBE is 
discussed below. 
8  “UBCE” (or bulk e-mail advertisement) means “an electronic message, containing the same or 
similar advertisement, which is contemporaneously transmitted to two or more recipients, 
pursuant to an Internet or intranet computer network”. See s 48-603E (a) of the Idaho Code 
Title 48 Monopolies and Trade Practices Ch 6 Consumer Protection Act s 48-603E Unfair Bulk 
E-mail Advertisement Practices (added by House Bill 505 approved 17 April 2000 effective July 
1 2000), hereafter ‘Idaho Code’; and s 1.75.4(4)(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes (as 
amended in 1999), hereafter ‘North Carolina General Statues’. 
9  “Sexually explicit e-mail” means “an e-mail that promotes or contains an electronic link to 
material that is harmful to minors”. See s 13-36-102(7)(a) of the Utah Code Title 13 Commerce 
and Trade Ch 36 Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit E-mail Act (added by Utah 
Laws 2002 Ch 125 and 229), hereafter ‘Utah Code’; also s 944.25(c) of Wisconsin Statutes Ch 
944 Crimes against Sexual Morality (added by 2001 Act 16 approved 1 June 2001) hereafter 
‘Wisconsin Statutes’; and s 4-88-602(11) of the Arkansas Code Title 4 Business and 
Commercial Law Subtitle 7 Consumer Protection Ch 88 Deceptive Trade Practices subchapter 
6 Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit E-mail Prevention Act (added by Act 1019 of 
2003 approved 2 April 2003), hereafter ‘Arkansas Code’. 
10  Sorkin (2001) 35/2 University of San Francisco Law Review 327-32; Kendrick (2003 Fall) 7/3 
Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 566-8 where the author discusses how states are 
split on the definition of spam. 
11  See s 45.50.479(b)(3)(A) and (B) Alaska Statutes; s 1497.1(c) Maine Revised Statutes; s 
445.2502(h) of the Michigan Compiled Laws Ch 445 Trade and Commerce Unsolicited 
Commercial e-mail Protection Act (added by 2003 Mich Pub Act 42 HB 4519 effective 1 
September 2003), hereafter ‘Michigan Compiled Laws’; and s 407.1120(2) of the Missouri 
Revised Statutes Title 26 Trade and Commerce Ch 407 Merchandising Practices E-mail 
Practices (enacted in 2000 amended by House Bill 228 (2003) approved 11 July 2003 effective 
28 August 2003), hereafter ‘Missouri Revised Statutes’. 
12  See Sorkin (2001) supra n 10 334. 
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establish a specific threshold for “bulk”; also that non-commercial messages (especially those 
of a political or religious nature) may constitute protected speech, while commercial messages 
can be regulated without falling foul of the First Amendment;13 regulation limited to commercial 
messages stands a better chance of being adopted than regulation applicable to both 
commercial and non-commercial messages; and that existing legislation regulating commercial 
telephone and facsimile solicitation, could easily be extended to cover commercial solicitation 
transmitted by e-mail. 
 
While the arguments for UCE are valid, certain commentators are of the view that 
there is a danger – apart from the risks of censorship and breach of confidentiality of 
communication – in defining spam by content.14 The burden of spam should not be 
defined by its commercial nature per se in that non-commercial messages present 
as many problems as their commercial counterparts.15  
 
(b) Unsolicited bulk e-mail (UBE) 
 
The term UBE is defined as any electronic message which is “developed and 
distributed in an effort to sell or lease consumer goods or services, and is sent in the 
same or substantially similar form to more than 1 000 recipients”.16 To qualify as 
“bulk” the required number of copies of messages sent must be within a certain time 
period.17 Others define UBE as Internet mail sent to a group of recipients who have 
not requested it.18 According to Spamhaus, spam is about “consent” not “content” (in 
                                                          
13  The First Amendment is one of the ten Amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights in the 
USA. These Amendments were adopted on 15 December 1791. The First Amendment 
prohibits the making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, impeding the free 
exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing freedom of expression et 
cetera. See Dictionary.com ‘First Amendment’ http://www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/first-
amendment (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
14  Asscher & Hoogcarspel Regulating Spam 11. 
15  Ibid. 
16  See ss 73.1(13) and 73.6 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 14; s 48-603E(a) of the Idaho 
Code; s 18.2-152.3:1(B)(1-2) of the Virginia Code Title 18.2 Crimes and Offenses Generally Ch 
5 Crimes against Property article 7.1 Computer Crimes (including amendments by Acts 2003, 
ch 987 & 1016, approved 3 April 2003), hereafter ‘Virginia Code’. Sorkin (2001) supra n 10 330-
2 opines that “there is no generally agreed number of e-mails and that there is some resistance 
in the anti-spam community to establish or disclose a precise number”.  
17  Ibid. In terms of this section “the volume of UBE transmitted to recipients should exceed 10000 
attempts in any 24 hour period; 100000 attempts in any 30 day time period; or one million in 
any year time period”. See too, s 48-603E (d) (4) of the Idaho Code. 
18  Hoffman P ‘Unsolicited bulk e-mail: definitions and problems’ http://www.imc.org/ube-def.html 
(date of use: 30 December 2015); TechTarget ‘UBE (unsolicited bulk email) definition’ 
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/UBE where the defining characteristics of UBE are 
listed as being sent as a mass mailing to a huge number of recipients at a time; and at least 
some of the intended recipients have not agreed to receive messages from the sender (date of 
use: 30 December 2015); Daniels J ‘Bulk e-mail or opt-in’ 
http://www.icontact.com/static/pdf/Bulk-E-mail.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015); and 
Clayton R ‘Good practice for combating unsolicited bulk e-mail’ 
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-206 (date of use: 30 December 2015).  
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other words, recipients must have consented to receive the mail regardless of the 
content of the message).19 Whether the unsolicited bulk e-mail message is an 
advert, a scam, or whatever, is irrelevant if the message was unsolicited and sent in 
bulk.20 
 
Arguments raised for defining spam as UBE include:21 
 
(a) The primary argument for defining spam as UBE is simply that the commercial or non-
commercial nature of an unsolicited message has little or nothing to do with the damage that 
is inflicted. The problem is not that the costs are shifted from the sender to recipients, but 
merely that recipients, and intermediate networks, sustain costs involuntarily, making the 
sender’s motivation largely irrelevant; 
(b) A legal rule against all unsolicited bulk e-mail is arguably more content-neutral than a rule that 
focuses on commercial messages. A rule focusing only on commercial messages might well 
open the floodgates to a massive increase in non-commercial spam. Since the problem with 
spam is volume and not content, the UBE approach seems to make more sense; 
(c) Restricting all unsolicited e-mail, rather than merely UCE or UBE, is probably not a realistic 
option. Single or non-commercial, unsolicited messages are far less objectionable than UCE 
or UBE and a much stronger case can be made for constitutional protection of such 
messages than for either UCE or UBE; and 
(d) A fourth alternative would be to limit the definition to messages that are both commercial and 
sent in bulk, “UBCE”22 for short. Since nearly all UCE is sent in bulk, this approach is roughly 
equivalent to defining spam as UCE, though it would be accompanied by the same 
evidentiary difficulties as the UBE definition. 
 
What emerges from the discussion above is that there are two clear camps on how 
spam should be defined. Below is an outline of the nature of spam flowing from the 
definitions above. 
 
(c) The nature of spam  
 
The following elements of spam can be isolated: unsolicited; commercial; and bulk.23 
While commentators agree on the “unsolicited” element, they differ when it comes to 
the type of mail involved – for example, whether the focus should be on “content” or 
on the “volume” of the e-mail message sent. The following is a brief description of 
these elements.  
 
                                                          
19  Spamhaus ‘The definition of spam’ http://www.spamhaus.org/consumer/definition (date of use: 
30 December 2015). 
20  Ibid. 
21  See Sorkin (2001) supra n 10 335. 
22  See supra n 8 for the definition of UBCE. 
23  These elements are sometimes referred to as: “key aspects” (see, in particular, Sorkin (2001) 
supra n 10 328); “keyword” see Asscher & Hoogcarspel supra n 14 10. 
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Unsolicited  
 
In order to qualify as spam the communication or e-mail must be unsolicited. Some 
states have defined unsolicited to mean without the recipients’ express permission – 
save that commercial e-mail is not unsolicited if the sender has a pre-existing 
business24 or personal relationship with the recipient(s).25 An e-mail is also not 
unsolicited if it was received as a result of the recipient opting into a system in order 
to receive promotional material.26 Therefore, unsolicited means “not addressed to a 
recipient with whom the initiator has an existing business or personal relationship, 
and not sent at the request of, or with the express consent of the recipient”.27 In 
addition to the unsolicited element, other elements depend on either the content or 
volume of the communication. 28  
 
Commercial 
 
Commercial is generally classified in terms of the message content rather than “the 
sender’s actual or presumed reason for sending the message”.29 This term therefore 
includes messages that promote the sale of goods or services, and/or the exchange 
of goods, services or real property.30 It also means any e-mail message sent to a 
                                                          
24  “Pre-existing” or “current business relationship” as used in connection with the sending of 
commercial e-mail provides that “the recipient has made an inquiry and has provided his or her 
e-mail address, or has made an application, purchase, or transaction, with or without 
consideration regarding products or services offered by the advertiser”. See s 16-9-100(17) of 
the Official Code of Georgia Title 16 Crimes and Offences Ch 9 Forgery and Fraudulent 
Practices art 6 Computer Systems Protection (as amended by Senate Bill 62 2005, approved 
and effective 19 April 2005), hereafter ‘Official Code of Georgia’; and s 17529(l) of the 
California Business and Professions Code. A “pre-existing business relationship” also means 
that “there was a business transaction between the initiator and the recipient of a commercial 
electronic mail message during the five year period preceding the receipt of that message. This 
includes transactions involving the free provision of information, goods, or services requested 
by the recipient, and it does not exist after a recipient requests to be removed from the 
distribution lists of the initiator”. See s 2307.64(8) Ohio Revised Code Title 23 Courts Common 
Pleas Ch 2307 Civil Actions Damage and Theft (as amended by HB 361 2005 effective 6 May 
2005), hereafter ‘Ohio Revised Code’. 
25  See s 4-88-602(12) of the Arkansas Code; also s 445.2502.2(h) of the Michigan Compiled 
Laws; and s 13-36-102(8)(a) of the Utah Code. 
26  See s 445.2502.2(h) of the Michigan Compiled Laws. 
27  See s 14-453(10) of the North Carolina General Statues. 
28  See Warner (2003) 22/1 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 156 where the 
author differentiates between the two types of approach, namely excess (volume) and the 
content-based approach.  
29  Sorkin (2001) supra n 10 329-30. 
30  See s 4-88-601(1) of the Arkansas Code; and s 776.4(5) of the Oklahoma Statutes Title 15 
Contracts (added by Okla. Laws 1999 ch 337 House Bill 1410 1999 approved 8 June 1999 
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receiving address or account and aimed at advertising,31 promoting, marketing, or 
otherwise attempting to solicit interest in any goods, services, or enterprise.32 The 
term commercial does not mean an e-mail message to which an interactive 
computer service provider has attached an advertisement in exchange of free use of 
an e-mail account where the sender has agreed to such an arrangement.33  
 
Sorkin notes that communications such as newsletters, chain letters, opinion 
surveys, and urban legends will not be regarded as spam as they lack “commercial 
content”, although they may satisfy the “bulk” element if they are sent to a sufficient 
number of recipients. 34 
 
Bulk 
 
A bulk e-mail refers to an e-mail containing the same advertisement or message 
being transmitted to two or more recipients using an Internet or intranet computer 
network.35 The bulk element is referred to by some as “the excessive volume 
approach which avoids content by insisting that content is irrelevant in deciding 
whether an e-mail qualifies as spam”.36 Haase37 et al are of the opinion that the bulk 
of spam messages share one or more of the following characteristics:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
effective 1 July 1999 amended by Senate Bill 660 2003 effective 1 November 2003), hereafter 
‘Oklahoma Statutes’. 
31  “Advertising” means an “electronic mail message sent to a computer for the purpose of 
promoting real property, goods, or services for sale, lease, barter, or auction”. See s 714E.1 (a) 
of the Iowa Code Ch 714E (added by House File 448 (1999) approved 26 May 1999 effective 1 
July 1999), ‘hereafter ‘Iowa Code’; s 41.710 of the Nevada Revised Statues; also see the 
following states: Georgia; Kansas; Maryland; North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania. 
Also see Warner (2003) supra n 28 156. 
32  See s 931(17) of the Delaware Code Title 11 Crimes and Criminal Procedure (as amended by 
72 Del Laws ch 135 approved 23 June 1999 effective 2 July 1999), hereafter ‘Delaware Code’; 
s 51.1741(1); Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51 Trade and Commerce Ch 19-C Unsolicited 
Commercial E-mail Restrictions (added by 2003 La Acts 1275 approved 2 July 2), hereafter 
‘Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51’. 
33  See s 40-12-401(a)(ii) of the Wyoming Statutes Title 40 Trade and Commerce Ch 12 
Consumer Protection art 4 Commercial Electronic Mail (added by 2003 Wyo Laws ch 86 
approved 3 March 2003 effective 1 July 2003), hereafter ‘Wyoming Statutes’; and s 932(17) of 
the Delaware Code. 
34  Sorkin (2001) supra n 10 333-6. 
35  See s 48-603E (a) of the Idaho Code. 
36  See Warner (2003) supra n 28 156; Dickinson (2004) 57/1 Federal Communications Law 
Journal 151; Asscher & Hoogcarspel supra n 14 10. 
37  Haase, Grimm & Versfeld International Commercial Law 131-5; also s 73.6 Louisiana Revised 
Statutes Title 14; s 39-14-603(a) of the Tennessee Code; and s 18.2-152.3:1(B) of the Virginia 
Code.  
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(a) They include or promote illegal or offensive content;  
(b) Their purpose is fraudulent or otherwise deceptive;  
(c) They are sent in a large untargeted and indiscriminate manner, often by automated 
means;  
(d) They are sent in a manner disguising the originator;  
(e) They do not offer a working address to which the recipient may send messages opting-out 
of receiving further unsolicited messages; and  
(f) They could collect personal information in breach of recipients’ privacy. These 
characteristics are not essential to whether an electronic message should be regarded as 
unsolicited or sent in bulk.  
  
From the above, it is clear that the definition of spam has three different elements, 
and depending on which state law one consults, those elements will apply in defining 
spam. It is also clear that one commercial e-mail sent to a number of recipients can 
be regarded as spam e-mail and can also satisfy the bulk requirement. In addition to 
the definitions above, state laws have mechanisms in place to regulate spam. 
 
6.2.2.2 Mechanisms to regulate spam 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, there are two mechanisms used to regulate spam in anti-
spam legislation: the opt-in and opt-out mechanisms. The following is a brief 
description of these mechanisms as provided in state laws. 
 
(a) Opt-in mechanism  
 
Only a handful of state laws use opt-in as a mechanism to regulate spam.38 Opt-in 
requires prior consent from the recipient before any marketing correspondence can 
be sent to him or her.39 Grossman notes that “the opt-in mechanism generally 
manifests in two ways: a mechanism that rigorously requires that a potential recipient 
give specific assent to receiving a specific communication; and a less stringent form 
which infers permission from established relationships”.40 Concepts such as: pre-
existing relationship;41 direct consent;42 established business;43 or affirmative 
                                                          
38  Only two states have adopted an opt-in approach namely: California and Delaware. 
39  This prohibits unsolicited communications to be sent without prior relationship. See Grossman 
(2004) 19/4 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1547-8. 
40  Ibid. The “less stringent forms” means “a previous established relationship between the 
individual and the retailer, whereby that individual had bought or contacted that retailer before 
communications were sent”.  
41  See supra n 24 for a definition of pre-existing relationship. 
42  “Direct consent” provides that “the recipient has expressly consented to receive e-mail 
advertisements from the advertiser, either in response to a clear and conspicuous request from 
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consent44 describes this mechanism. The state of California prohibits a person or an 
entity from initiating or advertising in an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement 
from and to a state.45 California’s state law also provides that: 46 
 
 commercial e-mail advertisements sent pursuant to the exemption allowed for a pre-existing or 
current business relationship, shall provide the recipient of that commercial e-mail 
advertisement with the ability to opt-out from receiving further commercial e-mail 
advertisements by either calling a toll free number or by sending an unsubscribe e-mail to the 
advertiser offering the products or services in that advertisement. The opt-out provision does 
not apply to recipients who are receiving free e-mail service with regard to commercial e-mail 
advertisements sent by the provider of the e-mail service. 
 
Delaware on the other hand, makes it unlawful for any person to send “un-
requested” or “unauthorised” e-mail to another person, and also discourages the 
distribution (intentionally or recklessly) of any unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail to a 
receiving address or account under the control of an authorised user of a computer 
system.47  
 
Ledbetter48 notes that while this mechanism greatly reduces the amount of spam by 
criminalising even a single attempt by a marketer to solicit consent, it is not without 
its problems.49 It has been argued that the California statute shuts down “permission- 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the consent or at the recipients own initiative”. See s 17529.1(d) of the California Business and 
Professional Code; and s 16-9-100(4) of the Official Code of Georgia. 
43  The term “established business relationship” means “a prior existing relationship formed by a 
voluntary communication between a person or entity and the recipient with or without an 
exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or use by the 
recipient regarding products or services offered by the person or entity”. See s 44-1372(4) of 
the Arizona Revised Statutes; also s 776.5(3) of the Oklahoma Statutes; and s 2250.2(2) of the 
Pennsylvania Statutes Title 73 Trade and Commerce Ch 40A Unsolicited Telecommunication 
Advertisement Act (added by 2002 Pa Laws 222 approved 16 December 2002), hereafter 
‘Pennsylvania Statutes’. 
44  “Affirmative consent” means that “the recipient of e-mail expressly consented to receive the 
message either in response to a clear and conspicuous request for the recipients’ consent or 
the recipients own initiative. A recipient is deemed to have given affirmative consent if the e-
mail message is from a person other than the person to whom the recipient directly 
communicated consent if clear and conspicuous notice was given to the recipient that the 
recipients e-mail address could be transferred to another person for the purpose of that person 
initiating the transmission of commercial e-mail message to the recipient”. See s 668.602(1) of 
the Florida Statutes.  
45  See s 17529.2(a) and (b) of the California Business and Professions Code; and s 668.603(1) of 
the Florida Statutes.  
46  Id s 17529.1(l) of the California Business and Professions Code. 
47  See s 937(a) of the Delaware Code. This section does not apply to e-mail that is sent between 
human beings, or when the individual has requested the information.  
48   See Ledbetter (2004) 34 Southwestern University Law Review 122. 
49  Ibid. 
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based” e-mail lists between marketers, regardless of a consumer’s willingness to 
give permission.50  
 
(b) Opt-out mechanism 
 
The bulk of anti-spam laws at state level in the USA have implemented the opt-out 
mechanism as part of their regulation of spam. The opt-out mechanism advocates 
that the sender51 may send spam messages to consumers even if there is no 
existing relationship between the two. The sender must provide the recipient52 with a 
convenient opt-out facility and a cost-free mechanism by which to notify the sender 
not to send any future e-mail(s) to the recipient.53 However, this mechanism must 
include54 a valid functional return e-mail address.55 In addition to this, sexually 
explicit e-mail(s) should also include a toll-free telephone number, if the sender has 
one.56 The sender must also maintain a functioning web site at which a recipient may 
request his or her removal from the sender’s mailing list.57   
 
Once the sender has been notified of the opt-out request, that sender must do the 
following: stop sending unsolicited e-mails to all of the e-mail addresses registered to 
the person who sent the request or entity opting out directly or indirectly through third 
                                                          
50  Ibid. 
51  The term “sender” means “a person who initiates a commercial e-mail advertisement”. See s 
51:1741(13) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51; and s 46.001(7) of the Texas Statutes 
Title 4 Business & Commerce Code Ch 46 e-mail Solicitation (added by Act 2003 ch 1053 
House Bill 1282 approved 20 June 2003 effective 1 September 2003), hereafter ‘Texas 
Statutes’. 
52  The term “recipient” means “the addressee of an unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisement. 
If an addressee of a commercial e-mail advertisement has one or more e-mail addresses to 
which a commercial e-mail advertisement is sent, the addressee shall be deemed to be a 
separate recipient for each address to which the advertisement is sent”. See s 17529.1(m) of 
the California Business and Professional Code; also s 16-9-100(19) of the Official Code of 
Georgia; and s 51.1741(12) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51.  
53  See s 4-88-603 of the Arkansas Code; s 445.2502(h) of the Michigan Compiled Laws; s 776.6 
(E) of the Oklahoma Statutes; and s 46.003(2) of the Texas Statutes.   
54  See s 51:1741.1 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51; and s 1497(2) of the Maine 
Revised Statutes.  
55  The phrase “functioning return e-mail address” means “an e-mail address displayed in a 
commercial e-mail advertisement that has the capacity to receive the number of reply 
messages that the sender of the commercial e-mail advertisement should reasonably expect to 
be transmitted by the recipients for no less than thirty days after the sending of such 
advertisements”. See s 51:1741(6) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51. 
56  See s 4-88-603 (3) (a), (b); and (4) of the Arkansas Code; also s 13-36-103 (1) (c) (ii) of the 
Utah Statutes; and s 445.2503 93 of the Michigan Compiled Statutes.   
57  See s 51.174.1(2) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51. 
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parties;58 and remove the recipient’s e-mail address from its e-mail list not later than 
the third day after the date on which the sender receives a request for removal of 
that address.59 The sender must also establish and maintain the necessary policies 
and records to ensure that a recipient who has notified the sender of such request 
that he or she no longer wishes to receive further mail, in fact does not receive any 
e-mail from the date of the notice.60 In addition to the above, the sender should 
update its records not less than fourteen business days after such request.61 
 
6.2.2.3 Labelling of e-mail messages 
 
Most state laws require that an unsolicited e-mail containing advertisements should 
include the following in its subject line: “ADV” as the first four characters;62 and 
“ADV: ADLT” as the first eight or nine characters (or in the first word) if the message 
contains information consisting of explicit sexual material that may only be viewed or 
purchased by an individual of eighteen years of age or older.63 In addition to the 
above, certain states require attorneys who advertise via unsolicited e-mail to include 
“legal advertisement” in the subject line64 together with “THIS IS AN 
                                                          
58  See s 1497(2) of the Maine Revised Statutes and s 445.2504 (2) of the Michigan Compiled 
Laws. 
59  See s 46.003(b) of the Texas Statutes.  
60  See s 445.2504(3) of the Michigan Compiled Laws.  
61  Ibid. 
62  “ADV” stands for advertising or advertisements. Most of these advertisements usually include 
unsolicited advertising material for the lease, sale, rental, gift, offer et cetera. See s 52-570c. 
(b) of the General Statutes of Connecticut Title 52. Civil Actions chapter 925. Statutory Rights 
of Actions and Defences (as amended in 2003); s 668.603.(1)(c) and (d) of the Florida Statutes; 
s 50-6-107(c)(1)(C) of the Kansas Statutes Ch 50 Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection art 6 
Consumer Protection (added by Laws 2002 ch 140 (SB 467 approved 17 May  2002); s 
51.1741.1(4) Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51; s 1497(3)(1) of Maine Statutes; s 57-12-23(3) 
of the New Mexico Statutes Title 57 Trade and Commerce art 12 Unfair Practices Act (added 
by 2003 SB 699 2003 NM Acts ch 168 approved 5 April 2003); s 41.725 (2) of the Nevada 
Statutes; s 776.5(6)(C) of the Oklahoma Statutes; s 37-24-6(13) of the South Dakota Codified 
Laws Ch 37-24 Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection provisions added or 
amended in 2002), hereafter ‘South Dakota Codified Law’; s 47-18-2501(e) of the Tennessee 
Code; and s 13-36-103(1)(b) of the Utah Statutes. 
63  States that have these provisions include among others: s 50-6-107(c)(1)(E) of the Kansas 
Statutes; s 51.1741.1(5) Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51; s 1497(3)(2) of Maine Statutes; s 
4-88-603(a)(2); s 57-12-23(4) of the New Mexico Statutes; s 51-27-04(1) of North Dakota 
Statutes; s 776.5(6)(D) of the Oklahoma Statutes; s 37-24-6.(13) of the South Dakota Codified 
Laws; s 47-18-2501(e) of the Tennessee Statutes; s 13-36-103(1)(b) Utah Code; and s 
944.25(1) and (2) Wisconsin Statutes; and s 46.003 (a) of the Texas Statutes. 
64  See Florida Rules of Professional Conduct (Fla RPC) rule 4-7.6(c)(3) 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
dealing with computer accessed communications; also Spamlaws ‘SpamLaws’ 
http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.shtml (date of use: 5 January 2016).  
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ADVERTISEMENT” prominently in each communication.65 These e-mail messages 
must also clearly and conspicuously disclose the following sender information: its 
legal name; correct street address; valid Internet domain name; and a valid return e-
mail address.66 Kendrick67 notes the following regarding the requirement of placing 
“ADV” on the header of an e-mail:  
 
 that this will afford consumers an opportunity to decide whether to read or discard the 
message; furthermore, that the Internet marketplace will move away from support for many 
small businesses towards a market that supports only a few established businesses; that the 
standardised ADV label will be used as a flag for ISPs and users to establish e-mail filters to 
either block or immediately delete the messages, which will, in turn, block new products or  new 
providers, and so benefit established marketers or online providers who have already captured 
the attention of consumers; and that labelled messages are also said to stigmatise the 
message to a degree difficult for an emerging business to overcome in that the label will in time 
become synonymous with, for example, pornography, shady businesses, financing deals, and 
the like.68  
 
6.2.2.4 Falsified or misleading headers and information 
 
(a) Background 
 
Most states prohibit individuals from transmitting commercial e-mail messages which 
intentionally falsify69 headers or other routing information of unsolicited commercial 
e-mail messages. This provision also prohibits e-mail messages70 that: contain false, 
                                                          
65  In the state of Kentucky, attorneys who advertise via written, recorder, or electronic 
communication targeted at potential clients, are required to display those words in capital 
letters. See SCR 3.130(7.09) of the Kentucky Bar Association Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky (Ky Sup Ct) http://www.cle.kybar.org/documents/scr/scr3/scr_3.130_(7.09).pdf (date 
of use: 5 January 2016).  
66  See s 51:1741.1 (3)(a)-(c) of Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51; and s 13-36-103.(1)(d) of the 
Utah Statutes. 
67  Kendrick (2003 Fall) supra n 10 574; also Bolin (2006) 24/2 Yale Law and Policy Review 415-
17. 
68  Ibid Kendrick.  
69  The term “materially falsified” means “altered or concealed in a manner that would impair the 
ability of one of the following to identity, locate or respond to a person who initiated an e-mail 
message to investigate an alleged violation of the section; a recipient of the message; an 
Internet access service processing the message on behalf of the recipient; a person alleging a 
violation of the section; or a law enforcement agency” (see s 3-805.1(10) of the Maryland 
Criminal Law Code Title 3 Other Crimes Against the Person Subtitle 8 Stalking and 
Harassment (as amended in 2004), hereafter ‘Maryland Criminal Law Code’). 
70  ‘Electronic mail message’ means “an electronic message or computer file that is transmitted 
between two or more telecommunications devices; computers; computer networks, regardless 
of whether the network is a local, regional, or global network; or electronic devices capable of 
receiving electronic addresses, regardless of whether the message is converted to hard copy 
format after receipt, viewed upon transmission or stored for later retrieval”. The term “e-mail 
address”, on the other hand, means “a destination commonly expressed as a string of 
 
 
153 
 
deceptive, or misleading information in their subject line;71 use a third party’s Internet 
domain name72 without the permission of that third party; and fraudulently 
misrepresent or obscure any information identifying the point of origin or the 
transmission path of that commercial e-mail message.73 The header information74 or 
content of the commercial e-mail sent without authorisation and with intent to 
mislead must contain a personal name, entity name, trade name, mark, domain, 
address, and phone number of the sender.75 A person shall “not knowingly sell, give, 
or otherwise distribute or possess with the intent to sell, give, or distribute, software 
for the purpose of facilitating or enabling the falsification of commercial e-mail 
transmission information or other routing information”.76 There have been a number 
of cases dealing with the falsification of headers and a selection is considered below. 
 
(b) Selected case law 
 
Parker v CN Enterprises 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
characters to which e-mail may be sent or delivered” (see s 668.601(6) and (7) of the Florida 
Statutes; s 16-9-100(7) Official Code of Georgia; and s 741E.1 (d) of the Iowa Statutes).  
71  “False and misleading” when used in relation to a commercial e-mail means that “the header 
information includes an originating or intermediate e-mail address, domain name, protocol 
address which was obtained by means of false or fraudulent pretences or representation; the 
header information fails to accurately identify the computer used to initiate the e-mail; the 
subject line of the e-mail is intended to mislead a recipient about a material fact regarding the 
content or subject matter of the mail; the header information is altered or modified in a manner 
that impedes or precludes the recipient of the e-mail or e-mail service provider from identifying, 
locating or contacting the person who initiated the e-mail”. See s 16-9-100(10) (A)-(G) of the 
Official Code of Georgia; and s 1497(5) Maine Statutes.  
72  “Internet domain name” is defined as “a globally unique, hierarchical reference to an Internet 
host or service, assigned through centralized Internet naming authorities, comprising a series of 
character strings separated by periods with the right-most string specifying the top of the 
hierarchy”. See s 407.1120(6) of the Missouri Revised Statutes; and s 37-24-36(6) of the South 
Dakota Codified Laws; and s 46.001(9) of the Texas Statutes.  
73  See s 6-47-2(d) of the Rhode Island General Laws Title 6 Commercial Law General Regulatory 
Provisions Chapter 47 Internet Access and Advertising by Facsimile (added in 1999), hereafter 
‘Rhode Island General Laws’; s 46.002 of the Texas Statutes; and s 19.190.020 of the Revised 
Code of Washington Title 19 Business Regulations-Miscellaneous Ch 19.190 Commercial 
Electronic Mail (as amended by 2003 Acts ch 137 HB 2007), hereafter ‘Revised Code of 
Washington’. 
74  The term “header information” means “the source, destination, and routing information attached 
to an e-mail message, including the originating domain name and originating e-mail address, 
and any other information that appears in the line identifying or purporting to identify a person 
initiating the message, and technical information that authenticates the sender of an e-mail 
message for network management purposes”. See s 3-805.1(6) of the Maryland Criminal Code 
and s 2913.421(A)(7) of the Ohio Revised Code. 
75  See s 16-9-100(10)(e) of the Official Code of Georgia.  
76  See s 445.2505(5) of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Other include the fact that it has only 
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to facilitate or enable the falsification 
of commercial e-mail transmission information or other routing information.  
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The facts in Parker v CN Enterprises77 were briefly that Nowak used a domain name 
(flowers.com) owned by Parker to send unsolicited mass mailings (spam) consisting 
of free cash grants of $19.95.78 The court ordered that Nowak (his company and 
those acting in concert with him) refrain from using Parker’s domain name in any e-
mail, or from using any Internet domain name as a return address without the 
owner’s permission.79 
 
Kleffman v Vonage Holdings Corp  
 
The facts in Kleffman v Vonage Holdings Corp80 were briefly that Kleffman received 
unsolicited e-mail advertisements from eleven different domain names all advertising 
Vonage and its broadband telephone service.81 Vonage was not specified in the 
domain name as the sender instead, the sender used other ‘nonsensical’ domain 
names.82 The court held that “commercial e-mail advertisements sent from multiple 
domain names with the intent to bypass spam filters were not rendered unlawful by 
the California Business and Professionals Code”.83 The legal significance of this 
decision has been noted as “able to prevent the flood of potential litigation from other 
members of the public who are simply annoyed, unhappy, or bothered by the amount 
of commercial e-mail advertisements received on a daily basis, in that the legislation 
only governs and punishes those who send falsified or fraudulent e-mails”.84 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia v Jeremy Jaynes  
                                                          
77  Parker v CN Enterprises (case no. 97-06273 Texas Travis County District Court (November 
1997)) http://www.loudy.com/CASES/Parker_v_CN_Entterprises.html (date of use: 30 
December 2015). Hereafter ‘Parker’s case’. 
78   Nowak’s spam used Parker’s domain name in the electronic return address, which allowed 
Nowak to avoid receiving thousands of return-to-sender messages and the inevitable hate mail 
from recipients. As a result, Parker received thousands of such messages which prevented her 
from accessing her Internet account for hours and temporarily shutting down her ISPs mail 
servers. Ibid. 
79  Ibid.  
80  See Kleffman v Vonage Holdings Corp 232 P3d 625, 627 (Cal 2010) 
http://www.caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1527999.html (date of use: 5 January 2016). 
Hereafter ‘Kleffman’s case’. 
81  Ibid.  
82  Ibid.  
83  Section 17529.5(a) (2) of the California Business and Professional Code makes it unlawful to 
advertise in a commercial e-mail advertisement that contains or is accompanied by falsified, 
misrepresented, or forged headers.  
84  See Kleffman’s case supra n 80; and for a discussion of this case see Machacek (2011) 14 
Chapman Law Review 587. 
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The facts in Commonwealth of Virginia v Jeremy Jaynes85 are briefly that in 2003 
Jaynes used computers in his North Carolina home to send more than 10 000, (and 
in one instance over 20 000), unsolicited bulk e-mail messages with falsified routing 
and transmission information to America Online (AOL) proprietary network on three 
different occasions.86 These messages were sent in bulk so contravening the 
Virginia Code.87  
 
The respondent argued that the Virginia Code violated the First Amendment 
because it was overboard and the language prohibited anonymous speech of a non-
commercial nature which is protected by the First Amendment.88 Jaynes appealed 
his conviction on the basis of a “facial challenge”89 to the statute. The court found 
that the statute used to charge Jaynes did not violate the First Amendment as it did 
not regulate free speech, and was not unconstitutionally vague in that it was not so 
vague that a person of ordinary intelligence could fail to understand its meaning.90 
The court also noted that the statute ciminalised the sending of bulk e-mail 
anonymously, and acknowledged that commercial bulk e-mail might constitutionally 
be regulated in that manner.91 It also found that the statute extended beyond this to 
encompass non-commercial bulk e-mails.92 Jaynes was convicted on three counts 
                                                          
85  Commonwealth of Virginia v Jeremy Jaynes (case no 08-765) 1-31 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/08-765_bio.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015). Hereafter ‘Jaynes case’. 
86  Id at 1-2. AOL is an ISP that provides e-mail accounts as part of its services located in Virginia. 
Each message was targeted at AOL subscribers as all e-mail addresses ended with 
“@aol.com”. Jaynes also registered numerous different domain names using false contact 
information through Network Solutions, whose offices are located in Virginia.  
87  Section 18.2-152.3.1 of the Virginia Code provides for transmission of unsolicited bulk 
electronic mail. 
88  See Jaynes case supra n 85 2-3.  
89  “Facial challenge” is defined as “a challenge which claims that the law is unconstitutional on its 
face” (in this case the Virginia Code). See Kreit (2010) 18/3 William & Mary Bill of Rights 
Journal 657 http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=wmborj 
(date of use: 30 December 2015). 
90  See Jaynes case supra n 85 15-30. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Id 3. Also see Meyerowitz (2008) Privacy & Data Security Law Journal 1024-42 
http://www.meyerowitzcommunications.com/pdf/Meyerowitz%20Spam%20Ruling.pdf (date of 
use: 30 December 2015) especially 1035-9 where the author discusses the constitutionality of s 
18.2-152.3:1 of the Virginia Code and other matters; Canfield (2010) 20 Civil Rights Law 
Journal 449 ff; and Balsam v Trancos Inc 2012 WL 593703 1-5 (Ca Ct App 24 2012) 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/02/california_appe_2.htm (date of use: 30 December 
2015). 
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and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each count to run consecutively for a 
period of nine years.93 
 
6.2.2.5 Harvesting and sale of lists and the use of dictionary attacks 
 
(a) Harvesting of lists 
 
Some states make it unlawful for any person or entity to collect e-mail addresses 
posted on the Internet if the purpose of the collection is to use those e-mail 
addresses either to initiate or to advertise in an unsolicited manner to a particular 
state.94 It has been indicated elsewhere that because e-mail harvesting is generally 
automated, spam can hit the addresses soon after they are used publicly for the first 
time.95 
 
(b) Selling or transferring lists 
 
In certain states anti-spam legislation makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly 
sell or otherwise provide lists of e-mail addresses used to initiate the transmission of 
unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements in violation of a particular state’s law.96 
Only a few states provide for a procedure which allows recipients to restrict the 
future sale or transfer of their e-mail address information to another person or 
organisation for the purpose of sending commercial e-mail.97   
 
                                                          
93   Ibid Meyerowitz; and Jaynes case supra n 85 15-30.  
94  See s 17529.4(a) (1) and (2) of the California Business and Professions Code and s 51.1741.2 
(B)(1) and (2) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51. 
95  See FTC Consumer Alert ‘E-mail address harvesting: how spammers reap what you sow’ 
(November 2002) http://www.webmaestro.biz/pdf/addressharvesting.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015). The Federal Trade Commission conducted an investigation into how 
spammers harvest e-mail addresses. “They “seeded” 175 different locations on the Internet 
with 250 new, undercover e-mail addresses. The locations included web pages, news groups, 
chat rooms, message boards, and online directories for web pages, instant message users, 
domain names, resumes and dating services. During the six weeks after those postings, the 
accounts received 349 spam e-mails; 86% of the addresses posted to web pages and 
newsgroups received spam. It did not matter where the addresses were posted on the page. If 
the address had the “@” sign in it, it drew spam; chat rooms were found to be virtual magnets 
for harvesting software. One address posted in a chat room received spam e-mails nine 
minutes after it was first used”. 
96  See s 44-1372.01(B)(2)(b) of the Arizona Revised Statutes; s 51.1741.2(B)(1) and (2) of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51; and s 445-2505(5) of the Michigan Compiled Laws. 
97  Ibid Arizona Revised Statutes; s 3.805.1 of the Maryland Criminal Law Code; and s 2250.4 (5) 
of the Pennsylvania Statutes. 
 
 
157 
 
(c) Dictionary attacks 
 
State laws also prohibit the use of e-mail addresses obtained by automated means 
based on a combination of names, letters, or numbers to initiate or advertise in an 
unsolicited commercial e-mail from a particular state or advertisement sent from that 
state.98 In addition to this, it is also unlawful for any person to use scripts or other 
automated means to register for multiple e-mail accounts from which to initiate or 
advertise, or to enable another person to initiate or advertise unsolicited commercial 
e-mail sent to and/or from a particular state.99  
 
6.2.2.6 Enforcement and penalties  
 
State laws advocate for both civil and criminal charges against those who violate 
certain of the provisions above. 
 
(a) Criminal action 
 
According to state laws, any transmission of unsolicited commercial or sexually 
explicit e-mail in violation of the provisions above constitutes an unfair and deceptive 
act or practice.100 The prosecuting attorneys of various districts and counties in some 
states also have full authority to enforce the provisions of the sub-chapters in the 
laws.101  
 
It is also an offence for a person intentionally to send a message(s) containing 
obscene material or material depicting sexual conduct in violation of the requirement 
that the “ADV” label appear on those particular e-mails.102 Any person violating this 
provision regarding the sending of unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit e-mail 
is guilty of a class-B misdemeanor103 and remains liable to civil action.104 All 
                                                          
98  See s 17529.4(b) of the California and Business Professions Code and s 3-805-1(b) (6)(i) of the 
Maryland Criminal Law Code.  
99  See s 17529.4(c) (1) and (2) of the California Business Professions Code. 
100  See s 4-88-607(a)-(c) of the Arkansas Code; and s 13.36-104 of the Utah Statutes.  
101  See s 4-88-607(b) of the Arkansas Code and s 776.7 of the Oklahoma Statutes. 
102  See s 37-24-6(13) of the South Dakota Codified Laws and s 46.005 of the Texas Statutes. 
103  See s 4-88-605 of the Arkansas Code; s 46.005 of the Texas Statutes; and s 445.2507(7) of 
the Michigan Compiled Statutes. Misdemeanors are classifications for less serious criminal 
offences. Every state in the USA has a system for classifying criminal offences. There are three 
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remedies, penalties, and authority are available to the Attorneys-General in those 
states when the question of enforcement arises.105 
 
(b) Civil action 
 
An action may be brought by any person who has received unsolicited commercial e-
mail or unsolicited sexually explicit e-mail which violates the legislative provisions of 
the state in which the actual damages are to be recovered.106 Each recipient or e-
mail service provider shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.107  
 
Some states require that whoever violates the provisions above shall be liable for 
damages to the recipient of an unsolicited commercial e-mail message in the amount 
of one hundred dollars ($ 100) for each violation, as well as reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs.108 The damages also extend to the injury that the recipient (and not 
the e-mail service provider or its property) might have sustained arising out of the 
transmission of unsolicited bulk mail.109  
 
6.2.2.7 Commentary and conclusion 
 
The prohibitions listed above apply to any person doing business in a particular state 
and to any person who transmits commercial e-mail messages from a computer 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
classes of misdemeanor namely: class A-C with “class A” being the highest level and “class C” 
the lowest; “class B” misdemeanors are punished by between 90-180 days in a county jail. See 
FreeAdvice ‘What are class A, B, and C misdemeanors’ http://criminal–
law.freeadvice.com/criminal-law/white_collar_crimes/criminal-misdemeanor-clases.html (date of 
use: 30 December 2015).  
104  See s 4-88-605(a)(b) of the Arkansas Code and s 13-36-104 of the Utah Code.  
105  See s 4-88-607(a)-(c) of the Arkansas Code; and ibid the Utah Code. 
106  Damages include: (a) ten dollars per unsolicited commercial e-mail or unsolicited sexually 
explicit e-mail sent to a previously opted-out e-mail address, or transmitted through the e-mail 
service provider, or otherwise sent in violation of the provisions of a particular Act; and (b) US 
$25 000 per day while the violation continues. See s 4-88-606 of the Arkansas Code and 
section 47-16-2501(i)(2) of the Tennessee Code.  
107  See s 4-88-606(2) of the Arkansas Code; s 44-1372.02 of the Arizona Revised Statutes; and s 
53-452(a) and (b) of the General Statutes of Connecticut. 
108  See s 3-805.1(c) of the Maryland Criminal Law Code; also s 6-47-2(h) of the Rhode Island 
General Laws Title 6 Commercial Law Chapter 7 Internet Access and Advertising by Facsimile 
(added in 1999).  
109  See s 47-16-2501(i)(2) of the Tennessee Statutes. In other states the civil penalty imposed are 
for the first violation not exceeding US $500; for a second violation not exceeding US $2 500; 
and for the third and subsequent violations, not exceeding US $5 000; also s 16-9-105 (b) the 
Official Code of Georgia; and s 40-12-403(a) of the Wyoming Statutes. 
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located in that state.110 They further apply to an e-mail address which the sender 
knows, or has reason to know, is held by a resident of that state, and to an 
interactive computer service with equipment or its principal place of business in that 
state.111  
 
Almost all of the anti-spam legislation considered above meets the requirements for 
strong legislation which include: definition(s) of what constitutes spam; mechanisms 
in place in order to regulate spam; and other requirements for the sending of 
unsolicited messages such as labelling, falsification of headers, and prohibiting 
harvesting or selling e-mail lists. Penalties are prescribed for non-compliance with 
the provisions of these laws. However, while state laws have been successful in 
protecting consumers locally, some are of the view that the same “are ill-equipped to 
deal with the issue of spam originating from beyond each state’s boundaries”.112  
 
Others have noted that the anti-spam laws above “may stifle the growth of online 
commerce by hampering the flow of otherwise accurate information from emerging 
Internet merchants to consumers”.113 Also that, instead of eliminating spam, the 
statutes are seen to be placing unnecessary limitations on legitimate Internet 
marketers and denying consumers the choices a rich Internet marketplace would 
provide.114 While most of these state laws have been effective in regulating spam, 
the enactment of the federal law has had the effect of pre-empting many of their 
provisions.115 Despite the pre-emptive nature of the federal law, certain provisions in 
state laws can also be identified in the federal law as pointed out below.  
 
                                                          
110  See s 44-1372.01(E); also s 44-1372.04 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which deals with 
instances in which the Act does not apply; and s 39-14-604(b) of the Tennessee Code. 
111   Ibid. 
112  See Amaditz (1999) 4 Virginia Journal of Law and Technology http://www.vjolt.net/ 
vol4/issue/home.art4.html (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
113  Kendrick supra n 10 575. 
114  Ibid 576. 
115  The state of North Dakota had a provision in its statute that “the Governor shall certify to the 
legislative council the effective date of any federal legislation that pre-empts state regulation of 
false, misleading, or unsolicited commercial e-mail messages. That Act became ineffective 
upon the effective date contained in the certification of federal legislation that pre-empts state 
regulation of false, misleading or unsolicited commercial e-mail message”. See s 2 of the North 
Dakota Statutes and s 325M.09(11) of the Minnesota Statutes 2002 Ch 395 Senate file no 
2908 (2002) (introduced 11 February 2002 approved 20 May 2002). 
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6.3 Anti-spam legislation at federal level  
 
6.3.1 Background  
 
The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act116 is the 
USA’s federal anti-spam law. It was adopted in 2003 and came into operation in 
January 2004.117 Section 2 of the CAN-SPAM Act highlights congressional findings 
and policy which include among others: the importance and convenience of low cost 
e-mail relied on by its citizens on a daily basis;118 that convenience and efficiency is 
under threat from the extremely rapid growth in the volume of unsolicited commercial 
e-mail;119 that some messages contain material that recipients might consider vulgar 
or pornographic; and that many senders of such mail intentionally disguise the 
source of the mail to include misleading information in the message subject lines in 
the hope of inducing recipients to view the messages;120 and that while some 
senders of commercial e-mail provide simple and reliable ways for recipients to 
reject receipt of their e-mails in the future, other senders provide no such (opt-out) 
mechanism, or refuse to honour such requests.121  
 
Senders122 have been known to use computer programs to gather large numbers of 
e-mail addresses on an automated basis from Internet web sites or online services 
where users post their addresses in order to make full use of the web site(s) or 
service(s).123 It was also pointed out that the problems associated with the rapid 
growth and abuse of unsolicited commercial e-mail cannot be solved by federal 
                                                          
116  Hereafter ‘the CAN-SPAM Act’. 
117  See s 16 of the CAN-SPAM Act. Former USA President Bush signed this Act into law. The 
background statement to his presidential action on the day the law was passed noted the 
following: “that spam is a problem for Americans; that the law provides a well-balanced 
approach that will help to address some of the harmful impacts of spam; the law builds upon 
the Administration’s efforts to empower consumers with choices in the technology field; the law 
strengthens a cornerstone of the administrations agenda to help protect children against 
pornography; and the Administration supports the law’s tools to help deter the harmful effects of 
deceptive and misleading spam”. See The White House ‘Fact sheet: President Bush signs anti-
spam law’ http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/12/print/20031216-4.html (date of 
use: 30 December 2015). 
118  See s 2 (a)(1) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
119  Id s 2(a)(3) and (6).  
120  Id s 2(a)(5), (7) and (9). 
121  Id s 2(a)(9). 
122  Id s 3(16)(A) which defines the term “sender” as “a person who initiates such a message and 
whose product, service, or Internet web site is advertised or promoted by the message”. 
123  Id s 2(a)(10). 
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legislation alone.124 New technological approaches and cooperation between 
countries will also play a significant role in limiting (or eliminating) spam.125 Section 
3(2)(A) of the CAN-SPAM Act notes that this Act was enacted “to regulate interstate 
commerce by imposing limitations and penalties on the transmission of unsolicited 
commercial e-mail via the Internet”.126 The purpose of the CAN-SPAM Act is to cover 
“commercial e-mail messages whose primary purpose is the commercial 
advertisement or promotion of commercial product or services including content on 
an Internet web site operated for a commercial purpose”.127  
 
The CAN-SPAM Act establishes requirements that must be met by those who send 
commercial e-mail and spells out penalties for senders and companies whose 
products are advertised in spam if they violate the law.128 
 
6.3.2 Anti-spam provisions under CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 
 
6.3.2.1 Definitions  
 
The term “commercial e-mail message” is defined as “any e-mail message the 
primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a 
commercial product or service (including content on an Internet web site operated for 
a commercial purpose)”.129 This term does not include “transactional” or “relational 
messages”.130 The federal law, like most of the state laws above, defines spam from 
a content (commercial) perspective and not necessarily in terms of volume or bulk. 
The term “e-mail address” means “a destination, commonly expressed as a string of 
characters, consisting of a unique user name or mailbox (commonly referred to as 
                                                          
124  Id s 2(a)(12). 
125  Ibid. 
126  See the Preamble to the CAN-SPAM Act 2003; also Fagan (2004) 33/10 The Colorado Lawyer 
61 ff, for a general discussion on the CAN-SPAM Act; Lavergne (2005) 1/3 NYU Journal of Law 
& Business 861 ff; and Baxter (2004) 8/1 NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 165-9. 
127  Section 3(2)(A) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
128  Ibid s 4-6. These requirements are discussed in detail below. 
129  Ibid s 3(2)(A). This definition is in line with the definition of unsolicited commercial 
communications at state level. Also see Marks (2004) 54/3 Case Western Reserve Law 943 
and Alongi (2004) 46/2 Arizona Law Review 288. 
130  See s 3(2)(B)) of the CAN-SPAM Act. A “transactional” or “relational message” means “an e-
mail message whose primary purpose is to facilitate, complete, or confirm a commercial 
transaction that the recipient has previously agreed to enter into with the sender; or to provide 
warranty information, product recall information, or safety or security information with respect to 
a commercial product or service used or purchased by the recipient”.  
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the local part) and a reference to an Internet domain (commonly referred to as the 
domain part), whether or not displayed to which an e-mail message can be sent or 
delivered”.131 On the other hand, the term “e-mail message” is defined as “a 
message sent to a unique e-mail address”.132  
 
6.3.2.2 Mechanism to regulate spam: Opt-out mechanism 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act, like most of the state laws before it, has adopted the opt-out 
mechanism which allows spammers to send unsolicited messages provided that 
each message complies with the provisions of the Act. The following are the 
requirements for sending unsolicited e-mail messages. 
 
(a) Inclusion of identifier, opt-out, and physical address in commercial e-
mail 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act makes it unlawful for any person to initiate133 transmission to a 
protected computer134 unless the message provides a clear and conspicuous 
identification that it is an advertisement or solicitation.135 It must also provide for a 
clear and conspicuous notice of the opportunity to decline to receive further 
commercial e-mail message from the sender.136 The opt-out address should also 
include a valid physical postal address for the sender.137 This provision does not 
apply if the recipient has given prior consent138 to receive a commercial e-mail 
message. 
                                                          
131  Id s 3(5).  
132  Id s 3(6). Other definitions are defined as the discussion continues below. 
133  The term “initiate” is defined in s 3(9) of the CAN-SPAM Act as meaning “to originate or 
transmit such message or to procure the origination or transmission of such message, but shall 
not include actions that constitute routine conveyance of such message”.  
134  Id s 3(13). The term “protected computer” has a meaning given that in terms of s 1030(e)(2)(B) 
of Title 18 of the United States Code (this section deals with fraud). 
135  Id s 5(a)(5)(i).  
136  Id s 5(a)(5)(ii). 
137  Id s 5(a)(5)(iii). 
138  Id s 3(1)(A) and (B) which defines the term “affirmative consent” as “the recipient expressly 
consented to receive the message either in response to a clear and conspicuous request for 
such consent or at the recipient’s own initiative; and if the message is from a party other than 
the party which the recipient communicated such consent, the recipient was given clear and 
conspicuous notice at the time the consent was communicated that the recipient’s electronic 
mail address could be transferred to such other party for the purpose of initiating commercial 
electronic mail message”. Compare this definition with that in n 44 above. 
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(b) Inclusion of return address or comparable mechanism in commercial e-
mail 
 
In addition to the opt-out mechanism, the CAN-SPAM Act requires that an address 
be included in a commercial e-mail message that is sent which clearly and 
conspicuously display a functional return e-mail message or other Internet-based 
mechanism.139 A recipient must be able to use this functional return e-mail address 
to submit, in a manner specified, a reply e-mail message or other form of Internet-
based communication requesting not to receive future commercial e-mail messages 
from the sender at the e-mail address where the message was received.140 The 
mechanism must be able to receive such requests or communications not less than 
30 days after the transmission of the original message.141 
 
The recipient should be provided with a list or menu from which he or she may 
choose the specific types of commercial e-mail message they wish or do not wish to 
receive from the sender.142 However, the list or menu must include an option under 
which the recipient may choose not to receive any commercial e-mail messages 
from the sender.143 Should the return e-mail address or other mechanism temporarily 
be unable to process requests due to some technical problems beyond the control of 
the sender, that sender will not be held accountable for failing to comply with the 
requirements of the CAN-SPAM Act.144 However, the sender should make sure that 
the problem is corrected within a reasonable time.145  
 
(c) Prohibition of transmission of commercial e-mail after objection 
 
If a recipient using a mechanism provided in the Act requests not to receive some or 
any commercial e-mail messages from a sender, it is unlawful:146 
 
                                                          
139  Ibid s 5(a)(3)(A)(i-ii). 
140  Ibid. 
141  Ibid. 
142  Id s 5(3)(B). 
143  Id s 5(a)(3)(B). 
144  Id s 5(a)(3)(C). 
145   Ibid. 
146  Id s 5(a)(4)(A). 
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(1) For the sender to initiate the transmission to the recipient, more than 10 business days after 
the recipient of such request, of a commercial e-mail message that falls within the scope of 
the request;147 
(2) For any person acting on behalf of the sender to initiate the transmission to the recipient, 
more than 10 business days after the receipt, of a commercial e-mail message with actual 
knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that such 
message falls within the scope of the request;148 
(3) For any person acting on behalf of the sender to assist in initiating the transmission to the 
recipient, through the provision or selection of addresses to which the message will be sent, 
of a commercial e-mail message with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the 
basis of the objective circumstances, that such message would violate clause (i) and (ii); or149 
(4) For the sender or any other person who knows that the recipient has made such a request, to 
sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer or release the e-mail address of the recipient 
(including through any transaction or other transfer involving mailing lists bearing the e-mail 
address of the recipient) for any purpose other than compliance with this Act or other 
provision of law.150 
 
 
Kikuchi opines that “the opt-out system is burdensome because both the sender and 
those acting on his or her behalf must comply with opt-out requests, which will 
drastically affect joint-marketing relationships because multiple parties must 
communicate with each other very efficiently if they hope to comply within the 
required ten-day deadline”.151 The opt-out system is therefore viewed as ineffective, 
inefficient, and burdensome because for that system to work it must be fully 
operational and the e-mail address provided for such opt-out purposes must be 
accurate in order for the sender to process that request.152  
 
6.3.2.3 Requirements for transmission of e-mail messages  
 
Section 5 of the CAN-SPAM Act provides the following requirements for transmission 
of commercial electronic messages in order to protect recipients153 who use 
commercial e-mail.  
                                                          
147  Id s 5(a)(4)(A)(i). 
148  Id s 5(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
149  Id s 5(a)(4)(A)(iii). 
150  Id s 5(a)(4)(A)(iv). 
151  Kikuchi (2004) 10/2 BU J Sci & Tech L 285. Kikuchi notes that “this will likely lead to the 
creation of massive lists of opted-out addresses that will need to be passed down a long line of 
vendors in order to comply, creating a huge burden on businesses which endeavor to comply 
with the Act”.  
152  On the other hand, by requesting to opt-out the user might be confirming that they are alive 
thus getting more spam e-mails from others. Id 285-6; and Lorentz (2011) 30/3 Review of 
Litigation 589-92 where the author discusses the major problems inherent in the CAN-SPAM 
Act, namely: the loophole for list owners; and clicking on potential virus links. 
153  Section 3(14) of the CAN-SPAM Act defines the term “recipient” as meaning “an authorised 
user of the e-mail address to which the message was sent or delivered. If a recipient of a 
commercial e-mail message has one or more e-mail addresses in addition to the address to 
which the message was sent or delivered, the recipient shall be treated as a separate recipient 
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(a) Prohibition of false or misleading transmission information  
 
Section 5(a) (1) of the CAN-SPAM Act prohibits the transmission of a commercial e-
mail message that contains header information154 that is materially false or materially 
misleading.155 The CAN-SPAM Act considers a “header information” to be “materially 
misleading if it fails to identify accurately a protected computer used to initiate the 
message because the person initiating the message knowingly used another 
protected computer to relay or retransmit the message for purposes of disguising its 
origin”.156 According to Fingerman, the aim of this provision is to force spammers to 
identify themselves in their mailings.157 The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits any person 
transmitting false or misleading information by e-mail knowingly.158 This section also 
prohibits promotions made by a business in the knowledge that the header 
information is misleading or false, or where it should have known this and 
reasonable steps should have been taken to prevent such transmission.159   
 
(b) Prohibition of deceptive subject headings  
 
The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits the transmission of commercial e-mail messages by 
persons who have actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied that a subject 
heading of the message is likely to mislead recipients as to the contents or subject 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with respect to each address”. Compare this with definition of recipient under state laws in n 52 
above. 
154  Section 3(8) of the CAN-SPAM Act defines the term “header information” as “a source, 
destination, and routing information attached to an e-mail message, including the originating 
domain name and originating e-mail address, and any other information that appears in the line 
identifying, or purporting to identify, a person initiating the message”. Compare with definition of 
header information under state laws n 74 above.  
155  See s 5(a)(1) of the CAN-SPAM Act. The term “materially” for purposes of this provision when 
used with respect to false or misleading header information, “includes the alteration or 
concealment of header information in a manner that would impair the ability of an Internet 
access service processing the message on behalf of a recipient, a person alleging a violation of 
this section, or a law enforcement agency to identify, locate, or respond to a person who 
initiated the e-mail message or to investigate the alleged violation, or the ability of a recipient of 
the message to respond to a person who initiated the electronic message” (see s 5(a)(6) of the 
CAN-SPAM Act). Compare state definition of “materially falsified” in n 69 above.  
156  See s 5(a)(1)(C) of the CAN-SPAM Act.  
157  See Fingerman (2004) 7/8 Journal of Internet law 1-14 http://www.danfingerman.com/papers/ 
CAN-SPAM.doc (date of use: 30 December 2015). Fingerman points out that “a header has 
three parts: address information (which controls where the e-mail is delivered); origin 
information (which documents where the message originated); and routing data (which 
documents the intermediary mail server that handled the message as it traversed the Internet)”. 
158  See s 6 of the CAN SPAM Act. 
159  Id s 6(a). 
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matter of the message.160 In 2004 the Federal Trade Commission announced the 
first cases that contained deceptive messages contravening the provisions of the 
CAN-SPAM Act.161  
 
Federal Trade Commission v Phoenix Avatar LLC   
 
The facts in Federal Trade Commission v Phoenix Avatar, LLC162 were as follows: 
Phoenix Avatar, a company based in Detroit, sent illegal spam messages selling 
false diet patches. Consumers who wished to buy the products clicked on a hyperlink 
in the message and were connected to one of the defendant’s web sites.163 It was 
alleged that the defendant earned $100 000 per month from product sales. It was 
further alleged that the claims made for these diet patches were false and that the 
patches, which sold for $59.95 each, had no effect at all.164 The defendant obscured 
(spoofed) their identities by using third party e-mail addresses in the ‘reply-to’ or 
‘from’ fields of their spam e-mails.165 When the spam message was undelivered it 
bounced back to unwitting third parties who were themselves incorrectly labelled as 
spammers.166 The defendants were ordered to pay monetary relief in the amount of 
$230 000 in favour of the Commission as equitable monetary restitution for 
consumer injury relief.167  
 
FTC v Global Web Promotions Pty Ltd  
 
                                                          
160  Id s 5(a)(2). 
161  Federal Trade Commission ‘FTC announces first CAN-SPAM cases: two operations generated 
nearly one million complaints to agency’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2004/04/ftc-announces-first-can-spam-act-cases (date of use: 30 December 2015).  
162  See Federal Trade Commission v Phoenix Avatar, LLC (trading as Avatar Nutrition) case no 
04C 2897 (2004) 1-24 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/03/ 
050331stip0423084.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘Phoenix Avatar case’. 
163  See Consumer Affairs ‘Feds nab two big spammers: defendants have sent millions of deceptive 
messages, investigators say’ http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/ can_spam.html (date of 
use: 30 December 2015). 
164  Ibid. 
165  See Federal Trade Commission ‘FTC announces first CAN-SPAM cases: two operations 
generated nearly one million complaints to agency’ supra n 161.  
166  Ibid. 
167  See Phoenix Avatar case supra n 162 9 for a stipulated order for the permanent injunction and 
final judgment. 
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In FTC v Global Web Promotions Pty Ltd168 an Australian company was alleged to 
have been responsible for massive amounts of spam in the United States. This 
company advertised its diet patch – similar to that offered in Phoenix Avatar – which 
sold for $ 80.90. They also sold human growth hormone (HGH) for $ 74.95.169 The 
company further claimed its HGH and natural HGH could maintain the appearance 
and current biological age of the user for the next ten to twenty years.170 The FTC 
introduced as evidence thousands of spoofed e-mails sent to victims which included 
AOL, Microsoft software, and other companies.171   
 
The court found that the defendants had initiated transmission to protected 
computers of commercial e-mail messages that contained materially false and 
misleading header information in violation of the CAN-SPAM Act.172 The court found 
that a monetary judgment against the defendants for an amount of $ 490 280 was 
proper for consumer injury resulting from the sale of diet patches and HGH 
products.173 The court also found that the total ill-gotten gains received by the 
defendants in violation of the Act was $ 1 700 982.74.174 
 
Federal Trade Commission v Spear Systems Inc et al 
 
In Federal Trade Commission v Spear Systems Inc et al 175 the defendants were 
found to be in violation of the CAN-SPAM Act for their deceptive acts or practices in 
connection with the sale of hoodia gordinii and HGH products, and also the initiation 
of commercial e-mail messages in violation of the CAN-SPAM Act.176 The FTC had 
filed a lawsuit against the defendants who were allegedly using other web sites to 
sell fake weight-loss supplements.177 The court found that the defendants had 
                                                          
168  FTC v Global Web Promotions Pty Ltd case no 04C 3022 (2005) 1-23 http://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/050920defjudg0423086.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015). Hereafter ‘Global Web Promotions case’. 
169  Id 2. 
170  Ibid. 
171  Ibid. 
172  See s 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(5)(A) of the CAN-SPAM Act; and id 6.  
173  Id 2-7. 
174  Id 7. 
175  See Federal Trade Commission v Spear Systems Inc case no 07 c 5597 (2009) 1-22 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/07/090702xavierjudgeorder.pdf 
(date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘Spear Systems case’. 
176  Id 3. 
177  Id 4. 
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initiated the transmission of commercial e-mail messages containing header 
information that was materially false or misleading in violation of the CAN-SPAM Act 
to protected computers.178 The court considered it proper in this case to enter 
equitable monetary relief against defendants for consumer injury and ill-gotten gains 
in the amount of $ 3 701 088.33.179   
 
Other cases include a spammer who was ordered to stop selling fake weight-loss 
and anti-aging products, and to also pay more than $ 2.5 million.180 And another 
case included a ‘spam gang’ ordered to pay $ 15.15 million for deceptively marketing 
male enhancement pills, prescription drugs, and weight-loss pills.181 
 
US v Twombly 
 
In US v Twombly182 the defendant (Twombly) leased servers using an alias so as to 
send large numbers of e-mail messages.183 The defendant allegedly sent 
approximately one million spam e-mail messages within two hours after he had been 
provided with logon credentials by Biznesshosting Inc.184 This was followed by a 
further 1.5 million e-mail messages days after the first batch was sent out.185 It was 
alleged that the web site was falsely registered under the name of a non-existent 
business, and that the message routing information and “from” lines had been 
falsified so preventing recipients, ISPs, and law enforcement agencies from 
identifying, locating, or responding to senders.  
 
                                                          
178  Id s 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2).   
179  Id 6. 
180  See Federal Trade Commission v Sili Neutraceuticals LLC case no 07 C 4541 (2008) 1-20 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/02/080123silidefaultjdgmnt.pdf 
(date of use: 30 December 2015); Federal Trade Commission ‘Judge agrees with FTC, orders 
spammers to pay more than $2.5 million and stop selling bogus weight-loss and anti-aging 
products’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/02/judge-agrees-ftc-orders-
spammers-pay-mpre-25-million-and-stop (date of use: 30 December 2015).  
181  See Federal Trade Commission v Lance Thomas Atkins case no 08CV5666 (2009) 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/11/091130atkinsjudgement.pdf 
(date of use: 30 December 2015). 
182  See US v Twombly 475 F Supp 2nd 1019 (SD Cal 2007) 1-11 https://casetext.com/case/us-v-
twombly-2 (date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘Twombly case’. 
183  Id 2. 
184  Ibid. 
185  Ibid. 
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The defendants filed a motion seeking, among other things, dismissal of their 
indictment on the basis that the statute under which they had been charged – section 
1037(a)(3) and (4) of the 18 United States Code (USC) – was unconstitutionally 
vague.186 Further, the defendants argued that a header does not necessarily identify 
the sender, and that a lay person has little or no ability to trace the sender’s location 
based on the address.187 They also argued that because the lay person’s ability to 
identify senders is inherently impaired, the statute is meaningless.188 The court noted 
that even if recipients could not identify senders from header information, the 
defendant had not shown that this applied equally to all users.189 It therefore found 
that the section was not unconstitutional, vague, or overboard and denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictments based on the section.190  
 
US v Kilbride 
 
The provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act were again challenged as being 
unconstitutionally vague, this time in the United States Court of Appeals. In US v 
Kilbride191 the facts were briefly that the defendants began their bulk e-mail 
advertising business in 2003 operating through an American corporation using 
servers in the state of Arizona.192 They then moved their operations overseas, 
running them through Ganymede Marketing, a Mauritian company, using servers 
located in the Netherlands.193 The advertisements appearing in the defendants e-
mails included sexually explicit images, two of which formed the basis for their 
conviction on obscenity charges. The defendant’s employees used fictitious 
information in headers and nonsensical domain names that matched generic user 
names to generate a series of different non-functional e-mail addresses to which to 
                                                          
186  Section 1037(a)(3) and (4) deals with materially falsifying header information in multiple 
commercial e-mail messages and intentionally initiating the transmission of those e-mail 
messages. 
187  Twombly case supra n 182 2 and 5.  
188  Ibid. 
189  Ibid. 
190  Id 7. 
191  See US v Kilbride 584 F 3d 1240 (9th Cir 2009) 1-19 http://www.nyls.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/141/2013/08/584-F.3d-1240-US-v.-Kilbride.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015). Hereafter ‘Kilbride case’. 
192  Id 1-3. 
193  Ibid. 
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send their bulk e-mail advertisements.194 These were placed in the field “from” of the 
headers so falsifying information appearing in the registration of the domain names 
used. Nine counts were brought against the defendants including violation of section 
1037(a)(3) and (4) of 18 USC.195 The defendants were convicted on all counts 
following a three-week jury trial.196 The court held that the criminal prohibitions in 
section 1037(a)(3) and (4) 18 USC were not unconstitutionally vague.197 The 
defendants were sentenced to 63 and 78 months in prison for misdemeanours, 
sending fictitious information in the headers of bulk e-mails, and creating nonsensical 
domain names and matching them with generic user names to generate a series of 
different e-mail addresses.198 
 
(c) Aggravated violations relating to commercial e-mail 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits any person “to initiate the transmission of a 
commercial e-mail message, or to assist in the origination of such messages, 
through the provision or selection of addresses to which the message will be 
transmitted, if that person had actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the 
basis of objective circumstances which includes address harvesting and dictionary 
attack”.199  
 
Address harvesting 
 
Section 5(b)(A)(i) of the CAN-SPAM Act makes provision for harvesting of e-mail 
addresses of recipients that were obtained using an automated means from an 
Internet web site or proprietary online service operated by another person, (including 
web site or online service). This also covers a notice stating that “operators of such 
web sites or online service will not give, sell, or otherwise transfer addresses 
maintained by the web site or online service to any other party for the purpose of 
                                                          
194  Ibid.  
195  This section deals with materially falsifying header information in multiple commercial electronic 
mail messages and intentionally initiating the transmission of such messages. See Cornell 
University Law School ‘18 U.S s 1037 – Fraud and related activity in connection with electronic 
mail’ https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1037 (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
196  See Kilbride case supra n 191 3. 
197  Id 3 and 13-19. 
198  Id 3-4. 
199  See s 5(b)(1)(A) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
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initiating or enabling others to initiate e-mail message(s)”.200 Kikuchi notes that this 
provision contains a weak prohibition on harvesting, contingent on violations of other 
provisions of the Act.201 That author further notes that users are fearful because they 
will not be able to make full use of web sites and Internet services if their addresses 
are constantly being harvested by spammers.202 They also note that this provision 
does not entirely prohibit the alphanumeric automated creation of addresses and 
harvesting and also does not require user consent.203  
 
Dictionary attacks 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act also makes it unlawful for any person to obtain the e-mail 
address of a recipient using an automated process that generates possible mail 
addresses by combining names, letters, or numbers into numerous permutations.204 
 
Automated creation of multiple e-mail accounts 
 
CAN-SPAM Act also outlaws the use by any person of scripts or other automated 
means to register for multiple e-mail accounts or online user accounts from which to 
transmit to a protected computer, or enable another person to transmit to a protected 
computer, a commercial e-mail message.205 This includes the relay or re-
transmission through unauthorised access.206 
 
(d) Placing warning labels on commercial e-mail containing sexually- 
oriented material 
 
                                                          
200  Id s 5(b)(A)(i).   
201  Kikuchi supra n 151 286. 
202  Ibid. 
203  Id 287. 
204  See s (5)(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the CAN-SPAM Act. Compare with para 6.2.2.5 above on the issue of 
address harvesting at state level. 
205  See s 5(b)(2). 
206  Id s 5(b)(3). This section makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to relay or re-transmit 
commercial e-mail messages that are unlawful in terms of the CAN-SPAM Act, from a protected 
computer or computer network that he or she has accessed without authorisation. 
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Section 5(d) of the CAN-SPAM Act requires that warning labels be placed on any 
commercial e-mail message that includes sexually-oriented material.207 This 
provision makes it unlawful for any person who fails to include in the subject heading 
for the e-mail message, the prescribed marks or notices,208 or fails to provide that the 
matter in the message that is initially viewable by the recipient, when the message is 
opened by any recipient and absent of any further actions by the recipient 
including:209 to the extent required or authorized pursuant to paragraph (2) any such 
marks or notices;210 the information required to be included in the message pursuant 
to subsection (a)(5);211 and instructions on how to access, or a mechanism to access 
the sexually-oriented material.212  
 
This section does not apply to the transmission of an e-mail message if the recipient 
has given prior consent to receive the message.213 Those who knowingly violate this 
provision shall be fined or sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years, or 
to both.214 The CAN-SPAM Act also provides that not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of the Act that clearly identifiable marks or notices should be 
included in or associated with commercial e-mail containing sexually-oriented 
material, in order to inform the recipient of that fact and to facilitate the filtering of 
such e-mail.215 The Commission was tasked with the publication of the marks or 
notices prescribed in the Federal Register and to provide notice to the public.216 
                                                          
207  The term “sexually explicit material” is defined as “any material that depicts sexually explicit 
conduct unless the depiction constitutes a small and insignificant part of the whole, the 
remainder of which is not primarily devoted to sexual matters”. See id s 5(d) (4). 
208  Id s 5(d)(1)(A). 
209  Id s 5(d)(1)(B). 
210  Id s 5(d)(1)(B)(i). 
211  Id s 5(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
212  Id s 5(d)(1)(B)(iii). Compare with para 6.2.2.3 above where this issue is dealt with at state level. 
213  Id s 5(d)(2). 
214  Id s 5(d)(5). 
215  Id s 5(d)(3). 
216  Ibid. The Federal Register outlining the requirements to place warning labels on e-mail that 
contains sexually oriented material was published on 29 January 2004, and the following 
requirements were outlined: “that any person who initiates to a protected computer, the 
transmission of a commercial e-mail message that includes sexually oriented material must: 
Include in the subject heading for that e-mail message the phrase “SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT-
CONTENT” in capital letters as the first twenty seven (27) characters at the beginning of the 
subject line; provide that the content in the message initially viewable by the recipient when the 
message is opened include the following phrase “SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT-CONTENT” in a clear 
and conspicuous manner; clear and conspicuous identification that the message is an 
advertisement or solicitation; clear and conspicuous notice of the opportunity of a recipient to 
decline to receive further commercial electronic mail messages from the sender; and a 
functioning return electronic mail address or other Internet-based mechanism clearly and 
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Eighteen months after the date of enactment of the CAN-SPAM Act a report was 
compiled setting out a plan requiring commercial e-mail to be identifiable from its 
subject line.217 The CAN-SPAM Act also deals with the prohibition of predatory and 
abusive commercial e-mail the transmission of which is regarded as a 
misdemeanour and attracts criminal liability for certain spam-related activities.218 
 
6.3.2.4 Enforcement of the Act 
 
(a) Background 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act provides general enforcement rules which are to be applied by 
the Commission as if the violation of the Act amounted to unfair or deceptive acts.219 
Enforcement can also be undertaken by certain agencies as provided for in the 
Act.220  
 
(b) The Commission 
 
In terms of the CAN-SPAM Act the Commission shall “prevent any person from 
violating the Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conspicuously displayed”. See Federal Register ‘Requirements to place warning labels on 
commercial electronic mail that contains sexually oriented material’ v 69 n 19 (29 January 
2004) 1-5 http://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/web/offices/com/sol/notices/69fr4269.pdf 
(date of use 6 January 2016); also s 316.4 16 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 316 Title 
16 Commercial Practices where the above phrase “sexually explicit content” was amended to: 
SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT which now comprise of 17 characters including the (-) between the 
words https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/16/316.4 (date of use: 6 January 2016). 
217   See s 11 (1)(B) of the CAN-SPAM Act. See Platt Majoras D et al ‘Subject line labelling as a 
weapon against spam: A CAN-SPAM Act Report to Congress’ (June 2005) 1-46 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/subject-line-labeling-weapon-against-
spam-can-spam-reprt-congress/050616canspamrpt.pdf (date of use: 6 January 2016). This 
report outlined the following as recommendations against subject-line labelling which included: 
(a) a mandatory subject line labelling is likely not an effective tool for ISPs to block and filter 
spam; (b) there are technological concerns with subject labelling requirements; and (c) 
mandatory subject line labelling would not strengthen anti-spam law enforcement (at 10-18). 
218  See s 4 of the CAN-Spam Act.  
219  These includes practice prescribed under s 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC); also Federal Trade Commission 15 USC. 57a (a)(1)(B) (this section deals with unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/57a (date of use: 30 
December 2015); also s 7(a) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
220  Id s 7(b) of the CAN-SPAM Act. These include, among others, agencies regulated by the 
following legislation: s 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 USC 1818); and Federal 
Credit Union Act (12 USC 1751).   
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jurisdiction, powers, and duties as if all applicable terms and provisions of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act were incorporated into and made part of the Act”.221  
 
(c) The State 
 
Civil action  
 
In any case in which a state Attorney-General or an official or agency of a state has 
reason to believe that an interest of the residents of that state have been or are 
threatened or adversely affected by any person who has violated some provisions of 
the CAN-SPAM Act,222 that Attorney-General, official, or agency may bring a civil 
action on behalf of the residents of the state in a district court of the United States 
having appropriate jurisdiction223 The availability of injunctive relief without a showing 
of knowledge is also covered in the CAN-SPAM Act.224 
 
Statutory damages 
 
Regarding aggravated damages, the court may increase the damage awarded to an 
amount equal to not more than three times the amount otherwise available under 
section 7(f)(1)(B)(ii) if it finds that the defendant committed the violation willfully and 
knowingly,225 or that his or her unlawful activity included one or more of the 
aggravated violations listed in section 5(b).226 In assessing damages under this 
provision the court may consider whether the defendant has established and 
implemented with due care, commercially reasonable practices and procedures 
                                                          
221  See the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 USC 41); and s 7(d) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
222  These include: s 5(a)(1) and (2) which deals with the prohibition of false or misleading 
transmission of information and the prohibition of deceptive subject headings.  
223  This can be done to enjoin further violation of s 5 of the CAN-SPAM Act by the defendant; or 
(b) to obtain damages on behalf of residents, in an amount equal to the greater of: the actual 
amount monetary loss suffered by such residents; or the amount determined under para 3 of 
this section. See s 7(f)(1)(a) and (b) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
224  This will apply to the following sections: Id s 5(a)(1)(C) which deals with header information that 
is considered materially misleading; s 5(a)(2) dealing with the prohibition of deceptive subject 
headings; s 5(a)(4)(A) which covers the prohibition of transmission of commercial e-mail after 
objection; s 5(b)(1)(A) on aggravated violations relating to commercial e-mail in particular 
address harvesting; s 5(b)(3) which covers the relay or transmission through unauthorised 
access; and s 7(f)(2). 
225  Id 7(f)(3)(C)(i).   
226  Id s 7(f)(3)(C) (ii). 
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designed effectively to prevent such violations.227 It may further consider whether the 
violations occurred despite commercially reasonable efforts to maintain compliance 
with the practices and procedures to which reference is made in clause (i).228 In the 
case of any successful action, the court may, in its discretion, award the costs of the 
action and reasonable attorney fees to the state.229 
 
(d) Action by provider of an Internet access service 
 
Where an Internet Access Service Provider (IASP)230 is adversely affected by a 
violation of the sections of the Act dealing with the following: deceptive headings; 
non-inclusion of a return address; prohibition of transmission after objection; and 
non-inclusion of identifier opt-out mechanism,231 that IASP may bring a civil action in 
any district court of the United States with jurisdiction over the defendant.232 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act also deals with the determination of the amounts to be paid for 
unlawful messages transmitted or attempted to be transmitted over the facilities of 
the IASP, or messages transmitted or attempted to be transmitted to an e-mail 
address obtained from the IASP in violation of the Act.233 The court may increase a 
damage award to an amount equal to not more than three times the amount 
otherwise available under this paragraph234 if it finds that the defendant committed 
                                                          
227  Id s 7(f)(D)(i). 
228  Id s 7(f)(3)(D)(ii).  
229  Id s 7(f)(3)(4) s 7(f)(4). 
230  Id s 3(11) which defines the term “Internet access service provider” as having the meaning 
given that term in s 231(e)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 USC 231(e)(4)). That 
section defines “Internet access service” as “a service that enables users to access content, 
information, e-mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to 
proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to 
consumers”.  
231  See, in particular, s 5(a)(1), 5(b) or 5(d) or pattern or practice that violates paras (2), (3), (4), or 
(5) of s 5(a), (b), and (d) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
232  Id s 7(g)(1). These include: to enjoin further violation by the defendant (see s 7(g)(1)(A) of the 
CAN-SPAM Act); also to recover damages in an amount equal to the greater of: (i) actual 
monetary loss incurred by the provider of the Internet access service as a result of such 
violation; and the amount determined under para (3).  
233  In general for purposes of para (1)(B)(ii) of s 7(g)(3) of CAN-SPAM Act the amount determined 
under this paragraph is the amount calculated by multiplying the number of violations 
committed. The section deals with the action by the IASP, and it provides for the following: an 
amount of up to $100 for a violation of s 5(a)(1), or up to $25 for any other violation of s 5 (see 
s 7(g)(3)(A)(i and ii)). 
234  Id s 7(g)(3)(c). 
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the violation wilfully and knowingly,235 and/or the defendant’s unlawful activity 
included one or more of the aggravated violations set out in section 5(b).236 In 
assessing damages, the court may consider whether:237 the defendant has 
established and implemented with due care commercially reasonable practices and 
procedures designed effectively to prevent such violations;238 or the violation 
occurred despite commercially reasonable efforts to maintain compliance with the 
practices and procedures to which reference is made in clause (i).239 In an action 
brought under paragraph (1), the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking 
for the payment of the costs of such action and assess reasonable costs, including 
reasonable attorneys’ fees, against any party.240  
 
6.3.2.5 Other provisions related to regulating unsolicited e-mail messages 
 
(a) Do-not-e-mail registry  
 
Section 9 of the CAN-SPAM Act provides for a do-not-e-mail registry.241 Six months 
after the coming into operation of the CAN-SPAM Act, the Commission sent a report 
to various agents setting out a plan and timetable for establishing a nationwide 
marketing do-not-e-mail registry.242 The report included an explanation of any 
practical, technical, security, privacy, enforceability, or other concerns that the 
Commission had regarding such a registry.243 It further outlined how the registry 
would operate as regards children with e-mail addresses.244 Authorisation to 
implement was granted nine months after the date of the enactment.245  
 
                                                          
235  Id s 7(g)(3)(c)(i). 
236  Id s 7(g) and s 7(g)(3)(c)(ii). There is also a limitation on the penalty for any violation of s 5 
(other than a violation of s 5(a)(1)) in that the amount determined under subparagraph (A) may 
not exceed $1 000 000. See s 7(g)(3)(B). 
237  Id s 7(g)(3)(D).  
238  Id s 7(g)(3)(D)(i). 
239  Id s 7(g)(3)(D)(ii). 
240  Id s 7(g)(4). 
241  See s 9(a) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
242  Id s 9(a)(1). 
243  Id s 9(a)(2). 
244  Id s 9(a)(1-3). 
245  Id s 9(b). 
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In 2004, having sought and received input from various sources, the FTC rejected 
the list on the basis that it would lack an authentication system for e-mail.246 Based 
on the input from those consulted, the Commission determined that “spammers 
would most likely use the registry as a mechanism for verifying the validity of e-mail 
addresses, and without authentication, the Commission would be largely powerless 
to identify those responsible for misusing the registry”.247 This aside, the registry-type 
solution to spam would raise serious security, privacy, and enforcement 
difficulties.248 
 
Balough249 is of the view that the do-not-spam registry will exacerbate the problem of 
spam in the sense that once an e-mail address is in that registry, it is virtually 
guaranteed that the person is alive and using that inbox.250 
 
(b) Improving enforcement by providing rewards for information about 
violations 
 
Section 11 of the CAN-SPAM Act required that within nine months after the date of 
the enactment, a report on a system of rewarding those who supply information 
about violations of the Act be issued.251 This included procedures for the 
Commission to grant rewards of not less than twenty per cent of the total civil 
penalties collected for a violation of the Act to the first person who identified the 
person in violation of the Act252 and those who supplied information which led to the 
successful collection of a civil penalty by the Commission.253 The report also had to 
                                                          
246  See Federal Trade Commission ‘National do not e-mail registry: a report to congress (2004) the 
executive summary’ 1-60 https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/can-spam-
act-2003-national-do-not-email-registry-federal-trade-commission-report-congress/report.pdf 
(date of use: 30 December 2015). 
247       Ibid. 
248  Ibid.  
249  See Balough (2003) 22/1 Journal of Computer and Information Law 87.  
250  Ibid 95; and Bolin supra n 67 426-8 for a discussion of the problems surrounding do-not-spam 
lists. 
251  See s 11(1) of the CAN-SPAM Act.  
252  Id s 11(1)(A). 
253  Id s 1. Also Platt Majoras D et al ‘A CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System: A Report to 
Congress’ (September 2004) for an executive summary of the report 1-74 
https://ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/can-spam-informant-reward-system-federal-
trade-commission-report-congressexpert-reports/040916rewardsysrpt.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015). 
253  1(1)(A)(i). 
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establish procedures to simplify the process for submitting complaints on violations 
of the Act, including procedures to allow for the electronic submission of complaints 
to the Commission.254 The report was compiled to consider key issues that should be 
included in establishing a reward system.255 Recommendations were made on the 
features or elements that a potentially effective reward system would need to 
incorporate should Congress decide to implement one.256 The following elements 
were identified: eligibility should be linked to the imposition of a final court order, 
rather than to the collection of civil penalties;257 reward payments should be funded 
through appropriations rather than based on collected civil penalties; eligibility for 
rewards should be targeted at persons with high-value information; and reward 
determination should be wholly within the FTC’s discretion and not subject to 
administrative or judicial review.258 
 
(c) The effects of the CAN-SPAM Act  
 
Not later than 24 months after the date of enactment of the CAN-SPAM Act, the 
Commissioner, in consultation with the Department of Justice and other appropriate 
agencies, was required to submit a report to Congress giving a detailed analysis of 
the effectiveness and enforcement of the provisions of the Act including the need (if 
any) for Congress to modify those provisions.259 An analysis of recommendations 
was also to be included.260 The above provision has illustrated how the CAN-SPAM 
                                                          
254  Id s 11(1)(A)(ii). 
255  See Platt Majoras D et al ‘A CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System: A Report to Congress’ 
supra n 253. 
256  Id 19-32. The following key issues were considered in setting forth a reward system: “how could 
a reward system improve enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act? Who are the potential 
informants who could identify the CAN-SPAM Act violators and supply valuable information 
leading to successful law enforcement action? What are the incentives and counter-incentives 
that would likely influence potential informants et cetera?”. 
257  Id 33-42. The following are to be strongly considered: “it should be specified that it is unlawful 
to provide false information in connection with the reward system; protection of informants’ 
identities should be provided allowing them to remain anonymous whenever testimony is not 
necessary for case prosecution; and it should be explicitly stated that the FTC cannot grant 
immunity”. 
258   Ibid. 
259  See s 10(a) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
260  Id s 10(a)(1). These recommendations included: “the extent to which technological and 
marketplace developments, including changes in the nature of the devices through which 
consumers access their e-mail messages, may affect the practicality negotiations and 
effectiveness of the provisions of the Act; how to address commercial e-mail that originates or 
is transmitted through or to facilities or computers in other nations, including initiatives or policy 
positions that the Federal Government could pursue through international negotiations, for 
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Act has been interpreted by the courts and how it is intended to protect consumers. It 
has also been noted that the CAN-SPAM Act draws most of its provisions from the 
state laws that preceded it. This is manifested by, among other elements, the CAN-
SPAM Act’s adoption of the opt-out mechanism which most states had followed in 
their legislation.  
 
In what follows a commentary on the benefits derived from the CAN-SPAM Act; the 
criticisms levelled at the Act; and suggestions for improvement as raised by 
commentators are reviewed. 
 
6.4 Commentary on the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 
 
6.4.1 Introduction 
 
The discussion here focuses on how the CAN-SPAM Act has been perceived by a 
variety of commentators. There have been different reactions to the Act pointing to 
both positives and negatives, both its weaknesses and strengths. All perspectives 
are considered in assessing whether or not the CAN-SPAM Act is effective in 
protecting consumers.  
 
6.4.2 Benefits of the CAN-SPAM Act 
 
Various benefits are set to flow from the CAN-SPAM Act which include, but are not 
limited to, the fact that any law which regulates spam is better than no law at all.261 
The Act leaves room for future change, and this it is a good step in the fight against 
spam.262 Proponents of the Act find that its alleged weaknesses are in fact its 
strength.263 The CAN-SPAM Act serves to deter spammers from sending fraudulent 
or misleading e-mail messages, from concealing their identities, and from using 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organizations, or institutions; and options for protecting consumers, including children, from the 
receipt and viewing of commercial e-mail that is obscene or pornographic”. Also s 10(a) (2) and 
10(a)(3) of the CAN-SPAM Act.  
261  See Yang (2004-2005) 4/1 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 12 ff.  
262  See Kikuchi supra n 151 311; and Brockhoeft (2004) 4/1 Loyola Law and Technology Annual 1. 
263  See Trussell (2004) 16/2 Loyola Consumer Law Review 183-5, where the author discusses the 
reactions to the CAN-SPAM Act. 
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intrusive methods to collect e-mail addresses.264 Some note that the CAN-SPAM Act 
has made spam more “respectable” in that there are now set guidelines governing 
the transmission of direct e-mail solicitation.265 Further, by overriding state laws, the 
CAN-SPAM Act is set to allow for easier enforcement as there are no conflicting 
jurisdictions which might create inconsistencies in defining spam.266 While the above 
are positive comments, others see only problems and criticise various aspects of the 
Act. 
 
6.4.3 Criticisms levelled against CAN-SPAM Act  
 
Less positive commentators perceive the CAN-SPAM Act as weak and full of 
loopholes.267 For them the Act is also vague, while for others it is harsh, or even 
under-enforced.268 The following are among the criticisms levelled against the CAN-
SPAM Act. 
 
6.4.3.1 Pre-emption of state laws 
 
(a) Background 
 
Section 8 of the CAN-SPAM Act provides that the Act will supersede any state 
regulation or rule of a state, or political subdivision of a state, that expressly regulate 
the use of e-mail to send commercial messages.269 Provision is made for an 
exception where state legislation, regulation, or rules prohibit falsification or 
deception in any part of a commercial e-mail message or information attached to the 
message.270 Among the criticism advanced is that the provisions applicable in certain 
states allow for more stringent requirements and impose heavier penalties than 
                                                          
264  Marks supra n 129 952 where the author discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the CAN-
SPAM Act. 
265  This is a sentiment shared by marketers. See Ledbetter supra n 48 113. 
266  Ibid.  
267  Marks supra n 129 952. 
268  Ibid. 
269  See s 8(b)(1) of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. 
270  Id s 8(b). The federal law will not pre-empt the applicability of state laws that are not specific to 
e-mail, including state trespass, contract, or tort law; or other state laws to the extent that those 
laws relate to Acts of fraud or computer crime. 
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those under the CAN-SPAM Act, and that these too have been superseded.271 
Mobarek272 noted that replacing the more stringent requirements with a mere 
prohibition on fraud, gives marketers a virtual green light to send spam to anyone 
they choose.273 In addition, preventing the application of state laws significantly 
retards progress towards a resolution of the problem.274 Furthermore, the supremacy 
of the CAN-SPAM Act applies only to those states that regulate commercial e-
mail,275 and the pre-emption clause contains broad exceptions for laws regulating 
falsification or deception which are not e-mail specific.276 As is to be expected, 
preventing states from applying their state law has featured prominently in the 
courts.  
 
(b) Selected case law on pre-emption 
 
White Buffalo Ventures v University of Texas at Austin  
 
The facts in the White Buffalo Ventures v University of Texas at Austin case277 were 
briefly that the plaintiff, White Buffalo, offered online dating services for students at 
the University of Texas (UT) in Austin.278 It sought an injunction against UT 
preventing the university from targeting and blocking its service e-mails as spam 
under the UT’s information technology policy.279 The district court denied the request 
for an injunction, and White Buffalo appealed claiming that the CAN-SPAM Act pre-
empted the UT’s anti-spam policy. The appeal was upheld on the basis that the 
CAN-SPAM Act had replaced state law.280 The court held that the ambiguity in the 
                                                          
271  See Alongi supra n 129 287; Cain (2007-2008) 3 Journal of Law and Policy for the Information 
Society 751 ff; and Brockhoeft supra n 262 40-2. For example, California state law had a 
stricter regulation prohibiting spam with its opt-in laws and also gave individuals a private right 
to bring suit for damages of up to $ 1 million (see California Business & Professional Code s 
17529.2).  
272  Mobarek (2004) 16/3 Loyola Consumer Law Review 263.  
273  Ibid. 
274  Ibid. 
275  See Helman (2009) 50 Boston College Law Review 1539; and Mutchler (2010) 43 Suffolk 
University Law Review 966-8. 
276  Sorkin (2003) supra n 4 11.  
277  White Buffalo Ventures v University of Texas at Austin 420 F 3d 366 (5th Cir 2005) 1-13 
http://www.openjurist.org/420/f3d/366/white-buffalo-ventures-llc-v-university-of-texs-at-austin 
(date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘White Buffalo case’. 
278  Id 1-2. 
279  Id 3. 
280  Id 4-8. 
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CAN-SPAM Act exempted state-run ISPs from its purview and allowed them to 
implement the filtering systems.281 Helman282 notes that “by expressly pre-empting 
state regulation while at the same time expressly exempting ISPs from pre-emption, 
the court failed to take into account situations where those two entities are one and 
the same as noted in the facts”.283 Szabo284 points out that the court here “failed to 
interpret the law correctly and so created a situation where states could face 
competing e-mail restrictions which could ultimately endanger the functionality of the 
Internet”.285 
 
Beyond Systems Inc v Keynetics Inc  
 
In Beyond Systems Inc v Keynetics Inc286 the plaintiff, Beyond Systems, alleged that 
it had received over 6 000 e-mail messages from the defendants, all of which were 
false and misleading with regard to their origin, transmission path, or subject line 
information.287 The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant spammers conspired to 
send the unsolicited bulk e-mail in violation of the Maryland Commercial E-mail Act 
(MCEMA).288 A broad reading of the exemption provision was followed when the US 
District Court of Maryland held that the MCEMA was not inconsistent with the CAN-
SPAM Act.289 The court held that because the MCEMA regulated falsified and 
deceptive header information in the e-mail message it did not frustrate the goals of 
the federal legislation and fell within the exemption provision in the CAN-SPAM 
Act.290 
 
Omega World Travel Inc v Mummagraphics  
 
                                                          
281  Id 8-13.  
282  See Helman supra n 275 1543-4 where the case is discussed. 
283  Ibid. 
284  See Szabo (2006) 7 Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law 72-5 for a discussion of this 
case. 
285  Ibid. 
286  See Beyond Systems Inc v Keynetics Inc 422 F Supp 2nd (2006) 1-60 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/1923.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
Hereafter ‘Beyond Systems case’. 
287  Id 1-12. 
288  See s 14.3001 of the MCEMA. 
289  Beyond Systems case supra n 286 27-29; and Helman supra n 275 1540-1. 
290  Ibid Beyond Systems case. 
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The applicant in Omega World Travel Inc v Mummagraphics291 brought a case 
seeking damages from the defendants affiliated to Omega World Travel for spam e-
mails advertising vacation packages allegedly sent by the defendants.292 The claim 
was brought under the CAN-SPAM Act and the Oklahoma statute which provided 
that:293 
  it shall be unlawful for a person to initiate an e-mail message that the sender knows, or has 
reason to know misrepresents any information in identifying the point of origin or transmission 
of the e-mail message. And does not contain information identifying the point of origin or the 
transmission path of the e-mail message, or contains false, malicious, or misleading information 
which purposefully or negligently injures a person.  
 
The court had to decide whether the Oklahoma statute fell within the CAN-SPAM 
Act’s exception for state laws governing commercial e-mail. The Fourth Circuit court 
upheld the lower court’s ruling that, to the extent that the Oklahoma statute penalised 
non-material errors, it did not fall within the exception and could therefore not be 
applied.294 Certain commentators have suggested that this case shows that statutes 
will not survive the CAN-SPAM Act pre-emption analysis if they can be interpreted as 
going beyond the material “falsification or deception” prohibition in commercial e-mail 
message or attachments.295 
 
Gordon v Virtumundo  
 
The facts in Gordon v Virtumundo296 were briefly that Gordon managed Omni 
Innovations, a business that provided software development services which 
discouraged the act of spamming.297 In connection with this business, Gordon 
established e-mail accounts and registered and maintained an Internet domain name 
“gordonworks.com” through “GoDaddy.com”, a domain name he used to attract the 
attention of spammers.298 Gordon began suing companies that were sending him 
spam under the CAN-SPAM Act and under Washington State’s commercial e-mail 
                                                          
291  See Omega World Travel v Mummagraphics 469 F 3d 348 94th Cir (2006) 
http://openjurist.org/469/f3d/348/omega-world-travel-incorporated-v-mummagraphics-
incorporated-w (date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘Omega World Travel case’. 
292  Id paras 1-9. 
293  See s 776.1A of the Oklahoma Statutes. 
294  Omega World Travel supra n 291 paras 29-46. 
295  See Wong (2007) 20/2 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 459 ff. 
296  See Gordon v Virtumundo 575 F 3d 1040 (2009 US App LEXIS 17518) 1-28 
http://www.nyls.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/141/2013/08/575-F.3d-1040-Gordon-v.-
Virtumundo.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘Gordon’s case’. 
297  Id 3-4. 
298  Ibid. 
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statutes.299 The question before the court was to what extent Gordon’s claims based 
on the Washington State statutes had been pre-empted by the CAN-SPAM Act.300 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of 
standing comprehensively, and held that the claims based on the Washington State 
statutes had been pre-empted by the CAN-SPAM Act. The judge interpreted these 
provisions as going beyond the CAN-SPAM Act’s prohibition on falsification and 
deception.301  
 
6.4.3.2 Regulation, not prohibition 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act is sometimes referred to as the “you-can-spam Act”, even 
though the Act is regarded as a pro-consumer measure which allows consumers to 
choose to stop receiving further unsolicited spam e-mail, it also allows spam and 
does not classify all spam as illegal.302 The CAN-SPAM Act is also said to have 
legalised unsolicited commercial e-mails provided that they meet the requirements it 
sets.303 While the CAN-SPAM Act has been said to protect consumers, it is also said 
to have failed to provide the most fundamental element of any anti-spam law – the 
prohibition of spam.304 It is seen to have failed in that while it was intended to reduce 
the volume of unsolicited e-mail, the statute has instead facilitated a dramatic 
increase in both the amount of spam and the percentage of overall e-mail qualifying 
as spam.305  
 
The CAN-SPAM Act fails to offer an effective solution to the enormous spam 
problem in that it allows the sender to invade in-boxes, and also forces spam 
recipients to take positive action to curtail future invasions.306 Even though anti-spam 
                                                          
299  See s 19.190.030 of the Washington Revised Code. This section deals with unsolicited or 
misleading electronic mail and violation of Consumer Protection Act (USA). 
300  Gordon’s case supra n 296 5-6.  
301  Ibid 5-15 and Susuk (2010) 6/2 Washington Journal of Law Technology and Arts 161-9 ff for 
the effects this case will have on the future of spam litigation.  
302  Rutenberg (2011-2012) 14/1 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 230-4.  
303  Brockhoeft supra n 262 39-40. 
304  See Mossoff (2004) 19/2 Berkley Technology Law Journal 637.  
305  See Soma, Singer & Hurd (2008) 45 Harvard Journal on Legislation 197; and Sorkin (2003) 
supra n 4 11.  
306  See Marks supra n 129 953; also Mayer (2004) 31/1 Journal of Legislation 189; ibid Sorkin; and 
Brockhoeft supra n 262 42-3.  
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measures have been adopted, legislation on its own is insufficient to resolve the 
considerable problems resulting from spam.307  
 
6.4.3.3 Limitation of right to claim 
 
(a) Background 
 
The CAN-SPAM Act has also been criticised for not allowing the individual the right 
to claim against the spammer – he or she must rely on the FTC to enforce his or her 
claim.308 This right to sue is also limited to IASP who are “adversely affected” by the 
unsolicited communications.309 In addition, the IASP must also prove that the 
defendant exhibited a pattern or practice in its delivery of unsolicited e-mail.310 The 
IASP must prove the defendant’s liability and the relief provided can result in an 
injunction or damages amounting to the greater of actual or statutory damages, 
which are often not collected in full.311  
 
Certain commentators argue for the traditional self-help role of individual litigation to 
be resurrected to tackle the modern communication problems as that will have a real 
impact on stemming the tide of unwanted commercial e-mail by both businesses and 
individuals.312 These private rights, it is argued, could create a “self-sustaining” anti-
spam system through which individuals could seek recourse without having to rely 
on ISPs, state attorneys, and government agencies for enforcement.313 This right of 
action will only be effective against spammers who are caught and found liable.314 
 
                                                          
307  See Trussell supra n 263 187. 
308  See Bolin supra n 67 415; Cain supra n 271 760; Ledbetter supra n 48 115-6; and Reid (2010) 
4 Akron Intellectual Property Journal 305. 
309  Lorentz supra n 152 574 and 584-6; also Susuk supra n 301 159-61 and 168-9 where the 
author lists the following as the decisions neutralising the private rights: “(a) the threshold 
question of whether a plaintiff is an IASP involves close judicial scrutiny regarding its underlying 
purpose; (b) if the plaintiff is an IASP it must show that it suffered significant IAS type harm 
above and beyond ordinary inconveniences from a normal spam volume; (c) should the 
plaintiff’s CAN-SPAM claim fail, the viability of a parallel state claim is now highly questionable; 
and (d) if the court determines that the claim is frivolous, the plaintiff runs the risk of being 
responsible of the defendant’s legal fees and costs”.  
310  Ibid.  
311  Lorentz supra n 152 584-6; and Helman supra n 275 1543.  
312  See Cain supra n 270 776; Id Lorentz 603-4; and Soma, Singer & Hurd supra n 305 197. 
313  Id Soma, Singer & Hurd 193-5 where the authors discuss the issue of allowing individuals to 
sue spammers for statutory damages. 
314  Ibid. 
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(b) Selected case law 
 
Gordon v Virtumundo 
 
In Gordon v Virtumundo315 the court held that the plaintiff met two requirements: that 
it must be an IAS; and that it must actually have been “adversely affected” which is 
one of the violations in the CAN-SPAM Act.316 
 
Spam Arrest LLC v Replacements Ltd 
 
The facts in Spam Arrest LLC v Replacements Ltd317 were briefly that Spam Arrest 
offered a subscription to an anti-spam service that blocked e-mails from senders until 
they had been verified.318 To verify senders, Spam Arrest e-mails a link to a 
verification page where the sender can click the verify button. The verification page 
contains a two paragraph “sender agreement”319 which specifies that clicking the 
verify button indicates consent to the sender agreement.320  
 
The court found that Spam Arrest could not show that the defendant, Sentient Jet, 
had sent unsolicited commercial e-mail. It also held that Spam Arrest bore the 
burden of showing that Sentient Jet had not received the consent of the e-mail 
recipients to send them e-mail, despite Sentient being required to prove that 
recipients had consented to its e-mail.321 
 
                                                          
315  Gordon’s case supra n 296 10-15.  
316  Ibid. See the facts of this case in pars 6.4.3.1 (b) above. 
317  Spam Arrest LLC v Replacements Ltd (2013) WL 4675919 (WD Wash Aug 29 2013) 1-36 
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/washington/wawdce/2:2012cv00481/182956/96/0.pdf?ts=1377958938 (date of use: 30 
December 2015), hereafter ‘Spam Arrest case’; and Goldman E ‘Anti-spam lawsuits rarely win, 
as highlighted by a recent loss by spam arrest’ 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/09/12/anti-spam-lawsuits-rarely-win-as-
highlighted-by-a-recent-loss-by-spam-arrest/ (date of use: 30 December 2015) where the 
author comments on the Spam Arrest case. 
318  Ibid Spam Arrest case. 
319  The sender agreement made senders promise that they were not sending unsolicited 
commercial e-mail and specified that senders had to pay $2000 for each violation of the 
agreement. 
320  Spam Arrest case supra n 317 1-36; and Beyond Systems INC v Kraft Foods Incorporated No 
13-2137 (July 21 2014) 1-13 http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-4th-circuit/1691263.html (date of 
use: 30 December 2015). 
321  Ibid Spam Arrest case. 
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Wagner v Spire Vision 
 
In Wagner v Spire Vision322 the plaintiff alleged that he had received 49 spam e-
mails all containing materially falsified, misrepresented, and forged information in 
violation of California’s anti-spam law.323 The defendants had allegedly registered 
their domain names and those used to send spam to unregistered fictitious business 
names.324 The court noted that in order for Wagner to prevail he had to show that the 
header information in the e-mails not only violated the California statute, but also 
contained material misrepresentations to avoid pre-emption under the CAN-SPAM 
Act.325 It was held that the plaintiff had not proven the merit of his claims under 
section 17529.5 of the California Business and Professions Code.326 
 
6.4.3.4 Global nature of spam 
 
It is said that the CAN-SPAM Act will make enforcement more difficult considering 
that spam also originates from outside the US borders.327 The main problem with 
enforcing the Act has been noted as an inability physically to locate spammers.328 
Daniel notes that the CAN-SPAM Act has not contributed to the resolution of 
problems relating to the global nature of spam, but that what it has achieved is that 
spammers have moved their operations offshore or use relays to make it appear as if 
they have moved.329 Daniel further notes that this raises new problems such as: 
jurisdiction; enforcement of laws against offshore spammers; and the identification 
and location of international spammers,330 and that tough spam regulation will 
compel spammers to move abroad.331 Regarding enforcement, it is noted that since 
spammers are moving beyond the US borders in order to avoid compliance with the 
                                                          
322  Wagner v Spire Vision C13-04952 WHA (ND Cal March 2014) 1-16 http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2014/06/can-spam-preemption-doesnt-apply-to-fraud-and-more.htm (date of use: 
30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘Wagner’s case’. 
323  See s 17529.5 of the California Business and Professions Code n 6 above. 
324  Wagner’s supra n 322 1-2. 
325  Id 5. 
326  Id 10-12. 
327  Ledbetter supra n 48 115-6; see also Chapter 4 4.4.2.3 (h) above on the global cooperation 
outreach. 
328  See Daniel (2005-2006) 94 Kentucky Law Journal 373.  
329  Ibid.  
330  Ibid. See also Dane (2006) 6 Asper Review International Business & Trade Law 251. 
331  Ibid Daniel. See also Helman supra n 275 1547-8. 
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CAN-SPAM Act, spam laws need to be adopted in other jurisdictions.332 Ideally, 
there should be worldwide uniformity in anti-spam legislation,333 with worldwide 
enforcement as recommended in the OECD’s Spam Toolkit.334 Incentives for those 
who cooperate in cross-border enforcement are also to be encouraged.335 In 
attempting to remedy the situation solutions have been proposed to advance and 
improve the CAN-SPAM Act. 
 
6.5 Solutions for improvements to the CAN-SPAM Act 
 
6.5.1 Technology for enforcement 
 
In addition to regulation through the CAN-SPAM Act, some commentators are of the 
opinion that the Act is ineffective without effective technology to identify e-mail 
senders, block unwanted e-mail, and determine an e-mail’s country of origin.336 The 
solution advanced is that in order to stop spam, private businesses engaged in 
developing technological solutions to block spam should hasten to develop the 
technology necessary to enforce the statute, which will include the ability to trace 
UCE to its source.337  
 
The key to fighting spam is set to be vigorous enforcement in which the federal 
government strives to identify the spammers and prosecute them to the fullest extent 
of the law.338 While technical approaches alone are not enough to solve the spam 
problem, market-based initiatives – including self-help mechanisms and spam filter 
systems – must be included, even if most of the time they merely delete spam.339 
 
6.5.2 Inclusion of opt-in mechanism 
 
It is also claimed that the solution to the eradication of spam lies in the introduction of 
restrictive mechanism such as opt-in mechanism in preference to the opt-out 
                                                          
332  Lorentz supra n 152 601-603. 
333  Ibid. 
334  Id 599-600. 
335  Ibid. 
336  Ledbetter supra n 48 124-7 and Daniel supra n 328 375-7. 
337  Id Daniel 373-80. 
338  Brockhoeft supra n 262 43. 
339  Marks supra n 129 957-8. 
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mechanism.340 Shames note that the effectiveness of the opt-out provisions in the 
CAN-SPAM Act may be questioned, it would appear to work more effectively in 
conjunction with the opt-in requirements where these are applied.341 The opt-in 
mechanism will also serve to increase the efficiency of e-mail by allowing users 
easily to identify spammers, and so eliminate the need for the do-not-e-mail 
registry.342 Balough notes that “the federal legislation should also adopt an opt-in 
mechanism with penalties that can be imposed not only against the spammer, but 
also in those web sites receiving the traffic generated by the unsolicited commercial 
e-mail”.343 In this regard, others argue that lessons can be learned from the 
international arena – especially as regards the opt-in mechanism – and that the USA 
should, therefore, look beyond its borders in order to strengthen its legislation 
regulating spam.344  
 
6.5.3 A multi-faceted solution 
 
Commentators in the USA have pointed to a multi-faceted approach to combat 
spam.345 In order to create a tougher and more effective anti-spam statute, it has 
been stated that this multi-faceted solution should include redefining spam by 
broadening the definition to include all UCE,346 and enacting minimum requirements 
for e-mail transmission on ISP networks.347 ISPs should also be held accountable to 
other ISPs for actual damages, and individuals should be entitled to sue spammers 
for statutory damages.348 Finally, international anti-spam efforts should be 
promoted.349 It has also been mooted that the USA should assist in developing an 
effective spam- reduction scheme, and that in doing so it would be well advised to 
                                                          
340  See Shames (2004) 66 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 396-403 and 408 where the author 
discusses the advantages, constitutionality, and effects of such a mechanism. Shames also 
note that: “this would require senders of unsolicited commercial e-mail to obtain the permission 
of recipients before sending them commercial solicitations”. 
341  Ibid. 
342  Kikuchi supra n 151 313. 
343  See Balough supra n 249 95. 
344  Kikuchi supra n 151 295-311 where the author notes that: “the USA should follow Japan and 
the European Union as examples of change, or incorporate some of the provisions from those 
jurisdictions that work”. See too Mutchler supra n 275 968-79 where the author compares the 
USA and EU and Lorentz supra n 152 603. 
345  See Soma, Singer & Hurd supra n 305 197; and Marks supra n 129 958.  
346  Ibid.  
347   Ibid. 
348  Ibid. 
349  Ibid. 
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look to Nigeria which has implemented both technological and legislative measures 
in its attempt to halt the proliferation of spam.350 Another way to stop spam e-mails is 
to have a worldwide, integrated system which includes countries, ISPs, individuals, 
and law enforcement agencies, all cooperating to make spam a less attractive 
marketing tool.351  
 
6.5.4 International cooperation  
 
6.5.4.1 Background 
 
As part of a multi-faceted solution to combat spam, countries have entered into 
partnership agreements with stakeholders in different countries. The USA has signed 
a number of Memorandum of Understanding352 with other agencies and 
organisations in different countries aimed at collaborating in the fight against spam. 
This is also what the ITU and OECD advocates as noted in chapter 4 above. 
 
6.5.4.2 Memorandum of Understanding between the USA and other countries 
 
(a) United States, United Kingdom, and Australia 
 
In 2004 the USA, the United Kingdom, and Australia joined forces by signing a MoU 
in which they undertook to share resources to fight spam.353 This MoU noted that the 
convenience and efficiency of e-mail is threatened by the extremely rapid growth in 
the volume of unsolicited commercial e-mail which often contains deceptive content 
                                                          
350  Nigeria which was considered a gateway for spam in 2002 began working with one of its 
companies to develop an anti-spam solution to stop outbound spam e-mails and also mandated 
its ISPs to install outbound e-mail filtering. See Alepin (2004-2005) 28 Columbia Journal of Law 
& the Arts 70. 
351  See Mutchler supra n 275 981. 
352  Hereafter ‘MoU’. 
353  See Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Enforcement Assistance in Commercial E-mail 
Matters Among the Following Agencies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia: The United States Federal Trade Commission; The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair 
Trading, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner, Her Majesty’s Secretary of the State 
for Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, and the Australian Communications Authority (02 July 2004) 1-11 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-antitrust-and-consumer-
protection-sooperation-agreements/050224memounderstanding.pdf (date of use: 30 December 
2015)). Hereafter ‘MoU USA, UK and Australia’. 
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or material that many recipients may consider offensive.354 As a result, the parties 
recognised their need to share evidence which will facilitate the effective 
enforcement of spam violations.355 Parties agreed on the following issues:356 
cooperation in detecting and investigating spam violations or suspected spam 
violations; research, consumer and business education; and law enforcement with 
regard to spam violators. The signatories further undertook to keep each other 
informed of developments having a bearing on the MoU in their respective 
countries.357  
 
(b) USA and Mexico 
 
The FTC and Mexico’s Consumer Protection Agency, Procuraduria Federal Del 
Consumidor (PROFECO) signed a bilateral MoU in January 2005 to promote 
enhanced cooperation in the fight against cross-border fraud.358 This document was 
the first consumer protection MoU signed by the FTC with a non-English-speaking 
nation.359 The MoU strengthens the close relationship between the USA and Mexico 
and will facilitate greater law enforcement coordination in consumer protection 
matters affecting both nations.360 The following key goals were established by this 
MoU: notification of enforcement activities; cooperation and coordination; and 
exchange of information.361  
 
(c) USA and Spain  
 
                                                          
354  Id 1. 
355  Id 4-6 for the objects and scope of assistance. 
356   Ibid. 
357  Id para II B.  
358  See Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance in Consumer Protection Matters 
between the Federal Trade Commission of the United States of America and the Procuraduria 
Federal del Consumidor (Office of the Federal Attorney for Consumer Protection) of the United 
Mexican States (2005) 1-7 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachement/international-
antitrust-and-consumer-protection-cooperation-agreements/050127/memounderstanding.pdf 
(date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘MoU USA and Mexico’. 
359  See Federal Trade Commission ‘FTC signs memorandum of understanding with the Mexican 
consumer Protection body’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/01/ftc-signs-
memorandum-understanding-mexican-consumer-protection (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
360  Ibid. This memorandum is considered a “best effort” agreement and does not legally bind nor 
alter either country’s existing consumer protection laws.  
361  See scope of assistance of the MoU USA and Mexico supra n 358 3-4.  
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In February 2005 the USA signed another MoU, this time with Spain, aimed at 
promoting enhanced cooperation and information-sharing on spam enforcement 
activities.362 Signatories recognised that it is in their common interest to share 
evidence that will facilitate effective enforcement for spam violations.363 Also 
included is: the facilitation of research and business education on spam, and the 
promotion of a better understanding of the participants economic; legal conditions 
and theories as regards spam violations.364 
 
(d) USA and Nigeria 
 
On 28 August 2013 the FTC signed a MoU with two Nigerian agencies to increase 
cooperation and communication in their joint efforts to stamp out cross-border 
fraud.365 This is the first FTC MoU to include a foreign criminal enforcement 
authority.366 The signatories observed that cross-border scammers use fraudulent 
bulk e-mails and other scams to reach consumers the world over. This MoU is said 
to help the agencies to protect consumers in both the USA and Nigeria.367 It will also 
address the scourge of cross-border scams using fraudulent e-mails, and other 
deceptive scams used to send bulk e-mails to consumers.368  
 
The MoU noted the need to create “the needed synergy and cooperation to fight 
such fraudulent and deceptive practices which are detrimental to the interests of 
                                                          
362  See Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Enforcement Assistance in Commercial e-mail 
Matters between the Federal Trade Commission of the United States of America and the 
Agencia Espanola De Proteccion De Datos. Document (2005) 1-9 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/defaults/files/attachments/international-antitrust-and-consumer-
protection-cooperation-agreements/050224memounderstanding.pdf (date of use: 30 December 
2015). Hereafter ‘MoU USA and Spain’. 
363  Ibid. 
364  Id 3. For the object and scope of assistance see MoU USA and Mexico supra n 358 3-5. 
365  See Memorandum of Understanding between US FTC and the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s 
Consumer Protection Council (CPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
on Mutual Enforcement Assistance in Consumer Protection Matters 1-10 (2013) 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/ftc-signs-memorandum-understandu 
=ing-nigerian-consumer-protection (date of use: 30 December 2015). Hereafter ‘MoU USA 
Nigeria’. 
366  This Day Live ‘CPC, EFCC, US Agency sign on consumer protection’ 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/cpc-efcc-us-agency-sign-mou-on-consumer-
protection/157613 (date of use: 30 December 2015). The CPC addresses consumer complaints 
through investigations and enforcement and the EFCC is a criminal enforcement agency with 
authority to address consumer fraud and other financial crimes.  
367  Ibid; and MoU USA and Nigeria supra n 365 2-4 for the objectives and scope of assistance. 
368  Ibid. 
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genuine businesses and consumers”.369 It also covers the following issues: 
information-sharing in investigations and law enforcement proceedings; civil or 
criminal investigation assistance; intelligence gathering; and the use of complaint 
data.370 Consumer education is also addressed and a joint implementation 
committee for performance under the MoU by the collaborating agencies is 
created.371 
 
(e) USA and UK 
 
On 6 March 2014 the FTC and the UK Privacy Enforcement Agency signed an MoU 
to promote increased cooperation and communication between the two agencies in 
an effort to protect consumer privacy.372 The MoU is designed “to bolster these 
countries’ privacy enforcement partnership at the time when consumer information is 
moving across national borders, increasing the need for cross-border enforcement 
cooperation”.373 The MoU’s aim is to provide mutual assistance and exchange of 
information for purposes of investigating, enforcing, and/or securing compliance with 
privacy laws, which includes the sharing of complaints and the provision of 
investigative assistance.374 The MoU also covers the enforcement of privacy laws in 
both countries,375 and signals regulators’ increasing efforts at cross-global 
enforcement, particularly as regards issues of privacy.376 
 
                                                          
369  Ibid. 
370  Ibid. 
371  MoU USA and Nigeria supra n 365 2-4. 
372  See Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Federal Trade Commission 
and the Information Commissioners Office of the United Kingdom on Mutual Assistance in the 
Enforcement of Laws Protecting Personal Information in Private Sector. Document accessed 
(2014) 1-10 http://www.ftc.gov/systems/files/attachments/international-competition-consumer-
protection-cooperstion-agreements/140306ftc-uk-mou.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
Hereafter ‘MoU USA and UK’. 
373  Ibid. 
374  Id 4-6 for the objects and scope of the MoU. 
375  These privacy laws include: Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 as amended; Fair Trade 
Reporting Act of 1970; CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 among others (Federal Trade Commission 
USA); and Data Protection Act of 1998 and Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC 
Directive) Regulations (Information Commission Office in UK). See Olshanlaw ‘FTC and UK 
Head sign MOU signaling cross border Privacy enforcement’ http://www.olshanlaw.com/blogs-
Advertising-Law-blog,FTC-UK-Cross-Border-Privacy (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
376  See MoU USA and UK supra 372 1-10. 
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The MoUs above are subject to review regarding the cooperation, coordination, and 
enforcement assistance undertaken by the parties.377 However, it will be best for 
parties involved to do their part in combating spam by adopting some of the 
provisions in the MoUs. 
 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter a discussion of the USA’s anti-spam laws was outlined. In the 
discussion it is noted how the anti-spam law came to being – from regulation at state 
level to the federal CAN-SPAM Act. It was pointed out that although the federal law 
pre-empts state laws, it also drew a number of its provisions from state legislation.  
Criticism of the federal Act was also highlighted.  
 
This chapter has also shown how the CAN-SPAM Act provisions have been 
interpreted by the courts, and suggestions on addressing the problems by other 
commentators were identified. Nationally, the USA’s CAN-SPAM Act reflects basic 
elements that are necessary in any anti-spam legislation. Even though the USA has 
chosen the opt-out mechanism, it has also outlined the process and the time frames 
for the implementation of such a mechanism. 
 
It further emerged that spam is both a national and an international problem. In 
addressing the call to combat spam at a global level, the USA appears to have 
followed the route of entering into individual MoUs with agencies or organisations in 
various countries. While these agreements are not binding, they are a step in the 
right direction and indicate recognition among countries that spam is indeed a global 
problem which can be overcome only by a multi-faceted solution.  
 
In the following chapter an examination on the Australian approach to the issue of 
spam will be addressed.
                                                          
377  See MoU USA and Spain supra n 362 8; also MoU USA, UK and Australia supra n 353 10; and 
MoU USA and Mexico supra n 358 7. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-SPAM LAWS: AUSTRALIA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 launched a discussion of anti-spam laws in the USA. In this chapter, focus 
will be on the second anti-spam jurisdiction by considering how the issue is regulated 
in Australia. Like the USA, Australia has been regulating spam since 2003. The 
Australian government has adopted a five-pronged strategy in its fight against spam 
namely: a multi-faceted initiative. This strategy includes strong legislation and 
enforcement within Australia; consumer and industry education; industry partnership; 
technology; and international cooperation.1  
 
The discussion follows the strategy outlined above. When discussing the issue of 
“strong legislation” the following outline will be highlighted: the purpose of the 
legislation and the anti-spam provisions; a commentary on the Act taking into 
consideration the benefits of the Act; challenges posed on the legislation which 
includes criticism by commentators; and enforcement. Case law is integrated into the 
discussion of these issues. The four remaining initiatives will follow before offering 
some concluding remarks. 
 
7.2 Anti-spam legislation in Australia 
 
7.2.1 Background to Australia’s anti-spam legislation   
 
Before anti-spam legislation came into operation, Australia dealt with the issue in 
other related legislation.2 Australia adopted its anti-spam law – the Spam Act3 – on 
                                                          
1  See ACMA ‘Submission to Spam Act Review: ACMA’ 5 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/ 
consumer_info/spam/acma%20submission%20to%20review.pdf (date of use: 15 January 
2016) and ACMA ‘Fighting spam in Australia’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-
ACMA-story/Meeting-our-standard/fighting-spam-in-australia (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
2  For a background on the pre-anti-spam law in Australia see: Vaile (2004) 6/9 Internet Law 
Bulletin 113; Malcolm (2001) 12/2 Journal of Law and Information Science 242-9; Relf (2005) 2 
Macquarie J Bus L 93-4; and Quo (2004) 11/1 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 4-
10 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2004/11.html (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
3  See Spam Act 129 of 2003. 
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12 December 2003 and assented to in April 2004.4 The Spam Act addresses the 
three main requirements: first, consent before unsolicited communications can be 
sent, which, in turn, invokes the opt-in requirement making spam illegal and 
punishable by law in Australia; second, accurate sender information when unsolicited 
mail is sent to end users; and third, an unsubscribe facility in such e-mails.5  
 
7.2.2 Purpose of the Spam Act 
 
The aim of the Spam Act is: to reduce Australia’s role as a source of spam, to 
minimise spam for Australian end users, and to extend Australia’s involvement in 
worldwide anti-spam activities.6 As noted by Australian Communications and Media 
Authority7 the mission of the Spam Act is therefore to promote citizen confidence in 
electronic messaging as a means of commercial communication.8 Note should be 
taken here that the Australian Communications Authority9 and the ACMA are used 
interchangeably when discussing the issues below.  
 
7.2.3 Anti-spam provisions under the Spam Act of 2003 
 
7.2.3.1 Definitions 
 
Section 4 of the Spam Act provides a list of definitions. While most of these 
definitions are highlighted when the relevant issues are considered below, the 
following definitions are outlined here for ease of reference. 
 
                                                          
4  The Act came into operation 120 days after it was signed into law in April 2004. See Vaile 
supra n 2 113. The Act was also rolled out in phases starting from 12 December 2003 and 
ending on 10 April 2004 (see s 2 of the Spam Act of 2003).  
5  See Australian Government Department of Communications Information Technology and the 
Arts ‘Spam Act 2003: A practical guide for government’ http://www.acma.gov.au/ 
webwr/consumer_info/spam/spam_act_pracguide_govt.pdf (date of use: 15 January 2015). 
6  See ACMA ‘Meeting the ACMA standard: fighting spam in Australia’ 
http://acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-ACMA-story/Meeting-our-standard/fighting-spam-in-
australia (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
7  Hereafter ‘ACMA’. The ACMA is the independent statutory authority tasked with ensuring most 
elements of Australian’s media and communications legislation related regulation and 
numerous derived standards and codes of practice operate effectively and efficiently and in the 
public interest. See ACMA ‘Introduction to the ACMA’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/ 
About/The-ACMA-story/Communicating/introduction-to-the-acma (date of use: 15 January 
2016). 
8  Ibid. 
9  Hereafter ‘ACA’. ACA and ACMA will be used interchangeably.  
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(a) Commercial electronic message 
 
A “commercial electronic message”10 is defined as “an electronic message where, 
having regard to its content, the way in which it is presented, and the content that 
can be located using the links, telephone numbers, or contact information (if any), 
are set out”.11 The purpose(s) of the message is listed in section 6(1) of the Spam 
Act which includes, among others, the advertising, promotion and supply of goods 
and services.12  
 
Like the USA above, the term “spam” in Australia is classified in relation to the 
content of the message as “commercial” and not its volume or “bulk” (or number of 
messages actually sent). The definition of CEM covers e-mails, mobile phone 
messaging (SMS, MMS, and EMS), and instant messaging of a commercial nature.13 
The Spam Act does not apply to facsimile messages, Internet pop-ups, or voice-to-
voice telemarketing.14 
 
(b) Electronic messages 
 
An “electronic message” is “a message sent using an Internet carriage service or any 
other listed carriage service”.15 It is also an electronic address related to an e-mail 
account, an instant messaging account, a telephone account, or any similar 
account.16 In terms of the Spam Act it is immaterial whether the electronic address 
exists,17 or whether the message reaches its intended destination.18 However, if a 
message is sent by way of voice call made using a standard telephone service, the 
                                                          
10  Hereafter referred to ‘CEM’. 
11  See s (6)(1)(a-c) of the Spam Act of 2003.   
12  Ibid s 6(1)(d-p) where other purposes are listed as: “offering, advertising or promoting the 
supply of land or interest of land; and also assisting or enabling, by deception, to dishonestly 
obtain property belonging to another person; obtaining a financial advantage from another 
person; or obtaining gain from another person”.  
13  ACMA ‘Australian eMarketing code of practice’ http://acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-
Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/australia-emarketing-code-of-practice-ensuring-you-dont-spam-
i-acma (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
14  Ibid. 
15  See s 5(1)(a) of the Spam Act. The term “message” is defined in s 4 of the Spam Act as 
“information whether in the form of text; data; speech, music or other sound; visual images; any 
other form; or any combination of forms”.  
16  Id s 5(1)(b).  
17  Id s 5(2). 
18  Id s 5(3). 
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message would not be considered an electronic message for purposes of the Spam 
Act.19 
  
7.2.3.2 Rules for sending electronic mail 
 
Section 3 of the Spam Act provides a simplified outline of the Act which establishes a 
scheme to regulate commercial e-mail and other types of CEM. This outline 
includes:20  
 
 the prohibition of the dissemination of unsolicited commercial electronic messages;21 provides 
 for CEMs to include information about the individual or organisations who authorises the 
 sending of the message; demands that commercial electronic messages contain a functional 
 unsubscribe facility; prohibits the supply, acquisition, or use of address-harvesting software; 
 prohibits the supply, acquisition, or use of an electronic address list produced using address-
 harvesting software; and provides civil penalties and injunctions as the principal remedies for 
 breaches of the Act.  
 
These requirements are found in Part 2 of the Spam Act which deals with the rules 
for sending CEMs.  
 
(a) Prohibition on sending unsolicited commercial electronic messages  
 
Section 16(1) of the Spam Act prohibits a person from sending or causing to be sent 
a UCEM that has an Australian link22 and is not a designated CEM.23 For the 
                                                          
19  Id s 5(5). 
20  Id s 15 for the simplified outline of this part. 
21  Hereafter ‘UCEM’. 
22  For purposes of the Spam Act a “CEM” has an Australian link if, and only if: “the message 
originates in Australia; or the individual or organisation who sent the message or authorised the 
sending of the message is: an individual who is physically present in Australia when the 
message is sent; or an organisation whose central management and control is in Australia 
when the message is sent; or the computer, server or device that is used to access the 
message is located in Australia; the relevant electronic account holder is: an individual who is 
physically present in Australia when the message is accessed; or an organisation that carries 
on business or activities in Australia when the message is accessed; or if the message cannot 
be delivered because the relevant electronic address does not exist, assuming that the 
electronic address existed, is reasonably likely that the message would have been accessed 
using a computer, server or device located in Australia”. 
23  Schedule 1(2) of the Spam Act outlines the term “designated CEM” as: “the message that 
consists of no more than factual information (with or without directly related comment) and any 
or all of the following additional information: the name, logo, and contact details of the individual 
or organisation who authorised the sending of the message; The name and contact details of 
the author; if the author is an employee, the name, logo and contact details of the author’s 
employer; if the author is a partner in a partnership the name, logo and contact details of the 
partnership; if the author is a direct or officer of an organization; if the message is sponsored, 
the name, logo and contact details of the sponsor; information required to be included by s 17 
(that deals with CEMs which must include accurate sender information); information that would 
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purposes of the Spam Act, these designated CEMs can be authorised by different 
institutions including government bodies24 and educational institutions.25 The 
purpose of having a category of designated UCEMs is to ensure that there are no 
unintended restrictions on government-to-citizen or government-to-business 
communication, or any restriction on religious or political organisations.26 The 
exclusion only applies if the relevant body is the supplier or prospective supplier of 
the goods or services concerned.27  
 
Section 16(1) does not apply if: “the relevant electronic account holder consented28 
to the sending of the message;29 or if the person30 did not know, and could not with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
have been required to be included by s 18 (that deals with CEMs which must contain a 
functional unsubscribe facility) if that section had applied to the message. Assuming that none 
of the additional information had been included in the message, the message would not have 
been a CEMs; and the message complies with such other condition or conditions (if any) as are 
specified in the regulations”. 
24  Section 4 of the Spam Act defines the term “government body” as: “a department of the 
Commonwealth, a state or a territory; an agency, authority or instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth, a state or a territory; a department of government of a foreign country; an 
agency, authority or instrumentality of the government of a foreign country; a department of the 
government of a part of a foreign country; and an agency, authority or instrumentality of the 
government of a part of a foreign country”. Other organisations included here are political 
parties, religious organisations, and charities (see cl 3 (a)-(c) of Schedule 1 to the Spam Act). 
25  See cl 4 (a)-(d) of Schedule 1 to the Spam Act. Section 4 of the Spam Act lists the following as 
educational institutions: a pre-school; a school; a college; and a university. 
26  See Relf supra n 2 101 and Bender MR ‘Australia’s spam legislation: a modern King Canute’ 
(2006) 2-24 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916724 (date of use: 15 
January 2016). 
27  Ibid. 
28  Schedule 2 (2) to the Spam Act defines the term “consent” as: “express consent: which takes 
place when an individual or organization first provides the e-mail address and if they plan to 
send the recipient CEMs then consent must be obtained. Express consent comprises the filling 
in a form; ticking a box on a web site; consent obtained either over a phone, face to face or by 
swapping business cards, as long as the recipient is aware they may receive commercial 
messages. One cannot send an electronic message seeking consent for this in itself is 
considered a commercial message because it seeks to establish a business relationship. 
Inferred consent can occur “via an existing business or other relationship, where there is 
reasonable expectation of receiving commercial electronic message; if the address is not 
accompanied by a statement saying “no commercial messages are wanted” the subject of the 
message is directly related to the role or function of the recipient. This happens through 
conspicuous publications if: the electronic address published is accessible to the public, or a 
section thereof (for example, it appears on a web site or in a telephone directory or brochure); 
the address is not accompanied by a statement that commercial messages are not wanted; and 
the subject matter of one’s message is directly related to the principal role or function of the 
recipient (electronic account holder)”. See ACMA ‘Spam consent’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/spam-consent-
ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-acma (date of use: 15 January 2016); also see Schedule 2(4) for 
instances when consent may be inferred from publication of an electronic address; and ACMA 
‘Inferred consent and conspicuous publications’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/spam-
inferred-consent-and-conspicuous-publications (date of use: 20 January 2015). 
29  See s 16(2) of the Spam Act. 
30  The term “person” is defined as including a partnership in s 4 of the Spam Act. 
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reasonable diligence have ascertained, that the message had an Australian link;31 
and if the person sent the message or caused the message to be sent by mistake”.32 
A person must not send, or cause a CEM to be sent, to a non-existent electronic 
address if he or she does not have reason to believe that the electronic address 
exists.33  
 
(b) Accurate sender information  
 
Section 17 of the Spam Act prohibits a person to send, or cause to be sent, a CEM 
with an Australian link unless the message clearly and accurately identifies the 
individual or organisation that authorised its being sent.34 The message must also 
include accurate information about how the recipient can readily contact that 
individual or organisation.35 The information must also comply with the condition or 
conditions (if any), specified regulations, and that information should be reasonably 
likely to be valid for at least thirty days after the message is sent.36 
 
(c) Functional unsubscribe facility 
 
Section 18 of the Spam Act provides for a functional unsubscribe facility. This 
section provides that a person may not send, or cause to be sent, a CEM which:37 
 
(a) has an Australian link; 
(b) is not a designated commercial electronic message; 
(c) unless the message includes: a statement to the effect that the recipient may use an 
electronic address set out in the message to send an unsubscribe message to the individual 
or organization who authorized the sending of the first mentioned message; or a statement to 
similar effect;38 
(d) the statement is presented in a clear and conspicuous manner; 
                                                          
31  See s 16(3) of the Spam Act. 
32  Id s 16(4). 
33  Id s 16(6)(a). 
34  Id s 17(1). 
35  Id s 17(1)(a). 
36  Id s 17(1)(1)(c) and (d); ACMA ‘Sender identification’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/ 
Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/sender-identification-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-
acma (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
37  Id s 18(1). 
38  Id s 18(1)(c) (i) and (ii). 
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(e) the electronic address is reasonably likely to be capable of receiving: (i) the recipient’s  
unsubscribe message39 (if any); and (ii) a reasonable number similar as unsubscribe 
messages sent by other recipients (if any) of the same message at all times during a period of 
at least 30 days after the message is sent;40  
(f) the electronic address is legitimately obtained; and 
(g) the electronic address complies with the condition or conditions (if any) specific in the 
regulations. 
 
(d) Supply, acquisition, and use of harvesting software or lists  
 
Part 3 of the Spam Act prohibits the supply, acquisition, or use of address-harvesting 
software.41 It also prohibits the production of electronic address lists using address- 
harvesting software.42 
 
Prohibiting supply of harvesting software and harvested address lists  
 
Section 20 of the Spam Act provides that a person may not supply,43 or offer to 
supply,44 address-harvesting software,45 or the right to use address-harvesting 
software. This includes harvested address lists, and the right to use those lists for 
other customers.46 This applies if the supplier is an individual who is physically 
present in Australia, or is a body corporate or partnership that carries on business or 
                                                          
39  Id s 18(9) which defines the term “unsubscribe message” as “an electronic message to the 
effect that the relevant electronic account-holder does not want to receive any further CEMs 
from or authorised by that individual or organization; or electronic message to similar effect”. 
40  Id s 18(1)(e)(i) and (ii). In 2004 a regulation was implemented which provided that the use of 
electronic address must not require the recipient of the CEM: to use a premium service; must 
not cost more than the usual cost of using that kind of electronic address using the same kind 
of technology as was used to receive the CEM; and must not require the recipient of CEM to 
pay a fee or charge to the sender of the message; or a related person. See reg 3.1-3.4 of the 
Spam Regulations 2004 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (8 April 2004). 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cht/num_reg_es/sr20042004n56202.html (date of use: 15 
January 2016). 
41  Section 4 of the Spam Act defines the term “address harvesting software” as “software that is 
specifically designed or marketed for use for: searching the Internet for electronic addresses; 
and collecting, compiling, capturing or otherwise harvesting those electronic addresses”. 
42  See Part 3 comprising of ss 19-22 of the Spam Act. 
43  See s 4 of the Spam Act which defines the term supply as (used in relation to goods or 
services) has the same meaning as in Trade Practices Act of 1974 (Australia); or (b) when 
used in relation to land includes transfer; or (c) when used in relation to an interest in land 
includes transfer.”   
44  See s 20(1) of the Spam Act. 
45  Id s 4 defines the term “software” as “including a combination of software and associated data”. 
46  Id s 20(1)(f) defines the term “customer” as “an individual who is physically present in Australia 
at the time of the supply or offer; or a body corporate or partnership that carries on business or 
activities in Australia at the time of the supply or offer”.  
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activities in Australia at the time of the supply or offer.47 Section 20 does not apply 
under the following circumstances: if the supplier had no reason to suspect that 
customers or another person intended to use the address-harvesting software or the 
harvested address list in connection with sending CEMs  in contravention of section 
16;48 and if  the supplier did not know, and could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
ascertained that the customer was an individual who was physically present in 
Australia, or a body corporate or partnership that carried on business or activities in 
Australia at the time of the supply or offer.49  
 
Prohibiting the acquisition of address-harvesting software or address lists 
 
Section 21 of the Spam Act prohibits a person from acquiring address harvesting 
software, or a right to use address-harvesting software.50 This includes harvested 
address lists51 or a right to use a harvested address list, if the person is an individual 
who is physically present in Australia,52 or is a body corporate or partnership that 
carries on business or activities in Australia at the time of the acquisition.53 
 
Subsection (1) does not apply if the person did not intend to use the address- 
harvesting software or the harvested address list in connection with sending CEMs in 
contravention of section 16.54  
 
Prohibition on use of address-harvesting software and harvested address lists  
 
Section 22 of the Spam Act prohibits an individual from using address-harvesting 
software or a harvested address list, if he or she is physically present in Australia at 
                                                          
47  Id s 20(1)(e)(i) and (ii). Also see ACMA ‘Spam address; harvesting and cold-calling prohibition’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/spam-address-harvesting-and-cold-calling-prohibition (date 
of use: 15 January 2016).  
48  See s 20(2) of the Spam Act. 
49  Id s 20(3)(a-d). 
50  Id s 21(1). 
51  Id s 4 which defines the term “harvested address list” as “a list of electronic address; or a 
collection of electronic addresses; or a compilation of electronic addresses; where the 
production of the list, collection or compilation is to any extent, directly or indirectly attributable 
to the use of address harvesting software”. See also ACMA ‘Get smart about purchasing lists’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/engage-blogs/engage-blogs/Emarketing/Get-smart-about-
purchased-lists (date of use: 15 January 2016).  
52  See s 21(1)(a-e) of the Spam Act. 
53  Id s 21(1)(f). 
54  Id s 21(2). 
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the time of the use, or is a body corporate or partnership that carries on business or 
activities in Australia at the time of the use.55 This section does not apply in relation 
to the use of address-harvesting software or a harvested address list if the use is not 
in connection with sending CEMs in contravention of section 16.56  
 
Sections 16-21 also make provision for ancillary contraventions which include the 
following: prohibition of aiding, abetting, counseling, procuring, or inducing, whether 
by threats or promises; or to be in any way directly or indirectly knowingly involved in 
or party to, or to conspire with others to effect a contravention of subsection (1) of 
the sections listed above.57 The Spam Act also makes provision for those who sent 
CEMs by mistake to bear the evidentiary burden of proving such mistake.58 An 
individual does not contravene the sections listed above merely because he or she 
supplies a carriage service which enables an electronic message to be sent.59 
 
The sections listed above also allow for the following exceptions: the fact that the 
person sending the CEM did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have 
ascertained, that the message had an Australian link. 60 Sections 16-19 and 20-23 of 
the Spam Act have been tested in the following selected cases interpreting the Spam 
Act: 
 
(e) Selected cases  
 
Australian Communications Media Authority (ACMA) v Clarity1/Wayne Mansfield 
 
In 2006, Australian Communications Media Authority (ACMA) v Clarity1/Wayne 
Mansfield61 was the first case to be decided under the Spam Act. The company, 
                                                          
55  Id s 22(1). 
56  Id s 22(2). 
57  Id ss 16(9); 17(5); 18(6) and (7); 20(5); 21(3); and 22(3).  
58  Id ss 16(5) and (8); 17(3) and (4); 18(5); and 20(4). Other exceptions include: the extent (if any) 
to which it is inconsistent with the terms of a contract or other agreement between the individual 
or organisation who authorised the sending of the first-message and the relevant electronic 
account holder if the person sent the message or caused the message to be sent by mistake. 
59  Id ss 16(10), 17(6), and 18(7). 
60  Id s 16(7)(a) and (b).  
61  See Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity 1 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1399 1-18 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2006/1399.html (date of use: 15 January 
2016). Hereafter ‘Clarity 1 case’; also HighBeam Research ‘ACMA noose chokes off local 
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Clarity 1 Pty Ltd, and its director, Wayne Mansfield, were responsible for sending out 
in excess of 213 million UCEMs advertising their business. They operated under the 
trading names “Business Seminars Australia” and “Maverick Partnership”, and used 
both address-harvesting software and obtained harvested address lists from external 
parties.62 All these acts took place around the time the Spam Act became law in 
2004. The case was heard before the Perth Federal Court, and on 13 April 2006 the 
judge found that both Clarity 1 and Mansfield were in breach of section 16 of the 
Spam Act for sending UCEMs and for using harvested address lists.63  
 
A defence raised in the case was that the sender relied upon inferred consent64 
having obtained the e-mail addresses before the commencement of the Spam Act, 
and had given the e-mail recipients the opportunity to withdraw their consent.65 The 
defence was dismissed by the court which found that silence or non-response by 
recipients did not provide a basis for consent under the Spam Act.66 The judge 
awarded a financial penalty of $ 4,5 million against Clarity 1 Pty Ltd, and $ 1 million 
against its managing director, Mansfield.67 The successful prosecution of this case 
was credited to SpamMatters68 for the forensic data they provided.69  
 
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Atkinson  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
spam’ http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-138418361.html (date of use: 20 January 2016); and 
Spamhaus ‘Australian Spam Act nails first spammer’ 
http://www.spamhaus.org/news/article/161/australian-spam-act-nails-first-spammer (date of 
use: 15 January 2016). 
62  Id Clarity 1 case 2-3 and 9-11; and ACMA ‘Spam case studies’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/spam-case-studies (date of use: 20 January 2016).  
63  Id Clarity 1 case 3-5. For the rules on the sending of CEMs see s 16 of the Spam Act; and for 
rules on address harvesting see ss 20, 21 and 22 of the Spam Act. 
64  See ACMA ‘Inferred consent and conspicuous publications’; and ACMA ‘Spam consent’ supra 
n 28. 
65  See ACMA ‘Spam case studies’ supra n 62. 
66  Clarity 1 case 9-11. 
67  Ibid. 
68  SpamMatters is a reporting button which enables the user to report spam to the ACMA with a 
single click. See Internet Marketing Newswatch ‘ACMA launches SpamMatters’ 
https://imnewswatch.com/2006/05/30/acma-launches-spammatters (date of use: 15 January 
2016). 
69  Ibid; also Bender supra n 26 1-24. 
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In the case of Australian Communications and Media Authority v Atkinson70 a 26- 
year-old man was arrested for being behind a large-scale spam operation that sent 
e-mails to Internet users around the world.71 Atkinson was pursued by the ACMA 
under the Spam Act after it had received more than 100 000 complaints from 
recipients.72 Atkinson was fined $ 16 million by the US Federal Trade Commission 
after it was found that he and an American citizen, were at the center of the world’s 
largest Internet spam operation – dubbed “Affking” – which operated by recruiting 
spammers from around the world.73 Apparently the team sent billions of e-mails 
directing recipients to web sites advertising fake male enhancement drugs and 
weight-loss pills shipped from India, which they falsely claimed to have come from a 
licensed pharmacy in the USA.74 
 
The court ordered that the respondent be restrained for a period of seven years from 
the date of the order from sending or causing to be sent,  UCEMs from any person in 
Australia to anywhere, or from anywhere to persons in Australia.75 Although Atkinson 
cooperated with the investigators, the court ordered him to pay a pecuniary penalty 
in an amount of $ 210 000 within 60 days of the order in respect of contraventions of 
the Spam Act.76 
 
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd  
                                                          
70  Australian Communications and Media Authority v Atkinson [2009] FCA 1565 (22 December 
2009) 1-18 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2009/1565.html (date of use: 15 
January 2016). Hereafter ‘the Atkinson case’. 
71  See Sydney Morning Herald ‘World’s biggest spammer’ faces Brisbane court’ 
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/worlds-biggest-spammer-faces-brisbane-court-
20091216-kwe3.html (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
72  See Atkinson case supra n 70 4-7 for the facts of the case.  
73  Id 10-14; and Federal Trade Commission v Lance Thomas Atkins Case No 08CV5666 (2009) 
1-25 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/11/091130atkinsjudgement.pdf 
(date of use: 15 January 2016); and Federal Trade Commission ‘Court orders Australian-based 
leader of international spam-network to pay $ 15.15 million: U.S. co-defendant forfeits more 
than $ 800 000 and faces jail time’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2009/11/court-orders-australian-based-leader-international-spam-network (date of 
use: 15 January 2016). 
74  See the Atkinson case supra n 70 1-3.  
75  Id 3. See ACMA ‘Penalties awarded in e-mail spam case’ http://www.acma.gov.au/ 
theACMA/acma-media-release-18720009-22december-penalties-awarded-in-email-spam-case 
(date of use: 15 January 2016).  
76  The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the 
proceedings in the agreed amount of $ 15 000 within 60 days of the order. See the Atkinson 
case supra n 70 3 and 17; and ACMA ‘Optus penalty for alleged breaches of Spam Act’ (media 
release January 2009) http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/ acma-media-release-52009-14-
january-optus-pays-penalty-for-alleged-breaches-of-spam-act (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
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Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) v Mobilegate Ltd77 was the 
first SMS spam case brought before the Federal Court. The case dealt with eight 
respondents – including Mobilegate Ltd and Winning Bid Pty Ltd – which had 
contravened the provisions of the Spam Act by sending UCEMs to mobile numbers 
offering chats via SMS at a cost of $ 5 per chat.78 The ACMA alleged that the 
respondent was involved in a complicated scheme to obtain mobile phone numbers 
from members of dating web sites.79 A penalty of $ 15.75 million was imposed on the 
parties involved for contravening the Spam Act.80 The respondents were also to 
refrain from taking part in a variety of activities involving the use of dating web sites, 
the use of fictitious profiles, using photographs without permission, and contacting 
web site users.81 Sections 16-21 also give rise to civil penalties which are discussed 
below. 
 
7.2.3.3 Civil penalties 
 
Part 4 of the Spam Act deals with a number of issues related to civil penalties.82 
Section 24 deals with pecuniary penalties for contravention of the Act’s civil penalty 
provisions. It provides that a Federal Court83 may order an individual to pay a 
pecuniary penalty which the court deems appropriate in respect of each 
contravention.84 In determining the pecuniary penalty, the court must have regard to 
                                                          
77  Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd [2010] FCA 1197 (5 
November 2010) 1-35 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2010/1197.html (date of use: 
15 January 2016). Hereafter ‘Mobilegate case’. 
78  Id 11-22 for the facts of this case. Other cases dealing with SMS spam include those on e-mails 
originating in Australia encouraging recipients to join a pyramid scheme; and SMS spam 
originating overseas providing racing tips software advertising. See ACMA ‘Million dollar 
penalties issued in first SMS spam case’ (August 2009) 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theAcma/acma-media-release-1512009-23-october-million-dollar-
penalties-issued-in-first-sms-spam-case (date of use: 15 January 2016) and ACMA ‘Federal 
Court finds Brisbane man breached Spam Act’ (December 2010) 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/federal-court-finds-brisbane-man-breached-spam-act (date 
of use: 15 January 2016). 
79  See Mobilegate case supra n 77 11-22. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. Also ACMA ‘ACMA obtains interlocutory orders in SMS spam case’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-obtains-interlocutory-orders-in-sms-spam-case (date 
of use: January 2016).  
82  In terms of s 4 of the Spam Act civil penalty provisions cover the following: s 16(1), (6) and (9); 
s 17(1) and (5); s 18(1) and (6); s 20(1) and (5); s 21(1) and (3); s 22(1) and (3); and a 
provision in the regulations declared to be civil-penalty provision in accordance with s 45(2)(c).  
83  Section 4 of the Spam Act defines the ‘Federal court’ as the Federal court of Australia. 
84  Id s 24(1). 
 
 
207 
 
all relevant issues including:85 the nature and the extent of the contravention; the 
nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention;86 
the circumstances in which the contravention took place;87 and whether the person 
has previously been found to have engaged in any similar conduct.88 If the court 
considers it appropriate to do so, it may also take account of whether the person has 
previously been found to have engaged in any similar conduct by a court in a foreign 
country.89  
 
Section 25 provides for a maximum penalty payable by a person in respect of a 
contravention of the Spam Act which attracts a civil penalty depending on whether 
that person has a prior conviction90 in relation to the civil-penalty provision.91 The 
maximum penalty is payable by different people or institutions such as a body 
corporate with92 or without a prior record,93 or a person other than a body corporate 
with94 or without a prior record.95 
 
                                                          
85  Id s 24(2). 
86   Ibid. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid. 
90  “Prior record” means “an order under s 24(1) against a person in respect of a contravention of a 
particular civil penalty provision; and that the first occasion for the purposes of determining the 
penalty payable under s 24(1) by the person in respect of a contravention of the civil penalty 
provision that occurs after the first day, the person has a prior record in relation to the civil 
penalty provision”. Id s 25(2). 
91  Id s 25(1).  
92  Id s 25(5) which states the different kinds of penalty ranging from 500 penalty units to 5 000 
and 10 000 penalty units for having contravened the civil penalty provision two or more times in 
a day. See Victoria Legal Aid ‘Penalty units’ https://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au/find-legal-
answers/fines-and-infringements/penalty-units (date of use: 15 January 2016).  
93  Id 25(3) which provides that: “if there is no prior record then the civil penalty provision must not 
exceed 100 penalty units (if it relates to s 16(1), (6) or (9)); and in any other case 50 penalty 
units; in case the body corporate has committed two or more contraventions 2 000 penalty 
units, or in any other case 1 000 penalty units are payable”. 
94  Id s 25(6)(b). In this instance the Act provides that: “if there is a contravention of a civil penalty 
in terms of s 16(1), (6) of (9) the penalty must not exceed 100 penalty units, or in any other 
case 50 penalty units. And if the Federal court finds that the person committed two or more 
contraventions on a particular day, then the total of the penalties payable under subsection 
24(1) must not exceed 2 000 penalty units in the case of subsections 16(1), (6) or (9), or in any 
other case 1 000 penalty units”. 
95  Id s 25(4)(a) and (b). This section provides that: “if there is a contravention of a civil penalty in 
terms of s 16(1), (6) or (9) the penalty must not exceed 20 penalty units, or in any other case 10 
penalty units. And if the Federal court finds that the person committed two or more 
contraventions on a particular day, then the total of the penalties payable in terms of subsection 
24(1) must not exceed 400 penalty units in the case of subsections 16(1), (6) or (9), or 200 
penalty units in any other case”. 
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Section 26 provides that the ACA may institute proceedings in a Federal Court on 
behalf of the Commonwealth for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty referred to in 
section 24 above.96 The proceedings in subsection 1 may be commenced within six 
years after the contravention.97 The Federal Court may direct that two or more 
proceedings under subsection (1) be heard together.98 In terms of the Spam Act, 
criminal proceedings may not be brought for contravention of civil penalties.99 
 
7.2.3.4 Ancillary orders 
 
Section 28 provides for ancillary orders in the form of compensation and recovery of 
financial benefits. 
 
(a) Compensation 
 
If the Federal Court finds that a person has contravened one or more civil-penalty 
provision under section 26,100 and it is satisfied that another person has suffered loss 
or damage as a result of any or all of those contraventions, it may, on application by 
the ACA or the victim, issue an order it considers appropriate directing the 
perpetrator to compensate the victim.101  
 
In determining whether the person has suffered loss or damage as a result of one or 
more contravention by another person in relation to sending of one or more CEMs, 
and in assessing the amount of the compensation payable, the court may have 
regard to the extent to which any expenses incurred by the victim can be attributed 
to dealing with the message.102 The effect of dealing with the messages on the 
victim’s ability depends on the business’s ability to carry on business or other 
activities.103  
 
                                                          
96  Id s 26(1).  
97  Id s 26(2). 
98  Id s 26(3). 
99  Id s 27.  
100  Id s 28(1)(a). 
101  Id s 28(1)(b). 
102  Id s 28(2). 
103  Ibid. The Federal court may make an order in subsection (1) whether or not it makes an order 
under s 24. An application under subsection (1) may be made at any time within 6 years after 
the contravention concerned (id s 28(3) and (4)). 
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(b) Recovery of financial benefit 
 
Proceedings under section 26 may be instituted if the Federal Court finds that a 
person has contravened one or more civil-penalty provision and it is satisfied that the 
person has obtained (whether directly or indirectly) a financial benefit that is 
reasonably attributable to any or all of the contraventions.104 The court may, on 
application by the ACA, issue an order directing the offender to pay to the 
Commonwealth an amount up to the amount of the financial benefit.105 An 
application under subsection (1) may be made at any time within six years after the 
contravention occurred.106 
 
7.2.3.5 Injunctions 
 
The issue of injunctions is dealt with in Part 5 of the Spam Act.107 Injunctions come in 
the following forms: restraining injunctions; performance injunctions; and interim 
injunctions. A restraining injunction applies if a person has engaged in, or is 
engaging or proposing to engage in, any conduct in contravention of a civil-penalty 
provision.108 The Federal Court may, on application by the ACA, grant an injunction 
restraining the person from engaging in such conduct.109 If, in the court’s opinion, it is 
desirable to do so, the injunction may require the person to do something.110 There 
are also certain limits on the grant of restraining injunctions.111 The performance 
                                                          
104  Id s 29(1)(a). 
105  The Federal court may make an order under subsection (1) whether or not it makes an order 
under s 24. Id s 29(1)(b) and (2). 
106  Id s 29(3). 
107  Id ss 31-36.  
108  Id s 32(1).   
109  Id s 32(1)(a). 
110  Id s 32(1)(b).  
111  Id s 35(1) deals with these issues and gives the Federal Court the power to grant injunction 
restraining a person from engaging in conduct of a particular kind. and may be exercised: “if the 
court is satisfied that the person has engaged in conduct of that kind whether or not it appears 
to the court that the person intends to engage again or to continue to engage in conduct of that 
kind; or if it appears to the court that if an injunction is not granted it is likely that the person will 
engage in conduct of that kind, whether or not there is an imminent danger of substantial 
damage to any person if the person engages in conduct of that kind”. Section 35(2) gives the 
Federal court the power to grant an injunction requiring a person to do an act or thing: “if the 
court is satisfied that the person has refused or failed to do that act or thing, whether or not it 
appears to the court that the person intends to refuse or fail to perform again or to continue to 
refuse or fail to do that act or thing; or if it appears to the court that if an injunction is not 
granted it is likely that the person will refuse or fail to do that act or thing whether or not the 
person has previously refused or failed to do that act or thing and whether or not there is an 
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injunction applies in cases where a person has initially refused or failed to perform 
an act, and that refusal or failure would be a contravention of a civil-penalty 
provision. The Federal Court may on the application of the ACA, grant an injunction 
requiring that particular person to perform the act.112  
 
If an application is made to the Federal Court for an injunction under section 32, 
before considering the application the court may grant an interim injunction 
restraining the person from engaging in conduct of a kind referred to in section 32.113 
The Federal Court may not require an applicant to give any undertakings as to 
damages when applying for an interim injunction under section 32.114 It may also 
discharge or vary an injunction granted under Part 5.115 The powers conferred on the 
Federal Court under Part 5 are additional to, and not in place of, any other powers of 
the court – whether conferred by the Act or otherwise.116 The Spam Act also makes 
provision for miscellaneous provisions in Part 7.117 
 
7.2.3.6 Enforcement of the Spam Act 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
The Spam Act was enforced by the ACA until 2005 when the ACMA took over this 
function. The goal of the ACMA is to promote confidence in electronic messaging as 
a form of commercial communication.118 The compliance and enforcement approach 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
imminent danger of substantial damage to any person if the person refuses or fails to do that 
act or thing”. 
112  Id s 32(2)(a) and (b) of the Spam Act.  
113  Id s 33(1). 
114  Id s 33(2). 
115  Id s 34. 
116  Id s 36.  
117  Id s 43-47 where the following miscellaneous provisions are contained: “the Act is not intended 
to exclude or limit the operation of a law of a state or territory to the extent that the law is 
capable of operating concurrently with this Act; the Act does not apply to the extent (if any) that 
it would infringe any constitutional doctrine of implied freedom of political communication; the 
regulations may make provision for and in relation to giving effect to an international convention 
that deals with either or both of the CEMs, and address harvesting software; the Minister must 
conduct a review of the operation of this Act and others before the end of two years after 
commencement of the Act; and the Governor-General may make regulations prescribing 
matters required or permitted to be prescribed by the Spam Act; and necessary or convenient 
to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to the Act”. 
118  See ACMA ‘Introduction to the ACMA’ 
http://acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/Corporate/Authority/introduction-to-the-acma (date of use: 
23 March 2017). 
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to the Spam Act establishes how the ACMA operates to minimise spam being sent 
from Australia, as well as the impact of spam on Australian nationals.119 The ACMA 
relies on market intelligence, internal engagement, education, and industry 
partnerships to assist and support the compliance and enforcement approach.120  
 
The Spam Act provides enforcement options and the ACMA determines appropriate 
action on a case-by-case basis.121 Enforcement actions are offered by the ACMA at 
any time, and provide an opportunity for a business or individual to formalise its 
commitment to comply with the Spam Act.122 The ACMA will consider the following 
factors when determining the appropriate outcome to an investigation: the impact of 
the message on members of the public; the number of warnings the sender has 
received;123 and the regularity and severity of the volume of the messages.124 Other 
considerations are whether the sender has cooperated with the ACMA, and whether 
the messages involved deceptive practices.125 In most circumstances, the ACMA will 
take administrative action which is likely to conclude in an informal warning; 
enforceable undertakings;126 or an infringement notice.127  
 
(b) Enforceable undertakings 
 
                                                          
119  Ibid. 
120  Ibid. 
121  See ACMA ‘Spam and legislation enforcement’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/spam-
legislation-enforcement-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-acma (date of use: 23 March 2017). 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid. 
124  Ibid. 
125  Ibid. 
126  See ACMA ‘Enforceable undertakings: guidelines for the use of enforceable 
(Telecommunication Obligations)’ March 2006 1-8 http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Legal% 20 
Services/Advice/pdf/Enforceable%20undertakings%20Guidelines%20Guidelines%20for%20the
%20use%20of%20enforceable%20undertakings%20Telecommunications%20Obligations.pdf 
(date of use: 15 January 2016). 
127  For a discussion on infringement notices see ACMA ‘Regulation Guide: No 5 Infringement 
Notices’ (September 2011) 1-6 http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Legal%20Services/Advice/ 
pdf/Regulatory%20guide%20No%205%20Infringement%20notices.PDF (date of use: 15 
January 2016); and ACMA ‘Cellarmaster Wines penalised’ (media release May 2013) 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/cellarmaster-
wines-penalised-for-spam-act-breaches (date of use: 20 January 2016). This case involved 
marketing-e-mail messages being sent without an opt-out facility, while others were sent to 
customers who had previously chosen to opt-out of such promotions and thus contravened s 
16-18 of the Spam Act. The business paid $ 111 000 in infringement notices following an 
investigation by the ACMA. 
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The issue of enforceable undertakings is dealt with in Part 6 of the Spam Act which 
covers CEMs and address-harvesting software.128 The ACMA may accept a written 
undertaking given by a person for the purposes of contravening specific provisions in 
the Spam Act.129 The person may, with the consent of the ACMA, withdraw or vary 
the undertaking at any time.130 If the ACMA considers that an individual who has 
been granted an undertaking under section 38 has breached any of the terms of the 
undertaking, it may apply to the Federal Court for an order.131  
 
An enforceable undertaking is a flexible tool in that it can enable past misconduct to 
be rectified and shape future behavior, including introducing preventative measures 
where there is a risk of breach rather than an actual breach.132 The advantages of 
enforceable undertakings are noted as: saving time, costs, and court resources 
required for litigation;133 and also that the party who gives the undertaking takes 
responsibility for its own organisational and behavioural change.134 In order to allow 
for compromise, both parties can contribute to structuring the compliance action, and 
also allow flexibility and the opportunity for behavioural change.135 Enforceable 
undertakings also encourage learning and ensure that the regulated entity’s process 
of compliance is on-going.136  
 
The assessment of compensation for breach of undertaking is determined when the 
Federal Court finds that a person has breached a term of an undertaking relating to 
the sending of CEMs.137 The court will have regard to the following factors when 
determining whether the breach has caused another person to suffer loss and 
damages, and also when assessing the amount of compensation payable, including 
                                                          
128  See ss 37-40 of the Spam Act. 
129  Id s 38(1). 
130  Id s 38(2). 
131  Id s 39(1) and (2). These orders include: “an order directing the person to comply with the term 
of the undertaking; an order directing the person to pay to the Commonwealth any financial 
benefit that the person has obtained directly or indirectly and that is reasonably attributable to 
the breach; any order that the court considers appropriate directing the person to compensate 
any other person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the breach; and any other 
order that the court considers appropriate”. 
132  See ACMA ‘Enforceable undertakings: guidelines for the use of enforceable 
(Telecommunication Obligations)’ supra 126 1-8. 
133  Ibid. 
134  Ibid. 
135  Ibid. 
136  Ibid. 
137  Id s 40. 
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the extent to which any expenses incurred by the victim are attributable to dealing 
with the messages138  
 
Examples of enforceable undertakings by companies in compliance with the 
provisions of Spam Act  
 
Since the coming into operation of the Spam Act, a number of enforceable 
undertakings have been met by businesses that had contravened some provisions in 
the Act.139 The format of these undertakings is largely similar and makes provision 
for definitions; the name of the infringing company; the infringement of a particular 
provision in the Spam Act; and a background to the charges facing the company.140 
Upon investigation by the ACMA, the company may undertake to perform certain 
duties which include making payments of a specified amount for previous CEMs sent 
without consent, and for conduct which will ensure that no further CEMs are sent.141 
The company must also review its e-marketing activities to ensure compliance with 
the Spam Act,142 offer its employees training,143 and engage in quality assurance.144 
                                                          
138  Id s 40(2). Other factors include: “the effect of dealing with the messages on the victim’s ability 
to carry on business or other activities; any damage to the reputation of the victim’s business 
that is attributable to dealing with the messages; any loss of business opportunities suffered by 
the victim as a result of dealing with the messages; and any other matters that the court 
considers relevant”.  
139   These include enforceable undertakings on the following sections s 16-18 dealing with the 
sending of CEMs without consent, or without an identifying label and facilitation of the 
unsubscribe link; and s 20-22 on address harvesting provisions. See ACMA ‘The ACMA’s 
enforceable undertakings’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-ACMA-
story/Regulating/the-acmas-enforceable-undertakings (date of use: 20 January 2016) and 
ACMA ‘Enforcement action archives’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-enforcement-
action-archives (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
140  See JER Pty Ltd (CAN 107 555 475 19 October 2011) 1-4 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/urban_agent-eu_s38_spam_act.pdf 
(date of use: 20 January 2016).   
141  Payments usually differ depending on the undertaking.  
142  Companies either conduct these reviews themselves or employ independent consultants to 
review such activities. A report is produced identifying the deficiencies and recommending 
improvements to policies and procedures to ensure the Spam Act compliance. An independent 
consultant will also recommend the frequency and scope of audits (including when and how 
often CEM campaigns or percentages of campaigns should be audited). See Nokia Corporation 
(media release 3 January 2012) 3-4 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/assets/ 
main/lib310480/nokia-eu_s38_spam_act-3jan2012.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
143  Usually companies undertake to develop and submit to ACMA for approval within a specified 
period, a detailed written copy of its training program, which will provide minimum training on 
the requirements of all provisions of the Spam Act. The training is usually offered to the 
employees, licensees, contractors, and affiliates who are involved in any activity. Once the 
training is completed a written confirmation should be sent to ACMA. Training is also offered to 
new employees who are involved in any activity in connection with that business or is likely to 
be responsible for the sending of CEMs within a specified period. See EventsHQ Pty Ltd (ACN 
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Undertakings in terms of the Spam Act apply for a specified period.145 Companies 
also acknowledge their involvement in contravening some provisions in the Spam 
Act.146 
 
Club Retail Pty Ltd 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
118 063 666) 3-4 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/eventshq-
s38_spam_act-eu.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). Hereafter ‘EventsHQ case’. 
144  This includes the respective company undertaking to review and submit to ACMA for approval 
a detailed written copy of its relevant quality assurance processes to ensure that the sending of 
CEMs by that particular company is complaint with the sections infringed. This quality 
assurance includes a requirement that the company in question comply with a particular 
section, for example: that the company ensure that each relevant electronic account holder 
within a list of proposed recipients of CEMs has consented to the receipt of the CEM (in terms 
of s 16); and in terms of s 17, by reviewing  the proposed message to ensure that the content of 
the message does not contain accurate information about how the recipient of the message 
could readily identify and contact the organisation which authorised the message; and s 18 by 
reviewing the proposed message to ensure that the content of the message contains a 
functional unsubscribe facility. See Virgin Blue Pty Limited (ACN 090 670 965 26 February 
2010) 1-8 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/virgin_blue_s38_spam_act-
enforceable_undertaking.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) and Best Buy Australia Pty Ltd 
(ACN 122 464 799 media release 24 February 2010) 1-8 http://www.acma.gov.au/ 
~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Compliance/Enforceable%20understanding/pdf/E
U%20Best%20Buy%20Australia%20PL%20August%202010%20Spam%20Act%202003.PDF 
(date of use: 20 January 2016). 
145  The expiry dates of such undertakings differ from case to case. In some instances the 
undertaking remains in force indefinitely unless otherwise agreed to in writing between ACMA 
and the undertaking party or unless varied or terminated by order of the Federal court in 
Australia. See the following undertakings: Qidi Enterprises Pty Ltd (ABN 35097220114 media 
release 20 January 2006) 3 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/p_ 
liang_qidi_enterprises-ast_enforc_utaking.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016); Oxygen8 
Communications Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 111 902 982 media release 15 December 2008) 3 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/oxygen8_s38_spam_act.pdf (date of 
use: 20 January 2016); and AustraliaSMS Pty Ltd (ABN 30 100 396 138 and ACN 100 396 138 
media release 21 July 2005) 3 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/ 
main/lib310480/aust/sms-boulos-ast_enforc_utaking.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). Others 
have specified periods of  36 months: see Funmobile Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 114 489 600 
media release 19 January 2010) 5 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/ 
lib310480/funmobile_s38_spam_act_eu.pdf  (date of use: 20 January 2016); 12 months: see 
New Dialogue Pty Limited (ACN 111 086 938 media release 29 September 2009) 6 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/new_dialogue_s38_spam_act_eu.pdf 
(date of use: 20 January 2016). 
146  These acknowledgements are by companies that have undertaken to perform an act. Usually 
these companies acknowledge that ACMA may make an undertaking available for public 
inspection; issue a media release on the acceptance of the undertaking; and also that the 
undertaking does not derogate from any rights and remedies available to any other person 
arising from the conduct described in the undertaking. See the following undertakings: Tiger 
Airways Holdings Limited (ACN 124 369 008 media release 22 October 2012) 1-9 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/tiger_airways-%20eu_s38_spam_act-
22oct2012.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016); and Big Mobile Pty Ltd (ACN 119 902 966 
media release 29 September 2009) 1-6 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/ 
main/lib310480/big_mobile_s38_spam_act_eu.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
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In Club Retail Pty Ltd147 the ACMA commenced an investigation in January 2015 
against Club Retail (an incorporated entity offering daily online deals) for 
contravening section 16 of the Spam Act. Club Retail had sent 294 CEMs without the 
consent of the recipients between June and December 2014. In February 2015 the 
ACMA wrote to Club Retail outlining its preliminary views and providing it with an 
opportunity to comment. In response, Club Retail undertook to establish a double 
opt-in process for obtaining consent from account holders of electronic addresses 
before sending CEMs to those addresses.148 It also undertook to desist from sending 
CEMs to any account holders who had not consented to receive such messages 
using the double opt-in process, unless the relevant electronic account holder had 
purchased an item from Club Retail.149  
 
Club Retail further accepted that the ACMA could issue a media release on 
execution of this undertaking by referring to its terms, which included that ACMA 
could publish the undertaking or make it available for public inspection, and could 
also refer to the undertaking publicly from time to time.150 
 
EventsHQ Pty Ltd 
 
EventsHQ Pty Ltd151 is a company incorporated in New South Wales which carried 
on business in Australia as a provider of poker events to pubs and clubs under the 
NPL brand.152 In 2011 there was an investigation into the company for having 
contravened sections 16,153 17,154 and 18 of the Spam Act.155 The company paid $ 
                                                          
147  See Club Retail Pty Ltd (ACN 165 324 881 media release 2015) 1-3. Hereafter ‘Club Retail’.  
148  Id 2. This double opt-in process requires the electronic account holder to confirm consent to the 
receipt of CEMs using the electronic address to which CEMs will be sent. See ACMA ‘Double 
opt-in helps marketers’ double check’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-
Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/double-opt-in-helps-marketers-double-check-1 (date of use: 20 
January 2016); and ACMA ‘The ACMA accepts enforceable undertaking from Alex Shehata’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/the-acma-accepts-enforceable-undertaking-from-alex-
shehata (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
149  Id 2. Confirmation was also received from relevant electronic account holders that consented to 
the receipt of CEMs from Club Retail in response to an electronic message sent to them using 
electronic address to which CEMs had previously been sent seeking confirmation of their 
consent to continue receiving CEMs from Club Retail; and which includes no content that offers 
to supply advertise or promote Club Retail.  
150  Id 2-3. 
151  See EventsHQ case supra n 143 1-6. 
152  Id 2. 
153  They contravened this section by sending or causing to be sent 91 CEMs without consent of 
the recipient. 
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22 000 for the CEMs which were subject to the investigation.156 It also undertook to 
develop and submit to the ACMA for approval, a written copy of its training program 
which would (as a minimum) provide training on the requirements of all provisions of 
the Spam Act.157 
 
Nokia Corporation  
 
Nokia Corporation158 is a company incorporated in Finland with customers 
throughout the world, including Australia. Nokia sent CEMs to its Australian 
customers from outside of Australia. Upon investigation, the ACMA was concerned 
that Nokia had contravened sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Spam Act. Nokia 
acknowledged that this was in fact the case, and undertook to pay $ 55 000 in 
settlement of the issues relating to the CEMs which the ACMA had investigated.159  
 
Apart from enforcement undertakings, the Spam Act also makes use of formal 
warnings which are outlined below. 
 
(c) Formal warnings 
 
Section 41 of the Spam Act authorises the ACMA to issue formal warnings to a 
person or company that contravenes the provisions in the Act, including sections 
16(1)160 and 18.161 These warnings are issued to those companies that are in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
154  The company contravened this section by sending or causing to be sent 62 967 CEMs without 
clear and accurate identification of who authorised the sending of the message. 
155  This company contravened the section by sending or causing to be sent 110 330 CEMs without 
contact details of the authoriser of the CEMs.  
156  Id 3. 
157  Ibid. 
158  Nokia Corporation supra n 142 1-6. 
159  Id 3. 
160  These formal warning include but are not limited to the following: Vadkho Pty Ltd (ACN 138 809 
917 media release 22 April 2015) 1-2 http://www.acma.gov.au/Citizen/Take-
action/Complaints/Spam-complaints/spam-enforcement-actions (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
An investigation commenced in June 2014 by the ACMA against Vadkho (which traded as 
GoDeals) for contravening s 16(1) by sending 197 CEMs that had an Australian link. These 
messages were sent for the purpose of offering to supply GoDeals’ goods or services, which 
resulted in the messages being CEMs; also IGEA Life Sciences Pty Limited (ACN 125 930 878 
media release 30 June 2014) 1-2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Compliance/Formal%20
warning/PDF/20140630%20%20IGEA%20Life%20Sciences%20Pty%20Limited%20%20Forma
l%20warning%20pdf.PDF (date of use: 20 January 2016). This formal warning entailed an 
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contravention of the Spam Act as a result of having sent messages without consent, 
and also to those who have violated the Act by failing to provide information on how 
a recipient could opt-out of the unwanted CEM.  
 
7.2.4 Commentary on the Spam Act 
 
7.2.4.1 Background 
 
In what follows a commentary on the Spam Act and how it has been perceived by 
different stakeholders is highlighted. First the discussion is on the benefits of the Act, 
followed by the criticisms levelled at the Act and finally a conclusion. 
 
7.2.4.2 Benefits of the Spam Act 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
investigation into IGEA which had allegedly contravened s 16 of the Spam Act. The ACMA had 
received complaints from consumers who had received CEMs from IGEA Life Sciences. It was 
determined that IGEA Life Sciences had indeed sent or cause to be sent electronic messages 
between the period of 17 July 2013 and 11 October 2013; Wailea Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 155 
959229 media release 07 October 2013) 1-2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications% 
20Compliance/Formal%20warning/ACRIS%20Svces%20ss161%20Formal%20warning%20Sp
am%20Act%20pdf.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). Wailea Pty Ltd trading as ACRIS 
Services was found to have sent 17 electronic messages in contravention of s 16 of the Spam 
Act between 1 February 2013 and 27 May 2013; and DND Media Pty Ltd (ACN 151 096 285 
media release 05 September 2013) 1-2  http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20 
Communications%20Compliance/Formal%20warning/DND%20Media%20s41%20Spam%20Ac
t%20Formal%20Warning%20%20pdf.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). DND was found to 
have contravened s 16(1) of the Spam Act by sending or causing to be sent 30 electronic 
messages between 5 February 2013 and 2 May 2013. 
161  Examples of formal warnings issued include: McDonald’s Australia Limited (ACN 008 496 928 
media release 18 December 2012) 1-2 http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-
Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/mr-992012-acma-warns-mcdonalds-for-send-to-friends-
marketing (date of use: 20 January 2016). This formal warning involved an investigation by the 
ACMA that found e-mails to have been sent using the “send-to-friend” facility (which promoted 
games and activities) which were sent to friends of users without ensuring the friends’ consent. 
The messages also did not have an unsubscribe facility as required by Spam Act. McDonalds 
later removed the “send-to-friend” facility from the happy meal web site and has given 
assurance as to its future e-marketing activities; Penta Group Pty Ltd (ACN 122757519 media 
release 2014) 1-2 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/penta-group-pty-ltd (date of use: 20 
January 2016). Penta Group was said to have contravened s 18(1) of the Spam Act by sending 
or causing to be sent 7 CEMs which had an Australian link and were not designated CEMs 
without the consent of the relevant account holders; and Global Billing Solutions Pty Ltd (ACN 
135 029 748 media release 23 March 2012) 1-2 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets 
/main/lib410040/global_billing_solutions-formal_warning_spam_act.pdf (date of use: 20 
January 2016). This formal warning dealt with the contravention of s 18 of Spam Act by the 
company Global Billing Solutions. As a result of the investigation it was found that this company 
had sent four electronic messages with an Australian link between 1 July 2010 and 6 August 
2010 users without consent. See ACMA ‘Formal warning index’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/formal-warnings (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
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Three months after its inception, the Spam Act was hailed by the ACA as an 
effective deterrent to spammers.162 The ACA claimed that after the Act came into 
operation, complaints about spammers had supposedly stopped.163 Those in favour 
of the Spam Act noted that while the Act is not a “silver bullet”, it is however a key 
element in the government’s approach to spam.164 In 2006 it was reported that the 
Spam Act had proven to be effective against professional spammers and had driven 
most of them out of the country.165 The Spam Act was also hailed as having imposed 
limits – accepted by both the business community and consumers – on e-marketing 
by responsible Australian businesses.166 It was further noted that Australia has 
strong legislation to regulate spam by limiting unsolicited e-marketing, which has 
proved effective in reducing the amount of spam created within its borders.167 
 
7.2.4.3 Criticisms of the Spam Act 
 
Immediately after its enactment, it was reported that the Spam Act came under 
heavy criticism from opposition politicians who believed that “a wide range of the 
exemptions in the law favoured certain interest groups”.168 These exemptions relate 
to the fact that only commercial spam is outlawed, whereas political parties, religious 
organisations, and charities can still use spam to reach people.169 This, according to 
some, “makes it difficult to understand why, assuming that lawmakers considered the 
existing legislation relating to the control of marketing as inadequate, they still chose 
not to amend it to increase its efficacy”.170 It has also been acknowledged that the 
Spam Act is not a cure for all spam-related matters.171 The Act has furthermore been 
referred to as “clumsy and flawed” by the Australian Democrats.172 Holmes notes 
                                                          
162  FindLaw Australia ‘Government Spam Act closes down major spammers’ 
http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/4662/government-spam-act-closes-down-major-
spammers.aspx (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
163  Ibid. 
164  See South China Morning Post ‘Australian anti-spam law sparks fierce criticism’ 
http://www.scmp.com/article/437282/australian-anti-spam-law-sparks-fierce-criticism (date of 
use: 15 January 2016). 
165  See ACMA ‘Submission to Spam Act Review: ACMA’ supra n 1 28. 
166  Ibid. 
167  See Manwaring (2009) Computers and Law 8. 
168  Ibid. 
169  Ibid. This is consistent with most anti-spam laws including those of the USA above. 
170  Ibid. 
171  Ibid; also South China Morning Post ‘Australian anti-spam law sparks fierce criticism’ supra n 
164. 
172  Ibid. 
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that the Spam Act is voluminous and difficult to understand fully, which might be the 
reason why there are many accompanying documents that, in particular, explain how 
businesses can continue their use of the Internet for marketing.173 Holmes argues for 
an improvement to the current laws regulating spam as opposed to the introduction 
of a new legislation which is specific to the Internet.174 The fact that enforcement of 
the new anti-spam law depends on encouragement and compliance175 does not 
mean that it will put a stop to unsolicited e-mails getting through to home computers, 
even if the Act sends the message that that practice is unacceptable.176 Kent is of 
the view that it is unlikely that the Spam Act will have a meaningful impact on 
reducing the amount of spam transmitted through the Internet.177  
 
Further, by trying to regulate the senders of spam based on their geographic 
location, the Australian government is said to be “attempting to solve the digital 
problem by using an outmoded analogue concept of Australian sovereignty”.178 
Some are of the opinion that domestic legislation alone is insufficient to eliminate 
spam, or even to reduce it to an acceptable level, and further that enforcement 
efforts under international law do not resolve the problems arising from conflicting 
obligations in a cross-jurisdictional context.179  
 
Bender notes that “the problem with relying on domestic legislation alone (even 
coupled with soft measures such as education), and any unilateral, exclusively 
legislative approach taken by other national governments, is limiting in that the spam 
problem is global with the vast majority of spam originating from outside of 
Australia”.180 Another shortcoming in the Spam Act is noted as: its failure to provide 
grounds for civil action by individuals or corporations against spammers, so making 
the ACMA the only party with standing.181 The Act also fails to render ISPs 
                                                          
173  See Holmes (2005) 38 The Profession (2005) 87. 
174  Id 86. 
175  Ibid. 
176  See Walker F ‘Even the new anti-spam laws won’t stop those pesky emails’ 
http://www.spamstop.com.au/spam-stop-articles/2004/2/7/even-new-antispam-laws-wont-stop-
those-pesky-emails (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
177  See Kent (2004) 76/4 Australian Quarterly 4. 
178  Id 5. 
179  See Manwaring supra n 167 8. 
180  See Bender supra n 26 7. 
181  Id 10. This is also consistent with the USA’s position in Chapter 6 par 6.4.3.3 above. 
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accountable for reducing spam levels, seeing that most of the spam that reaches 
consumers comes via ISPs.182  
 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Australia, like the USA above, has taken the first step in implementing an anti-spam 
Act. The Spam Act embodies most, if not all, the requirements set for anti-spam 
legislation: its provisions are clear and relevant penalties are prescribed. As the 
discussion above shows, Australia’s Spam Act has been effective in combating 
spam especially within its borders. Between the years 2004 and 2005 the ACMA 
received more than 200 000 reports of spam on its hotline and web site.183 These 
were, in the main, recorded as coming from offshore sites, or were classified as “slip-
ups” which did not require further investigation.184  
 
In 2015 the spam statistics for Australia revealed that the reports and complaints 
received per month had increased from those in 2014 statistics– almost 30 000 
reports were received in that year.185 By January 2016 the statistics had increased to 
over 30 000, while some months stood at close to 40 000 or more.186 These statistics 
are an indication that the undertakings and formal warnings are effective in 
minimising spam in Australia. 
 
The variety of enforcement actions and the encouragement of voluntary compliance 
are a plausible attempt to combat spam in that they also cater for small and medium- 
sized businesses which might not have the income to pay heavy penalties. However, 
by complying with those undertakings companies can also learn how to market their 
businesses without contravening the provisions of the Spam Act. While Australia 
might have minimised its spam intake in the country, it is still confronted with spam at 
a global level, a task they have addressed in the MoUs outlined below. In the 
                                                          
182  Id 12. 
183   See HighBeam Research ‘ACMA noose chokes off local spam’ supra n 61. 
184  Ibid. 
185  See ACMA ‘Spam statistics: January 2015’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/ACMAi/ 
investigation-reports/Statistics/spam-statistics (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
186  See ACMA ‘Spam statistics: January 2016’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/ACMAi/ 
investigation-reports/Statistics/spam-statistics (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
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discussion below the remaining measures are highlighted to judge how effective 
Australia has been in combating spam.  
 
7.3 Other multi-faceted measures to combat spam 
 
Section 42 of the Spam Act provides the following in addition to ACMAs functions: to 
conduct and/or coordinate community education programs on UCEMs; to address 
software harvesting in consultation with relevant industry and consumer groups and 
government agencies; to conduct and/or commission research into these measures; 
and to liaise with regulatory and other relevant bodies on cooperative arrangements 
for the prohibition or regulation of spam matters. 
 
7.3.1 Consumer education and awareness 
 
In June 2009 the unsolicited communications survey undertaken on behalf of the 
ACMA found that 78 per cent of respondents had heard of the term “spam”, and that 
most respondents usually deleted spam without opening it.187 In 2010 the ACMA 
launched a new reporting tool, the “spam SMS” which provided Australians with a 
quick and easy way to report SMS spam by forwarding messages received to a 
specific number.188  
 
The ACMA also installed a number of programs to minimise cyber threats, most 
notably the “Spam Intelligence Database”.189 Consumers were urged to report spam 
via this web site (where e-mail addresses are provided for the queries). However, 
consumers were also cautioned, before reporting a complaint, to note that the Spam 
                                                          
187  See ACMA ‘Spam education and awareness’ http://acma.gov.au/Citizens/Complaints/Internet-
complaints/Spam-complaints/spam-educationandawareness (date of use: 15 January 2016). In 
2013 a follow-up survey found similar results with 87% of respondents deleting e-mail spam 
without opening it.  
188  See Tay L ‘ACMA launches spam SMS reporting tool’ http://www.itnews.com.au/News/ 
214731,acma-launces-spam-sms-reporting-tool.aspx (date of use: 20 January 2016). “These 
spam complaints are related to scam activities including messages about fake lottery wins or 
pleas to transfer large sums of money. The Regulator reported that already in 2008/2009 there 
had been a 71% increase in SMS spam complaints, and a 12% increase in the first eleven 
months of 2009/2010. Consumers were more sensitive to SMS spam, and that the character of 
SMS limit created problems in providing accurate sender information and unsubscribe 
instructions. Complaints were often complex, and malicious use of SMS messages indicated 
that over 60% of SMS complaints related to mobile premium services”. 
189  See ACMA ‘Report spam’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Citizen/Stay-protected/My-online-
world/Spamreporting-spam-i-acma (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
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Act does not cover certain instances provided on that site.190 Through these 
services, consumer education and awareness has been served. 
 
7.3.1.1 Recipients 
 
The ACMA has developed educational strategies aimed, in the first instance at spam 
prevention, but which include how citizens needed to deal with spam when they 
receive it. A simple strategy included encouraging the public to deal with spam 
scams by either “ignor[ing] it”, “report[ing] it”, or “delet[ing] it”.191 ACMA also 
encourages the use of filtering software and network-level filtering by ISPs, and lastly 
it promotes its reporting facilities that allow users to forward SMS or e-mails directly 
in the format they are received.192 Consumers (particularly young people who are 
increasingly exposed to targeted SMS marketing messages, are reluctant or 
indifferent when it comes to reporting such) are also encouraged to send messages 
as soon as they receive them so that the information can assist the ACMA in its 
investigations into breaches of the Spam Act.193  
 
7.3.1.2 Businesses 
 
Before the ACA and National Office for the Information Economy194 were 
established, businesses carried out extensive awareness campaigns, including 
seminars and media interviews throughout Australia.195 They also distributed official 
government guides for businesses, and provided information through the ACA web 
site.196 
 
                                                          
190  Ibid. These instances included the following: “refunds and scams (in which a relevant forum is 
provided for those particular queries); voice telemarketing (consumers in this instance are 
urged to visit the do-not-call registry for complaints); the content of spam (consumers are 
advised to report such to ACMA’s content “Clarification Section” if the content is deemed 
offensive); faxes (same as voice telemarketing); and mobile premium service (information is 
available from the ACMA web site)”. 
191  Ibid. 
192  See ACMA ‘Spam education and awareness’ supra n 187. The direct forwarding options have 
become the preferred method of advising the ACMA of spam messages received by a 
substantial margin which more than 99% of messages received are directly forwarded. 
193  Ibid. 
194  Hereafter ‘NOIE’. 
195  See ACMA ‘Submission to Spam Act Review’ supra n 1 23. 
196  Ibid. 
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On-going business education is undertaken principally through the ACMA web site, 
hotline, brochures, and the complaints system.197 In order to identify companies that 
might not be aware of the Spam Act, the formal complaints system is used.198 
Usually the complaints are issued to companies which do not follow the standard 
requirements of the Spam Act as outlined above.199 Depending on the severity of the 
problem, the first step is educational and informative contact with the company to 
ensure it is aware of its obligations and has appropriate processes in place to comply 
with them.200 
 
In 2010 the ACMA delivered some initiatives as part of its cyber-safety program.201 
The Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA) also raises awareness in the 
marketing arena and offers education and certificates.202 
 
7.3.1.3 Public awareness 
 
The main portal for public awareness on how to prevent and report spam is the 
ACMA web site: www.acma.gov.au.203 In 2006 the spam section of the web site 
received 400 000 hits. The public is also informed of enforcement, technical 
initiatives, and other developments, and business about the activities and the Spam 
Act, through regular media releases.204 In addition, the ACMA has made available 
the use of podcasts on spam and e-security for small businesses, and is developing 
a consumer-focused podcast for a younger audience who are not consumers of 
                                                          
197  Ibid. 
198  Ibid. 
199  Ibid. 
200  Ibid. 
201  The initiatives included: “a new cyber-smart parent resource (a research into the information 
needs of parents, including areas where most parents are concerned about  the delivery 
channels that works best for them); an interactive e-learning platform to give teachers and 
schools more flexibility in accessing ACMA’s very resourceful outreach program; pre-service 
teacher training program to be rolled out to universities across Australia; a new DVD for 
teenagers dealing with online privacy was introduced in 2011; also cyber-safety resources were 
made available in multiple languages to meet the information needs of non-English speaking 
Australians”. See ACMA ‘Joint Select Committee on Cyber-safety Submission No 80’ (July 
2010) 2 and 5 http://www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jscc-subs-sub_80%20(3).pdf 
(date of use: 20 January 2016). 
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traditional media.205 The ACMA noted that despite the fact that ISPs are offering 
filters to consumers, consumers do not avail themselves of this help. The ACMAs 
response has always been to inform all members of the public who complain about 
the volume of unsolicited e-mails they receive, of the existence of these podcasts 
and to encourage their use.206 
 
In addition to podcasts education is also conducted through a number of mediums 
including: giving interviews in all mediums, like TV, radio, print, and online.207 
Feedback indicates that this has been very successful in raising awareness of the 
Spam Act and other initiatives that the ACMA and the Australian government are 
undertaking to deal with spam.208 
 
7.3.2 Industry measures 
 
Industry has been noted as being in the frontline in combating spam, and is 
recognised as an essential element in government’s anti-spam strategy. Responsible 
e-marketing business found that marketing channels were being flooded by the 
activities of spammers, and in the worst case scenarios, these activities by malicious 
spammers were harming public trust and confidence in e-commerce.209 
 
The ACMA issued regulatory guidelines to assist industry and the community by 
offering practical guidance and explaining the principles underlying the ACMA’s 
approach to spam activities.210 The ACMA also adopted what is called a “graduated, 
strategic, risk-based approach” to combating spam which seeks to educate industry 
on its compliance obligations in an informal and constructive manner.211 It also 
encourages a compliance culture among businesses and individuals engaged in e-
                                                          
205  Ibid. 
206  Ibid. 
207  Id 24. 
208  Ibid. 
209  See ACMA ‘Submission to Spam Act Review’ supra n 1 19. 
210  See ACMA ‘Regulatory guides and guidelines’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-
ACMA-story/Regulating/regulatory-guides-guidelines-limitations-on-control-acma (date of use: 
20 January 2016). 
211  See Australian National Audit Office ‘Regulation of unsolicited communications’ 
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marketing and adherence to regulatory obligations212 and e-marketing practices that 
are respectful of community standards, responsive to community complaints, and 
aim for best practice. The ACMA noted that the following stakeholders incur costs in 
dealing with spam, both in managing their infrastructure and in protecting their 
customers: ISPs; E-mail Service Providers (ESPs); and mobile phone companies.213 
These stakeholders also find themselves overwhelmed by complaints about spam 
being routed via customer machines on their networks.214  
 
The development of industry codes of practice provide a vehicle for industry 
collaboration on the problem of spam and play an important role in supporting and 
ensuring the effectiveness of the Spam Act.215 This is because codes and rules 
contained within the codes are relevant to industry’s current practices and ways of 
doing business, and are most likely to be adhered to by industry which developed 
and endorsed them.216 The efficacy of industry codes can be achieved through 
active promotion by government and key industry players and associations which will 
ensure that the relevant sectors of the industry are aware of the codes, and are also 
encouraged to sign-up to them.217  
 
7.3.2.1 E-marketing code for spam: A code for ISPs  
 
(a) Background to the Spam Code 
 
The e-marketing code218 was registered on 16 March 2006 to provide an outline of 
how the Spam Act applies to current e-marketing practices, and also to promote best 
practice use of CEMs in compliance with the Spam Act.219 The Code was developed 
by the following stakeholders: the Internet Industry Association (IIA) in conjunction 
with the Internet Associations from Western and South Australia; consumer groups; 
message service providers; government regulatory agencies; and corporate 
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business.220 The Code applied automatically to all persons, including individuals and 
organisations, undertaking an e-marketing activity (eg, ISPs and global ESPs 
offering services in Australia).221 According to ACMA, the Code was developed to 
establish comprehensive industry rules and guidelines for the sending of CEMs with 
an Australian link in compliance with the Spam Act.222 The Code’s rules and 
guidelines provided specific and practical guidance in relation to the sending of 
CEMs in the context of the current e-marketing practices.223 It also provided a 
framework by which industry could handle complaints about spam and monitor 
industry compliance with its provisions.224  
 
Under the Code, e-marketing companies could subscribe to the Code and nominate 
a recognised industry body of which they were a member, to consider escalated 
complaints as to their compliance with the Code.225 A signatory to the Code indicated 
its willingness and commitment to comply with the Code rules.226 The Code’s 
administrative body was made up of representatives from e-marketing industry 
associations, message service providers, and corporate business and was 
responsible for the on-going code administration.227  
                                                          
220  See ACMA http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/Library/Industry-library/Marketers/spam-code-of-
practice; also ACMA ‘Australian eMarketing code of practice’ supra n 13 4-6. 
221  See Lohman T ‘ACMA to force anti-spam on ISPs’ 
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(b) Aims of the Code 
 
The Code aimed to reduce the volume of UCEMs received by consumers and 
provided an e-mail service that offered spam filtering options to subscribers.228 It also 
provided advice to subscribers on how to deal with and report spam, and also 
ensured that “acceptable use policies” prohibited the use of their networks for 
spamming and informed their subscribers accordingly.229 It provided for compliance 
with requests from law enforcement and regulatory agencies investigating spam 
activities.230 The Code allowed for an industry-based complaint-handling process 
with escalated complaints referred to nominated recognised bodies.231 The Code 
also set out “safety net” provisions whereby complaints could be referred to the 
ACMA.232 
 
In launching the Code Australia, as the first country to adopt a legislative code of 
practice for ESPs, was lauded as leading the way in the fight against spam.233 The 
Code required ISPs and ESPs to inform end users of ways to combat spam and to 
have a process for handling complaints from subscribers in place.234 
 
(c) De-registration of the code 
 
In September 2014 a proposition was made in favour of de-registration of the 
Code.235 A preliminary assessment suggested that due to technological 
developments and the evolution of the Internet industry (since the registration of the 
                                                          
228  Id 15-19.  
229    Ibid. 
230  Ibid. 
231  Ibid. 
232  Ibid. In the first instance “any complaint about a breach of the code will be handled by e-
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code), certain obligations in the Code could be considered to no longer constitute 
standard industry practice and to have become irrelevant or outdated.236 
Accordingly, the Code was deregistered in October 2014.237 
 
7.3.3 Technological initiatives and solutions 
 
In 2006 the ACMA mandated ISPs and ESPs to provide spam-filtering options to 
their subscribers, even though three-quarters of all ISPs had already volunteered to 
offer spam-filtering products.238 This included “SpamMatters” which assisted the 
ACMA to track down spammers by providing a simple one click method for the public 
to report malicious messages.239 As noted above, SpamMatters is a customer 
friendly spam-reporting button enabling users to report and delete spam e-mails 
simultaneously by a single click.240 Instead of using a delete key to remove the 
spam, users can select the SpamMatters button and simultaneously delete and 
report the spam e-mail to the ACMA.241 The ISPs technical initiatives to prevent 
spam by introducing software that can assist users to stop spam was also 
introduced. To that end the ACMA as its first mandate, used forensic technology to 
collect and examine suspect e-mails to obtain evidence that could be used in a court 
action against spammers.242  
 
In 2005 the Australian Internet Security Initiative243 was launched as an initiative to 
help reduce malicious software (malware) infections and service vulnerabilities 
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239  See SPAMFighter ‘ACMA Unleashes SpamMATTERS: the new anti-spam button’ http://www. 
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forwarding messages received to a specific number. See ACMA ‘Spam SMS boosts the 
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occurring on the Australian Internet Protocol (IP) address ranges.244 This started with 
six ISPs, and by the end of 2015 membership had risen to 146 which included 126 
ISPs and eighteen educational institutions.245 The ISPs participating in the AISI are 
estimated to cover more than 95 per cent of Australian residential Internet users.246 
These ISPs assist by raising security levels on Australian IP address ranges, which 
reduces costs for all ISPs and users.247  
 
Through the AISI, daily e-mail reports are provided to ISPs which identify IP 
addresses on their networks which are perceived as being malware infected or 
potentially vulnerable to malicious exploitation.248 The ISPs are encouraged to use 
the AISI data to identify and inform affected customers of their malware infection or 
service vulnerability.249  
 
While two per cent of the spam in Australia came from within its borders in 2006, the 
remainder was from outside, hence the need to collaborate with other jurisdictions.250 
This is important, because the coming into operation of the Spam Act had the effect 
that spammers moved their activities outside of Australia’s borders where 
connectivity is inexpensive but easy to exploit for spamming activities.251 
 
7.3.4 International cooperation 
 
As noted in the previous chapters (particularly Chapters 4 and 6) international 
cooperation is extremely important if one is to fight spam effectively, and the ACMA 
is at the forefront of international efforts to fight spam and improve e-security.252 
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spim’ http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/htcb/htcb011.pdf (date of use: 20 January 
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Australia has also been recognised by organisations and telecommunication 
authorities for its work in the international spam community.253 According to the 
ACMA, Australia has been consistent in world rankings by dropping spam from a list 
of relaying countries. In 2004 Australia was ranked tenth in the world, meaning that it 
was among the top ten countries in the world from which most of the spam e-mails 
were originating. In 2010 this “ranking” dropped to 25th on the list; and in 2013 it was 
ranked at 44th (meaning the least senders of spam per country) in the world.254 It is 
noted that this decrease is partly due to the fact that Australia is a signatory to a 
number of multilateral and bilateral agreements with other countries some of which 
are highlighted below.255  
 
7.3.4.1 Australia and Korea 
 
In 2003 the Internet and Security Agency of Korea, the ACMA, and the NOIE of 
Australia, entered into MoU addressing cooperation in regulating spam.256 The 
purpose of this MoU was to encourage cooperation between the signatories in 
minimising spam originating in and being sent to end-users in each country.257 
Cooperation between the signatories was in the form of exchanging information on 
spam and the establishment of appropriate channels for this exchange.258 It further 
included the exchange of delegations, visits, and the encouragement of liaison 
between industry and government organisations to promote areas of interest and 
cooperation.259 The MoU was to remain effective for five-year years unless 
terminated by the signatories giving six months’ notice.260  
 
                                                          
253  Ibid.  
254  Ibid. 
255  See ZDNet ‘Anti-spam assault spans Asia-Pacific’ http://www.zdnet.com/article/anti-spam-
assualt-spans-asia-pacific (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
256  See The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Korean Information Security Agency and 
the Australian Communications Authority and the National Office for the Information Economy 
of Australia Concerning Cooperation in the Regulation of Spam 1-3 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Attachments%20Memorandum%20of%20Underst
anding%20Between%20KISA%20ACA%20and%20and%20NOIE.pdf (date of use: 20 January 
2016). Hereafter ‘MoU Australia and Korea’. 
257  Id para 2. See also Relf supra n 2 118. 
258  MoU Australia and Korea supra n 256 para 2. 
259  Id 2. 
260  Id paras 12-14. 
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7.3.4.2 Seoul and Melbourne 
 
This MoU was entered into between Seoul and Melbourne in an effort to minimise 
spam261 originating in either country or region, passing through either country or 
region, and being sent to end-users in either country or region.262 The MoU 
recognised that bilateral and multilateral cooperation could complement areas of 
mutual interest in reducing the spam problem, and identified areas of common 
interest for cooperation. This included, but was not limited to, the encouragement of 
the exchange of information, which covered policies and strategies for establishing 
and enforcing anti-spam regulatory frameworks;263 technical and educational 
solutions to the spam problem;264 and strategies for the effective use of regulation 
policies in support of enforcement.265 The exchange of intelligence relating to other 
countries or regions gathered as a result of enforcement and industry collaboration, 
and also anti-spam measures and emerging issues were encouraged.266  
 
Other areas of concern in the MoU included: the exchange of delegations and visits 
as appropriate; encouragement of liaison between industry and government 
organisations to promote areas of interest and cooperation; and other forms of 
cooperation arranged bilaterally or multilaterally by signatories.267 The MoU was 
approved on 27 April 2005 and in the same year was expanded to include thirteen 
organisations from ten economies in the Asia-Pacific region in order to better 
achieve global solutions to a global problem.268 The duration of the MoU was initially 
                                                          
261  Seoul-Melbourne Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Countering 
Spam 1-7 http://www.sm-mou.org/smmou/about_mou.php (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
Hereafter ‘MoU Seoul-Melbourne’.  
262  Id para 2. 
263  Id 1-2. 
264  Ibid. 
265  Ibid. 
266  Ibid. 
267  Id 2. In the case of changes in the anti-spam legislation of a signatory and signing of other 
agreements, the signatories will use their best efforts to consult with the other signatories 
promptly, either directly, indirectly, or through the Secretary of Signatories, as to whether such 
modifications may have implications for the operation of the MoU, and whether the MoU should 
be amended. The same will apply where signatories are considering becoming a party to 
another agreement that may have implications for the operation of this MoU.  
268  Ibid. The goals of the revised MoU are the development of: (a) policies and strategies for 
establishing and enforcing anti-spam regulatory frameworks; (b) technical and educational 
solutions to the spam problem; (c) the effective use of policies in support of enforcement; and 
(d) industry collaboration.  
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three years from the date of signature, but its validity was extended to end in May 
2013.  
 
7.3.4.3 Australia and the Kingdom of Thailand 
 
Other partnership agreements include a joint statement issued in conjunction with 
the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology of the Kingdom of 
Thailand in 2004.269 Under this joint statement the relevant institutions in Australia 
and Thailand, agreed to cooperate in matters of mutual interest through the 
exchange of ideas, information, personnel, skills and experiences, and collaborative 
activities that will be of benefit to both sides.270  
 
Areas of participation include, among others,271 exchanging information about anti-
spam policies and strategies, security issues and other identified areas of interest of 
both countries.272 This joint statement entered into force on 5 July 2004, and is to 
remain in force subject to availability of funds and resources.273 
 
7.3.4.4 Australia, United Kingdom and United States 
 
In 2004 an MoU to regulate spam was entered into by the United Kingdom’s 
Information Commissioner, the United States’ Federal Trade Commission, 
Australia’s Competition and Consumer Commission, and the ACA.274 The purpose of 
                                                          
269  See Joint Statement between the Department of Communications Information Technology and 
the Arts (Australia) and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology of the 
Kingdom of Thailand Concerning Cooperation in the Fields of Communications and Information 
Technology 1-2 http://www.acma.gov.za.au (date of use: 20 January 2016). Hereafter ‘Australia 
and Thailand Joint statement’. 
270  Id 1.  
271  Other areas include: exchanging information to telecommunications policy and regulatory 
matters and on the application of information technology; exchanging knowledge about 
participation in the activities of specialised international organisations; cooperating on the 
implementation of the other stakeholders; and Telecommunications and Information Working 
Group Mutual Recognition Arrangement. See APEC ‘What is Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation?’ http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC.aspx (date of use: 20 January 
2016). 
272  Id 1-2. 
273  Id 2. 
274  See The Memorandum of Understanding on continual enforcement assistance in commercial 
email matters among the following agencies of the United States; the United Kingdom and 
Australia: The United States Federal Trade Commission; the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair 
Trading; the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner; Her Majesty’s secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom; the Australian Competition and Consumer 
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this MoU is “to share evidence by recognising the three countries common interests 
in facilitating effective enforcement to combat spam violations; and to avoid 
unnecessary duplication, and facilitating sequential, simultaneous or coordinated 
investigations of spam violations, or suspected spam violations; and to exchange 
and provide appropriate information”.275  
 
In furthering their common interests, the participants intend to use best efforts to 
exchange and provide appropriate information in relation to consumer and business 
education.276 It further includes investigations and research in relevant areas, 
including practices such as address harvesting, dictionary attacks, and compliance 
education programs.277 Other objectives include the provision or obtaining of 
evidence that could assist in determining whether a person has committed or is 
about to send spam in violation of the provision, or in facilitating the administration or 
enforcement of measures aimed at spam.278 Parties also need to inform one another 
of spam violations occurring in their territories,279 and to discuss evidence in their 
possession by using best efforts to cooperate in the detection and investigation of 
spam violations.280 This MoU is to be reviewed on an annual basis regarding 
cooperation, coordination, and enforcement assistance undertaken among the 
participants.281 
 
7.3.4.5 Australia and Taipei 
 
In 2007 the Australian Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei and the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office entered into an MoU.282 The MoU acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission; and the Australian Communications Authority 1-11 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-antitrust-and-consumer-
protection-cooperation-agreements/040630spammoutext.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
Hereafter ‘MoU Australia, UK and USA’. 
275  Ibid. 
276  Id para II B. 
277  Id. These include: self-regulatory and technical enforcement solutions; amendments to relevant 
legislation; and staffing and resource issues, including the possibility of staff exchanges and 
visits. 
278  Id para II C. 
279  Id para II D. 
280  Id para II E. 
281  Id para X.  
282  See Memorandum of Understanding between Australia Commerce and Industry Office, and the 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia Concerning Cooperation in the Cooperation in 
the Regulation of Spam (signed  October 2007) 1-4  http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/ 
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the protection of the information economy is a major factor for social, economic, and 
environmental development, and for the realisation of productivity and improvement 
of service delivery in all sectors of the economy.283 The MoU noted that since spam 
could impair the infrastructure and viability of the information economy, mutual 
cooperation could minimise the volume of spam flowing between economies and 
assist in combating the spam problem.284  
 
The purpose of this MoU was to encourage cooperation between the signatories in 
minimising spam originating in and being sent to end users in their respective 
economies.285 Signatories where also encouraged to cooperate more closely in the 
exchange of information relating to spam in accordance with the relevant laws and 
regulations in each economy and on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual 
benefit.286 The MoU also encouraged the exchange of information about policies and 
strategies for establishing and enforcing anti-spam regulatory frameworks.287 Parties 
further agreed to discuss the effective use of regulation policies,288 and to exchange 
intelligence relating to the other countries gathered as a result of enforcement 
investigations and industry collaboration.289  
 
In order to coordinate cooperative activities each signatory was mandated to appoint 
a representative responsible for determining the particular directions of cooperation 
and for ensuring the effectiveness of all cooperation and exchange activities.290 
Signatories also agreed to consult with one another through specified channels to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Unsolicited%20Communications%20Compliance/Information/pdf/Spam%20International%20Co
operation%20Memorandum%20of%20Understanding%20Between%20Australia%20and%20%
Taiwan.Pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016). Hereafter ‘MoU Australia and Taipei’. 
283  Id 1.  
284  Ibid.  
285  Ibid. 
286  Ibid. 
287  Id paras 3 and 4. The cooperation between the signatories in the field of regulating spam may 
take the following form: exchange of information on spam, and establishment of channels for 
exchange of information as appropriate; exchange of delegations and visits as appropriate; 
encouragement of liaison between industry and nominated organisations to promote areas of 
interest and cooperation; and other forms of cooperation arranged by the signatories. 
288  Ibid. 
289  Ibid. 
290  Ibid. 
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define activities and other related matters.291 This MoU was to remain effective for a 
five-year period unless terminated by the signatories on six months’ notice.292  
 
7.3.4.6 Australia and New Zealand 
 
In 2009 the ACMA joined forces with New Zealand’s Department of Internal Affairs   
to establish channels of communication that would allow both agencies to move 
quickly in response to the challenges and demands of the ever-changing spam 
environment.293 The purpose of this MoU was to facilitate cooperation, assistance, 
and the exchange of information, including confidential information relevant to the 
regulatory functions of each Agency.294 The MoU also made provision for 
information, documents, and assistance to be provided regarding unsolicited 
information.295 It also provided for requests for assistance on compliance and 
enforcement, procedures for requests for information or documents, and also for 
permission to use the information.296 This MoU was to remain effective for three 
years unless it was terminated by the signatories giving a six months’ notice.297 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the five-fold regulation strategy for combating spam in Australia was 
outlined. Apart for its comprehensive anti-spam legislation, Australia has also 
equipped its consumers and citizens by educating and promoting awareness of the 
problem. Even where the consumers appear complacent, the ACMA is at the 
forefront in ensuring that consumers are not only aware of the dangers facing them 
when it comes to spam, but has also made tools available to assist them in 
combating spam. This education and awareness is available to all, especially the 
young and the elderly through all mediums of communication.  
                                                          
291  Id para 5. 
292  Id para 10. 
293  See Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA) and the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) 1-10 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Compliance/Information/
pdf/Spam%20International%20Cooperation%20Memorandum%20Understanding%20Between
%20Australia%20and%20New%20Zealand.PDF (date of use: 20 January 2016). Hereafter 
‘MoU Australia and New Zealand’. 
294  Id para 3.2. 
295  Id paras 5-11. 
296  Ibid. 
297  Id para 17. 
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The marketing industry, too, is playing its part in combating spam with industry 
players holding each other accountable and educating marketers on how to comply 
with the provisions of the Spam Act. While spam is an on-going problem, Australia is 
a good example of a jurisdiction which is aware of the escalating problem and is 
actively involved in implementing measures to combat spam and ensure adequate 
protection. Australia is also active in the global arena playing its part by forming 
partnerships with other countries and or organisations in an effort to combating 
spam. The implementation of a multi-faceted solution has also proved to be effective 
in minimising spam within Australia’s boundaries and also limiting the spam leaving 
its boundaries.  
 
This is a far cry from the South African regime for combating spam as is shown in 
the following chapter where the South African position is considered.
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CHAPTER 8 
 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-SPAM LAWS: A SOUTH 
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE1 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the last two chapters a discussion on anti-spam laws, in particular those of the 
USA and Australia was highlighted. This chapter continues in the same vein, but now 
focus is on South Africa. South Africa does not have a single, fully-fledged anti-spam 
Act. Rather, spam is regulated in a number of legislation addressing various issues.2 
These include the first anti-spam provisions in the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act,3 followed by a number of consumer-oriented laws which will be 
addressed below.4 Three Bills have also been published which contain spam-related 
matters: a proposed Amendment5 to the ECT Act; and two Bills on Cybercrime and 
Cybersecurity.6  
 
In this chapter focus is on these legislative provisions through an examination of: 
their background; the purpose of the specific piece of legislation; a consideration of 
their anti-spam and direct-marketing provisions; commentary on those provisions, 
including the benefits of a particular anti-spam provision (if any); criticisms levelled at 
particular provisions (if any); and, where applicable, solutions will be highlighted. An 
examination of case law is also made to establish how the court(s) have interpreted 
the relevant provisions. Further published Bills will be highlighted. In conclusion, a 
                                                          
1  Some sections of this chapter formed part of the conference proceedings: Tladi ‘SPAM: An 
Overview’ 266-78. The chapter is also a continuation of the following works: Pistorius & Tladi 
(2014) SA Merc LJ 688-705; and Tladi 2008 SALJ 178-92. 
2  These anti-spam provisions are contained in legislation covering electronic transactions and 
communications, consumer protection, the protection of personal information, or data 
protection, to name but a few.  
3  The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (hereafter the ‘ECT Act’). 
4  These laws include: National Consumer Credit Act 34 of 2005; the Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008; and the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
5  See the Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill Government Gazette 
GG No. 35821 Notice 888 (26 October 2012) http://www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Electronic-Communications-and-Transactions-Amendment-Bill-2012-
for-public-comments-20121026-GGN-35821-00888.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
6  See the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity: Bill (Draft for Public Comment) Government Gazette 
GG No. 39161 Notice 878 (30 November 2015) 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2015/20150902-gg39161_gen878-cyberbill.pdf 
(date of use: 20 January 2016); and Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill Government Gazette 
GG No. 40487 (9 December 2016) http://ellipsis.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/b-6-2017-
cybercrimes.pdf (date of use: 4 March 2017). 
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contextualisation of the various anti-spam provisions to establish whether 
harmonisation and alignment of these laws is necessary in formulating a model law 
for South Africa will be highlighted. The ECT Act will start the discussion, followed by 
other anti-spam and direct-marketing provisions.  
 
8.2 The ECT Act 25 of 2002 
 
8.2.1 Background to the ECT Act 
 
The ECT Act resulted from the Green paper on electronic commerce (e-commerce) 
prepared by the Department of Communications in 2000.7 In its executive summary, 
the Green Paper contained four categories outlining key issues or areas of concern 
that needed serious consideration in e-commerce policy formulation.8 One of those 
categories was the need for confidence in the security and privacy of transactions 
performed electronically.9 In addressing the issue of consumer confidence, the 
Green Paper highlighted the dangers from which consumers needed to be protected, 
including unsolicited goods and communications (spam) and dangers related to the 
invasion of privacy,10 to name but a few.11 These dangers reveal the need to protect 
consumers at every stage in their online transaction or communication. The Green 
paper led to the promulgation of the ECT Act in 2002.12  
 
                                                          
7  The Department of Communications ‘The Green Paper on e-commerce: Making it your 
business’ (2000) hereafter ‘the Green Paper’. The Green Paper was a consultative document 
designed to raise questions on issues that needed to be addressed by government policy 
formulation. It provided a platform from which topical issues around e-commerce could be 
translated into government policy. The Green Paper built on the discussion paper published in 
October 2000; followed by the White Paper in the second quarter of 2001; and specific 
legislation in the third and fourth quarters of 2001 (see the Green Paper 10-11) and 
Groenewald ‘Towards an electronic commerce policy for South Africa’ 106-112 for a discussion 
on electronic commerce policy for South Africa. 
8  See the Green Paper 9.  
9  Id 6. Other categories included the need to: enhance the information infrastructure for 
electronic commerce; establish rules that will govern electronic commerce; and bring the 
opportunities of e-commerce to the entire population. According to the Green Paper, “these 
categories give a general background to specific issues; discuss challenges and problems; and 
also paint an international as well as a national picture while posing policy questions relating to 
the issue”.  
10  These two dangers later formed the provisions in the ECT Act contained in ss 45, 50 and 51 
respectively.  These provisions are outlined below.   
11  See the Green Paper supra n 7 47. Other dangers include: dangers resulting from the ease and 
convenience of buying online; insufficient information about goods and services; the risk of 
being deprived of protection through unfamiliar, inadequate or conflicting laws of a foreign 
country being applicable to the contract; the easy access to a web site; and cyberfraud. 
12  The ECT Act was signed into law on 31 July 2002. 
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8.2.2 The purpose of the ECT Act  
 
The ECT Act applies to any electronic transaction or data message in the Republic.13 
The objectives of the ECT Act are listed in section 2(1) as among others:14  
 
 to enable and facilitate electronic communications and transactions in the public interest, and, 
to that end to, among others: remove and prevent barriers to electronic communications and 
transaction in the Republic; …promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic 
communications and transactions; …ensure that electronic transactions in the Republic 
conform to the highest international standards; …develop a safe, secure, and effective 
environment for the consumer, business, and the government to conduct and use electronic 
transactions; …and promote the development of electronic transaction services which are 
responsive to the needs of users and consumers.  
 
The ECT Act contains fourteen chapters covering a variety of issues. Of importance 
to this study is Chapter 7 dealing with consumer protection issues.15 
 
8.2.3 Consumer protection principles under the ECT Act 
 
Chapter 7 applies only to electronic transactions.16 Although there are a number of 
provisions in this chapter,17 focus is mainly on the issue of unsolicited 
communications (spam) in section 45. Sections 50 and 51 which deal with data 
protection principles will also be considered. The consumer protection provisions 
                                                          
13  See s 4(1) of the ECT Act.  
14  Ibid s 2(1)(d); (e); (h); (j); and (k). For a discussion of the facilitation of electronic transactions 
see: Coetzee (2004) 3 Stell LR 501-21; Meiring R ‘Electronic transactions’ 82-108; and Gereda 
‘The Electronic Communications and Transaction Act’ 268-74. 
15  Most of the provisions in Chapter 7 fall outside of this study. However, the following works in 
which consumer protection under the ECT Act has been canvassed extensively by other 
commentators can be consulted: De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 136-40; Papadopoulos 
‘Online consumer protection’ 64-79; Papadopoulos (2012) 75 THRHR 224-6; Neels (2010) 31/ 
1 Obiter 123-5; Eiselen ‘E-commerce’ 198-210; Snail (2007) 15/2 JBL 54-60; Jacobs (2004) 
16/4 SA Merc LJ 556-67; Buys ‘Online consumer protection and spam’ 139-60; and id Gereda 
276-8. 
16  See s 42(1) of the ECT Act. This chapter does not apply to a regulatory authority established in 
terms of a law if that law prescribes consumer protection provisions in respect of electronic 
transactions (s 42(3) of the ECT Act). The exceptions to the application includes s 44 (covering 
the cooling off clause) which does not apply to electronic transactions for financial services, or 
the supply of foodstuffs, beverages or any other goods intended for everyday consumption (s 
42(2) (a)-(j) of the ECT Act). 
17  The provisions in Chapter 7 include: the scope of application (s 42); information to be provided 
(s 43); performance (s 46); applicability of foreign law (s 47); s 48 (non-exclusions); and s 49 
(complaints to Commission). 
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under the ECT Act raise duties on the side of the vendor and third parties.18 They 
also create certain rights for the consumer.19  
 
8.2.4 Data protection principles under the ECT Act  
 
Chapter 8 deals with the protection of personal information20 obtained by electronic 
means.21 This chapter outlines eight specific principles to which a data controller22 
may subscribe. These principles cover the collection, collation, processing or 
disclosure of personal information on the data subject by the data controller.23 
However, subscription to these principles is voluntary.24  
 
Roos notes that:25  
The major deficiency in these provisions is that they do not impose legally binding obligations 
on data controllers. This means that should the data controller choose not to subscribe to the 
data privacy principles, the data subject will have no redress other than delictual remedies. 
Furthermore, there is no external supervisory body or criminal sanctions to enforce the 
principles and also no mechanism allowing the individual to enforce their rights rapidly and 
effectively.  
 
                                                          
18  See s 43(1) of the ECT Act. The vendor should provide the following information to consumers: 
Its full name; its physical address and telephone number; its web site address and e-mail 
address; and the terms of agreement, including any guarantees, that will apply to the 
transaction and how those terms may be accessed, stored, and reproduced electronically by 
consumers. 
19  These include: a consumer being entitled to cancel the transaction (without reason and without 
penalty) within seven days after the receipt of goods or services after the conclusion of the 
agreement (id s 43(3)); the right to be given an option to cancel his or her subscription to the 
mailing list of the third party, and also to be provided with the source from which that supplier 
received or obtained the consumer’s personal information (id s 45(1)). 
20  Section 1 of the ECT Act defines the term “personal information” as “information about an 
identifiable individual, including but not limited to:  information relating to race, gender, sex, 
language et cetera;  information relating to the education or the medical, criminal, employment 
history of the individual; any identifiable number, symbol, or other particular assigned to the 
individual;  the address, fingerprints; and  the name of the individual where it appears with other 
personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would 
reveal information about that person”.  
21   Id s 50(1).  
22  Section 1 of the ECT Act defines the term “data controller” as “any person who electronically 
requests, collects, collates, processes or stores personal information from or in respect of a 
data subject”. 
23  Id s 51. These include the written permission of the data subject for collection or processing of 
their personal information (s 51(1)) and disclosure by the data controller in writing to the data 
subject of the specific purpose for which that information is being requested (s 51(3)). See 
Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 426-427; Roos ‘Data Protection’ 361-4; also Papadopoulos & Snail 
‘Privacy and data protection’ 299; and Goodburn & Ngoye ‘Privacy and the Internet’ 174-5 a 
discussion of these principles. 
24  See s 50(2) and 50(3) of the ECT Act.  
25  Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 427-428. 
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Note should be taken here that sections 50 and 51 will be revoked once the 
Protection of Personal Information Act provisions come into effect. Below the anti-
spam provisions in section 45 of the ECT Act are discussed. 
 
8.2.5 Commentary on section 45 of the ECT Act 
 
8.2.5.1 Anti-spam provisions under the ECT Act 
 
As stated above, the first anti-spam provisions26 in South Africa are contained in 
section 45 of the ECT Act. The title of this section is “unsolicited goods, services or 
communications”. Section 45 reads as follows: 
 
(1) Any person27 who sends unsolicited commercial communications to consumers must provide 
the consumer:  
(a) With the option to cancel his or her subscription to the mailing list of that person; and  
(b) With the identifying particulars of the source from which that person obtained the 
consumer’s personal information, on request of the consumer.  
(2) No agreement is concluded where a consumer has failed to respond to an unsolicited 
communication. 
(3) Any person who fails to comply with or contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and 
liable, on conviction, to penalties prescribed in section 89(1).  
(4) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to a person who has advised 
the sender that such communications are unwelcome, is guilty of an offence and liable, on 
conviction, to the penalties prescribed in section 89(1). 
 
8.2.5.2 Benefits of the anti-spam provisions under the ECT Act  
 
The benefit of the anti-spam provisions in the ECT Act is that they fulfil the Act’s 
purpose of facilitating electronic communications and transactions in the public 
interest. The section has to an extent been aligned to international best practices by 
joining a host of countries with anti-spam laws or anti-spam provisions.28 Section 45 
                                                          
26  For a discussion of spam in South Africa see the following works: Eiselen ‘E-commerce’ 207-
210; Swales (2016) 28/1 SA Merc LJ 49-84; Maheeph Electronic Spamming 1-66; Hamann & 
Papadopoulos (2014) 47/1 De Jure 42-62; Pistorius & Tladi (2014) 26/3 SA Merc LJ 688-705; 
Tladi ‘SPAM: An overview’ 266-78; Papadopoulos supra n 15 223-40; Tladi (2008) 25/1 SALJ 
178-92; Sibanda (2008) 1 Journal of Information Law & Technology 1-9; Ebersӧhn (2004) 12/3 
JBL 137-42; Geissler Bulk Unsolicited Electronic Messages 1-403; Buys supra n 15 160-6; 
Gereda (2003) De Rebus 51-2; Ebersӧhn (2003) De Rebus 25-6; Haase J.W; Grimm & 
Versfeld International Commercial Law 123-70; and Chigona et al ‘Perceptions on SPAM in a 
South African context’ Internet and Information Technology in Modern Organisations: 
Challenges and Answers 283-291 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ 
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.515.745&rep=rep1&type=pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016).  
27  Section 1 of the ECT Act defines the term person as including a public body. 
28  Id s 2(1)(h) and Chapter 4 above, in particular para 4.3.4.2 (a) which addresses the 
requirements for crafting a strong anti-spam law. 
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also addresses the barriers inherent in an online environment and promotes 
consumer confidence in electronic communications.29 It also contributes to a safe, 
secure, and effective environment for both consumers and businesses.30 However, 
these benefits are not without problems and over the years commentators have 
levelled criticisms of section 45.31 
 
8.2.5.3 Criticisms levelled at section 45 of the ECT Act 
 
(a) Spam regulated and not prohibited 
 
Section 45 of the ECT Act has been referred to as a “low-key” approach to regulating 
spam32 in that its provisions do not prohibit spam but merely regulate it by giving 
consumers33 certain rights which they can enforce against the sender.34 These rights 
include the provision of an option to cancel the recipients’ subscription from the 
sender’s mailing list.35 This provision has been criticised as confirming the existence 
of a particular e-mail address which results in the consumer receiving yet more 
spam.36 Problems arising from the opt-out mechanism as noted above, include the 
fact that most if not all spammers disguise their header information when sending 
spam e-mail – for example, by concealing their particulars or using a third party’s 
domain name. This, in turn, makes it difficult for consumers to unsubscribe from the 
spammer’s mailing list as he or she is difficult to trace. Section 45, unlike its USA 
and Australian counterparts, provides only that there be an opt-out mechanism. 
There is no prescribed procedure on how opt-out request(s) will be administered by 
the sender or the time frames within which the request must be processed.37  
 
(b) Lack of a definition(s) 
                                                          
29  As highlighted in the Green Paper supra n 7 75-81. 
30  See n 14 above on the purpose of the ECT Act. 
31  See generally Tladi supra n 26 186-8 for the criticism levelled against s 45. 
32  See Eiselen supra n 26 207. 
33  Section 1 of the ECT Act defines the term “consumer” as “a natural person who intends 
entering into an electronic transaction with a supplier as the end user of the goods or services 
offered by the supplier”.   
34  See Buys supra n 15 165 and Sibanda supra n 26 4. 
35  See s 45(1) of the ECT Act. 
36  See Gereda supra n 26 52. 
37  See Tladi supra n 26 186-7. Also contrast with: paras 5.3.4.2 (d) (Chapter 5); para 6.3.2.2 
(Chapter 6); and 7.2.3.2(c) (Chapter 7). 
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Spam, as indicated earlier, is generally defined as unsolicited bulk mail or unsolicited 
commercial mail.38 From the title of section 45 it is clear that spam is described from 
a commercial view hence the terms: “unsolicited commercial communications”, and 
“unsolicited goods and services”. These terms align with those found in the USA and 
Australia above.39 Although these terms are used to describe spam, the ECT Act 
nonetheless fails to define what exactly the terms mean – a lack which some have 
found problematic in that it excludes other, equally irksome, forms of spam.40 This 
concern was highlighted in earlier chapters. 
 
(c) Harvesting e-mails and the sale of lists 
 
The ECT Act does not specifically cover the issue of the harvesting and sale of lists, 
neither does it address the use of software to gather e-mail addresses for sending 
spam e-mails.41 However, others are of the view this may be covered by sections 50 
and 51 of the ECT Act.42 As noted, the problem with the data collection principles 
under the ECT Act, is that they are not only voluntary, but as some have noted, such 
data can be collected by other means – for example, the use of cookies, web 
crawlers, et cetera – not covered by the ECT Act.43 As emerged from the discussion 
of the USA and Australia above, the practice of harvesting and selling lists and 
related practices are prohibited activities punishable by law.44 If these issues were to 
be investigated, the burden would be shifted from the consumer to the spammer, 
and the spammer would be held accountable for these deceptive practices. The 
                                                          
38  See in particular Chapter 6 above. Also see the following: Geissler supra n 26 28-32 where the 
author discusses the difference between UBE and UCE; Gereda supra n 26 51; Tladi supra n 
26 179-80; and Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 47-9. 
39  For a discussion of these terms see: Chapter 6 para 6.3.2.1 (USA); and Chapter 7 para 7.2.3.1 
(Australia) above. See also: the AU Convention (5.3.2.2(c) (ii); the COMESA Model Law on e-
commerce (5.3.3.3); and the SADC Model Law on e-commerce (5.3.4.2). 
40  See Buys supra 15 160-1, where it is noted that: “non-commercial e-mail such as newsletters, 
opinion surveys, religious messages, political content, hoaxes, et cetera, do not fall under that 
term, and also that the ECT Act does not provide clarity on whether a communication must be 
in electronic format in order to be classified as spam”. Despite the lack of definition, the 
following elements can be deduced from these terms: unsolicited; commercial; and even bulk. 
For a discussion of these elements see the following: Ibid; Gereda supra n 26 51; Geissler 
supra n 26 24-8; Tladi (2008) supra n 26 180; Sibanda supra n 26 4; and Papadopoulos supra 
n 15 233-4. 
41  See Tladi supra n 26 188. See in particular Chapter 3 para 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 above where this 
issue is dealt with. 
42  See Smith (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 599-601.  
43  Id 600; and Ebersӧhn (2004) supra n 26 741 ff. 
44  Contrast with the following: para 4.3.4.2 (Chapter 4); para. 6.3.2.3(c) (Chapter 6); and para 
7.2.3.2 (d) (Chapter 7) where this issue is addressed. 
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practice of harvesting is responsible for the increase in spam in other mediums, 
especially on mobile phones.45  
 
(d) Fraudulent headers and spoofing 
 
If an opt-out mechanism is to be effective, senders of spam e-mails must make their 
particulars available to recipients of such e-mails. The practice of disguising headers, 
or spoofing,46 is problematic in the sense that if an opt-out process lacks the 
mechanism to opt-out efficiently, recipients will not be able to unsubscribe from 
future unwanted mail. Consequently, the sender would not be in a position to receive 
and process opt-out requests and thus refrain from sending more spam.  
 
Unlike the position in the USA and Australia where such practices are prohibited,47 
the ECT Act does not address the use of fraudulent headers or the use of third-party 
domains in order to send spam.48 Some, however, argue that this issue could be 
covered under sections 86 and 87 of the ECT Act.49  
 
(e) Enforcement issues 
 
Enforcement in this case will take place within borders. Buys is of the opinion that 
“practical issues such as the gathering of evidence, and the fact that most spam 
messages have no indication of the sender’s location, together with jurisdictional 
barriers result in major law enforcement problems”.50 While the ECT Act also fails to 
address the issue of trans-border spam and how the Act will apply should spam 
                                                          
45  For a discussion of e-commerce and mobile commerce in South Africa, SMS marketing, and 
direct marketing and spam, see: Jobodwana (2009) 4 Journal of Information Law & Technology 
287-98; Jansen van Ryssen (2004) 4 Acta Commercii 48-59; Papadopoulos supra n 15 63-4; 
Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 44-5; and Chigona W et al supra n 26 283-291.  
46  For the discussion on spoofing see Ebersӧhn (2003) supra n 26 25-6; Tladi supra n 26 182; 
and para 3.2.6 (Chapter 3); and para 4.3.4.2(c) (iii) (Chapter 4). 
47  Contrast with the following provisions: paras 6.2.2.4 and 6.3.2.3 (a) and (b) in Chapters 6; and 
para 7.2.3.2(b) in Chapter 7. 
48   See Buys supra n 15 165 and Tladi supra n 26 187. 
49  See Snail (2009) 4 Journal of Information Law & Technology 5-7; Sibanda supra n 26 5; Buys 
supra n 15 165; and Ebersӧhn (2003) supra n 26 25. Section 86 deals with unauthorised 
access to, interception of, or interference with data; and s 87 covers computer-related extortion, 
fraud, and forgery. These provisions are located in Chapter XIII of the ECT Act which deals with 
cybercrime. 
50  See Buys supra n 15 164. 
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originating from beyond SA’s borders,51 the USA and Australia have clear measures 
in place to address this eventuality.52  
 
(f) Penalties 
 
Section 89 of the ECT Act provides for penalties resulting from non-adherence to the 
provisions of the ECT Act. A person convicted of an offence referred to in specific 
sections,53 is liable to a fine of one million Rand or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding twelve months.54 Interestingly, the above provision is housed in a chapter 
dealing with cybercrime, but, as noted above, section 45 does not criminalise spam 
but regulates it. Furthermore section 45 does not fall under the provisions in section 
89.55  
 
Other criticisms include that section 45 does not address the interests of ISPs who 
come under “attack” from spammers.56 Gereda notes that this is evident from the fact 
that “while consumers can request to be removed from the spammer’s mailing list(s), 
the ISP incurs losses from the very spam it receives and has to manage”.57 In light of 
these criticisms, solutions have been suggested for the improvement of section 45. 
 
8.2.5.4 Solutions to improve section 45 
 
(a) Institute an opt-in model and other solutions 
 
In light of the criticism above, certain commentators have suggested that South 
Africa should enact a “model law on spam” which adopts an opt-in mechanism as its 
default in preference to the current opt-out mechanism.58 As noted in Chapter 6, this 
                                                          
51  Id 165 for instances where the courts will have jurisdiction over spam-related criminal acts.  
52  See the issue of international cooperation between the USA (para 6.5.4 Chapter 6); and 
Australia (para 7.3.4 Chapter 7). Also see: para 4.3.4.6 (ITU); and para 4.4.2.3 (OECD) in 
Chapter 4. 
53  These include: s 37(3); 40(2); 58(2); 80(5); 82(2) or 86(1), (2) or (3) of the ECT Act. 
54   See s 89(1) of the ECT Act. 
55  See Tladi (2008) supra n 26 187. 
56  See Gereda supra 26 52. 
57  Ibid. Gereda note that “this is because the ISP carries the e-mail addresses of thousands of 
consumers who in turn only receive at least one spam e-mail in terms of the ECT Act before 
they can request that their e-mail addresses be removed from the spammer’s list”. Also see 
Chapter 3 para 3.3.1 where the costs incurred by ISPs are outlined.  
58  See especially Haase, Grimm & Versfeld supra n 26 157 and Geissler supra n 26 387-403. 
 
 
246 
 
is the solution that commentators in the USA were calling for, either to replace the 
opt-out mechanism, or to supplement it.59  
 
(b) A multi-layered solution 
 
Tladi notes that “given the global nature of spam, global measures need to be put in 
place if this scourge is to be eliminated which would include a multi-layered 
approach involving legislation, technical solutions, and consumer education”.60 Buys 
points out that “consideration should be given to the application of three general 
measures to address spam adopted in other jurisdictions including: informal 
measures such as self-regulation; technical measures undertaken by individuals and 
organisations; and litigation and legislation”.61 
 
(c) Other suggestions 
 
Ebersӧhn suggests that as section 45 lags behind corresponding foreign legislation it 
should be amended to prohibit: harvesting and dictionary attacks; the use of false 
and misleading e-mail headers; and the inclusion of labels such as “ADV” in the 
subject lines.62 He also notes that “those responsible for the ECT Act should be 
required to review the efficacy of section 45 on a regular basis,63 an evaluation which 
might result in measures to combat spam being added or discontinued where they 
are found no longer to meet the needs of that jurisdiction”.64  
 
The solutions above align with anti-spam laws and provisions noted in the previous 
chapters – in particular on how to draft an anti-spam Act and also to combat spam at 
a global level.65 There have in recent times, been developments which have to an 
                                                          
59   See paras: 6.5.2 (Chapter 6); and 7.2.3.2(a) in Chapter 7. 
60  See Tladi supra n 26 191-2.  
61  See Buys supra n 15 160-4. The multi-layered approach aligns with international best practices 
see: paras 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 (ITU); para 4.4.2.2 and 4.4.2.3 (OECD); para 6.5.3 (USA) and paras 
7.2.and 7.3 (Australia). 
62  See Ebersӧhn (2004) supra n 26 142 where the author compares SA with USA and Australia; 
Tladi supra n 26 91 where the author compares SA with the USA; and Sibanda supra n 26 7-8 
where Canada, the European Union, and South Africa are compared. 
63  Ebersӧhn (2004) supra n 26 142. 
64  Ibid. 
65   See para 4.3.4.2 in Chapter 4. 
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extent addressed the criticisms identified above and also reflect on the solutions 
outlined. These are highlighted below.   
8.2.6 Recent developments that shed light on the spam problem 
 
These developments can be traced back to 2009 when the Internet Service 
Providers of South Africa66 was formally recognized as an Industry representative 
Body (IRB) in terms of section 71 of the ECT Act.67 ISPA was also at the forefront of 
the case in 2014 which required that the court interpret the provisions of section 45. 
In the discussion which follows, these developments – ie industry regulation and the 
section 45 provisions – are traced through case law. 
 
8.2.6.1 Addressing section 45 criticisms through case law  
 
(a) Introduction 
 
In 2014 the first case dealing with the issue of spam namely: Ketler Investment CC 
Presentations v Internet Service Providers’ Association68 was heard before the 
courts. This case outlined the scope of the scourge that is spam, exposed the 
loopholes in section 45, and confirmed some of the criticisms levelled against that 
section. The case also highlighted the lengths to which ISPs go in order to protect 
themselves and their clients from receiving spam e-mails. Before getting into the 
discussion of these issues, the facts of the case will be briefly outlined so that when 
a discussion of the issues is highlighted below, it will be clear how the criticisms of 
section 45 were addressed in the case. Note should also be taken of the fact that the 
case is not discussed here at length but only those aspects related to the criticisms 
above are highlighted.69  
 
                                                          
66   Hereafter ‘ISPA’.  
67  See ISPA ‘About ISPA’ https://ispa.org.za/about-ispa (date of use: 20 January 2016). See ss 71 
and 72 of the ECT Act for recognition of representative body; also Guidelines for Recognition of 
Industry Representative Bodies of Information System Providers (GN 1283 in GG 29474 of 14 
December 2006), hereafter ‘IRB Code’; Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 700-03; and Marx & 
O’Brien (2011) 32/3 Obiter 551-6. 
68  See Ketler Investment CC Presentations v Internet Service Providers’ Association 2014 (1) ALL 
SA 566 (GSJ), hereafter ‘Ketler case’. 
69  For a discussion of this case see Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 688-705. 
 
 
248 
 
(b) Ketler Investment CC Presentations v Internet Service Providers’ 
Association 
 
The facts of the case are briefly that in 2012 the applicant (Ketler) engaged in the 
business of providing training courses throughout South Africa on the following 
matters: leadership; project management; and presentation skills.70 The courses 
were marketed in a variety of ways, including by means of newsletters sent to 
consumers by e-mail. Although the applicant did not indicate whether it had created 
the e-mail address lists, or purchased or otherwise procured those from other 
sources, the promotional material was sent to the addresses on the list via bulk e-
mail transmission. The e-mails were transmitted via an independent ISP to which 
Ketler subscribed.71  
 
It came to the respondent’s (ISPA) attention that Ketler had been sending unsolicited 
communications advertising its courses to consumers, even after those consumers 
had requested that it desist. The consumers also asked that the sender provide them 
with the source from which it had obtained their personal information. As a result of 
its spamming activities, ISPA listed Ketler as a spammer on its ‘Hall of Shame’ 
webpage.72 The applicant then alleged that the respondent had defamed it by 
placing it on its hall of shame.73 In coming to its decision, the court noted that:74  
 
the term “spammer”, or a derivative, does not per se constitute defamatory matter. There is, 
however, a distinct insinuation to consumers using the Internet that the applicant is acting in at 
least a morally offensive manner at the consumers’ cost. The terms “spam”, “spammer”, or 
“spamming”, in the context of the overall contents of the respondent’s hall of shame webpage, 
may also bear the connotation that the person referred to is acting in a manner abhorrent to the 
privacy rights of others. The court accordingly held that listing the applicant as a spammer in a 
hall of shame on the respondent’s webpage, together with the wording of that webpage as a 
whole, was defamatory of the applicant in the secondary meaning. 
 
                                                          
70  For the facts of the case see paras 1-3, 32-33 and 42-46 of the Ketler case supra n 68. 
71  For an example of the e-mail that the applicant sent to consumers see: id paras 36-38. 
72  The hall of shame is a webpage on ISPAs web site in which it lists spammers. See ISPA ‘ISPA 
hall of shame’ http://ispa.org.za/spam/hall-of-shame/ (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
73  See paras 2, 7 and 42-43 of the Ketler case supra n 68; and Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 690-5. 
74  See id Ketler case paras 9, 44, 47, 50-5 and 55. 
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The court dismissed the application with costs,75 and in 2014 Ketler paid ISPA an 
amount of R65 000.76 In this instance it might well be said that the court succeeded 
in holding Ketler accountable for his spamming activities.77 
 
(c) Lessons drawn from the case  
 
Note should be taken here that apart from the issue of defamation, other issues were 
highlighted in the case. For a spammer to send e-mails the following are required: 
the list(s) of e-mails addresses of consumers (which might have been harvested or 
bought); the methods spammers use to send spam e-mails; the problems caused by 
such practices; the use of third party domain and e-mail addresses in order to remain 
undetected; and the efficiency of the opt-out mechanism; and counter-measures by 
ISPs to protect consumers and themselves from such practices. These issues are 
discussed below. 
 
Section 45 does not outlaw spam 
 
The Ketler case is a clear example of how spammers use the loophole in section 45 
in order to advance their spamming activities. The applicant contended that “section 
45(1) of the ECT Act doesn’t prohibit spam but it does allow it to be sent in a 
regulated manner”, and that the applicant had fully complied with the section.78 
Notably, Ketler continued sending spam e-mails although the recipients had 
requested them to stop. Although the applicant had provided a link or mechanism by 
which recipients could opt-out, clearly Ketler had no intention of honouring the 
requests. Section 45(1) not only encourages spammers to continue sending spam 
because they know they can, it also undermines recipients’ confidence in the 
system.79  
 
                                                          
75  Id para 105.  
76  Mybroadband ‘SA spammer pays R65 000 to settle case’ http://mybroadband.co.za/ 
news/internet/104657-sa-spammer-pays-r65000-to-settle-case-case.html (date of use: 20 
January 2016).  
77  In fact the ITU had noted that the most successful cases are those that have the opt-out 
mechanism as a default measure in combating spam (see para 4.3.4.2(c) (ii) in Chapter 4). 
78  See para 7(a) of the Ketler case supra n 68.  
79  Id para 59.  
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Disguising headers and spoofing 
 
Another factor addressed in the Ketler case aimed at section 45 was that of the 
falsification of headers or spoofing.80 ISPA established in this case that the applicant 
had used both third-party domains81 and bogus e-mails to send spam. This explains 
why the consumers’ requests were not honoured because the spammer was not in a 
position to process such requests.82  
 
Harvesting and sale of lists 
 
The issue of the harvesting or the sale of lists of e-mail addresses was also 
highlighted in the case but was left open as the court was unable to establish how 
the applicant had obtained the list(s) it used to send unsolicited communications to 
consumers. The applicant was not in a position to disclose or provide evidence of 
where it had received the lists of e-mail addresses.83 The court, however, noted that 
lists can be harvested in a number of ways by those wishing to market their products 
or services through promotional material sent en masse by e-mail.84  
 
The court acknowledged that the issue of harvesting was problematic, especially for 
well established businesses like banks. It also noted that harvesting amounts to “an 
impermissible invasion of privacy which lacks express and informed consent”.85 
Confirming that this is a problem, it was recently reported that one of South Africa’s 
cell phone providers had leaked its subscribers’ personal information, a claim the cell 
phone giant denied.86  
 
8.2.6.2 Self-regulation and the Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) 
 
(a) Background 
                                                          
80  Id paras 37-38 where an example of a spoofed e-mail is provided.  
81  Section 1 of the ECT Act defines a domain name as “alphanumeric designation that is 
registered or assigned in respect of an electronic address or other resource on the Internet”. 
82  See para 32 of the Ketler case supra n 68.  
83  Id para 29 and Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 699.  
84  Ibid. These lists can either be bought from third parties or harvested from other public sites. 
85  See para 29 Ketler case supra n 68. 
86 See Mochiko T ‘Cybersecurity: oversharers anonymous’ http://www.financialmail.co.za 
/features/ 014/11/06/cyber-security-overshares-anonymous (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
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ISPA was established in 1996 as a voluntary association and incorporated in 2016.87 
As a regulatory body, ISPA has a code of conduct with which its members must 
comply.88  
 
(b) Anti-spam provisions in ISPA’s Code 
 
The ISPA code of conduct covers a variety of issues’,89 one being that of unsolicited 
communications (spam) in part F.90 This clause prohibits ISPA members91 from 
sending or promoting the sending of unsolicited electronic communications.92 
Members are also required to take reasonable measures to ensure that their 
networks are not used by others for that purpose.93 Clause 17 urges members “to 
provide a facility for dealing with complaints regarding unsolicited electronic 
communications originating from their networks and, in addition, to react 
expeditiously to complaints received”.94 Note should be taken here that the ISPA 
code has an important element, namely, that the opt-out mechanism be attended to 
expeditiously,95 which in itself aligns with the standards set by other jurisdictions 
such as the USA and Australia above.96 In addition to the clauses above ISPA notes 
that all unsolicited bulk e-mail is spam with the following exceptions:97 
 
Mail sent by one party to another where there is already a prior relationship between the two 
parties and subject matter of the message(s) concerns that relationship, is not spam; mail sent 
by one party to another with the explicit consent of the receiving party, is not spam.  
 
 
It is clear from the exceptions above that the ISPA make the sending of spam e-
mails by its members’ illegal. The above clauses favour an opt-in mechanism instead 
                                                          
87  See ISPA ‘About ISPA’ supra n 67. 
88  See ISPA ‘Code of conduct’ http://ispa.org.za/code-of-conduct (date of use: 30 January 2016). 
Hereafter ‘the ISPA Code’.  
89  The following are some issues contained in the ISPA Code: privacy and confidentiality (cl 4-5); 
consumer protection and provision of information to customers (cl 6-12); and cybercrime (cl 
18). 
90  Id cls 16 and 17. 
91   See ISPA ‘Membership’ https://ispa.org.za/membership (date of use: 30 January 2016). 
92   Id cl 16. 
93   Ibid. 
94   Ibid. 
95   Ibid. 
96   See para 6.3.2.2 in Chapter 6; and 7.2.3.2 in Chapter 7. 
97  ISPA ‘Spam’ http://ispa.org.za/spam/ (date of use: 30 January 2016)  
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of the opt-out mechanism which is contrary to its mandate.98 As a regulatory body 
ISPA was called out as applying double standards in its regulation of spam,99 adding 
to earlier criticisms that this industry body was acting as both judge and jury in its 
regulation.100 
 
(c) Technical measures by ISPA 
 
The ISPA, like any other service provider, is affected by the activities of spammers, 
and this was highlighted in the Ketler case. The importance of technical measures by 
ISPs in limiting spam was also highlighted in the case as an attempt to establish who 
was sending the spam e-mails to consumers. The ISPA employed the following 
technical measures: the use of spam-trap address; and role of e-mail accounts in 
order to uncover who was behind the spam e-mails and why consumers were unable 
to opt-out of the unwanted e-mails.101 These countermeasures cost resources for 
both the ISPs and consumers alike (although for consumers the impact is on a lesser 
scale).102  
 
The fact that an industry body has been established (regardless of its problems, 
which it is hoped will be attended to in due course) has at least satisfied the 
suggestion above that there should be self-regulation in order to deal with the 
technical aspects of spam. 
 
8.2.7 Conclusion 
 
While South Africa broke ground regarding the issue of spam, especially at a time 
(2002 to be exact) when nations were implementing anti-spam laws and anti-spam 
provisions, note has to be taken that the provisions of section 45 are insufficient in 
regulating spam. In addition, recent developments have also confirmed the loopholes 
in those provisions and have intensified the problem as noted above. It is this 
authors view that section 45 as it currently reads does not even at a basic level 
                                                          
98  Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 700-03. 
99  Id 688-705. 
100  See Marx & O’Brien supra n 67 551-6.  
101  See para 57 of the Ketler case supra 68; Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 698-700. 
102  Id Ketler case para 26-28 and 65-66; and id Pistorius & Tladi 698-9. 
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afford the required protection for consumers. Consequently, section 45, together with 
the attempts to make the provision more effective, have both created a band-aid 
solution which requires immediate attention. Hopefully, the other anti-spam and 
direct marketing provisions can shed light on the problem and perhaps offer better 
solutions than the ECT Act has to offer.  
 
Below is a discussion of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and 
Protection of Personal Information Act. The discussion will also include selected 
provisions in the National Credit Act103 where applicable. 
 
8.3 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008  
 
8.3.1 Background to the Consumer Protection Act   
 
Before the adoption of the Consumer Protection Act104 there were a number of 
pieces of legislation governing a variety of consumer issues’.105 The CPA is the 
culmination of several decades of debate and legal development in the field of 
consumer protection in South Africa, involving the government, national and 
provincial legislatures, and academics.106 The CPA “regulates the marketing of 
goods and services to consumers, plus relationships, transactions, and agreements 
between them and producers, suppliers, distributors, importers, retailers, and service 
providers of goods and services”.107 The CPA was signed into law on 24 April 2009 
and came into effect on 31 March 2011.108 The coming into operation of the CPA 
repealed some of the legislation which dealt with consumer issues, and made 
consequential amendments to various provisions in other Acts.109  
 
                                                          
103  Hereafter the ‘NCA’. 
104   Hereafter the ‘CPA’. 
105  The following are examples: Business Names Act 27 of 1960; Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 
1941; Price Control Act 25 of 1964; Sales and Service Matters Act 25 of 1964; Trade Practices 
Act 76 of 1976; and the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practice) Act 71 of 1988.  
106  See McQuid-Mason et al Consumer Law in South Africa 385; Van Eeden Consumer Protection 
Law 23; De Stadler supra n 15 1-6; Naude & Eiselen Commentary 1-21; Woker (2010) 31/2 
Obiter 217-23; and Du Preez (2009) 1 TSAR 58-83.  
107  Id Van Eeden 38-61; also id De Stadler 7-23; and id Naude & Eiselen 5. 
108  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (GG 32186 of 29 April 2009).  
109  Id s 121. The laws that were repealed include: s 2-13 and 16-17 of the Merchandise Marks Act 
17 of 1941, and all the laws in n 105 above. 
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8.3.2 The purpose of the CPA  
 
The purpose of the CPA is:110 
 
  to establish a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance of a consumer market that 
is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable, and responsible, and which promotes fair business 
practices. And which, moreover, protects consumers from unfair, unreasonable or otherwise 
improper practices from deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct, and improves 
consumer awareness and information and encourages responsible and informed consumer 
choice and behavior.  
 
The CPA applies to transactions entered into or having an effect within the Republic 
which promote goods and services.111 It also establishes a National Consumer 
Commission (NCC),112 and entrenches the fundamental rights of consumers113 – a 
first for South Africa.114 Of importance to this part of work are consumer rights that 
involve anti-spam and direct marketing provisions. However, it should be noted that 
while there are a number of direct marketing provisions under the CPA,115 only those 
that are housed in sections 11, 12, and regulation 4 of the CPA are outlined below.  
Part B of the CPA deals with the consumer’s right to privacy which is discussed 
below. 
 
                                                          
110  See s 3(1)(a); (c); (d); and (e) of the CPA. 
111  Id s 5(1)(a) and (b). See Van Eeden supra n 106 37-62 for the application and scope of the 
CPA and De Stadler supra n 15 24-56. 
112  See Chapter 5 of the CPA.  
113  See Jacobs, Stoop & Van Niekerk (2010) 13/3 PELJ 302-406; also De Stadler supra n 15 24-
56; and Van Eeden supra n 106 25-55, for a general discussion of fundamental rights.  
114  See McQuid-Mason et al supra n 106 13-14; Van Eeden supra n 106 51-2; and Naude & 
Eiselen supra n 106 17-18. For an exhaustive list of these rights see: Chapter 2 parts A-H of 
the CPA which includes the following fundamental consumer rights: rights of equality in 
consumer market (Part A s 8-10); consumer’s right to choose (Part C ss 13-21); right to 
disclosure and information (Part D sections 22-28); right to fair and honest dealing (Part F ss 
40-47); right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions (Part G ss 48-52); right to fair 
value, good quality and safety (Part H s 53-61); and supplier’s accountability to consumers 
(Part I s 62-67). 
115  For other provisions on direct marketing see the following sections: the consumer’s right to 
cooling off period after direct marketing (s 16 of the CPA); also De Stadler supra n 15 32 and 
Van Eeden supra n 106 138-9); the consumers’ right to return the goods (s 20 of the CPA; De 
Stadler supra n 15 34-6; and Van Eeden supra n 106 139); the right to fair and responsible 
marketing including among others: general standards for marketing of goods or services (s 29 
of the CPA) and De Stadler supra n 15 60-1); bait marketing (s 30 of the CPA); also De Stadler 
supra n 15 78-9 and Van Eeden supra n 106 162); negative option marketing (s 31 of the CPA; 
also Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 para 31.1-31.4; De Stadler supra n 15 80; and Van Eeden 
supra n 106 163-4); direct marketing to consumers (s 32 of the CPA and De Stadler supra n 15 
43); and catalogue marketing (s 33 of the CPA). For a discussion of these types of marketing 
see generally Opperman & Lake Understanding the CPA 23-64. 
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8.3.3 The consumer’s right to privacy   
 
The consumer’s right to privacy is dealt with in section 11 of the CPA titled: “The 
right to restrict unwanted direct marketing”. The section provides:  
   
(1) The right of every person to privacy includes the right to: 
(a) refuse to accept;  
(b) require another person to discontinue; or  
(c) in case of an approach other than in person, to pre-emptively block any approach or 
communication to that person, if the approach or communication is primarily for the 
purpose of direct marketing.  
(2) To facilitate the realisation of each consumer’s right to privacy, and to enable consumers to 
efficiently protect themselves against the activities contemplated in subsection (1), a person 
who has been approached for the purpose of direct marketing may demand during or within a 
reasonable time after that communication that the person responsible for initiating the 
communication desist from initiating any further communication.  
(3) The Commission116 may establish, or recognize as authoritative, a registry in which any 
person may register a pre-emptive block, either generally or for specific purposes, against any 
communication that is primarily for the purpose of direct marketing. 
(4) A person authorizing, directing or conducting any direct marketing- 
(a) Must implement appropriate procedures to facilitate the receipt of demands contemplated 
in subsection (2); and  
(b) Must not direct or permit any person associated with that activity to direct or deliver any 
communication for the purpose of direct marketing to a person who has: 
(i) Made a demand contemplated in subsection (2); or 
(ii) Registered a relevant pre-emptive block as contemplated in subsection (3). 
(5) No person may charge a consumer a fee for making a demand in terms of subsection (2) or 
registering a pre-emptive block as contemplated in subsection (3). 
(6) The Minister may prescribe regulations for the operation of the registry contemplated in 
subsection (3). 
 
 
Section 12, on the other hand, deals with the regulation of the timeframes in which 
marketers may contact consumers117 for marketing purposes. This section provides 
for a supplier118 “not to engage in any direct marketing towards a consumer at home 
for any promotional purpose during a prohibited period – specific days, dates, public 
                                                          
116  Section 1 of the CPA defines the term “Commission” as the “National Consumer Commission 
established in terms of s 85 of the CPA”. 
117  Id s1 which defines the term “consumer” in respect of any particular goods and services as: “(a) 
a person to whom those particular goods and services are marketed in the ordinary course of 
the supplier’s business; (b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the 
ordinary course of the supplier’s business, unless the transaction is exempt from the application 
of section 5(2) and 5(3). If the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods 
or a recipient or beneficiary of those particular services, irrespective of whether that user, 
recipient or beneficiary was a party to a transaction concerning the supply of those particular 
goods or services”.  
118  Id s 1 where the term “supplier” is defined as: “a person who markets any goods or services”. 
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holidays, or times of day – to the extent that the consumer has expressly or implicitly 
requested or agreed otherwise”.119  
 
8.3.4 Commentary on direct marketing provisions and the right to privacy 
under CPA 
 
8.3.4.1 Definitions 
 
Section 1 defines the term “direct marketing” as “to approach a person, (either in 
person,120 by mail, or electronic communication), for the direct or indirect purpose of 
promoting or offering to supply, in the ordinary course of business, any goods;121 or 
services;122 or requesting the person to make a donation of any kind for any 
reason”.123 The term “electronic communications” is defined as ‘communications by 
means of electronic transmission, including by telephone, fax, SMS, wireless 
computer access, e-mail or any similar technology or device’.124 In recent years a 
number of cases have been decided confirming these means of communication as 
electronic communications.125 
 
Hamann and Papadopoulos note that:126 
 
                                                          
119  Id s 12(1) and (2) contrasted with s 75 of the NCA which deals with the harassment of 
consumers at home. 
120  The term “person” is defined as including “a juristic person in terms of s 1 of the CPA”.  
121  The term “goods” is defined as including the following: “anything marketed for human 
consumption; any tangible object not otherwise contemplated in paragraph (a), including any 
medium on which anything is or may be written or encoded; any literature, music, photograph, 
motion picture, game, information, data, software, code or other intangible product written or 
encoded on any medium, or a licence to use any such intangible product; a legal interest in 
land or any other immovable property, other than an interest that falls within the definition of 
‘service’ in this section; and  gas, water and electricity” (ibid). 
122  The term “service” is defined as including, but is not limited to: “any work or undertaking 
performed by one person for the direct or indirect benefit of another; the provision of any 
education, information, advice, or consultation, except advice that is subject to regulation in 
terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 2002; and any banking 
services or related or similar financial services, or the undertaking, underwriting or assumption 
of any risk by one person on behalf of another” (ibid). 
123  Ibid. 
124  Ibid.  
125  See the following cases: Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC), where it was 
decided that an SMS was an electronic communication; also Sihlali v South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd [2010] ZALC 1, (2010) 31 ILJ 1477 (LC); and Spring Forest 
Trading v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash Combined Motor Holdings Limited (725/13) [2014] 
ZASCA 178, 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA).  
126  See Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 54; and De Stadler supra n 15 63.  
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  the CPA’s protection granted to consumers differs slightly from that of the ECT Act’s section 45, 
… protection is granted for direct marketing via an electronic communication, as well as 
requests for donations of any kind, whereas the ECT Acts relates only to UCE.  
 
This definition also accommodates the concern raised above that other types of 
spam are not included in the UCE, for example, by including “requests for donations 
of any kind”. The Act does not define the term donation, but one would assume that 
should a charity organisation or public institution request a gift or free contribution 
from consumers that would constitute spam.127 
 
8.3.4.2 Direct marketing and the right to privacy  
 
There is a relationship between direct marketing and the right to privacy. Some have 
noted that direct marketing involves two possible infringements of the right to 
privacy: firstly, when private information is gathered by the direct marketer without 
the knowledge of the consumer; and secondly, where consumers are contacted 
without their consent.128 Direct marketing may also be sent to consumers without 
aiming the marketing at consumers individually.129  
 
Under the CPA the right to privacy is noted as a right to be left alone, and also cover 
what others refer to as “information privacy”.130 Roos notes that “while the CPA 
provides no comprehensive regulation of information privacy, it does regulate 
information privacy only when the person can be contacted, but disregards how the 
direct marketer came to possess the contact details in the first place”.131 Some note 
                                                          
127  See Merriam Webster ‘Donation’ https://www.merriam-webster.com/disctionary/donation (date 
of use: 6 March 2017). 
128  See Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 11.9. 
129  Id para 11.13. On the other hand the term “advertisement” is defined in s 1 of the CPA as “any 
direct or indirect visual or oral communication transmitted by any medium, or any 
representation or reference written, inscribed, recorded, encoded upon or embedded within a 
medium, by means of which a person seeks to: bring to the attention of all or part of the public, 
the existence or identity of a supplier; or the existence, nature, availability, properties, 
advantages or uses of any goods or services that are available for supply, or the conditions on, 
or prices at which any goods or services are available for supply; promote the supply of any 
goods or services; or promote any cause”. 
130  See s 11(1)(a) of the CPA; also Naude and Eiselen supra n 106 11.8; 11.9; De Stadler supra n 
15 28; and Van Eeden supra n 106 128-9. Information privacy is regulated by the Protection of 
Personal Information Act, 2013. 
131  See Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 432-4. De Villiers notes that “the CPA thus prohibits the use of, or 
permitting a sender to use, a recipient’s personal information for promotional purposes unless 
the recipient has consented to his or her information being used in that way” (see De Villiers 
(2007) Oct/Nov Journal of Marketing 19). 
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that to develop this marketing relationship consumers “must perceive the benefits 
derived from the relationship with the marketer as outweighing the 
costs/disadvantages”.132 South Africans are largely ignorant when it comes to 
information privacy (data protection) and freely reveal such information in the context 
of their shopping experience, especially when engaging with direct marketers.133 By 
so doing, their personal information remains in the possession of the marketer who 
may either abuse or misuse it to the consumer’s detriment.134 While it is important to 
note that there can be no transaction or exchange without the communication of 
information, consumers still lag behind when it comes to enforcing their rights. Some 
note that “as a minimum, the two parties must be aware of one another’s 
existence,135 and must have some idea of what will be exchanged and what the 
respective benefits may be”.136   
 
8.3.4.3 Opt-out mechanism  
 
Section 11 allows for direct marketing to be sent by placing a duty on the consumer 
to do something about it. In this case the consumer can exercise his or her right to 
privacy by refusing to accept such marketing material, or requiring another person to 
discontinue or pre-emptively block such advances.137 This provision brings the opt-
out mechanism into play. Section 11(2) provides for a direct marketer to desist from 
sending unsolicited communications within a reasonable time when a request has 
been made by the consumer. In addition, section 11(4) places an obligation on the 
senders to “implement appropriate procedures” to facilitate the receipt of demands 
contemplated in subsection 2.138 These appropriate measures will be to act within a 
reasonable time upon receiving such demand. This subsection prohibits the sender 
                                                          
132  See Jordaan & Jordaan (2004) 23/1 Journal for Communication Sciences in Southern Africa 
139. 
133  See Jordaan (2007) 3/1 International Retail and Marketing Review 45; Naude & Eiselen 
Commentary supra n 106 para 11.9. 
134  Ibid. 
135  See Jordaan & Jordaan supra n 132 139. 
136  Ibid.  
137   See s 11(1) of the CPA. Contrast this with s 74(6) of the NCA which provides for: “the credit 
provider to present the consumer with a statement of options and afford the recipient an 
opportunity to choose to be excluded from any telemarketing campaign that may be conducted 
by or on behalf of the credit provider. The credit provider must also maintain a register of all 
options selected by consumers in the prescribed manner and form, and that the credit provider 
must not act contrary to an option selected by a consumer” (see s 74(7)(a) and (b) of the NCA). 
138  See s 11(4)(a) of CPA. 
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to direct or permit a third party or persons associated with the direct marketing 
activities to direct or deliver communications to consumers who have made a 
demand in subsection 2; and or have registered “a relevant pre-emptive block”.139 
This provision and that dealing with the pre-emptive block are also consistent with 
anti-spam provisions in other jurisdictions.140 Section 11 provisions are consistent 
with section 45(1) (a) of the ECT Act as outlined above with regard to the provision 
of an opt-out mechanism. But unlike the ECT Act, the CPA goes a step further 
addressing when the demands should be attended to.141 Although the CPA makes 
provision for the consumer to demand that communication desist within a reasonable 
time after initiation, it, however, fails to expand on what those time frames are. The 
phrase “within reasonable time” is relative, as it means different things to people, for 
some it might mean the moment the demand enters the spammers/senders e-mail 
box, and for others, anytime when the spammer/senders decides to open such email 
even if they might have received such demands earlier. Also this will only be 
effective in cases where the sender has provided accurate sender information or 
have not disguised their headers, a provision not made for in the CPA and which has 
an impact on the “appropriate measure” provision.  
 
Section 11 presupposes that the marketer will always make him- or herself known to 
the consumer and not falsify his or her headers.142 It also fails to provide that the opt-
out facility should be operational for a prescribed period so as to enable the sender 
to make use of it.143 The CPA also makes provision for recipients to opt-out of 
unsolicited e-mails without having to pay for such a service.144 This is not so much of 
a problem regarding online spam but it is problematic with regards to mobile spam, 
where consumers are constantly being asked to pay a fee to opt-out of such 
communications.145 Overall, the provisions of CPA regarding the opt-out facility are a 
                                                          
139  Ibid s 11(4)(b) read with 11(3) and (6). See Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 paras 11.16-11.17; 
and Van Eeden supra n 106 130. 
140   See the following paragraphs in Chapters 6 and 7 above: 6.3.2.2 (c) (USA which covers the 
prohibition of transmission after objection); and 7.2.3.2 (c) (Australia which provides for a 
functional unsubscribe facility).  
141  See s 11(4) read with (2) of the CPA. 
142  See Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 54-5.  
143  Ibid. 
144  Section 11(5) of the CPA; and Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 paras 11.18-11.19. 
145  See Mybraodband ‘Spam SMS: why South Africans pay to reply ‘stop’’ 
https://mybroadband.co.za/news/smartphones/136828-spam-sms-why-south-africans-pay-to-
reply-stop.html (date of use: 6 March 2017). 
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step forward on the ECT Act by putting additional measures in place to protect 
consumers. The CPA provisions are also lacking in some areas – for example, there 
are no provisions on falsifying sender information or spoofing, or timeframes on how 
and when the opt-out should be facilitated, et cetera. Perhaps the answer lies in the 
pre-emptive block which the consumer can utilise to stop communications even 
before he or she has been approached. 
 
8.3.4.4 National do-not-call registry  
 
(a) Background 
 
The CPA provides for the consumer to pre-emptively block any approach either in 
person or via a communication sent, if that approach is mainly for purposes of direct 
marketing.146 Section 11(3) of the CPA provides for a registry to be established by 
the Commission, or that an “authoritative registry” be recognised on which any 
person may register a pre-emptive block against direct marketing 
communications.147 Section 11(6) provides for the Minister to issue regulations for 
the operation of the registry.  
 
(b) Regulation 4: Mechanisms to block direct marketing communications  
 
Regulation 4 deals with the mechanism to block direct marketing communications, 
and covers a number of issues including the administration of the pre-emptive block 
and minimum requirements for the operation of the registry. Regulation 4(3) sets out 
the following requirements as minimum for operating the registry as contemplated in 
section 11(3):148 
 
(a) The registry must be capable of accommodating all persons in the Republic and cover the 
whole geographical area of the Republic; 
(b) The registry must at all times be accessible to all persons in the Republic for purposes of 
registering a pre-emptive block, without payment of any fees, but the person registering must 
pay the actual cost of the type of communication available for registration; 
(c) A consumer may register- 
(i) His or her name, identification number, passport number, telephone number, cell 
phone number, facsimile number, e-mail address, postal address, physical address, a 
                                                          
146   See ss 11 (1)(c) and 11(4)(b) of the CPA. 
147   Id s 11(3). 
148   See reg 4(3) of the CPA. 
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web site uniform resource locator (“URL”) or any other identifier which the operator of 
the registry makes provision for; 
(ii) The consumer’s own global address for any web site or web application or the site on 
the world wide web; 
(iii) If the operator of a registry so allows, the pre-emptive block for any time of the day or 
any day of the year; or 
(iv) If the operator of the registry so allows, a comprehensive prohibition for any medium 
of communication, address or time whatsoever. 
(d) Any pre-emptive block registered in accordance with this regulation becomes effective 30 
days from the date on which it is registered. 
 
Once a register has been compiled the direct marketer can make an application to 
the administrator149 of the registry to confirm whether or not a pre-emptive block has 
been registered by a specific consumer.150 The administrator may not provide the 
marketer with any details regarding any identifiable information of the consumer 
provided to the registry.151 An exception will be if the direct marketer has proof that 
an existing client has, after the commencement of the regulations, expressly 
consented to receiving direct marketing from marketers themselves.152  
 
In addition to the minimum requirements set out above, reg 4 also makes provision 
for the harvesting and sale of lists, a provision not covered under the ECT Act.153 
Sub-regulation 4(e) prohibits the administrator of the registry “from providing, selling, 
or otherwise disposing of any information contemplated in sub-regulation (c) to 
anyone – including any organ of state – save with the express, written permission of 
the consumer concerned, or by order of a court of law, or by operation of law”.154  
Regulation 4(4) also provides for the administrator to:155 
 
  proactively put in place sufficient security arrangements to prevent the manipulation, theft, or 
loss of data in the registry; compliance with any law for the protection of personal information or 
the protection of privacy; and also, from time to time in all official languages, conduct public 
information campaigns as required and approved by the Commission.  
 
The provision for the harvesting and sale of lists is consistent with the provisions in 
the USA and Australia above, save that the CPA does not provide for the use of 
                                                          
149  Id regs 4(3)(e), (f), (h), (l), and 4(4). For a discussion of the administrator: see Van Eeden supra 
n 106 129-34; Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 paras 11.18-11.11.19; and De Stadler supra n 15 
62-6. 
150  Id reg 4(3)(g). 
151  Id reg 4(3)(f). 
152  Ibid. 
153   Id reg 4(3)(e).  
154  Ibid.  
155  Id reg 4(4)(a); (b); (c) and (d). 
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software to harvest those lists. It should be noted that the CPA follows in the 
footsteps of the CAN-SPAM’s Act above, in that it calls for the establishment and 
implementation of the registry.156 It remains to be seen whether the registry as 
contemplated in the CPA will be implemented by the Minister years after the CPA 
has come into operation.157 The implementation of the do-not-contact list was put out 
on tender as early as 2011,158 followed by another attempt in 2013.159 At that time 
there were only two responses to the call for applications to administer such a 
registry.160 At the time of writing (January 2017) the registry has still not been 
established. However, there is a registry administered by the Direct Marketing 
Association of South Africa161 in place. 
 
(c) DMASA and its competitors 
 
Direct marketers rely on their databases in order to communicate with customers. 
Most direct marketing activities flow from an organisation’s database which contains 
valuable consumer information.162 In 2005 the DMASA was established as an 
association of direct marketing companies aimed at “protecting both industry and 
consumers from unethical or ignorant practitioners, and to lobby government and 
other regulatory bodies”.163  
 
                                                          
156  See Chapter 6 para 6.3.2.5 above. Also see the Australian version: ADMA ‘Do not mail-
consumers’ https://www.adma.com/au/do-not-mail (date of use: 20 January 2016); and ACMA 
‘Do not call register’ https://www.donotcall.gov.au (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
157  See Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 paras 11.18-11.19 and Van Eeden supra n 106 129-33. 
158  See GN 129 of 2011 GG 34088 of 8 March 2011. Also see TouchBasePro ‘Impact of the 
Consumer Protection Act on your e-mail marketing’ 6 http://creative engineeringstudio.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Impact-of-the-Consumer-Protection-Act-on-your-Email-
Marketing_TouchBasePro_May2011.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016); Mawson N ‘No 
decision on opt-out registry yet’ http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=comcontent 
&view=article&id=47451 (date of use: 28 January 2016). 
159   See Mawson N ‘Finally, a national opt-out list’ http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?id=69237 (date 
of use: 28 January 2016). 
160   Ibid. 
161  Hereafter ‘DMASA’. See DMASA ‘DMASA Direct Marketing Association’ 
http://www.dmasa.org/home/about-us (date of use: 20 January 2016).   
162  See Jordaan (2007) supra n 133 43. 
163  The DMASA seeks to regulate and professionalise the direct marketing trade by fostering trust, 
honesty, and accountability within the industry. See DMASA ‘DMASA Direct Marketing 
Association’ supra n 161. See Mudelair (2008) Journal of Marketing 22; and Naude & Eiselen 
supra n 106 11-13. 
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Key to the DMASA’s activities is the promotion and expansion of interactive and 
direct marketing within the country and region.164 Since 2007 the DMASA has been 
administering a national do-not-call registry (opt-out registry).165 This registry is a 
web site where consumers provide their personal details to pre-empt marketers from 
sending unwanted e-mails.166 Once the consumer is registered, he or she can also 
amend their particulars when necessary so linking to the existing contact details that 
can be modified.167 According to the then CEO of the DMASA “some marketers were 
completely ignorant of the practice of verifying the database before contacting 
consumers which meant that consumers were anyway consulted”.168 The DMASA 
members can access the registry free of charge to make use of its database list, as 
can non-members but subject to a fee.169  
 
In 2011 it was reported that the personal information of some 39 000 consumers 
registered on the DMASA site had been leaked to companies that were not DMASA 
members.170 Different views have been offered by those who had registered ranging 
from “the system being ineffective as they continue to receive unsolicited e-mails’ 
and that their personal information is also circulated outside the DMASA which is 
against the rules of that association”.171   
 
In 2012 it was reported that in the five years after its inception, the DMASA had 
registered 70 000 consumers who opted not to receive marketing from DMASA 
                                                          
164  DMASA offers a hotline to both consumers and competitors for complaints and it seeks to 
resolve issues through arbitration. DMASA is also an active member of the Advertising 
Standards Authority. Ibid DMASA. 
165  See Direct Marketing Associating of SA ‘The DMA National OPT OUT Database’ 
https://www.nationaloptout.co.za (date of use: 28 January 2016). 
166  Ibid. The requirements of registration on this site are: to provide: a valid RSA ID number and e-
mail address or cell number; contact details that they wish not to be contacted. On completion 
of the registration once the submit button has been clicked, the consumer will receive an e-mail 
requesting that they confirm their wish to be on the national opt-out database. Once 
confirmation has been received the consumer will be registered. If however, the consumer does 
not reply in five days then their details will be deleted. It takes six weeks for this service to be 
fully effective for example, for all members of the DMASA to stop contacting consumers.  
167  See Direct Marketing Associating of SA ‘The DMA National OPT OUT Database’ supra n 165. 
The changes to the consumer profile can be done on the DMASA site. 
168  Mudelair supra n 163 22. 
169  Id 23. 
170  See Mawson N ‘DMASA database ‘leaked’’ http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=44060:dmasa-database-leaked&utm_source=Story&utm_medium= 
Web&utm_term=44060:dmasa-database-leaked&utm_content=44060:dmasa-database-
leaked&utm_campaign (date of use: 28 January 2016). 
171  Ibid. 
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associates.172 This lack of growth was attributed to the fact that the public might not 
be aware (lack of education) of such a registry, or that consumers were afraid to 
enter their personal information on the registry because they were uncertain of 
where that information might end up.173 Swales note:174 
 
 The National Consumer Commission ought to have established a better ‘do-not-contact’ 
system in terms of the provisions of s 11 of the CPA. Although it is laudable that the DMASA 
has established its own opt-out database, it also suffers  from the issues all self-regulatory 
bodies are plagued with enforcement and compliance. 
 
Apart from the DMASA there is another opt-out registry administered by TrustFabric. 
TrustFabric is a company that builds vendor relationship management software.175 
TrustFabric also creates a platform which allows individuals to keep their personal 
information up-to-date in one place, and then, selectively and securely, to share that 
information with organisations with whom they have relationships.176 In 2012 it was 
reported that TrustFabric had registered 70 000 individuals in its do-not-contact 
registry within ten days of its establishment.177 TrustFabric also noted that 
consumers who wrote to the NCC expressed their concern about the conflict of 
interest arising from the DMASA having control over managing the national opt-out 
list.178  
 
In 2014 it was reported that there were less than 400 000 consumers who had 
signed up on both TrustFabric’s and DMASA’s registries.179 Both DMASA and 
TrustFabric were named as the two associations that were interested in 
administrating the opt-out registry in that year. It has been estimated that the cost of 
establishing an opt-out service will be in the order of five million Rand – a possible 
reason for the registry not having yet materialised.180   
 
                                                          
172  Mybroadband ‘Spam opt-out lists: TrustFabric versus DMASA’ http://mybroadband.co.za/news/ 
general/47560-spam-opt-out-trustfabric-versus-dmasa.html (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
173  Ibid. Also Mawson N ‘No decision on opt-out registry yet’ supra n 158. 
174   Swales supra n 26 75. 
175  See TrustFabric ‘About us’ https://www.trustfabric.com/about (date of use: 28 January 2016). 
176  Ibid. 
177  See Mybroadband. ‘Spam opt-out lists: TrustFabric versus DMASA’ supra n 172. 
178  Ibid. 
179  See Mawson N ‘DMASA database ‘leaked’’ supra n 170. 
180  Ibid. 
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8.3.4.5 Enforcement 
 
Section 4(1) of the CPA deals with the realisation of consumer rights and provides 
individuals181 with a number of options should they feel aggrieved. Individuals can 
approach a court, the Tribunal,182 or the NCC,183 if their consumer rights have been 
infringed, impaired, or threatened, or if prohibited conduct has taken place.184 The 
NCC can also initiate a complaint of its own accord, and also investigate complaints 
by consumers after which the matter will either be resolved by the NCC or be passed 
on to the National Credit Tribunal (NCT) for adjudication.185 If the supplier concerned 
is an industry not regulated by an ombudsman, the claim can be referred to a 
provincial consumer court,186 an alternative dispute resolution agent,187 or the 
NCC.188 
 
The Commission may also cooperate with, facilitate, or otherwise support the 
activities carried out by a consumer protection group which include:189 consumer 
advice and education activities and publications; research, market monitoring, 
surveillance and reporting; promotion of consumer rights; and advocacy of consumer 
interests. 
                                                          
181  Section 1 of the CPA defines the term “individuals” as including the following: “a person acting 
on his or her own behalf; an authorised person acting on behalf of another person who cannot 
act in his or her own name; a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or 
class of affected persons; a person acting in the public interest, with leave of Tribunal or court 
as the case may be; and an association acting in the interest of its members”.  
182  Id s 4(2)(a) provides that: “in any matter brought before the Tribunal or a court in terms of the 
Act: (a) the court must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation and 
enjoyment of consumer rights generally and in particular by persons contemplated in s 3(1)(b)”; 
s 4(2)(b) provides that “the Tribunal or court as the case may be: to promote the spirit and 
purposes of the Act; and make appropriate orders to give practical effect to the consumers right 
to access to redress including but not limited to: any order provided for in the Act; and any 
innovative order that better advances, protects, promotes and assures the realisation by 
consumers of their rights in terms of the Act”. See De Stadler supra n 15 169-71 and 
Opperman & Lake supra n 115 205-12. 
183  Id s 71(2). The section provides for any person to file a complaint concerning a matter with the 
Commission in the prescribed manner or form alleging that a person has acted in a manner 
inconsistent with this Act.  
184  Id s 4(1). 
185  De Stadler supra n 15 175-80; and Magaqa (2015) 27/1 SA Merc LJ 32-57 for a discussion of 
the NCC and NCT. 
186  See s 76 of the CPA; Opperman & Lake supra n 115 223-224; and De Stadler supra n 15 173-
5. 
187  Id s 70; and De Stadler supra n 15 171-2. 
188  See Chapter 5 of the CPA for the National Consumer Protection Institutions and s 99-101 for 
the enforcement functions of the NCC, compliance notices and objection to notices. Also see 
De Stadler supra n 15 175-80 for a discussion of the investigations of the NCC; Opperman & 
Lake supra n 115 208-12; and Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 para 83.1- 84.2 and 99.3-99.8. 
189  See s 77-78 and 84(a)-(e) of the CPA and Opperman & Lake supra n 115 230-6. 
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8.3.4.6 Penalties 
 
Any person convicted of an offence in terms of the CPA is liable190 to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or to both a fine and 
imprisonment.191 The magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to impose any penalty 
provided for in section 111(2) of the CPA.192 
 
8.3.5 Conclusion 
 
As noted above, the CPA has made provision for the requirements of sending direct 
marketing communications and advances which to an extent are in accord with 
international best practices as contrasted with those in other jurisdictions. The issue 
of the registry remains problematic as it creates uncertainty among consumers who 
are unable to exercise their rights as provided for in the Act.  
 
This uncertainty leaves consumers in a vulnerable place and direct marketers will 
inevitably exploit the situation. Overall, the provisions on direct marketing have been 
noted as “a welcome relief that is long overdue, as [they give] the consumer the right 
to reject and or accept unsolicited communications”.193  
 
The last anti-spam or direct marketing provisions to be considered are those in the 
Protection of Personal Information Act. An examination of these is outlined with a 
view to establishing whether they will bring us any closer to properly regulating 
spam, or whether they will, in fact, complicate the issue. 
 
8.4 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013  
 
8.4.1 Background to the Protection of Personal Information Act  
 
                                                          
190  Id s 111(1)(a) 
191  Id s 107(1) which deals with the breach of confidence and provides for an offence for those 
disclosing any personal information or confidential information concerning the affairs of any 
person obtained: (a) in the carrying out any function in terms of this Act; and (b) as a result of 
initiating a complaint or participating in any proceedings in terms of this Act. See exceptions to 
the above in s 107(2) of the CPA. 
192  Id s 111(2). For costs and offences related to prohibited conduct see s 108-110 and 112-113; 
Opperman & Lake supra n 115 237-41; and Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 para 99.1-99.2. 
193  See Papadopoulos supra n 15 235; and Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 53-4. 
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The protection of personal information, or data protection, provides legal protection 
for a person in instances where his or her personal information is processed by 
another person or an institution.194 This concept has also been interpreted to include 
the legal, regulatory, and institutional mechanisms that guide the collection, use, and 
disclosure of information.195 While other jurisdictions have been regulating the 
personal information of its citizens for decades, South Africa has only recently 
moved in this direction.196  
 
The forerunner to the Protection of Personal Information Act197 was a discussion 
paper tabled before the South African Law Reform Commission.198 The topic 
‘Privacy and Data Protection’ was considered by the Commission as far back as 
2005 in a discussion paper which contained a draft Bill on the protection of personal 
information.199 In 2009 the POPI Bill was drafted, and in November 2013 the POPI 
Act was approved, signed into law, and published in the Government Gazette on 26 
November 2013.200 The POPI Act has been dubbed ‘South Africa’s EU-style data 
protection law’ by some.201 There has been a need for this type of legislation in 
                                                          
194  See Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 267-81.  
195  The term “data protection” is commonly used in the following jurisdictions, among others, the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. In South Africa it is referred to as the ‘protection of 
personal information’. Id 267; and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 368.  
196  See Neethling (2012) 75 THRHR 242 where the author notes that “there are 76 countries that 
have introduced data protection laws”. For a discussion of these data protection laws see the 
following works: Naude and Papadopoulos (2016) 79/2 THRHR 214-226; and Papadopoulos & 
Snail ‘Privacy and data protection’ supra n 23 295-7 discussing the USA, OECD, and EU data 
protection rules; Id Roos 370-416 discussing the OECD guidelines, the Council of Europe 
Convention on Data Protection, and international data codes such as the United Nations, the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and African initiatives; Roos (2008) 4 PELJ 62-109; Roos 
(2007) 124/2 SALJ 400-3; and Van Schalkwyk & Marlie The protection of commercial 
information in electronic communications 38/1 46-72 and 87-90 for a discussion of the EU and 
the UN Guidelines. 
197  Hereafter ‘POPI Act’. 
198  See South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Discussion Paper 109 Project 124 
Privacy and Data Protection (2005). See also Maheep supra n 26 30-3; and Naude & 
Papadopoulos (2016) 79/1 51-52. 
199  See the following works discussing the Draft POPI Bill: Neethling supra n 196 245-255; also 
Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 434; Roos ‘Data protection’ 367-389; Papadopoulos & Snail supra n 23 
299-309; Hamman & Papadopoulos supra n 26 55-7; and Papadopoulos supra n 15 230-2.  
200  See Protection of Personal Information Act 4 2013. This Act is the first South African legislation 
that fully protects the processing of personal information of data subjects. See Michaelson 
‘POPI signed by the President’ http://www.michaelson.co.za/blog/popi-signed-by-the-
president/12625 (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
201  See Stein (2012) 12/10 Without Prejudice 48-9; Monty (2015) 15/6 Without Prejudice 86-7; and 
Matthes C ‘Unpacking the POPI Act: The ins and outs of protecting personal information’ 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71001 (date of use: 28 
January 2016). 
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South Africa for decades, and it is encouraging that it is now finally in place.202 It 
must be noted, however, that the operation of the POPI Act is to be introduced 
piecemeal by proclamation in the Government Gazette.  
 
8.4.2 The purpose of the POPI Act 
 
The aim of the POPI Act is to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy203 by 
safeguarding personal information when processed by a responsible party, subject to 
justifiable limitations aimed at balancing the right to privacy against other rights, in 
particular, the right of access to information.204 The POPI Act also protects important 
interests, including the free flow of information within the Republic and across 
international borders.205  
 
The POPI Act provides persons with rights and remedies to protect their personal 
information from processing that is not in accordance with the Act.206 It also 
establishes voluntary and compulsory measures – including the office of the 
Information Regulator who exercises powers and performs duties and functions in 
terms of the Act.207 The Act applies to fully, partly,208 and to the non-automated 
processing of personal information.209  
 
The POPI Act does not apply to the processing of personal information in the course 
of a purely personal or household activity,210 or to information that has been de-
                                                          
202  See Neethling supra n 196 241-2; also Roos Data Protection 654; and McQuoid-Mason (1982) 
XV/1 CILSA 135. 
203  The right to privacy is one of the fundamental human rights protected by the Constitution of 
South Africa Act 108 of 1996. Section 14 of the Constitution states that: “everyone has the right 
to privacy, which includes the right not to have the privacy of their communications infringed”. 
For a discussion of the right to privacy and common law see Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 418-22; 
Naude & Papadopoulos supra n 198 52-6; Neethling supra n 196 243-4; Papadopoulos & Snail 
supra n 23 276-8; Van Schalkwyk & Marlie supra n 196 75-6; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser 
supra n 194 217-54 and 370-3; Hofman Cyberlaw 43-62; Goodburn & Ngoye supra n 23 171-
96; and Buys ‘Privacy and the right to information’ 365-91. 
204  See s 2(a)(i) of the POPI Act.  
205  Id s 2(a)(ii). 
206  Id s 2(c). 
207  Id s 2(d). Chapter 5 of the POPI Act deals with supervision by the Information Regulator. 
208  Id s 2(4). The term automated is defined in s 1 of the POPI Act as meaning “equipment capable 
of operating automatically in response to instructions given for the purpose of processing 
information”. 
209  Id s 3(1)(a). 
210  Id s 6(1)(a). This covers the area where one keeps a directory of telephone numbers and 
addresses of friends and acquaintances. See Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 439. 
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identified to the extent that it cannot be re-identified.211 Section 5 of the POPI Act 
addresses the rights of data subjects.212 The POPI Act also regulates how personal 
information may be processed by setting conditions, in line with international 
standards, which prescribe the minimum threshold requirements for the lawful 
processing of personal information.213 The conditions for lawful processing of 
personal information include: the collection; purpose; use; quality; security; and the 
accountability of organisations in relation to that personal information.214 These 
information principles will not be discussed in depth here but certain conditions will 
be outlined in the discussion on unsolicited communications below. 
 
8.4.3 Direct marketing and unsolicited communications under the POPI Act  
 
8.4.3.1 Section 69: The rights of data subjects regarding direct marketing by 
 means of unsolicited electronic communications, directories and 
 automated decision making  
 
Section 69 provides: 
 
(1) The processing of personal information of a data subject for the purpose of direct marketing 
by means of any form of electronic communications, including automated calling machines, 
facsimile machines, SMSs or e-mail is prohibited unless the data subject: 
(a) Has given his, her or its consent to the processing; or 
(b) Is, subject to subsection (3), a customer of the responsible party. 
(2) (a) A responsible party may approach a data subject: 
(i) Whose consent is required in terms of subsection (1)(a); and 
(ii) Who has not previously withheld such consent only once in order to request the consent 
of the data subject. 
(b)The data subjects consent must be done in a prescribed form. 
(3) A responsible party may only process the personal information of a data subject who is a 
customer of that responsible party in terms of subsection (1) (b): 
(a) If the responsible party has obtained the contact details of the data subject in the context 
of a sale of product or services; 
(b) For purposes of direct marketing of the responsible party’s own similar products or 
services; and 
                                                          
211  Id s 6(1)(b). 
212  Id s 5(a)-(i). These include the right to have the data subjects’ personal information processed 
in accordance with the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information. See Roos 
‘Data privacy law’ 464-5. 
213  Id s 4. 
214  These information protection principles (conditions for lawful processing) are covered in 
Chapter 3 of the POPI Act. For a discussion of these principles see the following: Swales supra 
n 26 61-5; Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 442-54; Maheep supra n 26 44-50; Neethling supra n 196 
247-54; Papadopoulos & Snail supra n 23 301-305; Roos ‘Data Protection’ 371-9; Roos (2006) 
39/1 CILSA 107-27; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser supra n 194 267-81; and Van Schalkwyk & 
Marlie supra n 196 72 and 87-90. 
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(c) The data subject must also be given reasonable opportunity to object free of charge and 
in any manner free of unnecessary formality, to such use of his, her or its electronic 
details- 
(i) At the time when the information is collected; and 
(ii) On the occasion of each communication with the data subject for the purpose of 
marketing if the data subject has not initially refused such use. 
(4) Any communication for the purpose of direct marketing must contain:  
(a) Details of the identity of the sender or the person on whose behalf the communication has 
been sent; and 
(b) An address or other contact details to which the recipient may send a request that such 
communication cease. 
 
8.4.3.2 Commentary on direct marketing and unsolicited communications under the 
POPI Act 
 
(a) Definitions  
 
Section 1 of the POPI Act defines direct marketing as: 
 
 approaching a data subject, either in person or by mail or electronic communication for the 
direct or indirect purpose of: (a) promoting or offering to supply, in the ordinary course of 
business, any goods or services to the person; or (b) requesting the person to make a donation 
of any kind for any reason.  
 
At the outset it is important to note that the definition of direct marketing under the 
POPI Act corresponds to that in the CPA, save for a difference in the terms “data 
subject”215 and “consumer”. Some note that “direct marketing includes the collection 
of data using software and cookies which are also data files, but are not protected 
under the automated decision-making provisions in that legal consequences do not 
necessarily attach to them”.216 Section 69(1) provides for direct marketing as 
covering the processing of data subjects’ personal information217 in the following 
mediums: automatic calling machines;218 facsimile; SMSs; or e-mail.219 These 
                                                          
215  Id s 1 defines “data subject” as “the person to whom personal information relates”. 
216  Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 59. 
217  Ibid. This section defines the term “personal information” as “information relating to an 
identifiable, living, natural person and where it is applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic 
person, including but not limited to: information relating to race, gender, sex, age et cetera; 
information relating to the education or the medical financial criminal or employment history of a 
person; any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number, 
location information, online identifier or other particular assignment to the person; the biometric 
information of the person; and the name of a person if it appears with other personal 
information relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information 
about the person”. 
218  See s 69(5) which defines “automated calling machines” as “a machine that is able to make 
automated calls without human intervention”.  
219  Id s 69(1); and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 460-1. 
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mediums correspond to those covered by the definition of electronic communications 
under the CPA. The term electronic communications, on the other hand, is defined 
as “any text, voice, sound, or image message sent over an electronic communication 
network which is stored in the network or in the recipients’ terminal equipment until 
he or she collects it”.220  
 
Roos notes that a major requirement in the POPI Act is that “the information must 
have been obtained in the context of a sale, which links unsolicited communications 
with the “content” element which is “commercial”, rather than with the bulk or volume 
of the message”.221 
 
(b) Opt-in mechanism  
 
Section 69(2) provides for the responsible party222 to request for consent before they 
can send unsolicited communications, and also that the data subject must not have 
withheld such consent.223 The responsible party must approach the data subject 
once to request such consent. The term “consent” is defined as “any voluntary, 
specific, and informed expression of will in terms of which permission is given for the 
processing224 of personal information”. The number of times the term “consent” 
features in the section including other terms used to describe that consent 
emphasizes the importance and intensity of the provision. Although those descriptors 
are not defined it is clear that the person giving the consent must have done that 
                                                          
220  Id s 1. 
221  Id ss 69-70; and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 461-62. 
222  Ibid s 1 defines the term “responsible person” as meaning “a public or private body or any other 
person which, alone or in conjunction with others determines the purpose of and means for 
processing personal information. A private body on the other hand means: a natural person 
who carries or has carried on any trade, business or profession, but only in such capacity; a 
partnership which carries or has carried on any trade, business or profession; or any former or 
existing juristic person, but excludes a public body”. A public body means “any department of 
state or administration in the national or provincial sphere of government or any municipality in 
the local sphere of government; or any other functionary or institution when exercising a public 
power or performing a duty in terms of the Constitution or provincial constitution; or exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation”.  
223  Id 69(2)(a). 
224  Id s 1 defines the term “processing” as “any operation or activity or any set of operations, 
whether or not by automatic means, concerning personal information, including: (a) The 
collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, 
alteration, consultation or use; (b) dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or 
making available in any other form; or (c) merging, linking, as well as restriction, degradation, 
erasure or destruction of information”. 
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themselves and that they are informed of what they are consenting to. This consent 
for processing of personal information must have been done via specified 
communications, and in a prescribed manner and form.225 Note should also be had 
of the fact that the Minister may, in terms of section 69(2) of the POPI Act, issue 
regulations on the manner and form by which the data subject’s consent must be 
requested.226  
 
Section 69(3) requires that the personal information to be processed should be that 
of the responsible party’s customer and that the personal information must have 
been obtained from the data subject in the context of a sale of products and or 
services. This provision invokes an opt-in mechanism which requires that a 
relationship be established before anyone can send unsolicited direct marketing 
material.227  
 
At first glance it appears that the POPI Act has introduced a restrictive measure in 
regulating spam. For example, by placing an obligation on the responsible person to 
ensure that before he or she sends the data subject unsolicited communication or 
direct marketing, he or she must first obtain the consent of the data subject to 
process his or her personal information.228  
 
However, some have raised concerns about these provisions which include:229  
 
that the section is a disappointment in that it still allows a responsible party to approach a 
data subject at least once to request consent to send direct marketing material if that consent 
has not previously been withheld. This allowance is strongly opposed due to its scope for 
abuse, and because, in essence, it reverts back to the opt-out model. In fact, by allowing a 
responsible party to process personal information once to make the approach to get consent, 
the prohibition in section 69(1) is reduced to a second-level protection mechanism. That is it 
becomes relevant after the approach has been made. It is also contrary to the position 
established in the CPA where a direct marketer must, without exception, assume that a 
comprehensive pre-emptive block has been registered by a consumer.  
 
The sentiment above has proven to be true in that direct marketers upon hearing that 
POPI Act was to be enacted in 2013 started approaching potential customers for 
                                                          
225  Id s 69(1). 
226  Id s 112(2)(f). Also see s 113 on the procedure for making regulation; and Roos ‘Data privacy 
law’ 462-3. 
227   Id s 69(3)(a)-(b) read with s 69(1) and (2).  
228  Id s 69(1)(a). 
229  Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26; and Papadopoulos supra n 15 238-9. 
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consent. As a result, there was an increase in unsolicited advances both via e-mail 
and SMS during that period until today. And as if on cue these direct marketers like 
Ketler above are quick to point out that the POPI Act allows them to do that at least 
once. Regarding reverting back to the opt-out mechanism, the POPI Act makes 
provision for data subjects to “object free of charge” and in a manner free of 
unnecessary formality to such use at the time of collection.230 The problematic issue 
about this is that in most cases the responsible party approaching the data subject 
for consent would have obtained such personal information from other sources and 
not from the data subject themselves as the Act provides.231  
 
Vermeulen, notes that section 69(1)(a) provides for a soft opt-in mechanism which 
requires that contact be made once, and that consent be given.232 Although the issue 
of consent and a relationship calls for an opt-in mechanism, the POPI Act however, 
falls short by allowing for an approach to be made once. As noted above in Australia, 
one cannot send an electronic message seeking consent (for this in itself is 
considered a commercial message) because it seeks to establish a business 
relationship.233 Hence the restrictive approach in prohibiting the sending of 
unsolicited e-mails without a relationship.234 
 
(c) Fraudulent headers or spoofing 
 
The POPI Act addresses and prohibits fraudulent activities such as spoofing or 
disguising headers.235 Section 69(4)(a) makes provision for details of the identity of 
the sender, or the person on whose behalf the communication was sent. This 
information includes the address or other contact details to which the recipient may 
send a request that such communication cease.236 This section aligns with 
                                                          
230  See s 69(3)(c) of the POPI Act. 
231  Id s 69(3)(a). 
232  See Vermeulen J ‘Killing spam softly: POPI in South Africa’ http://www.broadband. co.za/ 
news/telecoms/81759-killing-spam-softly-popi-in-south-africa.html (date of use: 28 January 
2016).  
233  See ACMA ‘Spam consent’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-
you-dont-spam/spam-consent-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-acma (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
234  See the following for contrasting views on the opt-in mechanism: the ITU in Chapter 4 para 
4.3.4.2 (c)(ii); Chapter 5 SADC Model Law in para 5.3.4.2 (c)(ii); and Australia’s position in 
Chapter 7 para 7.2.3.2(a) above on the opt-in mechanism. 
235  See s 69(2)(a)(ii) of the POPI Act. 
236  Id s 69(4). 
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provisions in other jurisdictions such as the USA and Australia above.237 In fact the 
POPI Act has picked up where the CPA left off. This provision extends to third 
parties whom the sender might use in order to send communications for direct 
marketing. It is hoped that the implementation of this provision will enable the data 
subject to locate the spammer should he or she wish the solicitation to stop. Hamann 
and Papadopoulos note that even though a provision is made for falsifying of 
headers, “section 69(4) does not stipulate what, how or where contact details should 
be displayed for the purposes of requesting a sender to cease sending further 
communications”.238 
 
(d) Harvesting of lists 
 
Section 69(3) of the POPI Act requires that the personal information be processed 
only if the data subject concerned is a customer of the responsible party, and that his 
or her information must have been obtained in the course of a sale or service 
provided, and for the responsible party’s similar goods or services.239 This section 
covers the issue of the harvesting and sale of lists. This provision should also be 
read with the following conditions for the processing of personal information – in 
particular: condition 2 (processing limitation);240 condition 3 (collection for a specific 
purpose);241 condition 6 (openness principle);242 condition 7 (security safeguards);243 
and condition 8 (data subject participation).244 
 
Condition 2 provides for personal information to be processed lawfully and in a 
reasonable manner that does not infringe on the privacy of the data subject.245 This 
information may be processed in an adequate, relevant and not excessive 
manner.246 The personal information may only be processed under the following 
                                                          
237  This issue is covered in para 6.3.2.2 (c) (USA); and para 7.2.3.2 (b) (Australia). 
238   Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 60; and Papadopoulos supra n 15 240. 
239  See s 69(3)(a) and (b) of the POPI Act. 
240  Id s 9-12.  
241  Id s 13. 
242   Id s 17-18 
243  Id s 19-22. 
244  Id s 23-35. 
245  Id s 9(a) and (b).  
246   Id s 10. Roos note that “in terms of this minimality requirement, the amount of personal 
information collected should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the purpose(s) for which 
information is processed” (Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 443). 
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circumstances: consent for processing is from a data subject or a competent person 
where the data subject is a child; the processing protects the legitimate interest of 
the data subject.247 The data subject must also be given a chance to object at any 
time to the processing of their personal information for purposes of direct marketing 
other than direct marketing by means of unsolicited electronic communications in 
section 69.248 Section 12 also provides for the collection of personal information to 
be directly from the data subject with a few exceptions namely: “if the information is 
contained in or derived from a public record or has deliberately been made public by 
the data subject; the collection of information from another source would not 
prejudice a legitimate interest of the data subject”. 249  
 
Condition 3 deals with the purpose-specific condition which requires that personal 
information be collected for a specific, explicitly defined, and lawful purpose related 
to the function or activity of the responsible party.250 Roos note that “the purpose for 
which such information is collected must be established before any information is 
collected and that it may not be vague, uncertain or unlawful”.251  
 
Condition 6 covers the principle of openness, and provides that reasonable practical 
steps be taken by the responsible party to ensure that the data subject is aware of 
the following:252  
 
the information being collected and the source from where it was collected in case that 
information was sourced from a third party; the name and address of the responsible party; the 
purpose for which the information is collected; whether the supply of such information by the 
data subject is voluntary or mandatory; any particular law requiring or authorizing the collection 
of information; and the fact that the responsible party intends to transfer the information to a 
third party or international organization and the level of protection afforded to the information by 
that third party or international organization. 
 
This principle avoids the situation where the data is collected in secret and the 
subject is unaware of who is collecting and for what purposes.253 It also requires that 
the responsible party maintain the documentation of all its processing operations.254 
                                                          
247   Id s 11((1)(a) and (d). 
248   Id s 11(3)(b), contrasted with s 69: and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 445. 
249  Id s 12(1) and (2). See Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 443-6 for a discussion of this principle; and 
Swales supra n 26 61-2. 
250   See s 13(1) and 14 of the POPI Act; Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 446-7; and Swales supra n 26 62. 
251  Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 446. 
252   Section 18(1)(a)-((d); (f) and (g) of the POPI Act. Contrast these provisions with s 69(3)(a) of 
the POPI Act. Also see Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 449-451.  
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Condition 7 deals with the security measures on the integrity and confidentiality of 
personal information. Section 19 puts an obligation on the responsible party to 
secure the integrity and confidentiality of the personal information in its possession 
and to take appropriate, reasonable technical and organizational measures255 to 
prevent the following: “loss of, damage to or unauthorized destruction of personal 
information; and unlawful access to or processing of personal information.256 Those 
reasonable measures include: identifying all reasonable foreseeable internal and 
external risks to personal information; establishing and maintaining appropriate 
safeguards against the risks identified; regularly verify that the safeguards are 
effectively implemented; and that those safeguards are continually updated in 
response to new risks or deficiencies”.257 Roos note that appropriate security 
measures can generally be said to “mean that guarantee a level of security that is 
appropriate to the risks presented by the processing and the nature of the 
information to be processed”.258  
 
Condition 8, the last condition provides for the data subject to be a participant in 
processing of their personal information, by accessing and correcting such personal 
information.259 The right to access will include a request to the responsible person by 
a data subject to confirm (free of charge) whether the responsible party holds the 
data subjects personal information; and also a record or description of the personal 
information in possession of the responsible party.260 This will also include 
information about the identity of all third parties or categories thereof that would have 
had access to the personal information of the data subject.261 The information 
requested must be provided within a reasonable time; at a prescribed fee (if any); in 
a reasonable manner and format; and in a form that is generally understandable.262 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
253   Id Roos 449. 
254  See s 17 of the POPI Act. 
255   Roos note that: “technical measures will include measures imbedded in the technology used to 
process the information; and organizational measures will include the use of access codes” 
(Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 452). 
256   Section 19(1)(a) and (b) of the POPI Act. Contrast this with reg 4 under the CPA above; Id 
Roos 451-453; and Papadopoulos and Snail supra n 23 304-305. 
257   Id s 19(2) POPI Act. 
258   Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 451. 
259   See s 23 and 24 of the POPI Act. 
260   Id s 23(1)(a) and (b; also Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 453-4; Papadopoulos and Snail supra n 23 
305-6; and Swales supra n 26 64-5.  
261   Ibid POPI Act. 
262   Ibid. 
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The data subject may also request the responsible person to correct or delete 
personal information in its possession or under its control that is inaccurate, 
irrelevant, excessive, out of date et cetera.263 The POPI Act also require that 
responsible parties ensure that the conditions in chapter 3 of this Act and all the 
measures that give effect to such conditions are complied with at the time of the 
determination of the purpose and means of processing and during the processing 
itself.264  
 
The extent to which the POPI Act has gone in safeguarding the processing of 
personal information is commendable. By so doing, the issue of harvesting and sale 
of lists had been adequately covered. However, the most important question is what 
will happen to those lists already in circulation and still being used for marketing 
purposes once the POPI Act is fully operational. The provisions of the POPI Act will 
only apply from the time of its promulgation and not retrospectively. Be that as it 
may, at least data subjects will be in a position to deal with individuals that they have 
had contact with or whom they have consented to enter into a relationship.  
 
(e) Directories  
 
Section 70(1) of the POPI Act provides that before the subscriber’s265 personal 
information can be processed, he or she must be aware of the purpose of such 
collection.266 The data subject in this instance must be informed free of charge 
before his or her personal information is processed or included in such directories.267 
This does not apply to editions of directories produced in printed or off-line electronic 
format before the commencement of this section.268 Section 70(4) provides “if the 
personal information of data subjects who are subscribers to fixed or mobile public 
voice telephony services has been included in a public subscriber directory in 
                                                          
263   Id s 24(1). 
264   Id s 8 of the POPI Act. 
265  Id s 69(5) of the POPI Act defines the term “subscriber” as “any person who is party to a 
contract with the provider of the publicly available electronic communications services for the 
supply of such services”.  
266  Id s 70(1)(a) and (b). 
267  Id s 70(1). Section 70(2) further provides that “the objection must be in a manner free of 
unnecessary formality, to such use of his, her or its personal information or to request 
verification, confirmation or withdrawal of such information if the data subject has not initially 
refused such use”. 
268  Id s 70(3). 
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conformity with the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information 
before the commencement of this section, that information may continue to be 
included in this public directory in its printed or electronic versions, after having 
received the information required by subsection (1)”.269 
 
(f) Enforcement of the POPI Act  
 
Section 39 of the POPI Act establishes a juristic person known as the Information 
Regulator which will have jurisdiction throughout the Republic.270 The Information 
Regulator is an independent institution and is subject to the Constitution and to the 
law;271 it must be impartial and perform its functions and exercise its powers without 
fear, favour, or prejudice,272 and in accordance with the Act;273 and be accountable 
to the National Assembly.274 The office of the Information Regulator275 consists of a 
chairperson276 and four ordinary members.277 It must also establish an enforcement 
committee which must consist of at least one member of the Regulator.278  
 
The powers and duties and functions of the Regulator include:279 to provide 
education by promoting an understanding and acceptance of the conditions for the 
lawful processing of personal information and the objects of those conditions among 
others;280 to monitor and enforce compliance;281 to consult with interested parties by 
                                                          
269  Id 70(4); and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 461-2. 
270  Id s 39(a); and id Roos 465-471. 
271  Id s 39(b) 
272  Ibid.  
273  Id s 39(c). 
274  Id s 39(d). 
275  See Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 465-7; also Swales supra n 26 75-7; and Papadopoulos & Snail 
supra n 23 301 for a discussion of the office of the Regulator. 
276  See s 41(1)(a)(i) of the POPI Act. See the following sections regarding the chairperson: ss 
41(1)(c) and (f); 41(2)(a); also s 43 for the duties and powers and functions of the chairperson 
and other members: ss 41(1)(b), (e), and (g); and s 43 of the POPI Act. 
277  Id s 41(1)(a)(ii).  
278  Id s 50 which deals with the establishment of the enforcement committee. 
279  Id s 40 of the POPI Act. Also Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 466-7 for a discussion on the tasks of the 
Information Regulator. 
280  Id s 40(1)(a). Other requirements include: “making public statements regarding any matter 
affecting the protection of the personal information of a data subject or of any class of data 
subjects; giving advice to data subjects on the exercise of their rights; and, upon request, 
providing advice to the Minister or a public or private body on obligations under the provisions 
and generally on any matter relevant to the operation of the Act” (s 40(1)(a)(ii-v of the POPI 
Act). 
281  Id s 40(1)(b). The monitoring and enforcing compliance will be by: “public and private bodies 
with the provisions of the Act; undertaking research into and monitoring developments in 
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receiving and inviting representations from members of the public on any other 
matter affecting the personal information of a data subject;282 to cooperate on a 
national and international basis with other persons and bodies concerned with the 
protection of personal information;283 to handle complaints;284 to conduct research 
and report to Parliament;285 to issue codes of conduct;286 and to facilitate cross-
border cooperation in the enforcement of privacy laws by participating in any 
initiative aimed at such cooperation.287 Chapter 10 of the POPI Act deals with 
enforcement of the Act.288 Section 73 deals with the interference with the protection 
of personal information of data subjects in relation with the breach of the conditions 
for the lawful processing of personal information as prescribed in chapter 3 and also 
with non-compliance with specific sections of the Act including section 69, 70 and 
71.289 Any person may submit a complaint to the Regulator in the prescribed form 
and matter alleging interference with the protection of the personal information of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
information processing and computer technology to ensure that any adverse effects of such 
developments on the protection of personal information of data subjects are minimised and 
reporting to the Minister the results of such research and monitoring;  examining any proposed 
legislation, including subordinate legislation or proposed policy of the Government that the 
Regulator considers may affect the protection of personal information of the data subject and 
reporting to the Minister the results of that examination will be done in the following manner;  
monitoring the use of unique identifiers of data subjects, and reporting to Parliament from time 
to time on the results of that monitoring, including any recommendations relating to the need of, 
or desirability of taking, legislative, administrative or other action to give protection or better 
protection to the personal information of data subject; and examining any proposed legislation 
that makes the provision for the collection of personal information by any public or private body” 
(s 40(1)(b)(i)-(iii); (vii) and (ix)); also Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 476. 
282  Id s 40(c)(i). 
283  Id s 40(c)(ii). 
284  Id s 40(d). This section includes “the receipt and investigations of complaints about alleged 
violations of the protection of personal information of data subjects and reporting to 
complainants in respect of such complaints, gathering such information as in the Regulator’s 
opinion will assist him or her in discharging his or her duties and carrying out his or her 
functions under the Act; attempting to resolve complaints by means of dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation and conciliation; and serving any notices in terms of the Act 
and further promoting the resolution of disputes in accordance with the prescripts of this Act”.  
285  Id s 40(e). The research and reporting to Parliament is to be done in the following manner:  
“from time to time on the desirability of the acceptance by South Africa of any international 
instrument relating to the protection of personal information of the data subject; and on any 
matter including necessary legislative amendments relating to protection of personal 
information that in the Regulator’s opinion should be drawn to Parliaments attention”. 
286  Id s 40(f). These codes should be: “issued, amended or revoked from time to time; provide 
guidelines to assist bodies to develop codes of conduct or to apply codes of conduct; and 
consider afresh, upon application, determinations by adjudicators under approved codes of 
conduct”. See Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 469-70.  
287  Id s 40(g) read with chapter 9 dealing with transborder information flows; and s 40(h) for 
general powers and duties exercised by the Regulator.  
288  Id ss 73-99; also Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 470-5; and Papadopoulos and Snail supra n 23 307-
8. 
289   Id s 73(a) and (b). 
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data subject.290 Upon receipt of such complaints the Regulator will conduct a pre-
investigation;291 act as conciliator in relation to any interference with the protection of 
the personal information of a data subject; and conduct a full investigation of the 
complaint among others.292 
 
(g) Penalties  
 
Any person convicted of an offence in terms of the POPI Act will be liable on 
conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or to 
both a fine and such imprisonment.293 Penalties for non-compliance with the 
provisions of the POPI Act are dealt with under Chapter 11 titled: “Offences, 
Penalties and Administrative Fines”.294  
 
8.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The POPI Act was signed into law on 26 November 2013 with the commencement 
date set for 11 April 2014.295 Since then the Act has been implemented in phases, 
and in the view of some commentators, the provisions which have come into 
operation are not of great significance.296 Other provisions which will have a huge 
impact on how spam is regulated in South Africa are dependent on the appointment 
of the Information Regulator. This much-anticipated event was finally realised with 
the announcement on 7 September 2016 that the office Information Regulator had 
been established.297 This means that the South African landscape regarding the 
                                                          
290  Id 74 (a). 
291  Id s 79 for pre-investigation proceedings of Regulator.  
292  Id s76 (1). 
293  Id s 107(2); and Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 475-6. 
294  Chapter 11 deals with a variety of offences, penalties, and administrative fines which include: s 
100: obstruction of the Regulator; s 101: breach of confidentiality; s 102: obstruction of 
execution of warrant; s 103: failure to comply with enforcement or information notices; s 104: 
offences by witnesses; s 105: unlawful acts by responsible party in connection with an account 
number; s 106: unlawful acts by third parties in connection with an account number; s 107: 
penalties; s 108: magistrate court jurisdiction to impose penalties; and s 109: administrative 
fines. See Roos ‘Data privacy law’ 475-7. 
295  See Pillay (2014) 14/8 Without Prejudice 54. 
296  Ibid; Swales supra n 26 82; and Michaelsons ‘POPI commencement date or POPI effective 
date’ http://www.michaelson.co.za/blog/popi-commencement-date-popi-effective-date/13109 
(date of use: 28 January 2016). These include: s 1 (definition section); Chapter 5 (Part A 
Information Regulator); s 112 (regulations); and s 113 (procedure for making regulations). 
297  See Michaelsons ‘Information Regulator in South Africa’ http://www.michaelsons.co.za/blog/ 
information-regulator-in-south-africa/13893 (date of use: 19 September 2016). 
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issue of spam will have consequential effects on the existing provisions, especially 
section 45 of the ECT Act. The next step is for the President to proclaim the 
commencement of those provisions in the POPI Act which are yet to come into 
force.298 The proclamation date will be followed by a grace period of one year from 
the commencement of a particular section (in this case section 69).299 The grace 
period might also be extended by an additional period which may not exceed three 
years.300  
 
The POPI Act does, however, address a number of the concerns identified above, 
and has aligned itself with other international trends. Issues such as the harvesting 
of lists and the identification of senders of unsolicited electronic mail are some of the 
basic requirements included in the POPI Act which are not found in the ECT Act. 
Some consider the POPI Act’s provision on unsolicited communications “a major 
improvement on section 45 of the ECT Act in so far as it prohibits the processing of 
personal information for direct marketing purposes unless the data subject has 
consented (opt-in system) or is – subject to subsection (2) – a customer of a 
responsible party”.301  
 
In recent years a number of Bills have also been published which contain anti-spam 
provisions and these are discussed below. 
 
8.5 Bills on unsolicited electronic communications 
 
8.5.1 ECT Amendment Bill of 2012 
 
8.5.1.1 Introduction 
 
In 2012, a decade after the ECT Act was promulgated, an Amendment Bill was 
published302 to, among other things, amend the original Act so as to promote 
electronic transactions nationally and internationally, and to acknowledge the 
                                                          
298  Ibid. 
299   See s 114(1) of the POPI Act. 
300  Id s 114(2. 
301  See Papadopoulos supra n 15 240; and Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 59. 
302  Hereafter the ‘Amendment Bill’. See supra n 5. 
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benefits and efficiency of electronic commerce.303 Although the Amendment Bill 
proposes a number of amendments to the original Act, focus will only be on 
amendments proposed to section 45 of the ECT Act, and other related matters.  
 
8.5.1.2 Proposed definition of spam under the Amendment Bill 
 
As indicated above one of the criticisms levelled at the ECT Act was its failure clearly 
to define what constitutes spam. This proved problematic in the Ketler case where 
the court was forced to turn to the Oxford Dictionary to establish what spam is so as 
to decide whether or not Ketler was a “spammer”.304 The Amendment Bill introduces 
definitions of what constitutes unsolicited commercial communications, and also 
other definitions which are important in clarifying the issue of spam. Clause 1 of the 
Amendment Bill defines “unsolicited communications” as follows:  
 
Unsolicited communications shall in relation to a data message regarding goods or service, 
mean that the data message has been transmitted to a consumer by or on behalf of a supplier 
without the consumer having expressly or implicitly requesting that data message305 [emphasis 
mine]. 
 
 
The Amendment Bill also introduces the terms “commercial communications” and 
“commercial electronic transaction” which are respectively defined as:  
 
Commercial communications means a data message sent or received as part of or in 
anticipation of, a commercial electronic transaction;306 and  
Commercial electronic transaction307 means the sale or purchase of goods or services for 
consideration, whether between businesses, households, individuals, governments, and/or 
                                                          
303  Other purposes are: “to build confidence in the electronic communications by introducing 
schemes for the accreditation to authenticate services and products; to help realise the 
economic and social benefits that can be derived through the use of authenticated services and 
products in secure global electronic commerce among others” (see cl 1 of the Amendment Bill). 
304  See para 40 Ketler case supra n 68. The court defined the noun “spam” as “irrelevant or 
inappropriate messages sent on the Internet to a large number of newsgroups or users; and, as 
a verb, the court noted it bears a meaning of sending the same message indiscriminately to 
(large numbers of newsgroups or users) on the Internet”. This definition has to do with volume 
and not necessarily content. 
305  The term “data message” is defined in the Amendment Bill as “electronic communications 
including (voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and any form of 
electronic communications stored as a record”. This amendment discards phrases such as: 
data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic and includes: the word stored in 
subsection (b) of the original term (emphasis mine). See cl 1(q) of the Amendment Bill.  
306  See cl 1(e) of the Amendment Bill.  
307  “Electronic transaction” is defined as “a transaction conducted using electronic 
communications” (cl 1(v) of the Amendment Bill). This definition puts to rest the concern about 
the lack of clarity in the original Act as to whether a communication must be classified as 
electronic format to be spam (Buys supra n 15 161). 
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other public or private organisations, that are conducted over electronic communications 
networks and/or electronic communications facilities, and include the ordering, payment of 
consideration308 for and/or delivery of the goods or services in the same way. 
 
The proposed amendment to section 45 provides: 
 
(1) No person309 may send unsolicited communications without the permission of the 
consumer to whom those unsolicited communications are to be sent or are in fact sent. 
(2) No agreement is concluded where a consumer has failed to respond to an unsolicited 
communication. 
(3) Any person who fails to comply with or contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence 
and liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding R1 million or imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding 1 year. 
 
8.5.1.3 Commentary on the anti-spam provisions under the Amendment Bill 
 
(a) Background  
 
Clause 45 of the Amendment Bill has three provisions as opposed to the four in the 
original Act. Section 45(1) of the original Act is amended fundamentally in that it 
previously legalised spam and thus placed an obligation on recipients to perform 
certain tasks.310 The “new” clause 45 makes spam illegal. 
 
The Amendment Bill further clarifies the punishment to be meted out if the provisions 
of the clause are violated. Clause 45(2) imposes either a fine of one million Rand or 
one year’s imprisonment. The Amendment Bill proposes the deletion of section 45(4) 
of the original Act (which referred to section 89 of the ECT Act).   
 
(b) Proposed amendments to section 45  
 
Definition(s)  
 
                                                          
308  See cl 1(e) of the Amendment Bill which describes the term “consideration” as the meaning 
given to it in the Consumer Protection Act. Section 1 of Consumer Protection Act, 2008, defines 
“consideration” as “anything of value given and accepted in exchange for goods or services, 
including but not limited to: money, property, electronic credit; loyalty credit or award”. 
309  According to cl 1(z)(ff) of the ECT Amendment Bill, the term “person” includes “a natural person 
and any entity recognised as a juristic person and specifically includes a public body”. Contrast 
this with the definition in s 1 of the ECT Act which defines a person as including a public body. 
310  For a general background to the ECT Amendment Bill see Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 
26 60-1; Tladi ‘SPAM: An overview’ supra n 26 272-4. 
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The Amendment Bill defines the term unsolicited communications and South Africa 
will understand spam to be electronic communication transmitted to consumers with 
the aim of supplying goods and/or services. The commercial aspect is reiterated in 
the definition of “commercial communications” and “commercial electronic 
transactions” above, in that the communication should be of an electronic nature and 
the buying and selling should be undertaken using electronic communications, 
networks, or facilities.  
 
This definition is consistent with definitions in other anti-spam legislation.311 The 
definition of unsolicited communications also invokes the issue of “consent” or 
“permission”.312 This implies that there must be a relationship between the sender 
and the consumer before such communications are sent. Terms such as “expressly” 
and “impliedly” confirm this, despite their not being defined in the Amendment Bill.313 
This definition is in line with the prohibition in clause 45(1) and it invokes the opt-in 
mechanism, which, as noted above, some have been calling for. 
 
Opt-in mechanism v opt-out mechanism 
 
The opt-in model is consistent with the definition of unsolicited communications 
above especially where consent is required. This provision lays to rest the criticism 
that opt-in should be preferred to the opt-out mechanism. However, this 
notwithstanding, the original section 45(2) is retained and this is somewhat 
confusing. A restrictive mechanism is introduced which requires that a relationship 
be established before unsolicited mail is sent to a consumer in terms of section 
45(1).314 However, at the same time the provision still require that the consumer 
responds to the unsolicited communication by retaining section 45(2) of the original 
Act. Sense can, however, be made of the section if it is read to imply that an opt-out 
mechanism should be made available to those individuals who have already opted-in 
                                                          
311  See: para 6.3.2.1 (USA); and para 7.2.3.1 (Australia) for a discussion on the definitions. 
312  See para 2.14 of the Memorandum on the objects of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Amendment Act, 2012. 
313  See definitions of these terms in Chapter 4 above. 
314  The term “consumer” is defined as “any natural person who enters or intends entering into an 
electronic transaction with a supplier as the end user of goods or services offered by that 
supplier, and shall have a meaning given to it in the Consumer Protection Act” (see s 1(f) of the 
ECT Amendment Bill). 
 
 
285 
 
to receive such marketing advances via e-mail, but who, at a later stage, wish to stop 
receiving such mail. If not, then the Amendment Bill’s provision should be read like 
the POPI Act above, which introduces a soft opt-in to provide for cases where the e-
mail is indeed sent and the consumer needs to opt-out.  
 
The fact that a consumer is provided with a new mechanism by which to opt-in, he or 
she is still obliged to respond to spam e-mails. What remains unclear is whether this 
provision applies to messages to which the consumer has previously opted-in, or to 
any other message he or she might receive outside of an extant relationship.  
 
8.5.1.4 Conclusion 
 
From the above it is clear that the proposed provision has at least taken the 
criticisms levelled against the existing section into account, and has attempted to 
tighten the grip on spam by introducing the opt-in mechanism. While the Amendment 
Bill clarifies some of the confusion in the original Act,315 it still fails to address other 
practices that exacerbate the problem of spam which include: the harvesting of e-
mails; dictionary attacks; falsifying headers; and the use of labels.     
 
Although the amendments were published in 2012, at the time of writing the ECT 
Amendment Bill is still moot – the anti-spam regime in SA, therefore, remains the 
opt-out regime. The mere fact that the regime might be transforming from opt-out to 
opt-in does little to alter the situation. Besides, now that the POPI Act provisions on 
the issue come into operation, these proposed provisions would not apply as section 
45 would be repealed by the POPI Act. Perhaps the reason why there has been so 
little movement on the ECT Amendment Bill is because of the consideration for POPI 
Act provisions on spam which will cover more areas than the ECT Act.  
 
8.5.2 Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bills of 2015 and 2016  
 
8.5.2.1 Background  
 
                                                          
315  See especially the issue of penalties in s 89(1) of the ECT Act. 
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It is estimated that cyber-related offences are escalating and currently exceed one 
billion Rand in value annually.316 As a result, proposed legislation in the form of the 
Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill(s) was published to promote safer communities 
against cybercrimes and foster security in cyberspace.317 The Cybercrime Bill 
highlights the need for South Africa to align with international best practices 
regarding cybercrimes and cyber security. The Bills were released as follows: the Bill 
for public comment in 2015 with 30 November 2015 as the deadline for the 
submission of comments.318 Only a handful of comments had been received by the 
due date.319 In 2016 a follow up Bill was published which took into consideration the 
comments provided earlier.320 Note should be taken here that the first cybercrime 
provisions some of which were highlighted are found in the ECT Act.321 However, 
should the Cybercrimes Bill be passed into law some of those provisions in the ECT 
Act will be repealed.322 
                                                          
316  See South African Government ‘Justice publishes draft Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill for 
public comments’ (28 August 2015) http://www.gov.za/speeches/justice-publishes-cybercrimes-
and-cybersecurity-bill-public-comments-28-aug-2015-0000 (date of use: 28 January 2016). 
317  See Preamble to the Cybercrimes Bill.   
318  Hereafter ‘2015 Cybercrimes Bill’. See Ellipsis Regulatory Solutions ‘The cybercrime and 
cybersecurity Bill’ http://www.elipsis.co.za/cybercrimes-and-cybersecurity-bill (date of use: 28 
January 2016). 
319  These comments include: that large portions of the Cybercrimes Bill make sense, however, it is 
also set to be encroaching upon the constitutional freedoms. See Htxt.africa ‘Why the 
Cybercrimes Bill should concern South Africans’ http://www.htxt.co.za/2015/09/14/why-the-
draft-cybercrimes-bill-should-concern-south-africans/ (date of use: 28 January 2016) and 
Ellipsis Regulatory Solutions http://www.elipsis.co.za/cybercrimes-and-cybersecurity-bill. Other 
comments included: (a) the issue of definitions such as: “critical data”, “foreign state”, 
“unlawfully and intentionally access”, “law enforcement agency” and “investigator” (see 
http://www.elipsis.co.za/cybercrimes-and-cybersecurity-bill). Some clauses are set to be broad 
and vague, in particular: cl 2 (unlawful offence); cl 1 which is set to impose harsher penalties for 
the dissemination of hate speech online; Ch 6 which covers structures dealing with 
cybersecurity; and Ch 7 which covers national critical information infrastructure protection. Also 
see Internet Service Providers’ Association ‘Draft cybercrimes and cybersecurity Bill 2015’ 
http://www.ispa.org.za (date of use: 28 January 2016)). The problematic issue of stewardship of 
the Internet being a state security function; and that harsh draconian penalties would muzzle 
journalists; and that the Bill undermines the POPI Act were also noted as concerns (see, in 
particular, Right2Know Campaign ‘R2K submission on draft cybercrimes and cybersecurity Bill’ 
http://www.r2k.org.za/2015/11/30/cybercrimesbill (date of use: 28 January 2016)). 
320  Hereafter ‘2016 Cybercrimes Bill’. See supra n 6. 
321  See, in particular, Chapter 13 of the ECT Act which covers the following themes: definitions (s 
85); unauthorised access to, intercepting of, or interference with data (s 86); computer related 
extortion, fraud and forgery (s 87); attempt and aiding and abetting (s 88); and penalties in (s 
89). For a discussion on cybercrime provisions in the ECT Act see: Cassim (2011) 44/1 CILSA 
127-33; also Cassim (2010) 5/3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 118-
23; Snail (2009) 1 Journal of Information Law & Technology 1-13; Van der Merwe ‘Criminal 
Law’ 61-78; Gordon ‘Internet criminal law’ 423-46; and Watney ‘Cybercrime and investigation of 
cybercrime’ 336-7 and 347-50; and Collier ‘Criminal law and the Internet’ 319-47.  
322  See s 61 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill for the Schedule of laws to be repealed or amended by 
the Cybercrimes Bill. The following terms in s 1 will be repealed: “critical data”; “critical 
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8.5.2.2 Preamble to the Cybercrimes Bill   
 
The preamble to the Cybercrimes Bill makes provision for the creation of offences 
and the imposition of penalties which have a bearing on cybercrime; to criminalise 
the distribution of data messages that are harmful and provide interim orders; to 
further regulation of the jurisdiction for cybercrimes; and to further regulate the 
powers to investigate, search, access, or seize.323 It also regulates aspects of mutual 
assistance in the investigation of cybercrime, and the establishment of a 24/7 point 
of contact.324 It would also impose obligations on Electronic Communications Service 
Providers325 on aspects which may impact on cybersecurity and repeal and amend 
certain provisions of certain laws, and connected matters.326  
 
8.5.2.3 Anti-spam-related provisions under the Cybercrimes Bills  
 
(a) Background of the Cybercrimes Bills 
 
The Cybercrimes Bills contains a variety of issues relating to cybercrimes and cyber 
security.327 However, focus will only be on those provisions related to spam as they 
appear in both the 2015 and 2016 Bills. Below is a brief outline of these provisions. 
 
(b) Spam-related provisions in the Cybercrimes Bill 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
database”; and “critical database administrator”; Chapter IX (protection of critical databases) 
will be deleted; and parts of s 89 (dealing with penalties) will be repealed. 
323  See Preamble to the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill and Cybercrimes Bill 2016.  
324  Ibid. 
325  Hereafter ‘ECSP’. Clause 1 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill defines the term “ECSP” as: “(a) any 
person who provides an electronic communications service under and in accordance with an 
electronic communications service licence issued to such person under Chapter 3 of the 
Electronic Communications Act of 2005 or who is deemed to be licensed or exempted from 
being licensed as such in terms of the Electronic Communications Act of 2005; (b) ...; and (c) a 
person or entity who or which transmits, receives, processes or stores data on behalf of the 
person contemplated in sub-clause (a) and (b) or the clients of such person; or any other 
person  Also see clause 64 which covers the general obligations of electronic communications 
service provider liability)”. This definition is retained as is in section 1 of the 2016 Cybercrimes 
Bill. 
326  Ibid. 
327  See the following chapter in the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill: chapter 2 (cybercrimes); chapter 3 
(malicious communications); chapter 6 (mutual assistance); and chapter 12 (agreements with 
foreign states). 
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The spam related provisions under the two Bills are contained in the part on 
cybercrimes and include the following: unlawful securing of access; unlawful 
acquiring of data; unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tool; unlawful 
interference with data or computer program; unlawful acquisition, possession … of 
access codes and passwords. These will be outlined below. 
 
Personal information and financial information related offences 
 
Clause 3 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill deals with the prohibition on acquiring; 
possessing; or providing personal328 and financial information329 of another person 
for purposes of committing an offence.330 The Bill does not elaborate on what is 
meant by “committing an offence”, but it can be deduced from the provisions that the 
offence has to do with the cybercrimes contained in the Bill itself. In that case, since 
spammers need personal information in the form of e-mail addresses or contact 
numbers, this clause will apply to spam.  
 
The offence extends to anyone found in possession of the personal or financial 
information of another, if there is a reasonable suspicion that such information was 
acquired in the manner stated in that clause, and that the person possessing such 
information is unable to provide satisfactory reasons for such possession.331 Any 
person who contravenes the above provisions will be guilty of an offence332 and will 
be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five or ten million Rand or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five or ten years, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment.333   
 
Unlawful access 
 
                                                          
328  Clause 3(7)(a) of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill defines the term “personal information” as “any 
personal information defined under section 1 of the POPI Act”. The 2016 Cybercrimes Bill has 
done away with this provision. 
329  Id cl 3(7)(b) defines the term “financial information” as “any information or data which can be 
used to facilitate a financial transaction”. Also see cl 19 which covers the prohibition of financial 
transactions. See Cassim (2014) 47 CILSA 401 ff for a discussion of phishing and Watney 
supra n 320 349. 
330  See cl 3(1) and (2) of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
331  Id cl 3(4). 
332  Id cl s 3(1), (2), (3) and (4). 
333  Id cl 3(2), (5) and (6). 
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The 2015 Cybercrimes Bill also makes it an offence334 for anyone to unlawfully and 
intentionally access335 or intercept,336 in whole or in part: data;337 a computer device; 
a computer network;338 a database;339 a critical database;340 an electronic 
communications networks; or a National Critical Information Infrastructure.341 Any 
person who contravenes the provisions of sub-clause (1) will be liable on conviction 
to a fine not exceeding five or ten million Rand or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding five or ten years, or to both.342 Section 2 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill has 
rephrased the title to read: unlawful securing of access. This section has also 
                                                          
334    Id cls 4(1) and 5(1).  
335  Id cl 4(3) which defines the term “access” as “to make use of, to gain entry to, to view, display, 
instruct, or communicate with, to store data in or retrieve data from, to copy, move, add, 
change, or remove data or otherwise to make use of, configure or reconfigure any resource of a 
computer device a computer network, a database, a critical database, an electronic 
communications network or a National Critical Information Infrastructure, whether in whole or in 
part, including their logical, arithmetical, memory, transmission, data storage, processor, or 
memory functions, whether by physical, virtual, direct, or indirect means or by electronic, 
magnetic, audio, optical or any other means”. This definition has been modified in the 2016 
Cybercrimes Bill. 
336  Id cl 5(3) defines the term “interception of data” as meaning “the acquisition, viewing, capturing 
or copying of data through the use of hardware or software tool contemplated in section 6(5) or 
any other means, so as to make some or all of the data available to a person other than the 
lawful owner or of the data, the sender or the recipient or the intended recipients of the data 
and includes: examination or inspection of the contents of the data; and diversion of data or any 
part thereof from its intended destination to any other destination”. This term has been left out 
of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
337  Id cl 1 Bill defines the term “data” as “any representation of facts, information, concepts, 
elements, or instructions in a form suitable for communications, interpretation, or processing in 
a computer device, a computer network, a database, an electronic communications network or 
their accessories or components or any part thereof and includes a computer program and 
traffic data”. This term has also been modified in s 1 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill, and now 
includes: “electronic representations of information in any form”. The term “traffic data” means 
“data relating to a communication indicating the communications, origin, destination, route, 
format, time, date, size, duration or type of the underlying service” (this term is retained in the 
2016 Cybercrimes Bill); and “data message” means “a data in an intelligible form, in whatever 
form generated, sent, received, communicated, presented, tendered or stored by electronic 
means”. Section 1 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill has retained this term but rearranged it. 
338  Id cl 1 Bill defines the term “computer network” as “two or more inter-connected or related 
computer devices which allow these inter-connected or related computer devices to: exchange 
data or any other function with each other; exchange data or any other function with another 
computer network; or connected to an electronic communications network”. This term has been 
renamed to “computer system”. 
339  Id cl 1 defines the term “database” as “a collection of data in a computer data storage medium”. 
This term has been left out from the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
340  Ibid cl 1 defines the term “critical database” as “a computer data storage medium or any part 
thereof which contains critical data”. This term has been left out of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
341  Id cl 1 defines the term “National Critical Information Infrastructure” as “any data, computer data 
storage medium, computer device, database, computer network, electronic communications 
network, electronic communications infrastructure or any part thereof or any building, structure, 
facility, system or equipment associated therewith or part or portion thereof or incidental 
thereto”. This term has been left out of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. Also see s 59 (chapter 11 in 
the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill) which covers the establishment and control of National Critical 
Information Infrastructure Fund. 
342  Id cls 4(2)(a-b) and 5(2)(a-b). 
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replaced the terms above namely: computer program; computer data storage; and 
computer system.343  
 
A person is considered to have secured access to data or a computer program when 
the person is in a position to: “alter, modify or delete the data; copy or move the data 
to a different location in the computer data storage medium in which it is held or to 
any other computer data storage medium; obtain output data; or otherwise use data 
or computer program; also to cause the computer program to perform any 
function”.344 With regards to a computer data storage medium a person would have 
considered to have secured access if that person is in a position to: “access data as 
contemplated in s 2(a) or s 2(b) above; stored data or computer program on a 
computer data storage medium; or otherwise use the computer data storage 
medium”.345  
 
With regards to a computer system a person would be considered to have secured 
access when that person is in a position to: “use any resources of; instruct; or 
communicate with a computer system and the access contemplated in s 2(a)-(d) 
which the person secures is unauthorized”.346 The term “unauthorized” in this section 
means “that the person is not himself or herself lawfully entitled to secure access; 
does not have the lawful consent of another person who is lawfully entitled to secure 
access; or exceed his or her entitlement or consent to secure access to data, a 
computer program, a computer data storage medium or computer system”.347 
 
Unlawful acquiring of data 
 
Whoever overcomes any protection measure unlawfully or intentionally which is 
intended to prevent access to data; or acquires348 data, within or which is transmitted 
to or from a computer system is guilty of an offence.349 The same applies to the 
                                                          
343  See s 2(1) of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
344  Id s 2(2)(a) and (b). 
345  Id s 2(c). 
346  Id s 2(d). 
347  Id s 2(3). 
348  The term “acquire” means “to use; examine or capture data or any output thereof; copy data; 
move data to a different location in a computer system in which it is held or any other location; 
or divert data from its intended destination to any other destination”. Id s 3(4). 
349  Id s 3(1). 
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possession of data with the knowledge that a person will be guilty if such data was 
acquired unlawfully in terms of s 3(1).350 Any person found in possession of data, in 
regard of which there is a reasonable suspicion that such data was acquired 
unlawfully as contemplated in s 3(1) and that person is unable to give satisfactory 
account of such possession is also guilty.351 
 
Unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tool 
 
Clause 6 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill covers unlawful acts in respect of software 
and or hardware tools.352 This clause makes it an offence “for any person who 
unlawfully and intentionally manufactures, assembles, obtains, sells, purchases, 
makes available, or advertises any software or hardware tools for the purpose of 
contravening the provisions in clauses 3(1)(a); 4(1) or 5(1)”.353 Clause 6 also extends 
to the use and possession of any software or hardware tool in contravention of the 
clauses above.354 Any person found in possession of software or of hardware tools 
where there is a reasonable suspicion that the items are held for the purpose of 
contravening the provisions above, and who is unable to provide satisfactory 
reasons of such possession, will be guilty of an offence.355 A person contravening 
sub-clauses (1), (2) or (3) will be liable to a fine not exceeding five million Rand or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both such fine and 
                                                          
350  Id s 3(2). 
351  Id s 3(3). 
352  Id cl 5. Also see s 4 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. The term “software or hardware tools” is 
defined in cl 5(5) as “any data, electronic, mechanical or other instrument, device, equipment, 
or apparatus, which is used or can be used, whether by itself or in combination with any other 
data, instrument, device, equipment or apparatus, in order to: acquire, make available or to 
provide personal information or financial information as contemplated in particular clauses; 
access as contemplated in clauses 4(3); intercept data as contemplated in s 7(3); interfere with 
data as contemplated in cl 7(3)”. This term has been expanded in s 4(3) of the 2016 
Cybercrimes Bill to also include “acquiring, modifying, providing, making available, copying, 
using or cloning a password, access code or similar data or devices as defined in s 7(3)”. The 
term “computer program” means “a sequence of instructions which enables a computer device 
to perform specified functions” (see s 1 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill). 
353  Clause 6(1) of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill; also id s 4(1). Obviously the clauses mentioned 
therein are replaced by the following provisions in the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill: s 2(1) deals with 
securing access unlawfully); s 3(1) covers the issue of unlawfully acquiring of data; s 5(1) this 
covers the issue of unlawfully interfering with data or computer program; s 6(1) unlawful 
interference with computer data storage medium or computer system; or 7(1) (a) and (d) 
unlawful acquisition, possession, provision, receipt, or use of password, access codes or 
similar data device. 
354  Id cl 6(2).  
355  Id cl 6(3); also s 4(3) of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
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imprisonment; or to a fine not exceeding ten million Rand or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment.356  
 
Unlawful interference with data; computer program; computer data storage medium 
and computer system 
 
Section 5 makes it an offence for anyone who unlawfully and intentionally interferes 
with data; or computer program.357 The same applies with regard to computer data 
storage medium or computer system.358 The phrase “interference with data or 
computer program” means “to permanently or temporarily:359 delete or alter data or a 
computer program; render vulnerable, damage or deteriorate data or a computer 
program; obstruct, interrupt or interfere with the lawful use of data or computer 
program; and deny access to data or a computer program”. 
 
Unlawful acts in respect of malware 
 
Clause 9 covers the unlawful acts in respect of malware, and makes it an offence for 
any person to assemble, obtain, sell, purchase, possesses, make available, 
advertise, or use malware360 for the purposes of unlawfully and intentionally causing 
damage to data et cetera.361 Any person who is found in possession of malware and 
there is a reasonable suspicion that it is held for purposes of unlawfully and 
internationally causing damage to data, a computer device, et cetera, and who is 
unable to give a satisfactory account of his or her possession is likewise guilty of an 
offence.362 Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-clauses 1 and 2 is 
liable to a fine not exceeding five million Rand or to imprisonment for a period not 
                                                          
356  Id cl 6(4). The 2016 Cybercrimes Bill provides for penalties in s 14 (2) which are the same as 
the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
357  See s 5(1) of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
358  Id s 5(1). 
359  Id s 5(2). 
360  Id cl 9. The term “malware” is defined in cl 9(4) as “any data, electronic, mechanical or other 
instrument, device, equipment, or apparatus that is designed specifically to: create a 
vulnerability in respect of; modify or impair; compromise the confidentiality, integrity or 
availability; or interfere with the ordinary functioning or usage of, data, a computer device, a 
computer network, a database, a critical database, an electronic communications networks, or 
a National Critical Information Infrastructure”.  
361  Id cl 9(1). The clause includes damage caused on the following: a computer device, a computer 
network, a database, a critical database, an electronic communications network, or a National 
Critical Information Infrastructure. 
362  Id cl 9(2). 
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exceeding five years, or to both a fine and imprisonment.363 It is important to note 
here that the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill has done away with this clause. 
 
Unlawful acquisition, possession, provision, receipt or use of password, access 
codes or similar data or devices 
 
Section 7 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill makes it an offence for any person who 
unlawfully and intentionally acquires, possesses, provides to another person, or uses 
a password, an access code or similar data device for purposes of contravening the 
provisions in this Bill.364 If there is reasonable suspicion that anyone has acquired, or 
is in possession … of passwords or access codes for purposes of contravening 
provisions of this Bill and those persons are unable to give a satisfactory account of 
such possession, then they will be guilty of an offence.365 The terms “password, 
access codes” or “similar data device” are defined as:366  
 
a secret code or pin; an image; a security token; an access card; any device; biometric data; or 
a word or a string of characters or numbers used for financial transactions or user 
authentification in order to access data, a computer program, a computer data storage medium 
or a computer system. 
 
This provision is in line with the international trends as noted in Chapters 6 and 7 – 
ie, harvesting and especially the use of dictionary attacks.367 The following terms are 
indicative of such practices: using software to obtain, sell, purchase, acquiring, 
interfering, cloning a password or codes, make available or advertise e-mail 
addresses. All these are deceptive practices that spammers use to acquire personal 
information of recipients in order to send spam. Any person who unlawfully and 
intentionally attempts; conspires with any other person; aids, abets, induces, incites, 
instigates, instructs, commands or procures another person to commit an offence in 
terms of the above provisions is guilty of an offence and will be liable on conviction to 
the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence 
                                                          
363  Id cl 9(3). 
364  See s 7 (1) of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. The affected provisions include: ss 2(1); 3(1); 5(1); 
6(1); 8 or 9 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. This section reads the same as cl 10 of the 2015 
Cybercrimes Bill. 
365  Id s 7(2), contrast with cl 10(2) of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
366  See 7(3)(a) and (g) of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill; also cl 10(4) of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
367  See para 4.3.4.2 (c) (iv); para 6.3.2.3 (c); and para 7.2.3.2 (d). 
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would be liable.368 Clauses 3-5 and 9 above will be considered as aggravating 
factors if the offence was committed in concert with one or more persons.369 
 
(c) Enforcement 
 
Clause 64 addresses enforcement issues and also addresses the general 
obligations of the ECSP. It provides for reasonable steps to be taken in order to 
inform the clients of cybercrime trends which affect or may affect them.370 The clause 
also sets out procedures by which service providers’ clients can report cybercrimes 
to the ECSP. The ECSP is obliged to inform its clients of measures they may take in 
order to safeguard themselves against cybercrime.371 
 
An ECSP that is aware, or becomes aware, that its computer network or electronic 
communications network is being used to commit an offence provided in the Bill, 
must immediately report the matter to the National Cybercrime Centre and preserve 
any information which may assist law enforcement agencies in investigating the 
offences.372 This includes information which reveals the origin, destination, route, 
time, date, size, duration, and type of the underlying services.373 The ECSP which 
fails to comply with the sub-clauses above is guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine of ten thousand Rand for each day on which such failure to 
comply continues.374 
 
8.5.2.4 Commentary and conclusion  
 
The Cybercrimes Bills are another addition to the country’s ever-evolving anti-spam 
arsenal which promises to close the gaps, especially where computer-related crimes 
and activities are involved. The 2015 Bill specifically addresses the technical aspects 
of spam such as the use of malware,375 financial information (phishing),376 and 
                                                          
368  Id s 12 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill, contrast with cl 22 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
369  See cl 23 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill; also s 11(1) and (2) of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
370  See cl 64(1) of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill; also s 20 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
371  Ibid 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
372  Id cl 64(2)(a). 
373  Id cl 64(2) (b). 
374  Id cl 64(3). 
375  Id cl 9. 
376  Id cl 19. 
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software and hardware tools used to gain access to such information.377 The 
Cybercrimes Bill proposes the criminalisation of such acts and the penalties for such 
offences are clearly set out. The Bill applies to offences and acts or omissions 
committed in the Republic, and “a court in the Republic” will try those offences.378  
 
The global nature of cybercrimes presents challenges for South Africa and other 
nations wishing to address this issue. Some have noted that: “domestic solutions are 
inadequate in cyberspace because there are no geographical or political boundaries, 
and many computer systems can be easily accessed from anywhere in the world so 
rendering domestic laws increasingly obsolete”.379 The Cybercrimes Bills have 
addressed this concern in clause 65 which provides for agreements to be entered 
into with foreign states for mutual assistance and cooperation with regards to 
investigations into and prosecution of offences relating to cybercrime.380 This aligns 
with the provisions in the POPI Act.381 Cassim has advanced the following solutions 
as a way forward for SA in addressing cybercrime:382  
 
Encouraging Internet users to share the burden of securing information privacy where feasible; 
education in computer ethics should also be taught in schools to educate learners about the 
negative consequences of committing cybercrime; and this should be expanded to continuous 
research and training of IT security personnel, finance service sector personnel, police officers, 
prosecutors, and the judiciary to ensure that they remain abreast of the ever-changing 
computer technology.  
 
 
The 2016 Cybercrimes Bill has still not been promulgated, but should it become law 
its beneficial effect will lie in its technical measures – particularly as regards the use 
of software for harvesting lists.  
 
 
 
                                                          
377  Id cl 6. 
378  Id cl 25(1). The Bill fails to note the court.  
379  See Cassim (2010) supra n 321 123 and Cassim (2011) supra n 321 137.  
380  See Ch 10 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill. 
381  See chapter 9 of POPI Act dealing with trans-border information flows; also ch 6 of the 2016 
Cybercrimes Bill; and Chs 6 and 7 on international initiatives by the USA and Australia in 
combating spam. 
382  See Cassim (2011) supra n 321 123.  
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8.6 Contextualisation of South Africa’s anti-spam and direct-marketing 
provisions 
 
8.6.1 Introduction 
 
In outlining South Africa’s anti-spam provisions, it has become clear that these are 
scattered throughout a number of pieces of legislation noted which address a variety 
of issues. These legislative pieces have spanned a decade and continues to this 
day. The creation of an industry body to deal with these spam matters and related 
issues, and the interpretation of the relevant provisions by a court of law, have added 
value to the discourse, but a solution to the problems identified remains elusive. 
What the legislative pieces have done is to create a fragmented system which 
complicates issues considering that spam is also a global problem. This exposes 
South African consumers to rouge marketers within its borders, and also a possible 
safe haven for spammers as was noted in Chapter 5 above. Until this system is 
rectified, the problem will escalate with no solution in sight. An outline of how the 
fragmented system looks and how to work towards its alignment with international 
best practices is offered in what follows.  
 
8.6.2 Overlapping laws 
 
The laws outlined above often overlap; and in some instances they complement 
each other. Where overlaps or intersections occur, provision is made in those laws 
on how to deal with the overlaps. Obviously, these laws each define the issue of 
spam differently, each contains different mechanisms, and the penalties prescribed 
in the legislation also differ. 
 
8.6.2.1 ECT Act and the CPA 
 
The ECT Act makes provision for consumer rights within an online environment, 
whereas the CPA applies mainly in an offline environment. The provisions of the two 
Acts must be read and applied together. In terms of the CPA, where the legislation 
conflicts and concurrent application is not possible, the provision that extends the 
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greater protection to consumers prevails over an alternative provision.383 The coming 
into operation of the CPA has also amended certain provisions in the ECT Act, 
especially those that relate to the Consumer Affairs Committee which has been 
replaced by the National Consumer Commission.384 In coming to its decision, the 
court in the Ketler case also noted that the CPA and the ECT Act will run 
concurrently, especially with regard to the issue of self-regulation.385 
 
8.6.2.2 ECT Act, CPA and the POPI Act  
 
The first step toward consolidation of laws was taken when the POPI Act was signed 
into law in 2013. The anti-spam provisions apply only to electronic direct marketing, 
under the POPI Act and the CPA to non-electronic marketing. Where both provisions 
of the Acts apply and provisions are in conflict, section 2(9) of the CPA will determine 
which law takes precedence.386  
 
The coming into operation of the POPI Act has had the effect of repealing sections 
45, 50 and 51 of the ECT Act.387 The term “personal information” in section 1 of the 
ECT Act is to be replaced by that in the POPI Act. As noted above, the POPI Act is 
being implemented in phases, and the first phase covering the definition section is 
now in operation. The second phase of implementation will unfold only after the 
appointment of the Information Regulator – a process which only took place in 
September 2016.  
 
The coming into operation of the next phase means that the POPI Act will make the 
sending of spam illegal if the responsible person sends such without the consent of 
the recipient. However, sections 11 and 12 of the CPA will run concurrently with 
section 69 of the POPI Act when dealing with the issue of spam.  
 
8.6.3 Harmonisation of laws 
 
                                                          
383  See s 2(9)(b) of the CPA.  
384  Id Schedule 1(B); and Naude & Eiselen supra n 106 121.3. 
385  See para 81 of the Ketler case supra n 68; and Pistorius & Tladi supra n 26 703-4 for a 
discussion on overlapping of laws. 
386  See De Stadler supra n 15 62. 
387  See Schedule 1 of the POPI Act. 
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8.6.3.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned at the outset, the purpose with this chapter was not only to highlight 
legislative measures regulating spam, but also to question whether it is viable to 
have a number of anti-spam and direct-marketing provisions dealing with a single 
issue but prescribing contradictory requirements. Some are of the view that “spam 
and direct marketing online have not been viewed in a holistic context, and that this 
has resulted in the fragmented approach found in the legislations above”.388 
Although South Africa appears to have most provisions that can make for an anti-
spam law in place, the downside is that the system is fragmented. 
 
8.6.3.2 Requirements for sending electronic communications 
 
(a) Defining the problem 
 
Almost all the Acts that are discussed above define the terms for sending electronic 
communications satisfactorily. Some include additional concepts which better outline 
and enhance the scope of the problem. For example, the following definitions are 
covered in these laws: advertising or advertisement;389 commercial communications; 
commercial electronic transactions;390 consumer;391 data subject;392 direct 
marketing;393 electronic communications;394 person;395 personal information;396 and 
unsolicited commercial communications.397  
 
Hamann and Papadopoulos note:398 
 
 the definitional variations between the ECT Act, the CPA and the PPI399 should be carefully 
considered and harmonised as far as possible. …direct marketing online may not limit its 
                                                          
388  See Hamann & Papdopoulus supra n 26 61; Papadopoulos supra n 15 240. 
389  See s 1 of the NCA and the CPA. 
390  See cl 1(e) of the ECT Amendment Bill. 
391  See s 1 of the ECT Act, the NCA, and the CPA. 
392  Ibid the ECT Act and POPI Act. 
393  See s 1 of CPA and the POPI Act.  
394  Contrast s 1 of the ECT, CPA, and POPI Act. 
395  See s 1 of the CPA; s 1 of the POPI Act; and s 1 of the ECT Act. 
396  See s 1 of the POPI Act which has substituted s 1 of the ECT Act. 
397  See s 1(ss) of the ECT Amendment Bill. This definition is consistent with the direct marketing 
definitions under the CPA and the POPI Act. 
398  Papadopoulos supra n 15 239; and Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 59-60.  
399  Others refer to the Protection of Personal Information Act as the PPI. 
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activities to the sending of text, sound, voice and image. It should also include collecting data 
through software and cookies which are data files. 
 
The above authors further note:400  
  
 in trying to enforce a regulatory framework in an online environment, the enforcer must 
consider the different fields of application for each Act, and that the different definitions for 
terms like electronic communications and, more importantly, the overlapping and at times 
conflicting web of legislative provisions applicable to direct marketing or unsolicited commercial 
electronic communications, need to be included in the Act.  
 
(b)  Opt-in v opt-out mechanism 
 
As noted above, the South African regime still applies the opt-out mechanism which 
is encountered in various Acts.401 The CPA has taken a step in the right direction by 
making provision for a pre-emptive block402 which will enable consumers to register 
to opt-out of unwanted direct marketing e-mails. The CPA; NCA and the POPI Act 
provides that the opt-out mechanism must function free of charge,403 and that 
consumers may not be contacted at home for direct marketing purposes unless prior 
arrangements have been made.404 With the establishment of the office of the 
Information Regulator the opt-out mechanism will be replaced by an opt-in 
mechanism. 
 
(c) Harvesting and sale of lists 
 
Since personal information can be obtained in a variety of ways, there is a need to 
provide for the issues of harvesting and the sale of lists. The CPA prohibits the 
administrator from providing, selling, or otherwise disposing of any information 
contemplated in Reg. 4 of the CPA, to anyone, unless the express, written 
permission of the consumer has been obtained.405 The NCA also covers this issue 
by allowing consumers to opt-out of marketing or customer lists that might be sold or 
                                                          
400  Papadopoulos supra n 15 239. 
401  See s 45(1) of the ECT Act; s 11(2) of the CPA; s 74 (6)(a) of the NCA; and s 69(4)(b) of the 
POPI Act. 
402  See s 11(1)(c), (3) and (4) read with reg 4(3) of the CPA; and s 74(7) of the NCA. 
403  Id s 11(5); and s 69(3)(c) of the POPI Act. 
404  Id s 12; and s 75(2) of the NCA. 
405  See reg 4(e) of the CPA; contrast this with s 12; of POPI Act; and s 7 of the 2016 Cybercrimes 
Bill. 
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distributed by credit providers406 in contravention of the Act.407 This also includes the 
distribution of e-mail or SMS messages.408 The POPI Act, on the other hand, 
requires that only personal information of a data subject who is the customer and 
whose contact details were obtained in the context of the sale of a product or service 
may be processed.409 This also applies in instances where electronic directories are 
compiled – the data subject must be informed before such information is included in 
the directory.410 The POPI Act also elaborates on this issue by providing conditions 
for lawful processing of personal information as outlined above. Even the 
Cybercrimes Bill(s) makes provision for unlawful acts in respect of software and 
hardware tools which make obtaining, selling, or purchasing any software tools an 
offence.411 If enacted, the Cybercrimes Bill will add value to the regulation of the use 
of software for purposes of extracting the personal information of recipients in order 
to send spam e-mails. 
 
(d) False headers and spoofing 
 
Falsifying headers is provided for in section 69(5) of the POPI Act which requires 
that “any communication for the purpose of direct marketing, should contain details 
of the identity of the sender or the person on whose behalf the communication has 
been sent, together with an address or other contact details to which the recipient 
may send a request that such communications cease”.412 This section also applies to 
third parties who might be acting on behalf of the sender. Some have noted that 
while this issue has been addressed, “it is, however, inadequate as the Act fails to 
provide how and where those contact details need to be displayed”.413  
 
(e) Labelling  
                                                          
406  The term “credit provider” in respect of a credit agreement to which this NCA applies means 
among others: “the party who supplies goods and services under a discount transaction, 
incidental credit agreement or instalment agreement; the party who advances money or credit 
under a pawn transaction; and a party who extends credit under a credit facility”. See s 1 of the 
NCA for an exhaustive list. 
407  Id s 74(6)(b)(ii). 
408  Id s 74(6)(b)(iii). 
409  See s 69(3) of the POPI Act. 
410  Id s 70(1) and (2). 
411  See s 6 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
412  See s 69(4) of the POPI Act. 
413  See Hamann & Papadopoulos supra n 26 60. 
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The only legislation that contains labelling provisions is the NCA which requires that 
certain marketing information disseminated on behalf of a credit provider include a 
statement with the prescribed information for that particular solicitation.414 As noted 
above, labelling is important when it comes to the content of the message. Perhaps 
the POPI Act, as the default provision on spam, should be amended to include the 
labelling requirement. In that case recipients will be in a position to know the 
contents of the message before they open it and be able to make an informed 
decision before exposing themselves to messages with inappropriate content. The 
POPI Act should also specify where the label is to be placed and also to provide for 
the consequences for not adhering to that. In this case lessons from the USA and 
Australia above will be of value.  
 
(f) Enforcement and penalties 
 
The nature of enforcement depends on the Act concerned. The following institutions 
currently enforce the provisions of the various laws: the National Consumer 
Commission; the National Credit Tribunal; and the Information Regulator.415 The 
penalties also differ in that some of the legislation regard spam or spam-related 
activities as crimes punishable by imprisonment, a fine, or both. The periods of 
imprisonment differ as do the extent of the fines. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
South Africa has come a long way in attempting to redress some apartheid laws by 
adopting consumer-oriented laws to protect its consumers. This indicates that South 
Africa is doing its part to align with international best practices. While these 
measures are admirable, their weakness lies in the fragmented system in which they 
are found. In addressing the loopholes in the regulation of spam, commentators have 
suggested that: “the legislature drafts a comprehensive, holistic and comparative 
overview of current trends in legislative interventions, and that a concerted effort be 
made to harmonise the POPI Act, and CPA taking into consideration criticisms 
                                                          
414  See s 77 of the NCA. 
415  See the discussion on these institutions: NCC in para 8.3.4.5; Information Regulator para 8.4.3 
(f); ECSP para 8.5.2.3 (c); including the industry regulators: DMASA in para 8.3.4.4 (c); and 
ISPA 8.2.6.2 above. 
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above”.416 In addition “the signing of the POPI Act into law with the inception of the 
eight conditions for data processing will at least clarify the situation”.417 The coming 
into operation of section 69 of the POPI Act will repeal the problematic sections 45, 
50, and 51 of the ECT Act and other related matters. Taking into consideration the 
fact that the (soft) opt-in mechanism in the POPI Act is still another way of soliciting 
business from consumers then an amendment of the current provisions should be 
considered to include the suggestions outlined above in order to provide adequate 
protection. Most of the requirements for the dissemination of unsolicited electronic 
communications are already in place in the pieces of legislation identified above. 
These can be consolidated into a single document to regulate spam.  
 
South Africa should also acknowledge that spam is an international problem 
respecting no borders, affecting a variety of stakeholders, and as such it needs to act 
globally by partnering with other nations so as to keep each other abreast of the 
challenges posed by spam. The POPI Act with its trans-border provisions will in this 
case be a valuable contribution in that aspect although only focusing on data 
protection. As such South Africa would “think locally and act globally” as noted by the 
ITU above.  
 
In the final chapter of this thesis a multi-faceted approach to the ever-increasing 
problem of spam in South Africa is outlined.  
                                                          
416   See Papadopoulos supra 15 240; Hamann and Papadopoulos supra n 26 61.  
417   See Swales supra n 26 70. 
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CHAPTER 9 
   
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Summing up the issues 
 
The thesis started by asking whether South Africa’s current minimalistic and 
overlapping anti-spam and direct marketing provisions are adequate to protect 
consumers. It also sought to determine whether introducing more restrictive 
legislation will better protect online consumers from receiving spam. Lastly, it sought 
to establish whether a Model Law would be an appropriate starting point in aligning 
South Africa’s legislation with international best practices aimed at combating spam.  
 
In addressing these questions an analysis of what has been done to combat spam 
internationally, regionally, and in foreign jurisdictions was conducted. It was 
highlighted that the South African spam regime is fragmented, and a point was made 
that when the POPI Act comes fully into operation, it will limit spam to only where an 
approach is a (soft) opt-in. It was concluded that even if South Africa were to 
introduce a (soft) opt-in regime – a move long called for – section 69 of the POPI Act 
read with the conditions for lawful processing would still lack certain important 
requirements for the dissemination of commercial e-mail found in the anti-spam laws 
discussed above.  
 
Therefore, in order for South Africa to align itself properly with international best 
practices, a multi-faceted approach in combating spam is highly recommended. This 
approach will first deal with spam at a local level and also adopt measures to deal 
with the influx of spam from beyond its borders. 
 
9.2 A multi-faceted approach to combating spam 
 
A multi-faceted approach has been recommended by the ITU and the OECD above 
and is also part of Australia’s strategy in combating spam. Should South Africa take 
this route, this approach will not only be in line with other jurisdictions, but will also 
be a solution that has been called for by other commentators in the region. The 
multi-faceted approach will therefore include the following: strong legislation; 
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consumer education; technical measures; industry partnerships; and international 
cooperation.  
 
9.2.1 Strong legislation 
 
As a first step toward combating spam, it is strongly recommended that South Africa 
enact a specific anti-spam law at national level. Lessons on the drafting of such an 
Act can be drawn from other anti-spam laws, model laws, and instruments discussed 
above. The Model Law will therefore include the following:  
 
9.2.1.1 Definition section  
 
The following definitions, some of which already feature in South African anti-spam 
provisions above, must be included in the definition section: 
advertising/advertisement;1 commercial electronic message; commercial 
communications;2 commercial e-mail message;3 commercial electronic transaction;4 
consent5 (including the following types of consent: affirmative consent;6 assumed 
consent;7 express consent;8 and inferred consent);9 consumer; dictionary attacks; 
direct marketing;10 donation; electronic transactions;11 e-mail address;12 e-mail 
message;13 false and misleading;14 harvested address list;15 header information;16 
Internet domain name;17 recipient; sender; spoofing; and unsolicited communications 
                                                          
1  As defined in s 1 of the CPA; also s1 of the POPI Act. 
2  See s (6)(1)(a-c) of the Spam Act of 2003; also s 1(e) of the Amendment Bill. 
3  See s 3(2)(A) of the CAN-SPAM Act.  
4  See s 1(e) of the Amendment Bill. 
5  See s 4 of the Spam Act. 
6  Section 3(1)(A) and (B) of the CAN-SPAM Act; also s 1 POPI Act. 
7  See OECD Anti-spam Toolkit 9 and 27-28 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/consumer/36494147.pdf (date of use: 21 March 2016). 
8  ACMA ‘Spam consent’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-
dont-spam/spam-consent-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-acma (date of use: 21 March 2016). 
9  Ibid. 
10  As defined in s 1 of CPA and POPI Act. 
11  See s 1(v) of the Amendment Bill.  
12  See s 3(5) of the CAN-SPAM Act.  
13  See s 3(6) of the CAN-SPAM Act.  
14  When used in relation to commercial e-mail: see s 16-9-100 (10) (A)-(G) of the Official Code of 
Georgia; also s 1497 (5) Maine Statutes.  
15  See s 4 of the Spam Act. 
16  See s 3-805.1(6) of the Maryland Criminal Code; also s 2913.421 (A) (7) of the Ohio Revised 
Code.   
17  See s 407.1120 (6) of the Missouri Revised Statutes; also s 37-24-36(6) of the South Dakota 
Codified Laws; and s 46.001(9) of the Texas Statutes.  
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in all its variations as noted in the previous chapters.18 The legislation should strive 
to include all relevant terms for clarity and ease of reference. These definitions 
should also allow for future technological developments. 
 
9.2.1.2 Rules for sending electronic communications 
 
The rules of sending unsolicited electronic mail should be extensive as possible and 
most importantly take the protection of consumers into consideration. The following 
rules should therefore be included in the anti-spam law: 
 
(a) Prohibition for the sending of commercial e-mail (opt-in mechanism) 
 
The Model law should prohibit spam in all its forms and not make an allowance for 
an approach before a relationship. The provision should read as follows: “A person 
must not send, or cause an unsolicited electronic message to be sent, for purposes 
of marketing his or her goods or services unless consent has been given prior to 
such an approach”.19 In addition to this, an unsolicited electronic message may only 
be sent where an opt-in requirement has been met.20  
 
(b) Provision to opt-out of unwanted commercial e-mail 
 
The Model law should also provide for an opt-out mechanism in cases where 
consumers would no longer want to receive the unsolicited messages. Here the 
provisions of the SADC Model Law on marketing by means of electronic 
communication should be applied.21 The sender should also provide the recipient 
with a functioning return e-mail address(s) which the recipient can use to submit, or 
as a reply to an e-mail message or other form of Internet-based communication, 
requesting not to receive future commercial e-mail messages from the sender at the 
e-mail address where the message was received.22 The opt-out facility should be 
able to receive such messages or communications for no less than (a specified 
                                                          
18  See in particular chapter 6 and 7 above.  
19  See s 18(1) of the Spam Act. 
20  See s 30(2) of the SADC Model law. 
21  Section 30 of the SADC Model law provides the recipient with a valid and operational opt-out 
facility or other Internet-based mechanism, clearly and conspicuously.  
22  See s 5(a)(5)(ii) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
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amount of days) after the transmission of the original message.23 The sender who 
fails to provide the recipient with an operational opt-out facility, will be guilty of an 
offence and liable, on conviction.24 An opt-out facility should further reflect the 
sender’s identity and contact details, including its place of business, e-mail 
addresses, and telefax numbers; and the identifying particulars of the source from 
which the sender obtained the recipient’s personal information.25 A sender would not 
be liable if a return e-mail address or other mechanism is unexpectedly and 
temporarily unable to receive messages or process requests due to technical 
problems beyond the control of the sender, with the provision that the problem is 
rectified within a reasonable period.26  
 
The opt-out mechanism should be able to be processed free of charge as contained 
in the POPI Act and CPA provisions. The regulatory body in that regard must also be 
aligned so that those consumers who receive unwanted SMS messages should not 
be penalised to opt-out of such messages. 
 
(c) Prohibition on falsifying or misleading header and information  
 
The Model Law should prohibit the transmission of unsolicited electronic messages 
that: contains false, deceptive, or misleading information in its subject line; uses a 
third party’s Internet domain name without the permission of that third party; or 
otherwise fraudulently misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the 
point of origin or the transmission path of the unsolicited electronic messages.27 In 
addition to the POPI Act’s provision on identifying the sender or the person on whose 
behalf the communication has been sent,28 the Model Law should also include that: a 
person who intentionally sends, or cause an unsolicited electronic message to be 
sent, must make sure that the message clearly and accurately identifies the 
individual or organisation which authorised the sending of the message.29 It should 
                                                          
23  Id s 5(a)(3)(A)(i-ii). 
24  See s 30(5) of the SADC Model law; also s 5(a)(5)(iii) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
25  Id s 30(1)(a) (b) of the SADC Model Law. 
26  See s 5(a)(3)(C) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
27  See s 6-47-2 (d) of the Rhode Island General Laws: Title 6 Commercial Law General 
Regulatory Provisions; Chapter 47 Internet Access and Advertising by Facsimile (added in 
1999).  
28  See s 69(4)(c) of POPI Act. 
29  See s 17(1) of Spam Act. 
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also make it unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission of an unsolicited 
electronic messages containing, or is accompanied by, header information that is 
materially false or materially misleading.30 The message should include accurate 
information on how the recipient can readily contact that individual or organisation; a 
declaration that the information complies with the condition(s) (if any) specified in the 
regulations; and an undertaking that information is reasonably likely to be valid for at 
least thirty days after the message has been sent.31  
 
The information should form part of the header information of the message. This 
section will not apply if the sender was unaware, or could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have ascertained, that the message was sent or caused to be sent; and if 
the person sent the message, or caused the message to be sent by mistake.32  
 
(d) Labelling of commercial e-mail messages  
 
The Model law should also have provisions on labelling of messages. It should make 
it unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission of an unsolicited commercial 
electronic message unless the message provides clear and conspicuous 
identification that it is an advertisement or a solicitation.33 An unsolicited electronic 
message should include in its subject line “ADV” (advertisement) as the first 
characters;34 and if the message contains explicit sexually material that may only be 
viewed or purchased by individuals over the age of eighteen years, the subject line 
of each message must include “ADV: ADLT” as its first characters in the subject 
line.35 This should also include electronic communications with a political content. 
 
(e) Prohibition on harvesting and sale of e-mail addresses 
 
                                                          
30  See s 5(a)(2) of CAN-SPAM Act.  
31  Ibid. 
32  See s 17(2)(a) and (b); and 17(3) of the Spam Act. 
33  See s 5(a)(5)(i) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
34  See s 52-570c. (b) of the General Statutes of Connecticut; also section 668.603. (1)(c) and (d) 
of the Florida Statutes. 
35  See s 50-6-107 (c) (1) (E) of the Kansas Statutes; also section 51.1741.1 (5) Louisiana Revised 
Statutes Title 51; section 1497 (3) (2) of Maine Statutes. 
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The CPA and the POPI Act have made provision for harvesting and selling of lists. 
However the Model law should be specific as to what it is prohibited, for example: it 
should also include the following terms in its provision: the “supply”, “acquisition”, 
“use”, or “sale” of harvested lists.36 This provision should apply to all who aid, abet; 
counsel; procure; or induce, whether by threats or promises, or otherwise are in any 
way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or conspire with others to 
contravene this provision.37  
 
(f)  Prohibition on the use of dictionary attacks 
 
The Model Law should also prohibit the use of automated means to obtain e-mail 
addresses in order to initiate or advertise in an unsolicited electronic e-mail 
advertisement.38 This prohibition should also extend to the use of scripts or other 
automated means to register for multiple e-mail accounts or online user accounts 
from which to transmit, or enable another person to transmit, commercial e-mail 
messages.39 This provision must also include prohibition of the use of software and 
hardware for purposes of extracting personal information of recipients for spam 
purposes.40 
 
(g) Enforcement and penalties 
 
Regarding enforcement, consumers should be provided easy to follow methods in 
order to report spamming activities. These can include a web site where consumers 
can complain by leaving the names of those who are pestering them. In addition to 
fines and imprisonment, South Africa should implement mechanisms that can 
enforce the Act. As noted with the Australian experience the use of enforceable 
undertakings, and formal warnings have been effective in enforcing the Spam Act. 
                                                          
36  See s 20; 21; 22 of the Spam Act; also s 17529.4 (a)(1) and (2) of the California Business and 
Professions Code; s 44-1372-01 (B) (2) (b) of the Arizona Revised Statutes; and section 
3.805.1 of the Maryland Criminal Law Code.  
37  See s 20(5); 21 (3) and 22(3) of the Spam Act; and s 12 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
38  See s 17529.4 (c) (1) and (2) of the California Business Professions Code. 
39  See s 5(b)(2) of the CAN-SPAM Act. 
40   See cl 6 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Bill; and s 2(2); 3; 4; 7 of the 2016 Cybercrimes Bill. 
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These measures will at least eliminate the time and costs that applicants have to 
expend in order to secure the prosecution of spammers.41   
 
9.2.1.3 Conclusion 
 
While the amendments to the current regime are welcomed, it should be 
remembered that legislation is but a starting point in ensuring that, at national level, 
spam is properly regulated and that safeguards for consumers are put in place. The 
remaining four multi-faceted approaches are outlined below. 
 
9.2.2 Consumer education and awareness 
 
9.2.2.1 Background 
 
Consumer education should be the first priority in combating spam. An informed 
consumer is one who will act responsibly when engaging with technology and will 
ensure that he or she leaves minimal or no trail of personal information for marketers 
to exploit. As noted earlier, the majority of consumers in South Africa are uninformed 
as they were, by and large, excluded from the knowledge economy during the 
apartheid era. The preambles of the consumer oriented laws discussed in Chapter 8 
also attest to this. Therefore, consumer education and awareness are vital to ensure 
that consumers are not only aware of their rights, but are also able to activate them. 
This type of education should be undertaken by all stakeholders, and here the 
Australian model, together with the recommendations of the ITU and OECD, would 
be particularly instructive. 
 
9.2.2.2 The role of stakeholders in educating consumers 
 
(a) Government 
 
The role of the government is vital in this process, since it is instrumental in the type 
of education that can be offered at learning institutions. Although there is currently a 
                                                          
41  These measures have proved efficient in Australia as part of its reporting process and it has 
apparently reduced the amount of spam within its borders. With the increase in spam, and 
especially SMS spam, this might prove effective in South Africa as an alternative measure. 
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subject on Information technology (IT) at grade school, that is only offered from 
grade 10 to 12 and not at all grade schools. And because it is only offered in the last 
years of grade school that means only a few learners will be exposed to such 
education. Besides, even the content of that subject is limited to specific IT issues. 
Considering that learners fall under the category of individuals who have access to 
smart phones, tablets et cetera, from an early age and that they use such efficiently 
than their caregivers, by the time they engage with IT issues they would have long 
been exposed to the dangers noted above.  
 
It should therefore be the role of government to introduce IT subject that is age 
appropriate starting at the lower levels of grade school. This can form part of the 
existing subjects such as consumer studies, and even life orientation. At lower 
grades the content can start with an introduction to the basic functions of the devices 
that learners are already exposed to. This will then move on to the workings of the 
Internet and their activities in that environment, together with how their personal 
information can be compromised if they are not technologically savvy. The laws 
applicable in this arena should also be known to these young consumers. This will 
set the learners in the right direction towards being informed consumers. 
 
Government should further ensure that the public at large is also exposed to this 
form of education through the media – for example, TV, information brochures, and 
even billboard advertisements. This education should be offered in all eleven official 
languages to ensure that all consumers are exposed to such information in the 
language they understand.  
 
Government departments and institutions that deal with the dissemination of e-mails 
should also train their employees – in particular those directly involved in dealing 
with the processing of personal information. This education should also instruct 
employees on the dangers of accumulating or harvesting lists of personal information 
for sale.  
 
(b) Internet service providers (ISP) 
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The ISPs role is very critical in that they are not only providing the devices but are 
also in a place to inform consumers with information that can assist such in 
safeguarding their activities while using their gadgets. The duty of the ISPs is to 
inform their customers to be technological savvy and not fall into traps set for them 
by marketers or scammers alike. This can be achieved through newsletters 
instructing customers on new technologies, the use of filters, basic security 
measures and other technological tools that the consumer can have access to in 
order to limit unsolicited communications. 
 
In order to safeguard consumers’ right to privacy, marketers should be compelled to 
adhere to the rules and regulations set out above. While these measures are sound, 
they will be of little avail if consumers remain ignorant on how to navigate the 
Internet and the laws in place to protect them. Education will allow consumers to 
make informed choices before engaging with marketers or accepting free-gift offers – 
as the adage goes “if it’s free then you are the product”.42 
 
(c) Consumer advocacy groups 
 
The issue of spam keeps on perpetuating because consumers keep on responding 
to spam by buying the products advertised. Therefore, consumer education and 
awareness should be seen as a key element which is important for the success of 
anti-spam legislation. Consumers should be in a position to know basic rules of 
online activities. These will include: how to limit their exposure to spam (by not 
leaving their e-mail addresses on numerous web sites); and where to complain when 
confronted with spam. The role of consumer advocacy groups can go a long way 
where consumers will be educated about their fundamental rights and how to 
respond in cases where those rights are infringed. 
 
9.2.3 Industry initiatives 
 
                                                          
42  See Techdirt ‘Stop saying ‘if you’re not paying, you’re the product’’ 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121219/18272921446/stop-saying-if-youre-not-paying-
youre-products.shtml (date of use: 19 September 2016). 
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Industry should also be at the forefront in combating spam. Stakeholders such as: 
direct marketers; online operators; software companies; and ISPs should be setting 
examples as to how this should be done. Both the ISPA and DMASA are playing a 
vital role in combating spam. However, the codes of conduct of such industries 
should be in compliance with the founding legislation that established such an 
industry. These codes should take all technologies, new or future, into consideration 
and be amended as technology changes.  
 
9.2.4 Technological measures 
 
As noted above, filters have been at the forefront in limiting spam. However, they 
have also been shown to be limited in their application. As spammers find new ways 
to send spam, so should new technologies be developed and be made available to 
equip all stakeholders. The availability of new technological tools to customers has 
not only eliminated the middleman, but has also meant that consumers are available 
24/7. This guarantees exposure to the marketers’ all over the world. South Africa 
should look to the recommendations emanating from the international arena and 
align itself accordingly. Australia would be a good example here with the utilization of 
the SpamMatters button which enables consumers to report and delete spam at the 
same time. 
 
9.2.5 International cooperation 
 
Most spam in South Africa, originates from beyond its borders, and the laws are ill- 
equipped to prosecute those spammers. However, as the POPI Act addresses 
cross- border issues, it offers a starting point for dealing with these matters. Chapter 
5 of the POPI Act mandates the Information Regulator to conduct research into this 
aspect and also to liaise with other Regulators on the application of the Act.  
 
From these provisions South Africa should be in a position to conclude mutual 
agreements with countries notorious for sending spam, which will include the ten top 
worst countries from which the most spam is sent.43 This will result in partnerships 
                                                          
43   See Spamhaus ‘The top 10 worst spam countries’ 
https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/countries (date of use: 12 March 2017). At the top of the 
 
 
313 
 
that would assist South Africa and those countries in dealing with spam beyond their 
respective borders, as a result holding one another accountable. These agreements 
should be extended to community blocks to which South Africa is a member, as well 
as other organisations interested in eliminating the scourge. This will save South 
Africa from the dubious ‘honour’ of becoming a safe haven for spammers and 
scammers alike. Having the type of measures identified above in place, would put 
South Africa in a position to best assist its consumers and bring perpetrators to book.   
 
9.3 Recommendations and conclusion 
 
South Africa has come a long way in developing laws in combating spam. The local 
and global nature of spam has been emphasized in this thesis and South Africa has 
attempted to accommodate these to some extent. It is, however, important to note 
that while South Africa has laws in place it is recommended that the country aligns 
its laws to protect its citizens by implementing an anti-spam law that can deal with 
the issue of spam decisively at national level. Once protection is in place nationally 
and stakeholders are playing their part in combating spam, then the next step will be 
to enter into mutual agreements with other countries and organisations in order to 
combat spam at a global level.  
 
By so doing, South Africa would have aligned itself with international best practices 
that they strive to in their consumer oriented laws. While there is no guarantee that 
these measures will eradicate spam, as has been indeed noted in other jurisdictions 
– at least with such an alignment, local marketers and spammers alike will be 
compelled to adjust their behaviour to comply with the measures put in place. 
Consumers, on the other hand, would have received vital, albeit elusive, education to 
assist them in knowing how to navigate the technological space they find themselves 
in. As such, they will be informed consumers who will no longer be “the product” of 
spam and other fraudulent activities by marketers and spammers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
list is the United States; followed by China; Russian Federation; Hong Kong; Ukraine; Japan; 
United Kingdom; Germany; Turkey and India. All these are considered the worst spam haven 
countries. 
 
 
314 
 
For a healthy economy consumers need to be informed of the options available for 
them on how to fend for themselves before the law can even be put in place to 
protect them. Knowing their rights and responsibilities on how to use technology to 
their benefit will not only produce informed consumers but also well rounded 
consumers who are technologically savvy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
315 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BOOKS, DISSERTATIONS & THESIS  
 
Asscher & Hoogcarspel Regulating spam 
 Asscher FL & Hoogcarspel SA Regulating spam: A European perspective 
after the adoption of the E-Privacy Directive (2006) Information 
Technology & Law Series (IT & Law 10)  
 
Blainpain & Van Gestel Use and monitoring of e-mail 
 Blainpain R & Van Gestel M Use and monitoring of e-mail, intranet and 
Internet facilities at work: law and practice (Kluwer Law International 
2004)  
  
Cant & Van Heerden Marketing management 
 Cant MC & Van Heerden CH Marketing management: A South African 
perspective 2 ed (Juta & Co Ltd 2013) 
 
De Bruin Consumer trust 
 De Bruin R Consumer trust in electronic commerce: Time for best practice 
(Kluwer Law International Netherlands 2002)  
De Stadler Consumer law 
 De Stadler E Consumer law unlocked (SiberInk Cape Town 2013) 
Downing, Covington & Covington Dictionary 
 Downing D, Covington M & Covington MM Dictionary of computer and 
Internet Terms 7 ed (Barron’s 2000) 
 
Feinstein How to do everything 
Feinstein K How to do everything to fight spam, viruses, pop-ups & 
spyware (Corel VENTURAtm Publisher 2004) 
 
Geissler Bulk unsolicited electronic messages 
 Geissler ML Bulk unsolicited electronic messages (SPAM): A South 
African perspective (LLD Thesis UNISA 2004) 
Goodman Spam wars 
 Goodman D Spam wars: Our last best chance to defeat spammers, 
scammers, and hackers (SelectBooks Inc 2004) 
 
Haase, Grimm & Versfeld International commercial law 
 Haase JW, Grimm N & Versfeld E International commercial law from a 
South African perspective (Shaker Aachen 2003)   
Hitchcock Net crimes 
 Hitchcock JA Net crimes and misdemeanors: Outmaneuvering web 
spammers, stalkers, and con artists 2 ed (Information Today Inc 2006) 
Hofman Cyberlaw 
 Hofman J Cyberlaw: A guide for South Africans doing business online 
(Stoddart Publishing Co Ltd 1999) 
 
Kamal Law of cyber-space 
 
 
316 
 
 Kamal A The law of cyber-space: An invitation to the table of negotiations 
(UNITAR 2005)  
Kothari Research Methodology: Methods and techniques. 
 Kothari CR Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Age 
International Publishers 2004)  
Krum Mobile marketing 
 Krum C Mobile marketing: Finding your consumers no matter where you 
are (Pearson Education, Inc. 2010)  
 
Maheeph Electronic spamming 
 Maheeph P Electronic spamming within South Africa: A comparative 
analysis (LLM Dissertation University of KwaZulu-Natal 2014) 
Margolis Computer & Internet dictionary 
 Margolis PE Computer & Internet dictionary 3 ed (Random House NY 
1998)   
McQuid-Mason et al Consumer law in South Africa 
 McQuid-Mason D (gen ed) et al Consumer law in South Africa (Juta & Co 
Ltd Kenwyn 1997) 
 
Naude & Eiselen Commentary 
 Naude T & Eiselen T (eds) Commentary on Consumer Protection Act 
(Juta & Co (Pty) Ltd Claremont 2014)  
Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Neethling’s Law of personality 
 Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Neethling’s Law of personality 2 ed  
 (LexisNexis Durban 2007)  
 
Opperman & Lake Understanding the CPA 
 Opperman I & Lake R Understanding the Consumer Protection Act (Juta 
& Co Ltd Cape Town 2012) 
Oxford Dictionary of computer science 
 Oxford A Dictionary of computer science 7 ed (Oxford University Press 
NY USA 2016) 
 
Poteet Canning spam 
 Poteet J Canning spam: You’ve got mail (that you don’t want) (SAMS 
2004) 
 
Roos Law of Data protection 
 Roos A The law of data (privacy) protection: A comparative and 
theoretical Study (LLD Thesis UNISA 2003)  
Rowles Mobile Marketing 
 Rowles D Mobile marketing: How mobile technology is revolutionizing 
marketing, communications and advertising 1 ed. (Kogan Page Limited 
London 2014) 
  
Scholtz et al Guide to National Credit Act 
 Scholtz JW et al Guide to the National Credit Act (LexisNexis South Africa 
2008)  
Schryen Anti-spam measures 
 
 
317 
 
 Schryen G Anti-spam measures: Analysis and design (Springer-Verlag 
2007)  
Simmons & Simmons E-commerce law 
 Simmons & Simmons Communications E-commerce law: Doing business 
online (Palladian Law Publishing Ltd 2001)   
Shostak The cyberunion 
 Shostak AB (ed) The cyberunion handbook: Transforming labor through 
computer technology (ME Sharpe Armonk New York 2002) 
Sterne & Priore Email marketing 
 Sterne J & Priore A email marketing: Using email to reach your target 
audience and build consumer relationships (John Wiley & Sons Inc 2000)  
 
Van Eeden Consumer protection law 
 Van Eeden E Consumer protection law in South Africa (LexisNexis South 
Africa 2013)  
Van Schalkwyk & Marlie Transactions of the Centre for business law 
 Van Schalkwyk LM & Marlie L The protection of commercial information in 
electronic communications with special reference to the Internet (UV/UFS 
Bloemfontein 2005) 
 
Walker Absolute beginners guide 
 Walker A Absolute beginners guide to security spam spyware and viruses 
2 ed (QUE Indianapolis Indiana 2006)   
 
York & Chia E-commerce 
 York S & Chia K (eds) E-commerce: A guide to the law of electronic 
business (Butterworths London 1999) 
 
Zdziarski Ending spam 
 Zdziarski J.A Ending spam: Bayesian content filtering and the art of 
statistical language classification (No Starch Press San Francisco 2005)  
 
 
CHAPTERS IN BOOKS 
 
Buys ‘Online consumer protection and spam’ 
 Buys R ‘Online consumer protection and spam’ in Buys R & Cronjé F 
(eds) Cyberlaw @ SA II: The Law of the Internet 2 ed (Van Schaik 
Publishers Pretoria 2004) 138-70   
Buys ‘Privacy and the right to information’ 365-91 
Buys R ‘Privacy and the right to information’ in Buys R (ed) Cyberlaw @ 
SA: The Law of the Internet 1 ed (Van Schaik Publishers Pretoria 2000) 
365-91 
Bwalya ‘E-commerce penetration’ 
 Bwalya KJ ‘E-commerce penetration in the SADC region: Consolidating 
and moving forward’ in Cruz-Cunha MM & Varajao J (eds) E-business 
Managerial Aspects, Solutions and Case Studies (Hershey, Pa: IGI Global 
2011) 235-53  
 
Collier D ‘Criminal law and the Internet’  
 
 
318 
 
Collier D ‘Criminal law and the Internet’ in Buys R (ed.) Cyberlaw @ SA II: 
The Law of the Internet (2004) 319-347 
 
Du Plessis ‘The African Union’ 
 Du Plessis M ‘The African Union’ in Dugard J International Law: A South 
African Perspective 3 ed (Juta & Co Ltd Lansdowne SA 2006) 546-54 
 
Eiselen ‘E-commerce’ 
 Eiselen S ‘E-commerce’ in Van der Merwe D (ed) Information and 
Communications Technology Law 2 ed. (Lexis Nexis Durban 2016) 149-
220 
 
Gereda ‘The Electronic Communications and Transaction Act’ 
Gereda SL ‘The Electronic Communications and Transaction Act’ in 
Thornton et al (eds) Telecommunications Law in South Africa (STE 
Publishers Johannesburg 2006) 262-95 
Goodburn & Ngoye ‘Privacy and the Internet’  
Goodburn D & Ngoye M ‘Privacy and the Internet’ in Buys R & Cronjé F 
(eds) Cyberlaw @ SA II: The Law of the Internet 2 ed (Van Schaik 
Publishers Pretoria 2004) 171-96 
Gordon ‘Internet criminal law’  
Gordon B ‘Internet criminal law’ in Cyberlaw @ SA: The law of the Internet 
(2000) 423-446 
Groenewald ‘Towards an electronic commerce policy for South Africa’ 
 Groenewald M ‘Towards an electronic commerce policy for South Africa’ 
in Buys (ed) Cyberlaw @ SA: The Law of the Internet (Van Schaik 
Publishers Pretoria 2000) 97-113 
 
Meiring ‘Electronic transactions’  
Meiring R ‘Electronic transactions’ in Buys R & Cronjé F (eds) Cyberlaw 
@ SA II: The Law of the Internet 2 ed (Van Schaik Publishers Pretoria 
2004) 82-108 
 
Papadopoulos ‘Online consumer protection’ 
 Papadopoulos S ‘Online consumer protection’ in Papadopoulos S & Snail 
S (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA: Law of the Internet 3 ed (Van Schaik Publishers 
2012) 63-93 
Papadopoulos & Snail ‘Privacy and protection’ 
 Papadopoulos S & Snail S Privacy and protection’ in Papadopoulos S & 
Snail S (eds) Cyberlaw @ SA: Law of the Internet 3 ed (Van Schaik 
Publishers 2012) 275-313 
 
Roos A ‘Data Protection’ 
 Roos A ‘Data Protection’ in Van der Merwe D (ed) Information and 
Communications Technology Law (LexisNexis South Africa 2008) 313-97 
Roos ‘Data Privacy Law’  
Roos A ‘Data Privacy Law’ in Van der Merwe D (ed.) Information and 
Communications Technology Law 2nd ed. (LexusNexis 2016) 363-487 
 
Tladi S ‘SPAM: An overview’ 
 
 
319 
 
 Tladi S ‘SPAM: An overview of South African legislative development’ in 
Kierkegaard S (ed) Law & Practice Critical Analysis and Legal Reasoning 
(International Association of IT Lawyers 2013) 266-78 
 
Van der Merwe D ‘Criminal Law’ 
 Van der Merwe D ‘Criminal Law’ in Van der Merwe D (ed) Information and 
Communications Technology Law (LexisNexis South Africa 2008) 61-102 
 
Watney ‘Cybercrime and the investigation of cybercrime’  
Watney M ‘Cybercrime and investigation of cybercrime’ in Cyberlaw @ 
SA: The law of the Internet (2012) 333-51 
 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
 
Albrecht (2002-2003) 36 Suffolk University Law Review 
 Albrecht LJ ‘Online marketing: The use of cookies and remedies for 
Internet users’ (2002-2003) 36 Suffolk University Law Review 421-49 
Alepin (2004-2005) 28 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts   
 Alepin DC ‘Opting-out: a technical, legal and practical look at the CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003’ (2004-2005) 28 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 
41-70 
Alongi (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review    
 Alongi EA ‘Has the US canned spam’ (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review 263-
290 
Amaditz (1999) Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 
 Amaditz KC ‘Canning ‘spam’ in Virginia: Model legislation to control junk 
e-mail’ 1999 Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 4 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol4/issue/home_art4.html (Date of use: 30 December 
2015) 
Ampratwum (2009) 16/1 Journal of Financial Crime 
 Ampratwum EF ‘Advance fee fraud ‘419’ and investor confidence in the 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)’ (2009) 16/1 Journal of Financial 
Crime 67-80 
Atta-Asamoah (2009) 18/4 African Security Review 
 Atta-Asamoah A ‘Understanding the West African cyber crime process’ 
(2009) 18/4 African Security Review 106-114  
 
Balough (2003) 22/1 (Fall) John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 
 Balough RC ‘The Do-Not-Call Registry Model is not the answer to spam’ 
(2003) 22/1 (Fall) John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 
79-96 
Baxter (2004) 8 1 NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
 Baxter P.W ‘Has Spam Been Canned: consumers, marketers, and the 
making of the CAN-SPAM Act 2003’ (2004) 8/1 NYU Journal of 
Legislation and Public Policy 163-178 
 
Bennett (2011) 44/4 John Marshall Law Review 
 Bennett S ‘Regulating online behavioural advertising’ (2011) 44/4 John 
Marshall Law Review 899-962 
 
 
320 
 
Bindman (2013) 39/4 William Mitchell Law Review 
 Bindman JC ‘The spam filter ate my e-mail: When are electronic records 
received?’ (2013) 39/4 William Mitchell Law Review 1295-1332 
Bolin (2006) 24/2 Yale Law and Policy Review 
 Bolin R ‘Opting out of spam: A domain level do-not-spam registry’ (2006) 
24/2 Yale Law and Policy Review 399-435 
Bowman (2012) 7/3 Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 
 Bowman LJ ‘Pulling back the curtain: Online consumer tracking’ (2012) 
7/3 Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 721-52 
Brandon (2012) 29/1 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information 
 Brandon SC ‘What’s mine is yours: Targeting privacy issues and 
determining the best solutions for behavioral advertising’ (2012) 29/1 John 
Marshall Journal of Computer and Information 637-72 
Brockhoeft (2004) 4 Loyola Law and Technology Annual 
 Brockhoeft J.E ‘Evaluating the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003’ (2004) 4 Loyola 
Law and Technology Annual 1-44 
Budnitz (1998) 49/4 South Carolina Law Review 
 Budnitz ME ‘Privacy protection for consumer transactions in electronic 
commerce: Why self-regulation is inadequate’ (1998) 49/4 South Carolina 
Law Review 847-86  
Burger & Rensleigh (2007) 9/3 South African Journal of Information Management  
 Burger E & Rensleigh C ‘Investigating e-mail overload in South African 
banking industry’ (2007) 9/3 South African Journal of Information 
Management 1-18 http://www.sajim.co.za/default.asp?to=peer1vol9nr3 
(date of use: 7 September 2015) 
 
Cain (2007-2008) 3 I/S: Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 
 Cain RM ‘When does pre-emption not really pre-empt? The role of state 
law after CAN-SPAM’ (2007-2008) 3 I/S: Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 751-76 
Canfield (2009-2010) 20 Civil Rights Law Journal 
 Canfield N.S ‘The fallacy of publius as spammer: Jaynes v 
Commonwealth of Virginia and the proper doctrine for reviewing state 
anti-spam laws’ (2009-2010) 20 Civil Rights Law Journal 449-470  
Cassim (2010) 5/3 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 
 Cassim F ‘Addressing the challenges posed by cybercrime: a South 
African perspective’ (2010) 5/3 Journal of International Commercial Law 
and Technology 118-23 
Cassim (2011) 44/1 CILSA 
 Cassim F ‘Addressing the growing spectre of cybercrime in Africa: 
Evaluating measures adopted by South Africa and other regional role 
players’ (2011) 44/1 CILSA 123-38  
Cassim (2014) 47/3 CILSA  
 Cassim F ‘Addressing the spectre of phishing: Are adequate measures in 
place to protect victims of phishing?’ (2014) 47/3 CILSA 401-28   
Chapman (2007) 30/1 UNSW Law Journal 
 Chapman C ‘The legal challenges facing ACMA as Regulator’ (2007) 30/1 
UNSW Law Journal 220-31 
Coetzee (2004) 3 Stell LR 
 
 
321 
 
 Coetzee J ‘The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 
2002: facilitating electronic commerce’ (2004) 3 Stell LR 501-21 
 
Dane (2006) 6 Asper Review of International Business & Trade Law 
 Dane K ‘Controlling spam: the prospect of legislative success’ (2006) 6 
Asper 
 Review International Business & Trade Law 241-64 
Daniel (2005-2006) 94 Kentucky Law Journal 
 Daniel JW ‘Has spam been fried? Why CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 can’t: 
Regulation of unsolicited commercial electronic mail and the CAN-SPAM 
Act of 2003’ (2005-2006) 94 Kentucky Law Journal 363-92 
De Villiers (2007) Oct/Nov Journal of Marketing 
 De Villiers D ‘The opt-in vs opt-out debate’ (2007) Oct/Nov Journal of 
Marketing 19-20 
Dickinson (2004) 57/1 Federal Communications Law Journal 
 Dickinson D ‘An architecture for spam regulation (2004) 57/1 Federal 
Communications Law Journal 129-60  
Du Preez (2009) 1 TSAR 
 Du Preez M.L ‘The Consumer Protection Bill: a few preliminary comments’ 
(2009) 1 TSAR 58-83 
 
Ebersӧhn (2003) July De Rebus 
 Ebersӧhn G ‘The unfair business practices of spamming and spoofing’ 
(2003) July De Rebus 25-6 
Ebersӧhn (2004) 16/4 SA Merc LJ 
 Ebersӧhn G ‘Internet law: cookies, traffic data, and direct advertising 
practices’ (2004) 16/4 SA Merc LJ 741-64  
Ebersӧhn (2004) 12/3 JBL 
 Ebersӧhn G ‘An analysis of spam regulation: developments in America, 
Australia, and Europe’ (2004) 12/3 JBL 137-42 
Engle (2007-2008) 3/3 Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 
 Engle MM ‘Anti-spyware enforcement: recent developments’ (2007-2008) 
3/3 Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 581-94 
Esselaar & Miller (2002) 2/1 South African Journal of information and 
Communication 
 Esselaar P & Miller J ‘Towards electronic commerce in Africa: A 
perspective from three country studies’ (2002) 2/1 South African Journal 
of information and Communication 1-12 
http://www.sajic.org.za/index.php/SAJIC/20%article/20%viewArticle/172 
(date of use: 27 December 2015) 
Ewelukwa (2011) 13 European Journal of Law Reform 
 Ewelukwa N ‘Is Africa ready for electronic commerce: A critical appraisal 
of legal framework for ecommerce in Africa’ (2011) 13 European Journal 
of Law  Reform 550-76 
 
Fagan (2004) 33/10 Colorado Lawyer 
 Fagan M ‘Practicing safe e-mailing: The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003’ (2004) 
33/10 Colorado Lawyer 61-6  
Fingerman (2004) 7/8 Journal of Internet law 
 
 
322 
 
 Fingerman D ‘Spam canned throughout the land? Summary of the CAN-
SPAM Act commentary’ (2004) 7/8 Journal of Internet law 1-14 
http://www.danfingerman.com/papers/CAN-SPAM.doc (date of use: 30 
December 2015) 
Fleming & O’Carroll (2010) 16/4 Parallax 
 Fleming C and O’Carroll J ‘The art of the hoax’ (2010) 16/4 Parallax 45-59 
 
Gereda 2003 De Rebus 
 Gereda S ‘The truth about spam’ (2003) De Rebus 51-2  
Glickman (2005) 39/3 Canadian Journal of African Studies 
 Glickman H ‘The Nigerian ‘419’ advance fee scams: Prank or peril?’ 
(2005) 39/3 Canadian Journal of African Studies 460-89 
Goldman (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 
 Goldman E ‘Where’s the beef? Dissecting spam’s purported harms’ 
(2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 13-28  
Greenleaf & Georges (2014) 132 Privacy Laws and Business International Report 
 Greenleaf G & Georges M ‘African regional privacy instruments: Their 
effects on harmonization’ (2014) 132 Privacy Laws and Business 
International Report 19-21 http://papers.ssrm.com (date of use: 31 
December 2015) 
Grossman (2004) 19/4 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
 Grossman S ‘Keeping unwanted donkeys and elephants out of your inbox: 
The case for regulating political spam’ (2004) 19/4 Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal 1533-76 
 
Hamman & Papadopoulos (2014) 47/1 De Jure 
 Hamann B & Papadopoulos S ‘Direct marketing and spam via electronic 
communications: an analysis of the regulatory framework in South Africa’ 
(2014) 47/1 De Jure 42-62 
Helman (2009) 50 Boston College Law Review 
 Helman I ‘Spam-a-lot: the states’ crusade against unsolicited e-mail in 
light of the CAN-SPAM Act and the overbreadth doctrine’ (2009) 50 
Boston College Law Review 1525-62 
Hoofnagle et al (2012) 6 Harvard Law and Policy Review  
 Hoofnagle et al ‘Behavioral advertising: The offer you cannot refuse’ 
(2012) 6 Harvard Law and Policy Review 273-96 
 
Ider (1999) 138/7 Trusts and Estates 
 Idler J ‘Protecting your right to privacy on the Internet’ (1999) 138/7 Trusts 
and Estates 41-5 
Irving (1996) 1 University of Chicago Legal Forum 
 Irving L ‘Safeguarding consumers’ interests in cyberspace’ (1996) 1 
University of Chicago Legal Forum 1-14 
 
Jacobs (2004) 16/4 SA Merc LJ 
 Jacobs W ‘The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act: 
Consumer 
 protection and Internet contract’ (2004) 16/4 SA Merc LJ at 556-67 
Jacobs, Stoop & Van Niekerk (2010) 13/3 PER PELJ 
 
 
323 
 
 Jacobs W, Stoop P, & Van Niekerk R ‘Fundamental consumer rights 
under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A critical overview and 
analysis’ (2010) 13/3 PER PELJ 302-406 
Jansen van Ryssen (2004) 4 Acta Commercii 
 Jansen van Ryssen F ‘SMS marketing: It’s place in mobile commerce and 
opportunity in the South African Market’ (2004) 4 Acta Commercii 48-59  
Jayamala (2014) 95/1131 Australian Journal of Pharmacy 
 Jayamala G ‘Scams: It’s a scam’ (2014) 95/1131 Australian Journal of 
Pharmacy 18-19  
 http://search.informit.com.au/fullText;dn=759638788394502;res=IELHEA 
(date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Jobodwana (2009) 4 Journal of International Law and Technology 
 Jobodwana NT ‘E-commerce and mobile commerce in South Africa: 
Regulatory challenges’ (2009) 4 Journal of International Law and 
Technology 287-98  
Jordaan (2007) 3/1 International Retail and Marketing Review 
 Jordaan Y ‘Information privacy issues: implications for direct marketing’ 
(2007) 3/1 International Retail and Marketing Review 42-53 
Jordaan & Jordaan (2004) 23/1 Journal for Communication Sciences in Southern 
Africa 
 Jordaan Y & Jordaan AC ‘Communicating the protection of information 
privacy’ (2004) 23/1 Journal for Communication Sciences in Southern 
Africa 137-48  
 
Kendrick (2003 Fall) 7/3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 
 Kendrick JP ‘Subject: ADV: Anti-spam laws force emerging Internet 
business advertisers to wear the scarlet ‘S’’ (2003) 7/3 (Fall) Journal of 
Small and Emerging Business Law 563-76 
Kennedy (2009) Aug/Sept Journal of Marketing 
 Kennedy C ‘SMS competitions: are they one big rip-off?’ (2009) Aug/Sept 
Journal of Marketing 22-3 
Kent (2004) 76/4 Australian Quarterly 
 Kent M ‘Spam regulation and Australia: National sovereignty and the .au’ 
(2004) 76/4 Australian Quarterly 4-5 and 40 
Khong (2004) 1 Erasmus Law and Economic Review 
 Khong WK ‘An economic analysis of spam laws’ (2004) 1 Erasmus Law 
and Economic Review 23-45 
Kikuchi (2004) 10/2 BUJ Sci & Tech L 
 Kikuchi EH ‘Spam a box: Amending CAN-SPAM & aiming toward a global 
solution’ (2004) 10/2 BUJ Sci & Tech L 263-325  
King (2003) 12 Information and Communications Technology Law 
 King I ‘On-line privacy in Europe-new regulation for cookies’ (2003) 12 
Information and Communications Technology Law 224-36  
Kokt & Koelane (2013) 7/31 African Journal of Business Management 
 Kokt D & Koelane T ‘Reflecting on information and communication and 
technology (ICT) in marketing from a marketer’s and student perspective’ 
(2013) 7/ 31 African Journal of Business Management 3098-3108 
 
Lanois (2010) 9/2 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
 
 
324 
 
 Lanois P ‘Caught in the clouds: The web 2.0, cloud computing, and 
privacy?’ (2010) 9/2 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual 
Property 29-50 
Lavergne (2005) 1/3 NYU Journal of Law & Business 
 Lavergne EN ‘FCC gives teeth to CAN-SPAM Act of 2003’ (2005) 1/3 
NYU Journal of Law & Business 861-80 
Ledbetter (2004) 34 Southwestern University Law Review 
 Ledbetter TK ‘Stopping unsolicited commercial e-mail: Why the CAN-
SPAM Act is not the solution to stop spam’ (2004) 34 Southwestern 
University Law Review 107-32 
Leiserson (2002) 94/3 Law Library Journal 
 Leiserson AB ‘A user’s perspective on privacy and web’ (2002) 94/3 Law 
Library Journal 539-46  
Li (2006) 3/1 Webology 
 Li X ‘E-marketing, unsolicited commercial e-mail, and legal solutions’ 
(2006) 3/1 Webology http://webology.ir/2006/v3n1/a23.html (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 1-13 
Lindner & Riehm (2009) 1/1 JeDEM 
 Lindner R & Riehm U ‘Electronic petitions and institutional modernization: 
international parliamentary e-petition systems in comparative perspective’ 
(2009) 1/1 JeDEM 1-11 http://www.itas.kit.edu/pub/v/2009/liri09a.pdf (date 
of use: 6 November 2015) 
Lorentz (2011) 30/3 Review of Litigation 
 Lorentz D ‘The effectiveness of litigation under the CAN-SPAM Act’ 
(2011) 30/3 The Review of Litigation 559-606  
 
Machacek (2011) 14 Chapman Law Review 
 Machacek MS ‘Digest: Kleffman v Vonage Holdings Corp’ (2011) 14 
Chapman Law Review 583-8 
Magaqa (2015) 27/1 SA Merc LJ 
 Magaqa M ‘The NCC and the NCT walk the long road to consumer 
protection’ (2015) 27/1 SA Merc LJ 32-57  
Magee (2003) 19/2 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal 
 Magee J ‘The law regulating unsolicited commercial e-mail: An 
international perspective’ (2003) 19/2 Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal 333-82 
Malcolm (2001) 12/2 Journal of Law and Information Science 
 Malcolm J ‘Recent developments in Australian spam laws’ (2001) 12/2 
Journal of Law and Information Science 242-58  
Manwaring (2009) Computers and Law 
 Manwaring K ‘Canning the spam five years on: A comparison of spam 
regulation in Australia and the US’ (2009) Computers and Law 5-11 
Marks (2004) 54/3 Case Western Reserve Law 
 Marks EE ‘Spammers clog in-boxes everywhere: Will the CAN-SPAM Act 
of 2003 halt the invasion? (2004) 54/3 Case Western Reserve Law 943-
63 
Marx & O’Brien (2011) 32/3 Obiter 
 Marx FE & O’Brien N ‘To regulate or to over-regulate: Internet service 
provider liability: The industry representative body in terms of the ECT Act 
and regulations’ (2011) 32/3 Obiter 537-56 
 
 
325 
 
Mayer (2004) 31/1 Journal of Legislation 
 Mayer DL ‘Attacking a windmill: Why the CAN-SPAM Act is a futile waste 
of time and money’ (2004) 31/1 Journal of Legislation 177-90 
McQuoid-Mason (1982) XV/1 CILSA 
 McQuoid-Mason D ‘Consumer protection and the right to privacy’ (1982) 
XV/1 CILSA 135-57 
Mercado-Kierkegaard (2005) 21/4 Computer Law & Security Report 
 Mercado-Kierkegaard S ‘How the cookie (almost) crumbled: Privacy & 
lobbyism’ (2005) 21/4 Computer Law & Security Report 310-22 
Meyerowitz (2008) Privacy & Data Security Law Journal 
 Meyerowitz SA ‘Virginia Supreme court rejects state’s anti-spam law on 
First Amendment grounds’ (2008) Privacy & Data Security Law Journal 
1024-1042 
http://www.meyerowitzcommunications.com/pdf/Meyerowitz%20Spam%2
0Ruling.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Mobarek (2004) 16/3 Loyola Consumer Law Review 
 Mobarek SI ‘The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Was congress actually trying to 
solve the problem or add to it?’ (2004) 16/3 Loyola Consumer Law Review 
247-66   
Monty (2015) 15/6 Without Prejudice 
 Monty S ‘The popping of POPI’ (2015) 15/6 Without Prejudice 86-7 
Mossoff (2004) 19/2 Berkley Technology Law Journal 
 Mossoff A ‘Spam, oy what a nuisance!’ (2004) 19 2 Berkley Technology 
Law Journal 625-66 
Motloung (2015) March IMM Journal of Strategic Marketing 
 Motloung M Big data is all about gut feel and common sense’ (2015) 
March IMM Journal of Strategic Marketing 18-19 
Mudelair (2008) Journal of Marketing 
 Mudelair T ‘Opting-out’ (2008) Journal of Marketing 22-3 
Mutchler (2010) 43 Suffolk University Law Review 
 Mutchler A ‘CAN-SPAM versus the European Union E-Privacy Directive: 
Does either provide a solution to the problem of spam?’ (2010) 43 Suffolk 
University Law Review 957-81 
 
Naude & Papadopoulos (2016) 79/1 THRHR 
 Naude A & Papadopoulos S ‘Data Protection in South Africa: The 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 in light of recent 
international developments (1)’ (2016) 79/1 THRHR 51-68 
Naude & Papadopoulos (2016) 79/2 THRHR 
 Naude A & Papadopoulos S ‘Data Protection in South Africa: The 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 in light of recent 
international developments (2)’ (2016) 79/2 THRHR 213-230 
Ndonga (2012) 5 African Journal of Legal Studies 
 Ndonga D ‘E-Commerce in Africa: challenges and solutions’ (2012) 5 
African Journal of Legal Studies 243-68  
Neels (2010) 31/1 Obiter 
 Neels JL ‘Consumer protection legislation and private international law’ 
(2010) 31/1 Obiter 122-33 
Neethling (2012) 75 THRHR 
 
 
326 
 
 Neethling J ‘Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill’ (2012) 
75 THRHR 241-55 
Nelson (2003) 58 Business Lawyer 
 Nelson VA ‘Use of UCE: State laws regarding unsolicited commercial e-
mail advertisements’ (2003) 58 The Business Lawyer 1203-14 
 
O’Neill (2001) 47 Consumer Interests  
 O’Neill B ‘Online Shopping: Consumer Protection and Regulation’ (2001) 
47 Consumer Interests 1-3 
 
Papadopoulos (2012) 75 THRHR 
 Papadopoulos S ‘Are we about to cure the scourge of spam: A 
commentary on current and proposed South African legislative 
intervention’ (2012) 75 THRHR 223-40 
Petzer (2011) 8 Journal of Contemporary Management 
 Petzer DJ ‘Investigating mobile marketing acceptance of urban South 
Africans residing in Gauteng’ (2011) 8 Journal of Contemporary 
Management 384-407 
Pillay (2014) 14/8 Without Prejudice 
 Pillay L ‘The partial commencement of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act 2013’ (2014) 14/8 Without Prejudice 54 
Pistorius & Tladi (2014) 26/3 SA Merc LJ 
 Pistorius T & Tladi SEM ‘The hall of shame: Double standards for spam’ 
(2014) 26/3 SA Merc LJ 688-705  
Prince & Shea (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 
 Prince M & Shea PA ‘After CAN-SPAM: How states can stay relevant in 
the fight against unwanted messages: How children’s protection registry 
can be effective and is not pre-empted under the new federal anti-spam 
law’ (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 29-
78  
 
Quo (2004) 11/1 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
 Quo S ‘Spam: Private and legislative responses to unsolicited electronic 
mail in Australia and United States’ (2004) 11/1 Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law 1-31 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ 
MurUEJL/2004/11.html (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
 
Reid (2010) 4/2 Akron Intellectual Property Journal 
 Reid VJ ‘Recent developments in private enforcement of the CAN-SPAM 
Act’ (2010) 4/2 Akron Intellectual Property Journal 281-308 
Relf (2005) 2 Macquarie J Bus L 
 Relf P ‘A look at Australia’s new anti-spam legislation’ (2005) 2 Macquarie 
J Bus L 91-118 
Renke, Roestoff, & Haupt (2007) 28/2 Obiter 
 Renke S, Roestoff M & Haupt F ‘The National Credit Act: New parameters 
for granting of credit in South Africa’ (2007) 28/2 Obiter 229-70 
Rogers (2004) 25 Business Law Review 
 Rogers KM ‘The Privacy Directive and resultant regulations: The effect on 
spam and cookies Part II’ (2004) 25 Business Law Review 271-74 
 
 
 
327 
 
Roos (2006) 39/1 CILSA 
  Roos A ‘Core principles of data protection law’ (2006) 39 1 CILSA 103-30  
Roos (2007) 124/2 SALJ 
 Roos A ‘Data protection: explaining the international backdrop and 
evaluating the current South African position’ (2007) 124/2 SALJ 400-37  
Roos (2008) 4 PELJ 
 Roos A ‘Personal data protection in New Zealand: lessons for South 
Africa?’ (2008) 4 PELJ 62-109  
Rothchild (1999) 74/3 Indiana Law Journal 
 Rothchild J ‘Protecting the digital consumer: The limits of cyberspace 
utopianism’ (1999) 74/3 Indiana Law Journal 893-989  
Rutenberg (2011-2012) 14/1 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology 
Law Rutenberg D.J ‘Silence of the spam: Improving the CAN-SPAM Act 
by including an expanded private cause of action’ (2011-2012) 14/1 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 225-52  
 
Saurombe (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ   
 Saurombe A ‘The SADC Trade Agenda, a tool to facilitate regional 
commercial law: An analysis’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 695-709   
Schryen (2007) 16/1 Information and Communications Technology Law 
 Schryen G ‘Anti-Spam Legislation: An analysis of laws and their 
effectiveness’ (2007) 16/1 Information and Communications Technology 
Law 17-32 
Shames (2004) 66 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
 Shames ME ‘Congress opts out of canning spam’ (2004) 66 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 385-410 
Slutsky & Baran (2005) 10 Georgia Bar Journal 
 Slutsky B & Baran S ‘Spyware and the Internet: A cyberspace odyssey’ 
(2005) 10 Georgia Bar Journal 22-5 
Smith (2009) 23/1 Cultural Studies 
 Smith A ‘Nigerian scam e-mails and the charms of capital’ (2009) 23/1 
Cultural Studies 27-47 
Smith (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 
 Smith A ‘Privacy and the sale of customer lists in South African Insolvency 
law: Some issues reconnoiteres’ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 598-621 
Smith (2005) 12/2 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 
 Smith L ‘Global online shopping: How well protected is the Australian 
consumer?’ (2005) 12/2 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 163-90  
Snail (2007) 15/2 JBL 
 Snail L ‘An overview of South African e-consumer law in the context of the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (part 2)’ (2007) 15/2 
JBL 54-60  
Snail (2009) 1 Journal of Information Law & Technology 
 Snail S ‘Cyber-crime in South Africa: Hacking, cracking, and other 
unlawful online activities’ (2009) 1 Journal of Information Law & 
Technology 1-13 http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2009_1/snail (date of use: 28 
January 2016) 
Sibanda (2008) 1 Journal of Information Law & Technology 
 
 
328 
 
 Sibanda OS ‘Anti-spam: a comparative appraisal of Canadian, European 
Union, and South African regulatory regimes’ (2008) Journal of 
Information Law & Technology 1-9 
 http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2008_2/sibanda (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Soma, Singer & Hurd (2008) 45 Harvard Journal on Legislation 
 Soma J, Singer P, & Hurd J ‘Spam still pays: The failure of the CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003 and proposed legal solutions’ (2008) 45 Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 165-98 
Sorkin (2001) 35/2 University of San Fransisco Law Review 
 Sorkin DE ‘Technical and legal approaches to unsolicited e-mail’ (2001) 
35/2 University of San Fransisco Law Review 325-84 
Sorkin (2003) 22/1 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 
 Sorkin DE ‘Spam legislation in the United States’ (2003) 22/1 John 
Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 3-12 
Stein (2012) 12/10 Without Prejudice 
 Stein P ‘South Africa’s EU-style data protection law’ (2012) 12/10 Without 
Prejudice 48-9 
Steindel (2011) 17/2 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 
 Steindel TA ‘A path toward user control of online profiling’ (2011) 17/2 
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 459-90 
Subramaniam, Jalab HA & Taqa AY (2010) 5/12 International Journal of the Physical 
Sciences 
Subramaniam T, Jalab HA & Taqa AY ‘Overview of textual anti-spam filtering 
techniques’ (2010) 5/12 International Journal of the Physical Sciences 
1869-82 
http://www.academicjournals.org/app/webroot/article/article1380815369_
Subramaniam%20et%20al.pdf (Date of use: 26 November 2015) 
Susuk (2010) 6/2 Washington Journal of Law Technology and Arts 
 Susuk L ‘Death of the spam wrangler: CAN-SPAM private plaintiffs 
required to show actual harm’ (2010) 6/2 Washington Journal of Law 
Technology and Arts 155-69  
Swales (2016) 28/1 SA Merc LJ 
 Swales L ‘Protection of personal information: South Africa’s answer to the 
global phenomenon in the context of unsolicited electronic messages 
(spam)’ (2016) 28/1 SA Merc LJ 49-84 
Szabo (2006) 7 Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law 
 Szabo C.M ‘Attempting to herd spam and the effects of White Buffalo 
Ventures, LLC v University of Texas at Austin’ (2006) 7 Texas Review of 
Entertainment & Sports Law 63-78 
 
Tladi (2008) 125/1 SALJ 178-92 
 Tladi S ‘The Regulation of unsolicited commercial communications 
(spam): Is the opt-out mechanism effective?’ (2008) 125/1 SALJ 178-92  
Traung (2010) 31/10 Business Law Review 
 Traung P ‘EU law on spyware, web bugs, cookies, etc., revisited: Article 5 
of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications’ (2010) 31/10 
Business Law Review 216-28 
Trussell (2004) 16/2 Loyola Consumer Law Review 
 Trussell J ‘Is the CAN-SPAM Act the answer to the growing problem of 
spam?’ (2004) 16/2 Loyola Consumer Law Review 175-88 
 
 
329 
 
Uchenna (2012) 17/4 Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Law 
 Uchenna JO ‘A discourse on the perceived defects of the draft African 
Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework 
for Cybersecurity’ (2012) 17/4 Journal of Computer and 
Telecommunications Law 128-30 
 
Vaile (2004) 6/9 Internet Law Bulletin 
  Vaile D ‘Spam canned: new laws Australia’ (2004) 6/9 Internet Law 
Bulletin 113-15 
Volker (2011-2012) Summer Auditing 
 Volker E ‘Ponzi schemes in South Africa: a practical discussion’ (2011-
2012) Summer Auditing SA 5-10 
 
Warner (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 
 Warner R ‘Spam and beyond: freedom, efficiency, and the regulation of e-
mail advertising’ (2003) 22 John Marshall Journal of Computer and 
Information Law 141-77 
Whipple (2013) 21 LBJ Journal of Public Affairs 
 Whipple M ‘Regulating consumer profiling: going beyond advertising’ 
(2013) 21 LBJ Journal of Public Affairs 89-129 
Woker (2010) 31/2 Obiter 
 Woker T ‘Why the need for consumer protection legislation: a look at 
some of the reasons behind the promulgation of the National Credit Act 
and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31/2 Obiter 217-23 
Wong (2007) 20/2 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 
 Wong K ‘The future of spam litigation after Omega World Travel v 
Mummagraphics’ (2007) 20/2 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 459-
78 
 
Yang (2004-2005) 4/1 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
 Yang GC ‘CAN-SPAM: A first step to no spam’ (2004-2005) 4/1 Chicago-
Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 1-44 
Youngblood (2001) 11/1 DePaul-LCA Journal of Art and Entertainment Law  
 Youngblood C ‘A new millennium dilemma: Cookie technology, 
consumers, and the future of the Internet’ (2001) 11/1 DePaul-LCA 
Journal of Art and Entertainment Law 45-82 
 
 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
 
South Africa 
 
Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC) 
 
Ketler Investment CC Presentations v Internet Service Providers’ Association 2014 
(1) ALL SA 566 (GSJ) 
 
Sihlali v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd [2010] ZALC 1, (2010) 31 ILJ 
1477 (LC) 
 
 
 
330 
 
Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash Combined Motor Holdings 
Limited (725/13) [2014] ZASCA 178; 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA) 
 
Australia 
 
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Atkinson [2009] FCA 1565 (22 
December 2009) 1-18 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2009/ 
1565.html (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity 1 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1399 
1-18 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2006/1399.html 
(date of use: 15 January 2016) 
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd [2010] FCA 1197 
(5 November 2010) 1-35 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/ 
2010/1197.html (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
 AustraliaSMS Pty Ltd (ABN 30 100 396 138 and ACN 100 396 138 media 
release 21 July 2005) 1-7 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/assets/ 
main/lib310480/aust/sms-boulos-ast_enforc_utaking.pdf (date of use: 20 
January 2016) 
 
Best Buy Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 122 464 799 media release 24 February 2010) 1-8 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20 
Compliance/enforceable%20understanding/pdf/EU%20Best%20Buy%20A
ustralia%20PL%20Augst%202010%20Spam%20Act%202003.PDF (date 
of use: 20 January 2016) 
Big Mobile Pty Ltd (ACN 119 902 966 media release 29 September 2009) 1-6 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/big_mobile_s38_
spamact.eu.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
Club Retail Pty Ltd (ACN 165 324 881 media release 2015) 1-3 
http://www.152.91.62.26/sitecore/content/Home/Citizen/Take-action? 
Complaints/Spam-complaints/Spam-complaints/spam-enforcement-
actions (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
 
DND Media Pty Ltd (ACN 151 096 285 media release 05 September 2013) 1-2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Co
mpliance/Formal%20warning/DND%20Media%20s41%20Spam%20Act%
20Formal%20Warning%20%20pdf.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
EventsHQ Pty Ltd (ACN 118 063 666 media release 13 January 2012) 1-6  
 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/eventshqs38_spa
macteu.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
Funmobile Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 114 489 600 media release 19 January 2010) 1-6 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/funmobiles38spa
mact.eu.pdf  (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
Global Billing Solutions Pty Ltd (ACN 135 029 748 media release 23 March 2012) 1-
2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib410040/global_billing_sol
utions-formal_warning_spam_act.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
 
331 
 
IGEA Life Sciences Pty Limited (ACN 125 930 878 media release 30 June 2014) 1-2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Co
mpliance/Formal%20warning/PDF/20140630%20%20IGEA%20Life%20S
ciences%20Pty%20Limited%20%20Formal%20warning%20pdf.PDF 
(date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
JER Pty Ltd (CAN 107 555 475 19 October 2011) 1-4 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/urban_agent-
eus38spamact.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)   
 
McDonald’s Australia Limited (ACN 008 496 928 media release 18 December 2012) 
1-2 http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/ Ensuring-you-
don’tspam/mr-992012-acma-warns-mcdonalds-for-send-to-friends-
marketing (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
New Dialogue Pty Limited (ACN 111 086 938 media release 29 September 2009) 1- 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/new_dialogue_s3
8_spam_act_eu.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Nokia Corporation (media release 03 January 2012) 1-6 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/assets/main/lib310480/nokia 
eus38spamact3jan2012.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
Oxygen8 Communications Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 111 902 982 media release 15 
December 2008) 1-6 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/ 
lib310480 /oxygen8_s38_spam_act.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
Penta Group Pty Ltd (ACN 122757519 media release 2014) 1-2 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/penta-group-pty-ltd (date of use: 20 
January 2016)  
 
Qidi Enterprises Pty Ltd (ABN 35097220114 media release 20 January 2006) 1-7  
 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/p_liang_qidi_ente
rprisesast_enforc_utaking.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
Tiger Airways Holdings Limited (ACN 124 369 008 media release 22 October 2012) 
 1-9 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/tiger_airways 
 %20eu_s38_spam_act-22oct2012.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
Vadkho Pty Ltd (ACN 138 809 917 media release 22 April 2015) 1-2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Citizen/Take-action/Complaints/Spam-
complaints/spam-enforcement-actions (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Virgin Blue Pty Limited (ACN 090 670 965 26 February 2010) 1-8 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310480/virgin_blue_s38_
spam_actenforceable_undertaking.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
Wailea Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 155 959229 media release 07 October 2013) 1-2 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Co
mpliance/Formal%20warning/ACRIS%20Svces%20ss161%20Formal%20
warning%20Spam%20Act%20pdf.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
 
 
332 
 
United States of America 
 
Balsam v Trancos Inc 2012 WL 593703 (Ca Ct App Feb 24 2012) 1-5 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/02/california_appe_2.htm (date 
of use: 30 December 2015). 
Beyond Systems INC. v Kraft Foods Incorporated (2014 WL 3572771 July 21 2014) 
1-13 http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-4th-circuit/1691263.html (date of use: 
30 December 2015). 
Beyond Systems Inc v Keynetics Inc 422 F Supp 2nd (2006) 1-60 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/1923.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015) 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia v Jeremy Jaynes (No 08-765) 1-31 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/08-765_bio.pdf 
(date of use: 30 December 2015)  
 
Federal Trade Commission v Lance Thomas Atkins (Case No 08CV5666 2009) 1-25 
 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/11/091130atki
nsjudgemnt.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Federal Trade Commission v Phoenix Avatar, LLC trading as Avatar Nutrition (Case 
No 04C 2897 2004) 1-24 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/ 
cases/2005/03/050331stip0423084.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015)  
Federal Trade Commission v Sili Neutraceuticals LLC (Case No 07 C 4541 2008) 1-
20 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/02/080123silid
efaultjdgnt.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Federal Trade Commission v Spear Systems Inc (Case No 07 c 5597 2009) 1-22 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/07/090702xav
ierjudgeorder.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
FTC v Global Web Promotions Pty Ltd (Case No 04C 3022 2005) 1-23 
 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/050920defj
udg042386.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
Gordon v Virtumundo 575 F 3d 1040 (2009 US App LEXIS 17518) 1-28 
http://www.nyls.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/141/2013/08/575-F.3d-
1040-Gordon-v-Virtumundo.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
Kleffman v Vonage Holdings Corp 232 P 3d 625, 627 (Cal 2010) 
http://www.caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1527999.html (date of 
use: 5 January 2016) 
 
Omega World Travel v Mummagraphics 469 F 3d 348 94th Cir 2006 1-9 
http://openjurist.org/469/f3d/348/omega-world-travel-incorporated-v-
mummagraphics-incorporated-w (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
Parker v CN. Enterprises (Case No 97-06273 Texas Travis County District Court 
November 1997) 1-3 http://www.loudy.com/CASES/Parker_v_ 
CN_Entterprises.html (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
 
 
333 
 
Spam Arrest LLC v Replacements Ltd (2013) WL 4675919 (WD Wash. Aug. 29 
2013) 1-36 https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/washington/wawdce/2:2012cv00481/182956/96/0.pdf?ts=1377958
938http://blog.ericgoldman/archives/2013/09/spamarrests.se.htm (date of 
use: 30 December 2015) 
 
US v Kilbride 584 F 3d 1240 (9th Cir 2009) 1-19 http://www.nyls.edu/wp 
 content/uploads/sites/141/2013/08/584-F.3d-1240-US-v.-Kilbride.pdf (date 
of use: 30 December 2015) 
US v Twombly 475 F Supp 2nd 1019 (SD Cal 2007) 1-11 
https://casetext.com/case/us-v-twombly-2 (date of use: 30 December 
2015)   
 
Wagner v Spire Vision (C13-04952 WHA ND Cal March 2014) 1-16 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/06/can-spam-preemption-
doesnt-apply-to-fraud-and-more.htm (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
White Buffalo Ventures v University of Texas at Austin 420 F 3d 366 (5th Cir 2005) 1-
13 http://www.openjurist.org/420/f3d/366/white-buffalo-ventures-llc-v-
university-of-texs-at-austin (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
 
LEGISLATION AND FOREIGN LEGAL INSTRUMENTS  
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Acts 
 
Business Names Act 27 of 1960 
 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practice) Act 71 of 1988 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 2002 
 
Guidelines for Recognition of Industry Representative Bodies of Information System 
Providers’ (IRB Code) GN 1283 GG 29474 (14 December 2006) 
 
Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941 
 
National Consumer Credit Act 34 of 2005 
 
Price Control Act 25 of 1964 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 
 
Sales and Service Matters Act 25 of 1964. 
  
Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976 
 
 
 
334 
 
Bills  
 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity: Bill (Draft for Public Comment) Government Gazette 
GG No. 39161 Notice 878 (30 November 2015) 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2015/20150902-
gg39161_gen878-cyberbill.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill Government Gazette GG No. 40487 (9 
December 2016) http://ellipsis.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/b-6-
2017-cybercrimes.pdf (date of use: 4 March 2017) 
 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill Government Gazette 
GG No. 35821 Notice 888 (26 October 2012) http://www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Electronic-Communications-and-Transactions-
Amendment-Bill-2012-for-public-comments-20121026-GGN-35821-
00888.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015). 
 
Other documents 
 
The Department of Communications Green Paper on e-Commerce: Making it your 
business (2000) 
 
South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Discussion Paper 109 Project 124 
Privacy and Data Protection (2005) 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Acts 
 
Spam Act of 2003  
 
Trade Practices Act of 1974 
 
Other documents 
 
ACMA ‘Australian eMarketing Code of Practice’ (March 2005) 1-67 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media?Unsolicited%20Communications%20Co
mpliance/Regulation/pdf?Australia%20EMarketing%20Code%20of%20Pr
actice.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
ACMA  ‘Joint select committee on cyber-safety submission no. 80’ (July 2010) 1-
28 http://www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jscc-subs-
sub_80%20(3).pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Regulation guide: no 5 infringement notices’ (September 2011) 1-6 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Legal%20Services/Advice/pdf/Regulator
y%20guide%20No%205%20Infringement%20notices.PDF (date of use: 
15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Submission to Spam Act Review’ (Melbourne 2006) 1-30 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/consumer_info/spam/acma%20submissio
n%20to%20review.pdf (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
 
 
 
335 
 
Joint  Statement between the Department of Communications Information 
Technology and the Arts (Australia) and the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology of the Kingdom of Thailand Concerning 
Cooperation in the Fields of Communications and Information Technology 
1-2 http://www.acma.gov.za.au (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
 
Memorandum of Understanding between Australia Commerce and Industry Office, 
and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia Concerning 
Cooperation in the Cooperation in the Regulation of Spam (signed in 
October 2007) 1-4 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications 
%20Compliance/Information/pdf/Spam%20International%20Cooperation
%20Memorandum%20of%20Understanding%20Between%20Australia%2
0and%20%Taiwan.Pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA) and the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs 
(DIA) 1-10 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20 
Compliance/Information/pdf/Spam%20International%20Cooperation%20
Memorandum%20Understanding%20Between%20Australia%20and%20N
ew%20Zealand.PDF (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Korean Information Security Agency 
and the Australian Communications Authority and the National Office for 
the Information Economy of Australia Concerning Cooperation in the 
Regulation of Spam 1-3 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Attachments%20 
Memorandum%20of%20Understanding%20Between%20KISA%20ACA%
20and%20and%20NOIE.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Memorandum of Understanding on continual enforcement assistance in commercial 
email matters among the following agencies of the United States; the 
United Kingdom and Australia: The United States Federal Trade 
Commission; the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading; the United 
Kingdom’s Information Commissioner; Her Majesty’s secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom; the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission; and the Australian Communications Authority 1-
11 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-antitrust-
and-consumer-protection-cooperation 
agreements/040630spammoutext.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
Seoul-Melbourne Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in 
Countering Spam (signed 4 May 2010) 1-8 http://www.sm-
mou.org/smmou/about.mou.php (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
Spam Regulations 2004 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (8 April 2004). 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cht/num_reg_es/sr20042004n56202.htm
l (date of use: 15 January 2016). 
 
CANADA 
 
Acts 
 
 
 
336 
 
Canada Anti-Spam Legislation of 2014 
 
JAPAN 
 
Acts 
 
Law on Regulation of Transmission of Specified Electronic Mail Act passed April 
2002, amended in 2005 and 2008 
http://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/2008/07/japanese-new-
anti_spam.law (date of use: 7 September 2015). 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
Acts 
 
Alaska Statutes: Title 45 Trade and Commerce; Chapter 50 Competitive Practices 
and Regulation of Competition; section 479 Limitation of electronic mail 
(added by 2003 Alaska Laws ch.14, H.B 82 2003, approved May 5 2003 
effective July 30 2003) 
Arizona Revised Statutes Title 44: Trade and Commerce; Chapter 9. Trade Practices 
Generally; Article 16. Commercial e-mail (added by 2003 S.B 1280 
approved May 16 2003) 
Arkansas Code Title 4: Business and Commercial Law; Subtitle 7 Consumer 
Protection; Chapter 88: Deceptive Trade Practices Subchapter 6: 
Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Electronic Mail Prevention 
Act (added by Act 1019 of 2003 (approved April 2 2003)) 
  
California Business and Professions Code: Division 7; Part 3, Chapter 1: Article 1.8 
Restrictions on Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Advertisement (added by 
Stats. 2003 ch. 487 (SB 186), approved September 23 2003 as 
amended).  
Connecticut General Statutes: Title 52 Civil Actions; Chapter 925 Statutory Rights of 
Action and Defenses (as amended in 2003) 
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM 
Act of 2003) 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 USC 231(e)(4) 
 
Delaware Code: Title 11 Crimes and Criminal Procedure (as amended by 72 Del. 
Laws c 135 approved by Governor June 23, 1999; effective July 2 1999) 
 
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (as amended) 
 Florida Rules of Professional Conduct (Fla. R.P.C) Rule 4-7.6(c) (3) 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM (date of use: 30 
December 2015)  
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 USC 1818) 
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct (Fla RPC) rule 4-7.6(c)(3) 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM (date of use: 30 
December 2015)  
Florida Statutes: Title 39 Commercial Relations; Chapter 668 Electronic commerce; 
part III Federal Credit Union Act (12 USC 1751) e-mail communications 
 
 
337 
 
(added by 2004 Fla. Laws ch. 233, approved  May 25 2004, effective 
July 1 2004)  
 
Idaho Code Title 48: Monopolies and Trade Practices; Chapter 6: Consumer 
Protection Act; section 48-603E. Unfair Bulk Electronic Mail 
Advertisement Practices (added by House Bill 505 (approved by Governor 
April 17 2000 (effective July 1 2000))  
Illinois Compiled Statutes: Chapter 815 Business Transactions Deceptive Practices; 
815 ILCS 511/ Electronic Mail Act  
Iowa Code Chapter 714E (added by House File 448 (1999) approved by Governor 
May 26 1999 (effective July 1 1999))  
 
Kansas Statutes: Chapter 50 Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection; Article 6 
Consumer Protection (added by Laws 2002 ch 140 (SB 467) approved 
May 17 2002)  
Kentucky Bar Association Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky (Ky Sup Ct) 
http://www.cle.kybar.org/documents/scr/scr3/scr_3.130_(7.09).pdf (date of 
use: 5 January 2016)  
 
Louisiana Revised Statutes: Title 14 Criminal Law; (as amended by 1999 La. Acts 
1180 approved July 9 1999).  
Louisiana Revised Statutes: Title 51 Trade and Commerce Chapter 19-C Unsolicited 
Commercial E-mail Restrictions (added by 2003 La. Acts 1275, approved 
July 2 2003) 
 
Maine Revised Statutes Title 10 Commerce and Trade Part 3 Regulation of Trade 
Chapter 224 e-mail Solicitation (added by Public Laws ch. 327 (2003), 
H.B. 210 (approved May 27 2003) 
Maryland Criminal Law Code Title 3: Other Crimes against the Person; Subtitle 8: 
Stalking and Harassment (as amended in 2004) 
Michigan Compiled Laws Chapter 445. Trade and Commerce Unsolicited 
Commercial e-mail Protection Act (added by 2003 Mich Pub Act 42 (HB 
4519) effective 1 September 2003) 
Minnesota Statutes 2002 Ch 395 Senate file no 2908 (2002) (introduced 11 February 
2002 approved 20 May 2002) 
Missouri Revised Statutes Title 26: Trade and Commerce Chapter 407. 
Merchandising Practices and Electronic Mail Practices (enacted in 2000) 
amended by House Bill 228 (2003) approved 11 July 2003 (effective 28 
August 2003) 
 
New Mexico Statutes: Title 57 Trade and Commerce Article 12 Unfair Practices Act 
(added by 2003 SB 699 2003 NM Acts ch 168 approved 5 April 2003) 
North Carolina General Statutes (as amended in 1999)   
North Dakota Statutes: Title 51 Sales and Exchanges Chapter 27 Commercial E-mail 
Solicitation (added by session laws 2003 ch 439 (HB 1388) 
 
Official Code of Georgia: Title 16 Crimes and Offences Chapter 9 Forgery and 
Fraudulent Practices Article 6 Computer Systems Protection (as amended 
by Senate Bill 62 2005 approved and effective 19 April 2005) 
 
 
338 
 
Ohio Revised Code: Title 23 Courts Common Pleas Chapter 2307 Civil Actions 
Damage and Theft (as amended by HB 361 2005 effective 6 May 2005)  
Oklahoma Statutes: Title 15 Contracts (added by Okla. Laws 1999 ch 337 House Bill 
1410 1999 (approved by Governor 8 June 1999 effective 1 July 1999 
amended by Senate Bill 660 2003 effective 1 November 2003)  
 
Pennsylvania Statutes: Title 73 Trade and Commerce Chapter 40A Unsolicited 
Telecommunication Advertisement Act (added by 2002 Pa Laws 222 
approved 16 December 2002) 
 
Revised Code of Washington: Title 19 Business Regulations-Miscellaneous Chapter 
19.190 Commercial Electronic Mail (as amended by 2003 Acts ch 137 
(HB 2007))  
Rhode Island General Laws Title 6: Commercial Law General Regulatory Provisions 
Chapter 47 Internet access and Advertising by Facsimile (added in 1999)  
 
South Dakota Codified Laws: Chapter 37-24 Deceptive Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection (provisions added or amended in 2002)  
 
Tennessee Code Title 39: Criminal Offences Chapter 14 Offenses against Property: 
Part 6 Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003 
(added in 2003) 
Texas Statutes Title 4: Business & Commerce Code Chapter 46 Electronic Mail 
Solicitation (added by Acts 2003 ch 1053 (House Bill 1282) approved 20 
June 2003 effective 1 September 2003) 
 
Utah Code: Title 13 Commerce and Trade Chapter 36 Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit E-mail Act (added by Utah Laws 2002 Chapters 125 and 
229)  
 
Virginia Code: Title 18.2 Crimes and Offenses Generally Chapter 5 Crimes against 
Property Article 7.1 Computer Crimes (including amendments by Acts 
2003 ch 987 & 1016 approved 3 April 2003)  
 
Wisconsin Statutes: Chapter 944 Crimes against Sexual Morality (added by 2001 Act 
16 approved 1 June 2001) 
Wyoming Statutes: Title 40 Trade and Commerce Chapter 12 Consumer Protection 
Article 4 Commercial Electronic Mail (added by 2003 Wyo Laws ch 86 
approved 3 March 2003 effective 1 July 2003)  
 
Other documents 
 
Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 316 Title 16 Commercial Practices 
 
Federal Trade Commission ‘National do not e-mail registry: a report to congress 
(2004) the executive summary’ 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/can-spam-act-
2003-national-do-not-email-registry-federal-trade-commission-report-
congress/report.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015). 
Federal Trade Commission ‘Online profiling: a report to Congress part 2 
 
 
339 
 
 recommendations’ 1-2 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/934.pdf (date of use:10 
November 2015) 
Federal Register ‘Requirements to place warning labels on commercial electronic 
mail that contains sexually oriented material’ 69 19 (29 January 2004) 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/com/sol/notices/69fr42
69.pdf (date of use 6 January 2016) 
 
Memorandum of Understanding on continual enforcement assistance in commercial 
email matters among the following agencies of the United States; the 
United Kingdom and Australia: The United States Federal Trade 
Commission; the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading; the United 
Kingdom’s Information Commissioner; Her Majesty’s secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom; the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission; and the Australian Communications Authority 1-
11 http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-antitrust-
and-consumer-protection-sooperation-
agreements/050224memounderstanding.pdf (date of use: 30 December 
2016) 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Federal Trade 
Commission and the Information Commissioners Office of the United 
Kingdom on Mutual Assistance in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting 
Personal Information in Private Sector. Document accessed (2014) 1-10 
http://www.ftc.gov/systems/files/attachments/international-competition-
consumer-protection-cooperstion-agreements/140306ftc-uk-mou.pdf (date 
of use: 30 December 2015).  
Memorandum of Understanding between US FTC and the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria’s Consumer Protection Council (CPC) and Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on Mutual Enforcement Assistance 
in Consumer Protection Matters (2013) 1-2 http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2013/08/ftc-signs-memorandum-understandu=ing-
nigerian-consumer-protection (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Enforcement Assistance in Commercial 
Email Matters Between the Federal Trade Commission of the United 
States of America and the Agencia Espanola De Proteccion De Datos 1-9 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/defaults/files/attachments/international-antitrust-
and-consumer-protection-cooperation-
agreements/050224memounderstanding.pdf (date of use: 30 March 2015) 
Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Enforcement Assistance in Commercial 
E-mail Matters Among the Following Agencies of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia: The United States Federal Trade 
Commission; The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading, the United 
Kingdom’s Information Commissioner, Her Majesty’s Secretary of the 
State for Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, and the Australian 
Communications Authority (2 July 2004) 1-11 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/international-antitrust-
and-consumer-protection-sooperation-agreements/050224 
memounderstanding.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
 
 
340 
 
Platt Majoras D et al ‘A CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System: A Report to 
Congress’ (September 2004) 1-74 
https://ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/can-spam-informant-
reward-system-federal-trade-commission-report-congressexpert-
reports/040916rewardsysrpt.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Platt Majoras D et al ‘Subject line labelling as a weapon against spam: A CAN-SPAM 
Act Report to Congress’ (June 2005) 1-46 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/subject-line-
labeling- weapon-against-spam-can-spam-report-
congress/050616canspamrpt.pdf (date of use: 6 January 2016) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, MODEL LAWS AND CONVENTIONS 
 
AFRICA 
 
African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
adopted by the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union (27 
June 2014 Malabo) https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/AU-
270614-CSConvention.pdf (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
 
COMESA Model Law on Electronic Transactions and Guide to Enactment (2010)  
 Constitutive Act of the African Union (1999) http://www1.uneca.org/ 
Portals/ngm/Documents/Conventions%20and%20Resolutions/constitution
.pdf (date of use: 15 December 2015) 
 
Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework 
for Cybersecurity in Africa, also titled Draft African Union Convention on 
the Confidence and Security in Cyberspace (Version 01/09/2012) 
http://au.int/en/cyberlegislation (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (17 August 
1992) http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration_Treaty-of-
SADC.pdf (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
 
Official Gazette of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
16 (15 October 2011) 
 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law on Electronic 
Transactions and Electronic Commerce Harmonization of ICT Policies in 
Sub-Saharan African (2013) 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model Law on Computer Crime 
and Cybercrime Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan African 
(2013) 
 
ITU 
 
Convention 
 
ITU  ‘Collection of the Basic Texts of the International Telecommunication 
Union Adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conference’ (2011 ed) 
 
 
341 
 
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/conf/S-CONF-PLEN-2015-TOC-
HTM-E.htm (date use: 6 November 2015) 
 
Other documents 
 
Bambauer DE et al ‘A comparative analysis of spam laws: the quest for a Model 
Law’ (Document CYB/03 Geneva, Switzerland 28 June - 1 July 2005) 1-
41 
https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Compa
rative_Analysis_of_Spam_Laws.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
Bueti MC ‘ITU Survey on Anti-spam Legislation Worldwide’ ITU WSIS Thematic 
Meeting on Cybersecurity (Document CYB/06 Geneva, Switzerland 28 
June 1 July 2005) 1-62 http://www.itu-int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/ 
Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf (date of use: 30 November 
2015)  
 
ITU  ‘Multilateral and Bilateral Cooperation to Combat Spam’ 1-12 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_Multi
lateral%20Bilateral%20Coop.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2016) 
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communications and Security 
(Cyberspace security countering spam) ‘Framework for countering spam 
in IP based multimedia applications’ (Recommendation ITU-T X.1245 
(12/2010) 1-23 http://www.itu.rec/T-REC-X.1245-201012-l/en (date of use: 
30 November 2015) 
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communication and Security 
(Cyberspace security countering spam) ‘Interactive gateway system for 
countering spam’ (Recommendation ITU-T X.1243 (12/2010) 1-22 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=10829 (date of 
use: 05 December 2015) 
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communications and Security 
‘Supplement on a practical reference model for countering e-mail spam 
using botnet information’ (Series X.1243) 1-16 http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=11755 (date of use: 30 November 
2015)  
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communications and Security 
ITU-T X 1240 Series ‘Supplement on Countering Spam and Associated 
Threats’ (Supplement 6) (09/2009) http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/recommendations/ rec/aspx?rec=10245 (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communications and Security 
‘Supplement on framework based on real time blocking lists for countering 
VoIP spam’ (ITU-T X.1245 Recommendation: Supplement 11 (09/2011) 1-
18 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=11342 (date of 
use: 30 November 2015).  
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communications and Security 
(Telecommunication security) ‘Technical framework for countering email 
spam’ (Recommendation ITU-T X.1241 (04/2008)) 1-11 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=9335 (date of 
use: 30 November 2015)  
 
 
342 
 
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open Systems Communications and Security 
(Telecommunications security) ‘Technical strategies for countering spam’ 
(Recommendation ITU-T X.1231 (04/2008) 1-11 http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=9333 (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU-T  Series X: Data Networks Open System Communications and Security 
(Telecommunication security) ‘Technologies involved in countering e-mail 
spam’ (Recommendation ITU-T X.1240 (04/2008)) 1-19 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=9334 (date of 
use: 30 November 2015)  
ITU-T Telecommunication Standardization Sector of ITU World Telecommunication 
 Standardization Assembly (WTSA) ‘Resolution 51: Combating Spam’ 
(Resolution passed Florianopolis 5-14 October 2004) 1-3 
http://www.itu.int/ITUT/wtsa/resolutions04/Res51E.pdf (date of use: 30 
November 2015)  
ITU-T World Telecommunication Standardization Sector of ITU World Countering 
Spam (Resolution passed Florianopolis 5-14 October 2004) 1-3 
http://www.itu.int./dms_pub/ITU-T/opb/res/T-RES-T.52-2012-PDF-E.pdf 
(date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU-T World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA) (resolution was 
passed in Dubai, 20-29 November 2012) ‘Resolution 52: Countering 
spam’ (renamed ‘Countering and combating spam’ 
http://www.itu.int./dms_pub/ITU-T/opb/res/T-RES-T.52-2012-PDF-E.pdf 
(date of use: 30 November 2015). 
ITU WCIT ‘Final Acts World Conference on International Telecommunications’ 
 Dubai 2012) 1-30 http://ww.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-
Seminars/spam/201307/pages/default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
ITU WSIS Thematic Meeting on countering spam curbing spam via technical 
measures: an overview 1-18 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam 
/contributions/Background%20Papercurbing%20Spam%20Via%20Techni
cal%20Measures.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU WSIS Thematic meeting on countering spam ‘Multilateral and bilateral 
cooperation to combat spam’ 1-12 
 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_Multi
lateral%2Bilateral%20Coop.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU WSIS Thematic meeting on cyber-security ‘A comparative analysis of spam 
laws: The quest for a Model Law’ (Document CYB/03 10 June 2005)  
ITU WSIS Thematic workshop on countering spam ‘Discussion paper countering 
 spam: How to craft an effective anti-spam law’ 1-15 
 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_How
%20to%2craft%20-effective%20anti-spam%20law.pdf (date of use: 30 
November 2015) 
 
Rotenberg M ‘Consumer perspectives on spam: challenges and challenges’ (2004) 
1-19 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper%20c
onsumer%20perspective%20on%20spam.pdf (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
 
 
 
343 
 
Sarrocco C ‘Spam the Information Society: Building Frameworks for International 
Cooperation’ 1-28 (2004) http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions 
/Background%20Paper_Building%20Frameworks%20for%20Int/%20Coop
eration.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
 
OECD 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Task Force on 
Spam: Anti-Spam-Law Enforcement Report DSTI/CP/ICCP/SPAM (2004) 
3 FINAL (13 May 2005) 
OECD ‘Report on the OECD Task Force on Spam: Anti-spam ToolKit of 
Recommended Policies and Measures’ (19 April 2006) 
 DSTI/ICCP/SPAM(2005)3/FINAL 1-115 
 http://www.oecd.org/internet/consumer/36494147.pdf (date of use: 30 
November 2015) 
 
UNITED NATIONS 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Harmonization of 
Cyberlaws and Regulation: The Experience of the East African 
Community (Reforming Cyberlaws Part 1)’ 
UNCTAD/DTL/STICT/2012/4/Corr.1 1-66 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2012d4_en.pdf (date of 
use: 9 December 2015) 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 (with additional 
article 5 bis as adopted in 1998) 
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (UNECIC) (2007) 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment (2001) 
 
 
INTERNET SOURCES 
 
ABSA ‘Phishing scams’ http://www.absa.co.za/Absacoza/Security-
Centre/Scams/Phishing-Scams (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Abbreviations ‘What does Whatsapp stand for?’ 
http://www.abbreviations.com/whatsapp (Date of use: 6 November 2015)  
Accessnow ‘Africa moves towards a common cybersecurity legal framework’ 
http://www.acessnow.org/blog/2014/06/02/africa-moves-toward-a-
common-cyber-security-legal-framework (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
Accessnow ‘Emerging threats in cybersecurity and data protection legislation in 
African Union countries’ https://www.accessnow.org/emerging-threats-in-
cybersecurity-data-protection-in-african-union (date of use: 27 December 
2015) 
ACMA ‘ACMA fights malware at two fronts’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Internet/e-Security/Australian-Intenet-
Security-Initiative/acma-fights-malware-on-two-fronts (date of use: 20 
January 2016) 
 
 
344 
 
ACMA ‘ACMA obtains interlocutory orders in SMS spam case’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-obtains-interlocutory-orders-in-
sms-spam-case (date of use: January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Australian eMarketing code of practice’ 
http://acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-
spam/australia-emarketing-code-of-practice-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-
acma (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Cellarmaster Wines penalised’ (media release May 2013) 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-
dont-spam/cellarmaster-wines-penalised-for-spam-act-breaches (date of 
use: 20 January 2016). 
ACMA ‘Do not call register’ https://www.donotcall.gov.au (date of use: 20 January 
2016) 
ACMA ‘Double opt-in helps marketers’ double check’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-
dont-spam/double-opt-in-helps-marketers-double-check-1 (date of use: 20 
January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Enforceable undertakings: guidelines for the use of enforceable 
(Telecommunication Obligations)’ March 2006 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Legal%20Services/Advice/pdf/Enforceab
le%20undertakings%20Guidelines%20Guidelines%20for%20the%20use
%20of%20enforceable%20undertakings%20Telecommunications%20Obli
gations.pdf (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Enforcement action archives’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-
enforcement-action-archives (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Federal Court finds Brisbane man breached Spam Act’ (December 2010) 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/federal-court-finds-brisbane-man-
breached-spam-act (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Fighting spam in Australia’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-
ACMA-story/Meeting-our-standard/fighting-spam-in-australia (date of use: 
15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Formal warning index’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/formal-
warnings 
 (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Get smart about purchasing lists’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/engage-blogs/engage-
blogs/Emarketing/Get-smart-about-purchased-lists (date of use: 15 
January 2016)  
ACMA ‘Inferred consent and conspicuous publications’ 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/spam-inferred-consent-and-
conspicuouspublications (date of use: 20 January 2015)  
ACMA ‘Introduction to the ACMA’ 
http://acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/Corporate/Authority/introduction-to-
the-acma (date of use: 23 March 2017) 
ACMA ‘Meeting the ACMA standard: fighting spam in Australia’ 
 http://acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-ACMA-story/Meeting-our-
standard/fighting-spam-in-australia (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Million dollar penalties issued in first SMS spam case’ 
 
 
345 
 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-media-release-1512009-october-
million-dollar-penalties-issued-in-first-sms-spam-case (date of use: 15 
January 2016) 
 ACMA ‘Optus penalty for alleged breaches of Spam Act’ (media release January 
 2009) http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-media-release-52009-14-
january-optus-pays-penalty-for-alleged-breaches-of-spam-act (date of 
use: 15 January 2015)   
ACMA ‘Penalties awarded in e-mail spam case’ 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-media-release-18720009-
22december-penalties-awarded-in-email-spam-case (date of use: 15 
January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Proposed de-registration of spam code’ 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/Consultations/Current/proposed-
deregistration-of-spam-code (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Regulatory guides and guidelines’ 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-ACMA-
story/Regulating/regulatory-guides-guidelines-limitations-on-control-acma 
(date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Report spam’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Citizen/Stay-protected/My-online-
world/Spamreporting-spam-i-acma (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Sender identification’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-
Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/sender-identification-ensuring-you-dont-
spam-i-acma (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Spam address; harvesting and cold-calling prohibition’ 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/spam-address-harvesting-and-cold-
calling-prohibition (date of use: 15 January 2016)  
ACMA ‘Spam and legislation enforcement’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Marketers/Anti-Spam/Ensuring-you-
dont-spam/spam-legislation-enforcement-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-acma 
(date of use: 23 March 2017). 
ACMA ‘Spam case studies’ http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/spam-case-
studies (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Spam code of practice’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/Library/Industry-
library/Marketers/spam-code-of-practice (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Spam consent’ http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/marketers/Anti-
Spam/Ensuring-you-dont-spam/spam-consent-ensuring-you-dont-spam-i-
acma (date of use: 15 January 2016)  
ACMA ‘Spam SMS boosts the ACMA’s fight against spam’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-media-release-692010-9-june-
spam-sms-boosts-the-acmas-fight-against-spam (date of use: 20 January 
2016) 
ACMA ‘Spam statistics: January 2015’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/ACMAi/investigation-
reports/Statistics/spam-statistics (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘Spam statistics: January 2016’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/ACMAi/investigation-
reports/Statistics/spam-statistics (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
 
 
346 
 
ACMA ‘Submission to Spam Act Review: ACMA’ 5 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/consumer_info/spam/acma%20submissio
n%20to%20review.pdf (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘The ACMA accepts enforceable undertaking from Alex Shehata’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/the-acma-accepts-enforceable-
undertaking-from-alex-shehata (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
ACMA ‘The ACMA’s enforceable undertakings’ 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/About/The-ACMA-
story/Regulating/the-acmas-enforceable-undertakings (date of use: 20 
January 2016) 
ADMA  Do not mail-consumers’ https://www.adma.com/au/do-not-mail (date of 
use: 20 January 2016). 
ADMA ‘Members Hub’ https://www.adma.com.au/members-hub/overview/ (date 
of use: 20 January 2016) 
African Union ‘AU in a nutshell’ http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (Date of use: 9 
December 2015)  
African Union ‘Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 
http://www.au.int/en/recs/igad (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
African Union ‘History’ http://www.au.int/en/about/history (date of use: 9 December 
2015) 
African Union: INFOSOC ‘Cyber Security’ http://pages.au/int/infosoc/cybersecurity 
 (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
African Union ‘Oliver Tambo Declaration’ Extra-Ordinary Conference of African 
 Union Ministers in Charge of Communication and Information 
Technologies Johannesburg, South Africa (2-5 November 2009) 1-5 
 http://www.ernwaca.org/panaf/spip.php?article1154 (date of use: 9 
December 2015) 
African Union Summit ‘Transition from the OAU to the African Union’ 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm (date of use: 
3 March 2017) 
Alfreds D ‘Spam declines, malware jumps: Kaspersky’ 
http://www.news24.com/Technology/News/Spam-declines-malware-
jumps-Kaspersky-20131119 (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
American Cancer Society ‘Rumors, myths and truths’ 
http://www.cancer.org/AboutUs/HowweHelpYou/rumours-myths-and-
truths (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
APEC ‘What is Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation?’ http://www.apec.org/About-
Us/About-APEC.aspx (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
AtomPark Software ‘How to gather email addresses and create mailing lists 
http://www.massmailsoftware.com/ezine/past/2003-03-05.htm (date of 
use: 10 November 2015).   
ATU ‘ATU member states as at 25th April 2013’ http://www.atu-
uat.org/index.php/members/member-states (date of use: 9 December 
2015) 
ATU ‘Goals Strategies’ http://www.atu-uat.org/index.php/about-us/core-activity-
programmes/global-decision-making (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
ATU ‘History’ http://www.atu-uat.org/index.php/about-us/history (Date of use: 9 
December 2015) 
 
 
347 
 
AU ‘Southern African Development Community (SADC)’ 
http://www.au.int/en/recs/sadc (Date of use: 09 December 2015)  
Australian eMarketing code signatory ‘Application for signatory status under the 
Australian eMarketing Code of Practice’ 
 http://acma.gov.au/~/media/Unsolicited%20Communications%20Complia
nce/Form/pdf/Australian%20EMarketing%20Code%20of%20Practice%20
Application%20for%20Signatory%20Status.pdf (date of use: 20 January 
2016)  
Australian Government ‘More malware, adware, spyware, spam and spim’ 
http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/htcb/htcb011.pdf (date of use: 
20 January 2016) 
Australian Government Department of Communications Information Technology and 
the Arts ‘Spam Act 2003: A practical guide for government’ 
 http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/consumer_info/spam/spam_act_pracguid
e_govt.pdf (date of use: 15 January 2015) 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre ‘Penalty units’ 
http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforcement-action/penalty-units (date of use: 
15 January) 
AVTest ‘Spam’ https://www.av-test.org/en/statistics/spam (date of use: 07 
September 2015) 
 
Bender MR ‘Australia’s spam legislation: A Modern-Day King Canute’ (2006) 1-24 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916724 (date of 
use: 15 January 2016) 
Bizcommunity ‘Telemarketing rings true in South Africa’ 
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/14/118519.html (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
Bonar A ‘Buying e-mail lists cheaper than e-mail list rental’ 
 http://emailexpert.org/buying-email-lists-cheaper-than-email-list-rental/ 
(date of use: 10 November 2015)  
Bujra A ‘Africa: The transition from OAU to AU’ Lecture delivered at ACARTSOD 
Tripoli, Libya http://www.dpmf.org/meetings/From-OAU-AU.html (date of 
use: 9 December 2015) 
BusinessDictionary.com ‘Database management system (DBMS)’ 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/database-management-
system-DBMS.html (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
BusinessDictionary.com ‘Personal information’ 
 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/personal-information.html 
(date of use: 10 November 2015)  
 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ‘Canada’s Anti-
spam Legislation’ http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/internet/anti.htm (date of use: 7 
September 2015) 
Chang R ‘Could spam kill off e-mail?’ (Oct 22 2003) 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/113061/could_spam_kill_off_e-mail.html 
(date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Chigona W; Bheejun A; Spath M; Derakhashani S and Van Belle JP ‘Perceptions on 
spam in a South African context’ Internet and Information Technology in 
Modern Organisations: Challenges and Answers 283-291 
 
 
348 
 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.515.745&rep=re
p1&type=pdf (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Clayton R ‘Good practice for combating unsolicited bulk e-mail’ 
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-206 (date of use: 30 December 2015)  
CAUCE ‘About CAUCE’ http://www.cauce.org/about.html (date of use: 30 
 November 2015) 
CAUCE ‘Home’ http://www.cauce.org (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
CAUCE ‘Spam reporting centers’ http://www.cauce.org/spam-reporting-centres.html 
(date of use: 30 November 2015) 
Centre for Constitutional Rights and the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
http://www.elipsis.co.za/cybercrimes-and-cybersecurity-bill (date of use: 
20 January) 
Cloudmark ‘Spammers target mobile users with more than 350,000 unique SMS 
 spam variants in 2012’ http://www.cloudmark.com/en/press/spammers-
target-mobile-users-with-more-than-350-000-unique-sms-spam-variants-
in-2012 (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Coalition against Unsolicited Bulk E-mail, Australia (CAUBE.AU) ‘The Problem’ 
 http://www.caube.org.au/problem.htm (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
COMESA ‘About COMESA’ 
http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=Article&id=
75&Itemid=106 (date of use: 9 December 2015)  
COMESA ‘COMESA member states’ 
 http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
23&Itemi=121 (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
COMESA ‘Looking back: evolution of PTA/COMESA’ 
 http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9
5&Itemid117 (date of use: 9 December 2015)  
Consumer Affairs ‘Feds nab two big spammers: defendants have sent millions of 
deceptive messages, investigators say 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/can_spam.html (date of use: 30 
December 2015) 
Corbett J ‘Reserve Bank launches anti-pyramid scheme campaign’ 
 http://www.moneyweb.co.za/reserve-bank-launches-antipyramid-scheme-
campaign (Date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Cornell University Law School ‘18 U.S s 1037 – Fraud and related activity in 
connection with electronic mail’ 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1037 (date of use: 30 
December 2015) 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime CETS No 185 (23/11/2001 Budapest) 
 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.Htm (date of use: 9 
 December 2015) 
 
Daniels J ‘Bulk e-mail or opt-in’ http://www.icontact.com/static/pdf/Bulk-E-mail.pdf 
 (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Department of Internal Affairs ‘Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act 2007: Prohibiting 
 Spam and Promoting Good Business Practice’ 
http://blog.ubiquity.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/Business-Guide-to-the-
Unsolicitedelectronic-Messages-act-2007.pdf (date of use: 20 January 
2016)  
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (RSA) ‘Organization of 
 
 
349 
 
 African Unity (OAU)/ African Union (AU)’ 
 http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (date of use: 09 
December 2015)  
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (RSA) ‘Regional Economic 
 Communities (RECs)’ http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/recs.htm (Date of 
use: 9 December 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘Email or e-mail, e-mail’ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/e-mail 
(date of use: 5 November 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘First Amendment’ http://www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/first-
amendment (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘Mouse droppings’ 
 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mouse+droppings (date of use: 10 
November 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘Petition’ http://www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/petition (date of 
use: 6 November 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘Shareware’ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/shareware (date 
 of use: 10 November 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘Trojan horse’ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/trojan+horse 
(date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Dictionary.com ‘Web crawler’ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/webcrawler 
 (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Direct Marketing Associating of SA ‘The DMA National OPT OUT Database’ 
https://www.nationaloptout.co.za (Date of use: 28 January 2016) 
Dube M ‘Traditional and emerging partners’ role in African Regional Economic 
Integration: issues and recommendations’ SAIIA Occasional Paper No 
158 Economic Diplomacy Project 1-34 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1/saia_sop_158
%20_dube_20131204 (date of use: 30 January 2016) 
Duermyer R ‘Direct mail defined’ 
 http://homebusiness.about.com/od/homebusinessglossar1/g/direct_mail_d
ef.htm (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
 
Ellipsis Regulatory Solutions ‘The cybercrime and cybersecurity Bill’ 
http://www.elipsis.co.za/cybercrimes-and-cybersecurity-bill (date of use: 
28 January 2016) 
Emery D ‘What is a chain letter?’ 
http://urbanlegends.about.com/od/internet/f/chain_letter.htm (date of use: 
5 November 2015) 
Encyclopedia of the Unusual and Unexplained ‘Superstitions, strange customs, 
taboos, and urban legends’ 
http://www.unexplainedstuff.com/Superstitions-Strange-Customs-Taboos-
and-Urban-Legends/index.html (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
European Union ‘The history of the European Union’ http://www.europa.eu/about 
 eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Everett-Church R ‘Why spam is a problem’ 
http://www.isoc.org/oti/articles/0599/everett.html (date of use: 7 
September 2015) 
 
Federal Trade Commission ‘Court orders Australian-based leader of international 
 
 
350 
 
 spam-network to pay $15.15 million: U.S. co-defendant forfeits more than 
$800.000 and faces jail time’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2009/11/courtorders-australian-based-leader-international-spam-
network (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
Federal Trade Commission ‘FTC announces first CAN-SPAM cases: two operations 
generated nearly one million complaints to agency’ 
http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2004/04/ftc-announces-
first-can-spam-act-cases (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Federal Trade Commission ‘FTC signs memorandum of understanding with the 
 Mexican consumer protection body’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press 
 releases/2005/01/ftc-signs-memorandum-understanding-mexican-
consumer-protection (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Federal Trade Commission ‘Judge agrees with FTC, orders spammers to pay more 
 than $2.5 million and stop selling bogus weight-loss and anti-aging 
products’ http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/02/judge-
agrees-ftc-ordersspammers-pay-mpre-25-million-and-stop (date of use: 
30 December 2015) 
Federal Trade Commission ‘Online profiling: a report to Congress part 2 
recommendations’ http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/934.pdf 
(date of use: 10 November 2015). 
Fidler M & Madzingira F ‘The African Union Cybersecurity Convention: a missed 
 human rights opportunity’ http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/22/the-african-
union-cybersecurity-convention-a-missed-human-rights-opportunity/ (date 
of use: 27 December 2015) 
FindLaw Australia ‘Government Spam Act closes down major spammers’ 
http://www.findlaw.com.au/news/4662/government-spam-act-closes-
down-majorspammers.aspx (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
Finnan D ‘Africa: Lack of laws governing cybercrime making Africa a safe haven for 
Cybercriminals’ http://allafrica.com/stories/201502161962.html (date of 
use: 27 December 2015)  
Fletcher D Time ‘A brief history of spam’ 
https://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1933796,00.html 
(date of use: 10 November 2015)  
France24 ‘1960: The year of independence’ http://www.france24.com/en/20100214 
 1960-year-independence (date of use: 27 December 2015) 
FreeAdvice ‘What are class A, B, and C misdemeanors’ 
http://criminal.law.freeadvice.com/criminal-
law/white_collar_crimes/criminal-misdemeanorclases.html (Date of use: 
30 December 2015) 
Free  Dictionary ‘Information age’ 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/information+age (date of use: 7 
September 2015) 
Free Dictionary ‘Information superhighway’ 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/information+superhighway (date of use: 
7 September 2015) 
 FTC  Consumer Alert ‘E-mail address harvesting: how spammers reap what 
you sow’ (November 2002 
http://www.webmaestro.biz/pdf/addressharvesting.pdf (date of use: 30 
December 2015)  
 
 
351 
 
Fuqua J ‘Why Lawyers have a bad name: a net legend’ 
http://www.jamesfuqua.com/lawyers/jokers/canter.shtml (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
 
Garfinkel S ‘Spam King’ https://www.wired.com/1996/02/spam-king (date of use: 6 
November 2015). 
Githaiga G A Report of the online debate on African Union Convention on 
Cybersecurity (AUCC)’ 1-23 http://www.iitpsa.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/REPORT-ON-OF-THE-ONLINE-DEBATE-ON-
AFRICA-UNION-CONVENTION-ON-CYBERSECURITY.pdf (date of use: 
27 December 2015)  
Glasner J ‘A brief history of spam and spam’ http://www.wired.com/2001/05/a-brief-
history-of-spam-and-spam (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
Goldman E ‘Anti-spam lawsuits rarely win, as highlighted by a recent loss by spam 
arrest’ http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/09/12/anti-spam-
lawsuits-rarely-win-as-highlighted-by-a-recent-loss-by-spam-arrest/ (date 
of use: 30 December 2015) 
GoPetition ‘Petitions at GoPetition’ http://www.gopetition.com/petitions (date of use: 
6 November 2015) 
 
Harris D ‘Drowning in sewage spam, the curse of the new millennium: an overview 
and white paper’ http://www.spamhelp.org/articles/drowning-in-
sewage.pdf (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
HighBeam Research ‘ACMA noose chokes off local spam’ 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-138418361.html (date of use: 20 
January 2016) 
Hoax Busters ‘The big list of Internet hoaxes’ http://www.hoaxbusters.org/#C (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
Hoax-Slayer ‘Bad advice messages: misleading recommendations’ http://www.hoax-
slayer.com/bad-advice-emails.html (date of use: 5 November 2015)  
Hoax-Slayer ‘Sick baby hoaxes-charity hoaxes’ http://www.hoax-slayer.com/charity-
hoaxes.html for the stories behind these hoaxes (date of use: 5 November 
2015) 
Hoax-Slayer ‘Why do people create e-mail hoaxes’ http://www.hoax-slayer.com/why-
hoaxes.html (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
Hoffman P ‘Unsolicited bulk e-mail: definitions and problems’ 
http://www.imc.org/ube-def.html (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Holmes N ‘In defence of spam’ (2005) 38 The Profession 86-8 
http://www.eprints.utas.edu.au/1296/1/Cm5Ap0.pdf (date of use: 30 
January 2016) 
Hormel Foods ‘Brand overview’ http://www.hormelfoods.com/brands/spam (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
Howe W ‘Sympathy hoaxes and warm fuzzy stories’ 
http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/legends/sympathylegends.html (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
Htxt.africa ‘Why the draft cybercrimes Bill should concern South Africans’ 
http://www.htxt.co.za/2015/09/14/why-the-draft-cybercrimes-bill-should-
concern-south-africans/ (date of use: 28 January 2016) 
 
ICPEN  ‘London Plan of Action’ http://icpen.org/for-consumer-experts/consumer 
 
 
352 
 
 protection-around-the-world/london-action-plan (date of use: 30 
December 2015) 
Idea Engineer ‘Ask before you send marketing e-mail’ http://www.biz-
community.com/Article.aspx?c=16&1=196&ai=2969 (date of use: 7 
September 2015) 
Infoplease ‘African Union’ http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/african-
union.html (date of use: 3 March 2017) 
Internet Marketing Newswatch ‘ACMA launches SpamMatters’ 
http://www.imnewswatch.com/2006/05/30/acma-launches-spammatters 
(date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Internet Service Providers’ Association ‘Draft cybercrimes and cybersecurity Bill 
2015’ http://www.ispa.org.za (date of use: 28 January 2016) 
Internet Society ‘A ten year tribute to Jon Postel’ 
http://www.isoc.org/awards/postel/memory.shtml (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
Internet Society ‘Brief history of the Internet’ 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-
history-internet (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
Internet Society Program for joint ATU and the Internet Society seminar on 
 combating spam (9 September 2013 Nairobi Kenya) 
 http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ATU%20Spam%20Agend
a%20an%20Speakers.pdf (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
Investopedia ‘Definition of direct marketing’ 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/direct-marketing.asp (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
Investopedia ‘Definition of telemarketing’ 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/telemarketing.asp (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
Investopedia ‘Mobile commerce’ http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mobile-
commerce.asp (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
Investopedia ‘Ponzi scheme’ http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ponzischeme.asp 
(date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Investopedia ‘What is a pyramid scheme’ 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/04/042104.asp (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
IOL  News ‘Crime: separating the fact from fiction’ 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/crime-seperating-the-fact-from-
fiction-1.411773#.VlMSl3YrJhE (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
ISPA  ‘About ISPA’ http://www.ispa.org.za/about-ispa (date of use: 30 January 
2016). 
ISPA  ‘Code of conduct’ http://ispa.org.za/code-of-conduct (date of use: 30 
January 2016). 
ISPA  ‘ISPA hall of shame’ http://ispa.org.za/spam/hall-of-shame/ (date of use: 
20 January 2016) 
IT  Security ‘The 25 most mistakes in email security’ 
http://www.itsecurity.com/features/25-common-email-security-mistakes-
022807 (date of use: 10 November 2015)  
ITU  ‘About ITU’ http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages?default.aspx (date of use: 
30 November 2015) 
 
 
353 
 
ITU  ‘About the ITU-D and the BDT’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Pages/About.aspx 
 (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘Council 2005: Note by the Secretary-General Report on spam’ Document 
C05/EP/10-E (Geneva 12-22 July 2005) 2 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/itu-spam-council-report.pdf (date of use: 
30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘Discover ITU’s History’ 
 http://www.itu.int/en/History/Pages/DiscoveerITUsHistory.aspx (date of 
use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘HIPSSA project: Support for harmonization of the ICT policies in Sub-
Saharan Africa’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC-
ACP/HIPSSA/Pages/default.aspx (date of use: 20 March 2017) 
ITU ‘Legislation and enforcement: a cross-border issue’ 
https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/law.html (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
ITU ‘ITU and Internet Society collaborate to combat spam” 
http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2014.aspx#.VIvi-E1DGpo 
(date of use: 7 September 2015) 
ITU  ‘ITU-T in brief’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/Pages/default.aspx (date 
of 
 use: 30 November 2015)   
ITU  ‘ITU-T study groups (study period 2013-2016)’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU 
 T/studygroups/2013-2016/Pages/default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
ITU  ‘ITU-T study group 10 (study period 2001-2004)’ http://www.itu.int/ITU 
 T/studygroups/com10/index.html (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘ITU-T study group 17 (study period 2005-2008)’ http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/2005- 2008/com17/tel-security.html (date of use: 30 November 2015)  
ITU  ‘ITU-T work programme’ http://www.itu.int/itut/ 
 workprog/wpblock.aspx?isn=1759 (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘Merger of study groups 7 and 10 into new study group 17’ 
 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygoups/com07/merger.html (date of use: 30 
November 2015)  
ITU ‘Short history of study group 17’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/2013 
 2016/17/Pages/history.aspx. (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU ‘Study group 17 at a glance’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU 
 T/about/groups/Pages/sg17.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015)  
ITU ‘The framework of ITU-T’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU 
 T/about/Pages/framework.aspx (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU ‘Virtual Conference on Regulatory Cooperation on Spam’ http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/Events/semonars/Virtual-events/Spam/index.html (date of use: 30 
November 2015) 
ITU ‘What does ITU do?’ http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/whatwedo.aspx (date of 
 use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘Workshop on countering and combating spam’ (Durban South Africa 8 
July 2013) http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and 
 Seminars/spam/201307/Pages/default.aspx (date of use: 30 November 
2015)  
 
 
354 
 
ITU  World Summit on the Information Society ‘First phase Geneva (10-12 
December 2015) the Summit’ http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/index.html 
(date of use: 30 November 2015) 
ITU  ‘WSIS Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam: Chairman’s Report’ 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/chairman-report.pdf (date of use: 30 
November 2015) 
ITU World Summit on the Information Society ‘Plan of Action’ Document WSIS 
 03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (12 December 2003) 
 http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html (date of use: 30 
November 2015) 
ITU World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) ‘Thematic Meeting on 
Countering Spam’ (Geneva, 07-09 July 2004) 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/presentations/HORTON-
OpeningRemarks.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015)  
ITU  WSIS ‘WSIS+10 High Level Event’ (Geneva 10-13 June 2014) 
 http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/implementation/2014/forum (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
ITU-T ‘Africa united in combatting spam and e-waste’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU 
 T/Workshop-and-Seminars/spam/201307/Pages/Default.aspx (date of 
use: 9 December 2015) 
ITU-T ‘Study Group 7 area of responsibility (study period 1997-2000)’ 
 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/1997-2000/com07/area-resp-old.html (date of use: 
30 November 2015) 
ITU-T ‘Study groups (study period 2013-2017)’ http://www.itu.int/en/ITU 
 T/studygroups/2013-2016/17/Pages/countering -spam.aspx (date of use: 
30 November 2015) 
ITU-T World Telecommunication Development Conference WTDC-06 ‘Mechanisms 
for enhancing cooperation on cybersecurity, including combatting spam’ 
(Document 116 (Rev.5)-E (12 April 2006) 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/ITU-060315-
CoopInCSpam.pdf (date of use: 30 November 2015) 
Iweriebor E.E.G ‘The colonization of Africa’ 
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-colonisation-of-africa.html 
(date of use: 27 December 2015) 
 
Jackson T ‘Can Africa fight cybercrime and preserve human rights’ 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32079748 (date of use: 27 December 
2015) 
Japan African Network ‘African countries’ independence days’ 
 http://www.japanafricanet.com/directory/presidents/africanindependence.h
tml (date of use: 27 December 2015) 
 
Kania D ‘The art and science of online profiling’ 
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1702454/the-art-and-science-of-
online-profiling (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Kassner M ‘The truth behind those Nigerian 419 scammers’ 
 http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/the-truth-behind-those-
Nigerian-419-scammers (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Kapersky Lab ‘Malware classifications’ http://www.kaspersky.co.za/threats/what-is 
 malware (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
 
 
355 
 
Kruger H ‘The Top 10 Scam types in South Africa’ 
 http://www.junkmail.co.za/blog/the-top-10-scam-types-in-south-sfrica/6897 
(date of use: 6 November 2015) 
 
Lohman T ‘ACMA to force anti-spam on ISPs’ 
http://www.itnews.com.au/News/36262,acma-to-force-anti-spam-on-
isps.aspx (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
Lynch K ‘Timeline of spam related terms and concepts’ 
http://keithlynch.net/spamline.html (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
 
Macharia J ‘Africa needs a cybersecurity law but AU’s proposal is flawed, advocates 
say’ http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/24712/africa-union-
cybersecurity-law-flawed (date of use: 27 December 2015) 
Mann J ‘Spam is 95% e-mail traffic says Barracuda’ 
http://www.techspot.com/news/28226-spam-is-95-of-e-mail-traffic-says-
barracuda.html (date of use: 07 September 2015) 
Matthes C ‘Unpacking the POPI Act: The ins and outs of protecting personal 
information’http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com 
content&view=article&id=71001 (date of use: 28 January 2016) 
Mawson N ‘DMASA database ‘leaked’’  http://www.itweb.co.za/ 
index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=44060 (date of use: 28 
January 2016)  
Mawson N ‘Finally, a national opt-out list’ 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?id=69237 (date of use: 28 January 
2016) 
Mawson N ‘No decision on opt-out registry yet’ 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=47
451 (date of use: 28 January 2016) 
Mbuvi D ‘African countries propose stringent rules governing ecommerce and data’ 
http://www.cio.co.ke/news/main-stories/african-countries-propose-
stringent-rules-governing-ecommerce-and-data (date of use: 27 
December 2015) 
McNamee T; Mills G; and Pham J.P ‘Morocco and the African Union: prospects for 
re-engagement and progress on the Western Sahara’ (Discussion paper 
1/2013) 1-27 
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_
Reports/Brenthurst-paper-201301-Morocco-and-the-AU.pdf (date of use 
27 December 2015) 
Merriam Webster ‘Donation’ https://www.merriam-webster.com/disctionary/donation 
(date of use: 6 March 2017). 
Merriam Webster ‘Scam’ http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scam (date of 
use: 6 November 2015) 
Michaelsons ‘POPI commencement date or POPI effective date’ 
 http://www.michaelson.co.za/blog/popi-commencement-date-popi-
effective-date/13109 (date of use: 28 January 2016) 
Michaelson ‘POPI signed by the President’ http://www.michaelson.co.za/blog/popi-
signed-by-the-president/12625 (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
Microsoft ‘Fix your hijacked web browser’ http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc 
 security/browser-hijacking.aspx (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
 
 
356 
 
Mochiko T ‘Cybersecurity: oversharers anonymous’ 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/11/06/cyber-security-
overshares-anonymous (date of use: 20 January 2016)  
Molefi N ‘Consumers ripped off by spam SMSes’ 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/ce063b8041dfe949a29eaf1c2eddf908/Con
sumers-ripped-off-by-spam-SMSes-20131811 (date of use: 20 January 
2016) 
Mybroadband ‘SA spammer pays R65 000 to settle case’ 
 http://mybroadband.co.za/news/internet/104657-sa-spammer-pays-
r65000-to-settlecase-case.html (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Mybroadband ‘Spam opt-out lists: TrustFabric versus DMASA’ 
 http://mybroadband.co.za/news/general/47560-spam-opt-out-trustfabric-
versusdmasa.html (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
Mybroadband ‘Spam SMS: why South Africans pay to reply ‘stop’’ 
https://mybroadband.co.za/news/smartphones/136828-spam-sms-why-
south-africans-pay-to-reply-stop.html (date of use: 6 March 2017) 
 
Ndomo A ‘Regional Economic Communities in Africa: a progress overview’ (May 
2009) http://www2.gtz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECS_Final_report.pdf 
(date of use: 9 December 2015) 
Nedbank ‘Scams’ http://www.nedbank.co.za/web 
site/content/crimeawareness/scams.asp (date of use: 6 November 2015)  
Nigerian scams ‘West Africa scam/Nigeria advance fee fraud in Internet web mail 
frauds and email letter scam’ http://www.crimes-of-
persuasion.com/Crimes/Business/nigerian.htm (date of use: 6 November 
2015) 
Nigeria: The 419 Coalition Web site ‘the Nigerian scam (419 advance Fee fraud) 
defined’ at http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/ (Date of use: 5 November 
2015) 
 
OECD ‘About the OECD’ http://www.oecd.org/about (date of use: 30 November 
 2015) 
OECD ‘OECD invites five countries to membership talks, offers enhanced 
 engagement to other big players’ 
 http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/southafricaandtheoecd.htm (date of use: 
9 December 2015) 
OECD ‘OECD launches anti-spam toolkit and invites public contributions’ 
 http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdlaunchesanti 
 spamtoolkitandinvitespubliccontributions.htm (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
OECD ‘Organisation for European Economic Co-operation’ 
 http://www.oecd.org/general/organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-
operation.htm (date of use: 9 December 2015)  
OECD Council at Ministerial Level ‘OECD 50th Anniversary Vision Statement’ 
 (C/MIN(2011)6) 1-4 http://www.oecd.org/mcm/48064973.pdf (date of use: 
9 December 2015) 
OnGuardOnilne.gov ‘Spam’ http://www.onguardonline.gov/spam.html. (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
 
 
357 
 
Olshanlaw ‘FTC and UK Head sign MOU signaling cross border Privacy 
enforcement’ http://www.olshanlaw.com/blogs-Advertising-Law-blog,FTC-
UK-Cross-Border-Privacy (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
 
Patel A ‘How spammers get your number’ http://www.citypress.co.za/business/how-
spammers-get-your-number/ (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Postel J ‘On the junk mail problem’ Network Working Group (SRI-ARC) Request for 
Comment 706 (Nov 1975) NIC #33861, http://www.rfc-
archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=706 (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
Proome J ‘SA e-mail spam percentage revealed’ 
   http://mybraodband.co.za/news/security/58901-sa-e-mail-spam-
percentage-revealed.html (date of use: 7 September 2015) 
 
Questia ‘Four strategic pillars to guide the African Union: Commission’s activities 
 2009-2012’ https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-203770101/four-
strategic-pillars-to-guide-the-african-union (date of use: 9 December 
2015) 
Quirk ‘What is eMarketing and how is it better than traditional marketing?’ 
https://www.quirk.biz/resources/88/What-is-eMarketing-and-how-is-it-
better-than-tradional-marketing (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
 
Rahul.net ‘Overview of spam from Lipsitz’ http://www.rahul.net/falk/Lip (date of use: 
10 November 2015) 
Rao JM and Reiley D ‘The Economics of spam’ 
http://www.davidreiley.com/papers/SpamEconomics.pdf (date of use: 7 
September 2015) 
Raz U ‘How spammers harvest e-mail addresses’ 
http://www.private.org.il/harvest.html (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Reference ‘What does the phrase ‘surf the Internet’ mean’ 
https://www.reference.com/technology/phrase-surf-internet-mean-
8bf3144adff725c (date of use: 3 March 2017) 
Reese M ‘Warning signs of ponzi schemes: part 2’ 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/part-2-warnings-signs-of-
ponzipyramid-schemes (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Right2Know Campaign ‘R2K submission on draft cybercrimes and cybersecurity Bill’ 
http://www.r2k.org.za/2015/11/30/cybercrimesbill (date of use: 28 January 
2016) 
Rimmer SW ‘Death of spam: a guide to dealing with unwanted e-mail’ 
http://www.mindworkshop.com/nospam.html (date of use: 6 November 
2015) 
Roigas H ‘Mixed feedback on the African Union Convention on Cyber security and 
Personal Data Protection’ https://ccdcoe.org/mixed-feedback-african-
union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-protection.html (date 
of use: 9 December 2015) 
Rutgers ‘Chain letters’ http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/~watrous/chain-letters.html (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
 
SADC ‘Member states’ http://www.sadc.int/member-states (date of use: 9 
 December 2015) 
SARS ‘Scams and phishing attacks’  
 
 
358 
 
 http://www.sars.gov.za/TargTaxCrime/Pages/Scams-and-
Phishing.aspx?k=SARSScamSource%3Aemail (date of use: 6 November 
2015) 
Scambusters.org ‘Internet scams, identity theft, and urban legends: are you at risk?’ 
http://www.scambusters.org (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
Singel R ‘April 12, 1994: Immigration lawyers invent commercial spam’ 
https://www.wired.com/2010/04/0412canter-siegel-usenet-spam (date of 
use: 6 November 2015) 
Shcherbakova T; Vergelis M & Demidova N ‘Spam and phishing in the first quarter of 
2015’ https://securelist.com/analysis/quarterly-spam-reports/69932/spam-
andphishing-in-the-first-quarter-of-2015 (date of use: 10 November 2015). 
Solomon D ‘Harvesting e-mail addresses’ 
http://www.businesstoolchest.com/articles/data/20010305130908.shtml 
(date of use: 10 November 2015) 
South African History Online (SAHO) ‘The impact of colonialism’ 
 http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/impact-colonialism (date of use: 27 
December 2015) 
Suchet P ‘Real time online profiling’ http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column 
/1718804/real-time-online-profiling (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Sullivan B ‘Preventing a brute force or dictionary attack: how to keep the brutes away 
from your loot’ http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/17111/Preventing-a-
BruteForce-or-Dictionary-Attack-How (date of use: 10 November 2015)  
Surf-in-the-Sprit ‘How spammers reap what you sow’ 
 http://www.surfinthespirit.com/the-web/harvesting.html (date of use: 10 
November2015) 
Snopes.com ‘Chain Linked’ http://www.snopes.com/luck/chain.asp (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
Snopes.com ‘Lights out’ http://www.snopes.com/crimes/gangs/lightsout.asp (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
Snopes.com ‘Petitions’ http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/petition/internet.asp (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
Snopes.com ‘Thousand dollar bill’ http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/nothing 
/billgate.asp (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
South African Government ‘Justice publishes draft cybercrime and cybersecurity Bill 
for public comments’ (28 August 2015) 
http://www.gov.za/speeches/justice-publishes-cybercrimes-and-
cybersecurity-bill-public-comments-28-aug-2015-0000 (date of use: 28 
January 2016) 
SouthAfrica.info ‘Ponzi scheme money frozen’ 
http://www.southafrica.info/news/business/690383.htm (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
South China Morning Post ‘Australian anti-spam law sparks fierce criticism’ 
 http://www.scmp.com/article/437282/australian-anti-spam-law-sparks-
fierce-criticism (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
SPAMFighter ‘ACMA Unleashes SpamMATTERS: the new anti-spam button’ 
 http:/ New-Anti-Spam-Button.htm (date of use: 20 January 2016). 
Spamhaus ‘About Spamhaus’ https://www.spamhaus/organization (date of use: 30 
 November 2015) 
 
 
359 
 
Spamhaus ‘Australian Spam Act nails first spammer’ 
http://www.spamhaus.org/news/article/161/australian-spam-act-nails-first-
spammer (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
Spamhaus ‘Spamware’ http://www.spamhaus.org/whitepapers/spamware (date of 
 use: 10 November 2015) 
Spamhaus ‘The Definition of Spam’ http://www.spamhaus.org/consumer/definition 
 (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Spamhaus ‘The top 10 worst spam countries’ 
https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/countries (date of use: 12 March 
2017). 
Spamhause ‘The world’s worst spammers’ http://www.spamhause.org/ 
statistics/spammers (date of use: 7 September 2015)  
Spam Laws ‘Spamlaws: how to stop scams and fraud’ http://www.spamlaws.com 
(date of use: 7 September 2015) 
Spamlaws ‘Spam laws’ http://www.spamlaws.com (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Spamlaws.com ‘The purpose of chain letter scams’ 
 http://www.spamlaws.com/chain-letter-scam-purpose.html (date of use: 5 
 November 2015) 
Systems Publishers ‘South African spam summit announced’ 
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article.aspx?c=16&1=196&ai=2347 (date of 
use: 7 September 2015)  
 
Talton B ‘The challenge of decolonization in Africa’ 
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-challenge-of-decolonization-
africa.html (date of use: 27 December 2015) 
Tamarkin E ‘The AU’s cybercrime response: a positive start, but substantial 
challenges ahead’ Policy Brief 73 1-8 (January 2015) 
https://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/the-aus-cybercrime-
response-a-positive-start-but-substantial-challenges-ahead (date of use: 
27 December 2015) 
Tay L ‘ACMA launches spam SMS reporting tool’ http://www.itnews.com.au/ 
News/214731,acma-launces-spam-sms-reporting-tool.aspx (date of use: 
20 January 2016) 
Technopedia ‘Interface Message Processor (IMP) 
https://www.technopedia.com/definition/7692/interface-messag-processor-
imp (date of use: 18 March 2017) 
TechTarget ‘Header’ http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/header (date of use: 4 
March 2017) 
TechTarget ‘Malware (malicious software)’ 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/malware (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
Techtarget ‘Snoopware’ http://www.whatis.techtarget.com/definition/snoopware (date 
of use: 10 November 2015)  
TechTarget ‘UBE (unsolicited bulk email) definition’ 
 http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/UBE (date of use: 30 December 
2015) 
Techterms ‘Freeware’ http://www.techterms.com/definition/freeware (date of use: 10 
November 2015) 
TechTerms ‘Smishing’ http://www.techterms.com/definition/smishing (date of use: 
 6 November 2015) 
 
 
360 
 
TechTerms ‘SMS’ https://techterms.com/definitions/sms (date of use: 10 November 
2015) 
Templeton B ‘Origin of the term ‘spam’ to mean net abuse’ 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/spamterm.html (date of use: 05 
November 2015)  
Templeton B ‘Reaction to the DEC spam of 1978’ 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/spamreact.html (date of use: 5 
November 2015) 
The Age ‘Aust program being tested to identify spammers’ 
 http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/12/01/1101577531043.html (date 
of use: 20 January 2016).  
The FBI (San Francisco Division) ‘Sanford Wallace indicted for spamming Facebook 
users’ 1-2 https://www.fbi.gov/sanfrancisco/press-releases/2011/sanford 
 wallace-indicted-for-spamming-facebook-users (date of use: 10 November 
2015) 
The Christian Science Monitor ‘White South Africans use Facebook in campaign to 
return to Holland’ 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0517/white-South-Africans-
use-Facebook-in-campaign-to-return-to-Holland (date of use: 5 November 
2015) 
The Guardian ‘Racism row over South Africa school’s alleged hair policy’ 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/29/south-africa-pretoria-
high-school-for-girls-afros (date of use: 1 September 2016). 
The  Museum of Hoaxes ‘Charles Ponzi and the Ponzi scheme’ 
http://hoaxes.org/archive/permalink/charles_ponzi_and_the_ponzi_schem
e (date of use: 06 November 2015)  
The Register ‘Spanking Spam King: Sanford Wallace faces jail for Facebook flood’ 
 http://theregister.co.uk/2015/08/25/spammer_wallace_faces_jail_facebook
_scam (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
The Sydney Morning Herald ‘World’s biggest spammer’ faces Brisbane court’ 
 http://www.smh.com.au/technology/security/worlds-biggest-spammer-
faces-brisbane-court-20091216-kwe3.html (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
This Day Live ‘CPC, EFCC, US Agency sign on consumer protection’ 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/cpc-efcc-us-agency-sign-mou-on-
consumer-protection/157613 (date of use: 30 December 2015) 
Tin Can Communications ‘Unsolicited advertising material bothers 74% of South 
African consumers’ http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article. 
aspx?c=19&=196&ai=1877 (date of use: 7 September 2015) 
TouchBasePro ‘Impact of the Consumer protection Act on your e-mail marketing’ 1-
16 http://creativeengineeringstudio.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Impact-of-the-Consumer-Protection-Act-on-your-
Email-MarketingTouch BasePro_May2011.pdf (date of use: 20 January 
2016) 
TrustFabric ‘About Us’ https://www.trustfabric.com/about (date of use: 28 January 
 2016) 
 
Uchenna JO ‘Multilateral legal responses to cyber security in Africa: any hope for 
effective international cooperation?’ Paper presented at the 7th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (2015) 105-117 
 
 
361 
 
https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2015/proceedings/08_orji.pdf (date of use: 27 
December 2015)  
Ugwu P ‘Analyst picks holes in proposed AU Cybersecurity Convention’ 
http://www.nigeriacommunicationsweek.com.ng/e-business/analyst-picks-
holes-in-proposed-au-cybersecurity-convention (date of use: 27 
December 2015)  
UNECA ‘CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan states’ 
 http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-
states-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
UNECA COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Protocols/ 
 Treaties http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/uma-arab-maghreb-union-0 
(date of use: 9 December 2015) 
UNECA ‘EAC Eastern African Communities’ http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eac 
 east-african-community-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015)  
UNECA ‘ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States’ 
 http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-
african-states-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015)  
UNECA ‘History and background of Africa’s regional integration efforts’ 
 http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-economic-community-west-
african-states-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
UNECA ‘Regional integration tenets and pillars’ 
 http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/regional-integration-tenets-and-pillars 
(date of use: 9 December 2015)  
UNECA ‘SADC Southern African Development Community’ 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/sadc-southern-african-development-
community-0 (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
UNECA ‘UMA Arab Maghreb Union: Treaty/Protocols’ 
 http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/uma-arab-maghreb-union-0 (date of use: 
9 December 2015) 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) ‘History and background 
of Africa’s regional integration efforts’ 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/history-background-africas-regional-
integration-efforts (date of use: 9 December 2015) 
Urban Dictionary ‘Spamvertise’ 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=spamvertise (date of 
use: 10 November 2015) 
Usenet.org ‘What is Usenet?’ http://www.usenet.org (date of use: 3 March 2016) 
US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Ponzi schemes’ http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/ponzi.htm (date of use: 6 November 2015) 
US Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Pyramid schemes’ http://www. 
sec.gov/answers/pyramid.htm (date of use: 5 November 2015) 
 
Van Zyl G ‘Adoption of the ‘flawed’ AU cybersecurity convention postponed’ 
http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/523-africa/232273-
adoption-of-flawed-au-cybersecurity-convention-postponed (date of use: 9 
December 2015)  
Vere A ‘Legal and Regulatory frameworks for the knowledge economy: concept 
paper’ E/ECA/CODIST/1/15 (29 March 2009) 
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/3452/Bib-
27924.pdf?sequence=1 (date of use: 9 December 2015)  
 
 
362 
 
Vermeulen J ‘Killing spam softly: POPI in South Africa’ 
http://www.broadband.co.za/news/telecoms/81759-killing-spam-softly-
popi-in-south-africa.html (date of use: 28 January 2016) 
Victoria Legal Aid ‘Penalty units’ http://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au/find-legal-
answers/fines-and-infringements/penalty-units (date of use: 15 January 
2016) 
 
Walker F ‘Even the new anti-spam laws won’t stop those pesky emails’ 
http://www.spamstop.com.au/spam-stop-articles/2004/2/7/even-new-
antispam-laws-wont-stop-those-pesky-emails (date of use: 15 January 
2016) 
Wanli MA; Dat T; Dharmendra S; and Sen L ‘Hoodwinking spam email filters’ 
 (Proceedings of the 2007 WSEAS International Conference on Computer 
 engineering and Applications Australia January 17-19 2007) 533-537 
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dat_Tran11/publication/255665198.H
oodwinkin_Spam_Email_Filters/links/54087f860cf2c48563bdc37f.pdf 
(date of use: 26 November 2015) 
Washington Times ‘Spammers turn to ‘dictionary attacks’ 
 http://www.washingtontimes.com/business/20040505-092614-5432r.htm 
(date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Adware’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/adware.html (date of use: 
 10 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Arpanet’ http://webopedia.com/TERM/A/ARPANET.html (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Big data’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/B/big_data.html (date of 
use: 4 March 2017) 
Webopedia ‘Keylogger’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/K/keylogger.html (date of 
 use: 10 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Phishing’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/phishing.html (date of 
 use: 6 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Shareware’ http://webopedia.com/TERM/shareware.html (date of use: 
 10 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Spider’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/spider.html (date of use: 
 10 November 2015)  
Webopedia ‘Spyware’ http://www.webopedia.com/sgsearch/results?cx=partneTEr 
 pub-8768004398756183%3A6766915980&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF 
 8&q=spyware (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘Spyware’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/spyware.html (date of 
use: 10 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘The difference between a computer virus, worm and Trojan horse’ 
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2004/virus.asp (date of 
use: 5 November 2015) 
Webopedia ‘What is big data?’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM?B/big_data.html 
(date of use: 7 September 2016) 
Webopedia ‘Zombie’ http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/Z/zombie.html (date of use: 
6 November 2015) 
Webster M ‘Scam’ http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scam (date of use: 6 
November 2015) 
WhatIs.com ‘Memorandum of understanding (MOU or MoU)’ 
 
 
363 
 
 http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/memorandum-of-understanding-
MOU-or-MoU (date of use: 5 December 2015) 
White House Fact sheet: ‘President Bush signs anti-spam law’ 
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/print/20031216-4.html 
(date of use: 30 December 2015) 
WiseGeek ‘What is bulk email?’ http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-bulk-email.htm 
 (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
Wired ‘Spam king’ https://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.02/spam.king_pr.html. 
 (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
WhatIs.com ‘Anti-syware software’ http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/anti 
 spyware-software (date of use: 10 November 2015) 
WhatIs.com ‘Definition header’ http://whatis.techtarget.com/def/header (date of use: 
30 November 2015) 
WSIS Geneva 2003-Tunis 2005 16-18 November 2005 ‘Tunis Commitment’ 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html (date of use: 30 November 
2015) 
 
ZDNet ‘Anti-spam assault spans Asia-Pacific’ http://www.zdnet.com/article/anti 
 spam-assualt-spans-asia-pacific (date of use: 15 January 2016) 
ZDNet ‘Aust spam enforces turn to forensics for ‘dobbing’ campaign’ 
 http://www.zdnet.com/article/aust-spam-enforcers-turn-to-forensics-for-
dobbingcampaign/ (date of use: 20 January 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
364 
 
INDEX PAGE 
 
African Union       108-109; 114-124 
AU Convention on Cyber security  
and Personal      116-117 
Regional Integration    109-113 
Penalties      122-123 
         
ATU         112-113 
Cooperation       135-137  
  
Australia        196-216 
Anti-spam provisions    196-217 
Benefits      217-218 
Cases       203-206; 216-218 
Civil penalties     206-208 
Criticisms      218-220 
E-marketing code      225-228 
Enforcement      210-217 
Industry measures      224-225 
International cooperation     229-235 
   Korea      230 
   New Zealand     235 
   Seoul and Melbourne   231-232 
   Taipei      233-235 
   Thailand     232 
   UK and USA     232-233   
   
COMESA        111 
  Model Law and Guide    125-129 
 
Consumer protection 
  COMESA       125 
ECT Act      239-240 
SADC       131 
 
Consumer education and awareness      
  ITU       85-86 
  OECD       97-100 
  Australia      221-224 
 
Contextualisation and commentary 
  African region     137-139 
  African Union     117-124 
  Australia      217-220 
  COMESA      126-127 
  ITU and OECD     104-106 
  SADC       132-134 
  South Africa      296-301 
  USA       179-188 
 
 
365 
 
State level     158-159 
 
Direct marketing       13-17 
Definitions      13-14; 119; 256; 270 
Traditional marketing versus  
electronic marketing    15-17 
 
Harmonization  
ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa  129-130 
ITU       80-81 
South African     297-301 
 
ITU         57-88  
  Enforcement      77-80 
ITU-T       59 
Multi-pronged approach    64-87 
 Industry partnership    84 
 International cooperation   86-87 
 Penalties     76-77 
 Strong legislation    64-81 
 Technical tools    81-84 
Study group 17     60 
 
OECD         89-104 
  Anti-spam technologies    97 
  Anti-spam Toolkit     90-91 
  Cooperative partnerships    100-102 
  Elements      91-103 
  Global cooperation     102-103 
  Industry driven initiatives    96-97 
  Task force      89-90 
   
Opt-in         116-117 
AU   120-121 
Australia   198-200 
ECT Amendment Bill   283-285 
ITU   68-69 
POPI Act   271-273 
SADC   133-134 
USA state level   148-150 
  
Opt-out 
Australia      200-201 
COMESA      126; 128-129  
CPA       258-260 
ECT Act      241-242 
ITU       69-70; 75-76 
SADC       133-134 
USA       162-164 
State level     150-151 
 
 
366 
 
SADC   112; 129-135 
  Model Law on Electronic Transactions  131-134 
Model Law on Computer crimes and  
Cyber-crimes     134-135 
Spam 
ARPAnet      18-20 
Definitions 
 Commercial electronic messages (CEM) 197 
 Commercial communications  282-283 
Commercial electronic  
transactions     283 
Electronic communications   128; 133; 271 
UBE or UBEM    144-145 
UBCE      143 
Unsolicited communications  282 
UCE or UCEM    143-144 
UCEA      142 
Dictionary attacks 43-44; 73-74; 157; 171; 
204-205; 291-294 
Harvesting 41-42; 73-75; 156-157; 
170-171; 201-203; 243-
244; 274-277 
Labelling of e-mails 71-73; 151-152; 171-
173; 
Lucrative business  33-35 
Malware      292-293 
Methods      37-46 
Nature      145-148 
Online profiling     38-39 
   Use of cookies    40-41 
Problems      46-50 
Spyware      44-45 
Spam fighters  54-55 
Spoofing (fraudulent headers) 46; 70-73; 152-156; 
165-170; 200; 244; 
273-274; 306-307 
Technical measures    50-54; 228-229 
Types       20-33 
 
UNITED STATES  
  
CAN-SPAM Act       160-194 
  Anti-spam provisions    161-179 
Benefits      179-180 
Cases 166-170; 181-184; 186-
187  
Criticisms  180-188 
Do-not-email registry   176-177 
Enforcement   173-176 
International cooperation   190-194 
 
 
367 
 
   Mexico     191 
    Nigeria     192-193 
    Spain     191-192 
    UK      193-194   
   UK and Australia    190-191 
Solutions   188-194 
Pre-emption      180-185 
State laws        141-159 
Anti-spam features     142-159  
Cases       153-156 
Enforcement and penalties   157-158 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
CPA         253-266  
  Consumer’s right to privacy   254-255 
Direct marketing and the right to privacy  256-258  
 Do-not-call registry     260-264 
  Enforcement      265 
  Penalties      266 
   
Cybercrimes Bills       285-295 
  Anti-spam provisions    288-294 
  Enforcement      294 
 
ECT Act        238-253 
  Anti-spam provisions    241 
   Amendment Bill    283-285 
  Benefits      241-242 
  Case(s)      248-250 
  Criticisms      242-245 
Data protection     240-241 
Enforcement      244-245  
Penalties      245 
Solutions      245-247 
 
POPI Act        266-281 
  Direct marketing and unsolicited  
communications     269-280 
Directories      277-278 
Enforcement      278-280 
  Penalties      280 
 
Self-regulation     
  DMASA      262-264 
  ISPA       250-252 
 
